In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112330 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the City of St. Louis vs. ) Cause No. 2222-CR00557-01 ) STEPHEN WILEY, ) Honorable Christopher E. McGraugh ) Appellant. ) FILED: May 27, 2025
Opinion
Stephen Wiley (Wiley) appeals from the trial court’s judgment following a jury trial
convicting him on assault in the first degree, armed criminal action, and domestic assault in the
third degree for conduct committed against two victims, A.H. and Victim. Wiley raises three
points on appeal. Point One asserts the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the
indictment for violating his right to a speedy trial. Points Two and Three bring evidentiary
challenges. Specifically, Point Two argues the trial court plainly erred in admitting evidence of
domestic assault because the State failed to establish that Wiley and Victim were in a domestic
situation. Point Three contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that
Victim obtained an order of protection against Wiley because it was improper propensity
evidence. Although a delay of 590 days was presumptively prejudicial, the trial court did not err
in denying Wiley’s speedy-trial motion because he contributed to or acquiesced to multiple continuances and demonstrated no substantial impairment to his defense. We deny Point One.
We next review Point Three, because it was preserved for review, and deny the point because the
single, isolated mention of an order of protection did not prejudice the outcome of Wiley’s trial.
Finally, we deny Point Two because Wiley demonstrates no facially substantial grounds for
manifest injustice to justify plain-error review. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Background
In the light most favorable to the verdict, 1 the following evidence was adduced at trial:
On April 14, 2022, A.H. was visiting his girlfriend, Victim, at her home. A.H. was
dropping Victim’s daughter off at the school bus stop when Wiley walked by wearing a hood
over his head and a mask partially covering his face. A.H. recognized Wiley, whom he had met
when Wiley came to Victim’s home “want[ing] to see his kids or something like that.”
A.H. returned to Victim’s home and saw Wiley walking out from beside Victim’s home
and then up the street. When Wiley got within twenty feet of A.H., he turned around and said
something to him, then took out a gun and fired a single shot that struck A.H. in the abdomen.
A.H. retreated to the house, where he collapsed on the porch. Wiley followed him. Wiley
attempted to shoot him a second time, but the gun malfunctioned and did not fire.
Victim opened the front door and pulled A.H. inside, then shut the door behind them.
Wiley kicked the door twice, breaking part of the frame and making the door to “fl[y] off the
hinges.” Wiley entered the house and hit Victim in the face with the gun. Victim pleaded with
Wiley not to shoot her or their young son, whom she was holding protectively in her arms.
Wiley eventually left. Neighbor witnessed the shooting and called 911. Police used a license
1 State v. Scherrer, 673 S.W.3d 899, 907 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).
2 plate reader (LPR) to track Wiley’s vehicle near the scene. Police arrested Wiley two days later
on April 16, 2022, and matched a gun found with him to shell casings recovered from the scene
of the crime.
The State charged Wiley with committing first-degree assault and armed criminal action
for the conduct against A.H., and third-degree domestic assault and first-degree burglary for the
conduct against Victim. The trial court denied bond. While waiting for trial, on June 21, 2023,
Wiley filed a pro se request for a speedy trial and a pro se motion for a recognizance bond, both
of which the trial court denied.
The case proceeded to trial on November 27, 2023—590 days after Wiley’s arrest.
Before trial, Wiley moved to have his indictment dismissed for violation of his speedy trial
rights. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the current setting was the earliest
opportunity to try the case and that Wiley failed to show prejudice to his defense. The trial court
granted Wiley’s motion in limine barring the State from referencing any prior bad acts unrelated
to the current charges, including whether Wiley violated a protection order. The State informed
the trial court that it was not intending to get into the possible protection order violation and that
it had instructed its witnesses not to talk about it or any other prior incidents.
During trial, Victim, A.H., and Neighbor testified. The State also called several law
enforcement officers, including Detective, who testified about Wiley’s police interview. When
asked about where he was on the day of the offense, Wiley initially said he was driving around
St. Louis looking for scooters to pick up. When asked whether he had gone to Victim’s house,
he denied knowing her address but said he knew how to get there. When confronted about his
license plate being tracked near Victim’s home on the day of the offense, he admitted the plate
was for his car but denied going to her home, saying the last time he had been to Victim’s home
3 was two weeks ago. Wiley first told police he had gone to Victim’s home two weeks earlier to
drop off his child, then later recanted and said he had gone to Victim’s home two weeks earlier
because he had not seen his child in several months to a year. Detective testified that he
confronted Wiley about whether it had really been a whole year since he went to Victim’s home,
and “[w]e talked about the order of protection because she [Victim] had an order of protection.”
Defense objected to the Detective mentioning the order of protection on the grounds that the
State had not proved the order of protection was properly served on Wiley at that time and
because the testimony violated the motion in limine prohibiting prior bad acts evidence. The
trial court admitted the testimony over defense objection, ruling that it went to the res gestae 2 of
Wiley’s statement. The State did not elicit any further testimony about the disputed order of
protection from Detective or any other witness.
Additionally, during trial, the State adduced the following evidence about the role played
by the Metropolitan St. Louis Police Department’s Domestic Abuse Response Team (DART) in
investigating the case:
State: Now, who eventually did the scene get turned over to?
Detective: It was determined to be what the events occurred and how everyone was connected to each other, the sergeant on scene radioed the DART unit, which stands for the domestic abuse response team. They responded out to the scene and they took over primary investigative duties.
State: Why would the DART officers be involved in this case?
Detective: [Victim] and [Wiley] had a child in common and were involved in a previous relationship.
State: So that would make it a domestic situation.
Detective: Yes, sir.
2 Res gestae, meaning ‘things done,’ refers to the sequence of events surrounding the charged offense. State v. Davis, 226 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (internal citation omitted).
4 Another officer who investigated the charges also testified and identified his role within
the police department as a “domestic violence detective.” Wiley did not object to either
testimony. Wiley did not testify or put on evidence in his defense.
The jury found Wiley guilty of first-degree assault, armed criminal action, and third-
degree domestic assault. The jury found Wiley not guilty of first-degree burglary. The trial
court sentenced Wiley to a total of eighteen years in prison. Wiley now appeals.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright,
551 S.W.3d 608, 616 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (citing State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo.
banc 2009)). “An abuse of discretion occurs only if the [trial] court’s ruling admitting or
excluding evidence ‘is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is
so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful,
deliberate consideration.’” State v. Loper, 609 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State
v. Blurton, 484 S.W.3d 758, 769 (Mo. banc 2016)). “If reasonable minds could differ on the
propriety of the ruling, no abuse of discretion has occurred.” State v. Pool, 674 S.W.3d 173, 179
(Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (internal quotation omitted). We will reverse for an abuse of discretion
“only if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial or
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 731 (internal quotation omitted).
We also review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s overruling a motion to dismiss
charges for violation of the right to a speedy trial. State v. Lewis, 707 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2024) (internal citation omitted). However, “[w]hile the trial court’s factual findings
are subject to deferential review, [an appellate] [c]ourt will review de novo whether [a
defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated.” State v. Scherrer, 673
5 S.W.3d 899, 908 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Mo. banc
2015) (alterations in source)); see also Lewis, 707 S.W.3d at 655 (internal citation omitted)
(noting “where the facts [in the speedy-trial record] are uncontested and the issue is a matter of
statutory construction, the ruling is subject to de novo review.”).
Any unpreserved claims of error may not be reviewed except under the plain-error
standard. Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 731 (citing Rule 30.20 3). “[T]his Court will not review a claim
for plain error unless the claimed error ‘facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that
manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Discussion
I. Point One—The trial court did not err in denying Wiley’s speedy-trial motion to dismiss the charges against him
A defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial under both the Sixth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at
313 (internal citation omitted). “A primary purpose of the right to a speedy trial is ‘to guard
against inordinate delay between public charge and trial,’ and thus prevent prejudice to a
meritorious defense or interference with a defendant’s liberty.” Scherrer, 673 S.W.3d at 908
(quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 537 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). When a defendant
alleges that right has been violated, courts balance the four Barker factors: “(1) the length of
delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice
to the defendant resulting from the delay.” Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S.
at 530). “The existence of any one of these factors is neither necessary nor sufficient to finding a
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). “Rather,
‘courts must . . . engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.’” Id. (quoting Barker,
3 All Rule references are to Mo. R. Crim. P. (2025).
6 407 U.S. at 533). Applying that balancing process to the instant case, we find the trial court did
not err in denying Wiley’s speedy-trial motion due to the factors regarding the reasons for delay
and the lack of prejudice. See id.
1. Length of delay
“The length of the delay is a ‘triggering mechanism’ because until there is a ‘delay [that]
is presumptively prejudicial,’ there is no need to discuss the other factors that are part of the
balancing process.” State v. Vickers, 560 S.W.3d 3, 14 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting State ex
rel. Garcia v. Goldman, 316 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Mo. banc 2010)). “Missouri courts have found
that a delay of greater than eight months is presumptively prejudicial.” Id. at 14–15 (quoting
Garcia, 316 S.W.3d at 911).
The parties agree the length of delay here is presumptively prejudicial because the trial
began 590 days after Wiley was arrested. See id. The parties further agree that after subtracting
the delays caused by defense, the remaining delay is approximately one year, which is also
presumptively prejudicial. See id. Accordingly, we proceed with analyzing the remaining
factors. See id.
2. Reason for delay
Wiley twice caused delays by seeking continuances in order to obtain legal representation
from April 25 to May 2, 2022 and from May 12 to May 20, 2022. “[D]elays attributable to the
defendant weigh heavily against the defendant[.]” Coleman v. State, 640 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2022) (quoting Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 314). Wiley and the State jointly sought four
continuances: from July 25 to September 6, 2022; from December 2, 2022 to January 30, 2023;
from August 10 to August 18, 2023; and from August 18 to the date trial began on November 27,
2023. “[D]elays that are jointly requested by the parties are neutral factors in the analysis.” Id.
(citing Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 314). The other delays, totaling over 300 days, were attributable to
7 the trial court’s routine docket management with no indications of bad faith efforts to hamper the
defense. Such delays caused by unexplained or neutral reasons “weigh against the State, but not
heavily.” Id. (citing Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 314). “Pretrial delay is often inevitable and wholly
justifiable.” State v. Davis, 903 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (internal citation
omitted). The trial was held on the first available trial setting. Therefore, this factor weighs in
favor of Wiley, but not heavily. See Coleman, 640 S.W.3d at 166 (citing Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at
314); see also Vickers, 560 S.W.3d at 16.
3. Assertion of defendant’s right
Wiley filed a pro se request for a speedy trial over one year after his arrest. He also
moved for a recognizance bond at that time, and the trial court denied both requests. “Waiting
several months to assert the right to a speedy trial has been found to weigh against a defendant.”
Vickers, 560 S.W.3d at 17 (internal quotation omitted); see e.g., Coleman, 640 S.W.3d at 166
(finding this factor weighs in a defendant’s favor when he asserts his speedy-trial right “early
and often”). “Although [a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, . . . failure to assert
the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.”
Vickers, 560 S.W.3d at 16 (quoting State ex rel. McKee v. Riley, 240 S.W.3d 720, 729 (Mo. banc
2007)) (alterations in source). After asserting his right to a speedy trial, Wiley subsequently
joined the State in requesting two continuances to allow time for depositions to prepare for the
trial setting, which undermines a claim that speedy trial rights were violated. 4 See id. This
factor therefore weighs against Wiley. See id.
4 One week before trial, Wiley considered waiving his right to counsel because, as he alleged to the trial court, his public defender was ineffective for taking too long to have the case tried. Wiley ultimately decided against waiver.
8 4. Prejudice
When determining prejudice, there are three main concerns: “(1) prevention of oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limitation
of the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Sisco, 458 S.W. at 317 (quoting Garcia,
316 S.W.3d at 912). The most serious concern is impairment of the defense. Id.
Wiley contends that he suffered prejudice because he was incarcerated during the pretrial
proceedings. “Although the restriction of freedom that comes with being incarcerated may give
rise to actual prejudice, [a] [d]efendant’s general claim of prejudice based upon the length of his
incarceration establishes only minimal prejudice.” State v. Smith, 491 S.W.3d 286, 307–08 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2016) (citing Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 317; State v. Raine, 829 S.W.2d 506, 513 (Mo.
App. W.D. 1992)) (emphasis added). Wiley’s bare allegation of pretrial oppression thus
establishes only minimal actual prejudice. See id. (citing State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 613
(Mo. App. E.D. 2010)); see also Wright, 551 S.W.3d at 620. Wiley alleges that he experienced
anxiety and concern due to the delay, however, “anxiety alone does not establish prejudice
absent the showing of specific instances that weighed heavily on the defendant.” Coleman, 640
S.W.3d at 166 (quoting Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d at 613). Wiley’s vague allegations do not amount
to serious concerns of prejudice. See id. at 166–67.
In any event, even “actual prejudice resulting from pretrial incarceration may be
outweighed by a lack of impairment to the defense.” State v. Juniel, 568 S.W.3d 504, 514 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2019) (internal citation omitted); see also Wright, 551 S.W.3d at 620 (declining to
find prejudice where it was purely speculative whether the delay prevented the defendant from
calling a certain witness even though the record showed the defendant suffered from untreated
asthma and was unable to see his children while incarcerated). For this most critical concern,
Wiley only generally alleges that he was prejudiced by the delay because witnesses’ memories 9 could deteriorate over time. Wiley did not call any witnesses at trial and “does not identify any
witnesses who disappeared or otherwise became unavailable because of the delay, nor does he
allege that any evidence was lost.” Juniel, 568 S.W.3d at 514 (quoting Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at
317). “Any prejudice from the delay must be actual and apparent, or at least inferable, from the
record, rather than merely speculative.” Coleman, 640 S.W.3d at 166 (internal quotation
omitted). Because the record strongly suggests that the pretrial delay did not hinder Wiley’s
defense, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the State. See Wright, 551 S.W.3d at 621.
5. Balancing the Barker factors
Balancing the factors, we conclude Wiley’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. See
Juniel, 568 S.W.3d at 515 (citing Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 319). Although the length of delay of
590 days was presumptively prejudicial, triggering our obligation to review the remaining
Barker factors, that presumption was attenuated by Wiley’s own twelve-month delay in making a
speedy trial request and in acquiescing to joint continuances. See id. Most importantly, Wiley
has not demonstrated sufficient actual prejudice to his defense, which weighs heavily in favor of
the State. See Coleman, 640 S.W.3d at 167 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court
did not err in denying Wiley’s speedy-trial motion. See Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 313 (citing Barker,
407 U.S. at 530). Point One is denied.
II. Point Three—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about an order of protection
Turning to the remaining points on appeal, we begin with Point Three because it was
preserved for appellate review.
Generally, Missouri courts prohibit introducing prior bad act evidence “to show that a
defendant is a person of bad character or has a propensity to commit crimes.” State v. Graves,
619 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citing State v. Conley, 873 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Mo.
10 banc 1994)). “However, such evidence of prior misconduct may be admissible if it is logically
relevant, in that it has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the
charged offense.” State v. Davis, 226 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (internal citation
omitted). For example, one recognized exception is the res gestae, also known as evidence
“present[ing] a complete and coherent picture of the criminal events that transpired.” Id. Even if
the evidence is logically relevant to painting a complete and coherent picture of the criminal acts,
“[t]he evidence also must be legally relevant, in that its probative value must outweigh its
prejudicial effect.” Id.
Here, Detective testified about confronting Wiley in a police interview regarding
inconsistencies in his story as to when he was last at Victim’s home. Within that context,
Detective testified that he spoke with Wiley “about the order of protection because she [Victim]
had an order of protection.” On appeal, Wiley argues the trial court erred in admitting this
testimony over his objection because informing the jury that Victim had obtained a protection
order against Wiley was impermissible evidence of prior uncharged bad acts committed by
Wiley against Victim. Further, Wiley maintains the evidence was not relevant impeachment
evidence because the State never proved Wiley had notice of the order of protection.
“Evidence is admissible if it tends to prove one issue in dispute, even though it is not
admissible to prove other issues and may be prejudicial.” State v. Clevenger, 289 S.W.3d 626,
629 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (finding a trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of an
order of protection for lack of relevance to any disputed issue at trial). We agree that mentioning
Victim’s order of protection created a logical inference that Victim must have alleged Wiley
committed prior bad acts against her in order to be granted that protective order, which would
make the Detective’s testimony prohibited by the general rule. See Graves, 619 S.W.3d at 575
11 (citing Conley, 873 S.W.2d at 236). However, the trial court here found that the order of
protection, which would otherwise be inadmissible propensity evidence, was nevertheless
admissible as relevant to the res gestae of the crime, namely, to Wiley’s account of what led up
to the incident on April 14, 2022 at Victim’s home. See Davis, 226 S.W.3d at 170.
“Acts or events are a part of the res gestae if they occur in the same transaction as the
crime, are substantially contemporaneous with the commission of the crime and are part of one
continuous transaction in the accomplishment of a common design.” State v. Winston, 657
S.W.2d 399, 401 (Mo. App. W.D. 1983) (internal citation omitted). Whether evidence of
uncharged bad acts should be admitted to show the res gestae, or complete and coherent picture
of the offense at issue, “requires a ‘balancing of the effect and value’ of the evidence and ‘rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Davis, 226 S.W.3d at 170 (internal quotation
omitted). “Generally, acts, statements, occurrences and the circumstances forming part of the
main transaction may be shown in evidence under the res gestae rule where they precede the
offense immediately or by a short interval of time and tend, as background information, to
elucidate a main fact in issue.” Id. at 170–71 (citing State v. Sherman, 637 S.W.2d 704, 706
(Mo. banc 1982)).
The State charged Wiley with committing two counts of assault against two victims at
Victim’s home. Because Wiley initially denied having been to Victim’s home on the date of the
offenses and disputed when he last went to Victim’s home, Detective’s testimony about Wiley’s
inconsistent statements was generally relevant to disputed issues in the case. See id. However,
we agree with Wiley that there would be little impeachment value to the officer confronting
Wiley about an order of protection if indeed it had not yet been served. See id.; Clevenger, 289
S.W.3d at 628–29. Thus, we are not persuaded the probative value outweighed its potential
12 prejudicial effect. See Davis, 226 S.W.3d at 170 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, to the
extent the order of protection was mentioned without establishing that Wiley actually knew of it
at the relevant time period, we would find the legal relevance balancing test would weigh against
admission, such that the trial court abused its discretion. See id.
Notwithstanding, Wiley wholly fails to demonstrate that any error in admitting the
testimony resulted in actual prejudice as required for reversal. See id. at 169; see also Loper, 609
S.W.3d at 731 (internal quotation omitted). No prejudice results unless “the erroneously
admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all of
the evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have
acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.” State v. Stafford, 589 S.W.3d 705, 712
(Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). In determining whether a reference to an
uncharged offense is prejudicial, we consider “whether the State prompted or emphasized the
reference, whether the reference was fleeting and isolated, whether specific offenses were
mentioned, whether an objection was made and sustained, and whether the reference played a
decisive role in the verdict given the context of the State’s case against the defendant.” Id.
(citing State v. Goff, 129 S.W.3d 857, 866 n.7 (Mo. banc 2004)); see also Graves, 619 S.W.3d at
575 (internal citation omitted) (analyzing the prejudicial effect of uninvited evidence of other
crimes in the context of whether the trial court should have declared a mistrial).
In this case, Wiley’s allegation of prejudice is purely speculative. The jury was not told
what conduct prompted Victim to seek an order of protection against Wiley. The State did not
deliberately elicit the evidence, which was offered unprompted by Detective when describing
how he confronted Wiley on inconsistent statements. Further, the order of protection was only
mentioned in passing and did not violate the motion in limine barring the State from adducing
13 evidence that Wiley violated the order of protection in that the testimony only referred to
whether Wiley knew an order of protection existed. The State did not emphasize or unduly
highlight the challenged testimony. Ultimately, we are not persuaded that a single, isolated
mention of an order of protection—which had been issued, even if Wiley had not yet known of
it—amounted to an error that unfairly prejudiced the outcome of Wiley’s trial. See Stafford, 589
S.W.3d at 712 (citing Goff, 129 S.W.3d at 866 n.7) (finding no prejudice in the admission of
uncharged bad act evidence where the record showed the State did not improperly highlight the
evidence during the presentation of evidence or in closing argument). Point Three is denied.
III. Point Two—We decline plain-error review as Wiley fails to demonstrate manifest injustice resulting from the trial court’s admission of DART testimony
Lastly, Wiley requests we exercise our discretion to conduct plain-error review of
whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence that DART investigated the offenses
because the State failed to prove a domestic situation between Wiley and Victim. Wiley
acknowledges that he did not object to the evidence at trial, nor did he include it in his motion for
new trial.
Plain-error review is discretionary. Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 733 (internal quotation
omitted). “Including a claim of error in a motion for new trial is a requirement of preserving an
issue for review, but a claim of error is not wholly preserved absent a timely objection at trial.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted). In this case, the alleged error was not brought to the attention of
the trial court at trial or after trial. “The plain error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be
used to justify a review of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate
review.” State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotation
omitted). “Unless manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice is shown, an appellate court
should ‘decline to review for plain error under Rule 30.20.’” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
14 We find Wiley has not facially established substantial grounds for believing that manifest
injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted from the brief mention of DART. See id.; see also
Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 731 (internal quotation omitted). In particular, Wiley was charged with
domestic assault in the third degree, and the State adduced evidence of a domestic situation
between Wiley and Victim through evidence that Wiley and Victim had children together. See
Burgess v. State, 649 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (quoting § 455.010(7), RSMo (2016))
(noting proof for domestic assault that a defendant and victim had a continuing social
relationship of a romantic or intimate nature includes “anyone who has a child in common
regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at any time”).
Additionally, Wiley did not object to Victim’s testimony that she had some problems with him in
the past and was concerned about what was going to happen to her when he broke into her home.
“A complaining party is not entitled to assert prejudice if the challenged evidence is cumulative
to other related admitted evidence.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 536 (internal quotation omitted).
Finding no substantial grounds of manifest injustice in the unchallenged DART testimony, Wiley
has not met his burden for plain-error review, and we deny Point Three. See id.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, J.
Lisa P. Page, P.J. and Virginia W. Lay, J., concur.