SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC93348 ) SHARNIQUE N. JONES, ) ) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY The Honorable Colleen Dolan, Judge
Opinion issued April 15, 2014
Sharnique N. Jones was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, second degree
assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. On appeal, she raises four points of error.
In her first three points, she claims the trial court erred in overruling her motions for
judgment of acquittal on each offense for which she was convicted because there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In her fourth
point, Ms. Jones claims the trial court plainly erred in admitting into evidence statements
she made to the police as evidence of guilt of murder in the second degree because the state
failed to establish the corpus delicti. Because the state presented evidence that sufficiently
established the corpus delicti of the murder offense and because there was sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Ms. Jones guilty of each offense, this
Court affirms the judgment of the trial court. Factual and Procedural Background
Sharnique Jones gave birth to her daughter, S.J., on January 3, 2008. Between
January 6 and March 21, 2008, Ms. Jones took S.J. to the hospital 12 times for a variety of
health problems. Ms. Jones first brought S.J. to the hospital because S.J. was jaundiced, but
doctors determined it was not at a level requiring treatment. She next brought S.J. to the
emergency room, complaining that she had a fever and was not eating. S.J. did not have a
fever when she was in the emergency room, and staff reported that S.J. ate well while at the
hospital. Several days later, Ms. Jones brought S.J. to the hospital with a possible Zantac
overdose. 1 According to Ms. Jones, a man who previously had raped her came into the
house, grabbed S.J. and the Zantac, and locked himself and S.J. in the bathroom. After
about 10 minutes, he came out of the bathroom and ran out of the house. S.J. had what
looked like Zantac around her mouth and on her clothes, leading Ms. Jones to believe she
was given a large dose of Zantac. The hospital performed a drug screen and other tests, all
of which came back normal.
Over the next couple of months, Ms. Jones continued to bring S.J. to the hospital
frequently because of other health concerns. Three times, she reported that S.J. was
experiencing apnea, which occurs when a person stops breathing for more than 10 seconds.
Overall, S.J. appeared healthy and had normal vital signs during her visits, but a pediatric
neurologist observed that S.J. was experiencing seizures and, on two occasions, her seizures
were confirmed by an EEG. The seizures were not life threatening, and S.J. was prescribed
medication to control them.
1 Zantac is a medication prescribed in liquid form to infants who have acid reflux. During these visits, medical staff instructed Ms. Jones regarding proper feeding and
safe sleeping practices for newborns. They also provided her with information about
community resources available to new mothers. Ms. Jones was educated about safe
sleeping practices again during a home visit with a social worker.
On April 7, 2008, Ms. Jones called 911, informing the operator that she had laid S.J.
in a bassinet and later found her not breathing. Pine Lawn Police Chief Rickey Collins was
the first to arrive at the scene, and he performed CPR on S.J. until the paramedics arrived.
The paramedics were unable to resuscitate S.J., and she was pronounced dead at the
hospital. Dr. Ariel Goldschmidt, a doctor working on a fellowship in the St. Louis medical
examiner’s office, initially determined S.J.’s cause of death to be death by natural causes
from a seizure disorder. He determined the cause of death based on Ms. Jones’ statements
to the investigator from the medical examiner’s office and S.J.’s medical history because
there was no other cause of death apparent from the physical autopsy or the toxicology and
laboratory reports. The chief medical examiner, Dr. Michael Graham, signed the death
certificate with that determination.
Ms. Jones gave birth to a son, D.W., on January 18, 2009. Two days later, Ms. Jones
brought D.W. to the hospital, reporting that he was jaundiced. The hospital admitted D.W.
for malnutrition, lethargy, and marginal dehydration. Ms. Jones reported that D.W. was not
waking himself up to feed and that he did not want to eat at home. He was receiving only
80 calories a day but needed between 250 and 275 calories per day. The hospital put D.W.
3 on a feeding program using a nasogastric tube to drip formula directly into his stomach. 2
Ms. Jones became upset with the feeding program and accused hospital staff of force-
feeding D.W. She checked D.W. out of the hospital against medical advice. During this
visit, Ms. Jones had been instructed about proper feeding.
Three days later, Ms. Jones took D.W. to the hospital after reporting that he had
stopped breathing while she was feeding him. Concerned because of S.J.’s history, doctors
performed an extensive neurological workup on D.W. but were unable to determine the
cause of the reported apnea. The medical staff believed, however, that Ms. Jones was
continuing to underfeed D.W., and they made multiple attempts to talk to her about the
amount of formula D.W. needed. They referred D.W.’s case to the state children’s division,
which took protective custody of D.W. After he gained enough weight, the hospital
discharged him into the care of a foster parent. He continued to gain weight while in her
care.
Detective Harolton Clayborn investigated the nutritional neglect of D.W. Ms. Jones
agreed to talk to him about D.W. at police headquarters, and she signed a Miranda 3 rights
warning and waiver form. Ms. Jones told Detective Clayborn that she had missed several
feedings while D.W. was in her custody. With regard to D.W.’s second hospitalization, she
admitted that she had been burping D.W. on her lap when he stopping breathing. She had
diverted her attention to the television, and when she started paying attention to D.W. again,
2 Because D.W. was malnourished, he would tire easily from sucking and would not want to feed. The tube allowed him to receive the nutrition that he needed but was too weak to get on his own. By feeding more, D.W. would gain strength, which would allow him to feed eventually without the tube. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 4 he was face down in a burp rag. She noticed that D.W. was not breathing and that his face
was blue. When Detective Clayborn told her he did not believe she was telling the whole
truth, Ms. Jones told him that D.W. was actually lying face down in the burp rag before she
noticed that his face was blue.
During her interview, Ms. Jones told Detective Clayborn that she was scared when
the incident with D.W. occurred because she had lost S.J. about a year before. Detective
Clayborn was concerned that Ms. Jones had another child who had died at home after being
found not breathing, and he questioned Ms. Jones about S.J.’s death. Ms. Jones stated that,
on the day S.J. died, she had been trying to get S.J. to stop crying but that she was getting
frustrated “to the point where [she] felt like harming [herself] or [S.J.].” Ms. Jones admitted
that she laid S.J. on the bed with her face in the pillow, not thinking twice about what would
happen to herself or S.J. She then went downstairs to look for pills to commit suicide but
changed her mind after some family members came home. Ms. Jones thought about S.J.
and went back upstairs about 15 to 20 minutes later, and she found S.J. lying on the bed, not
breathing. Police notified Dr. Graham about Ms. Jones’ statements regarding S.J.’s death
and asked that he review the case. Dr. Graham reviewed S.J’s autopsy report, considering
Ms. Jones’ statement that she placed S.J.’s face in a pillow, and determined the cause of
death to be suffocation. He amended the death certificate accordingly.
The state charged Ms. Jones with second degree murder for causing the death of S.J.
by suffocation, first degree endangering the welfare of a child by acting in a manner that
created a substantial risk to the life and health of D.W., and first degree assault for
knowingly causing serious physical injury to D.W. After a trial, the jury found her guilty of
5 second degree murder, first degree endangering the welfare of a child, and the lesser
included offense of second degree assault. The trial court sentenced Ms. Jones to concurrent
sentences of 15 years for murder and seven years each for endangering the welfare of a child
and assault. Ms. Jones appealed. On its own motion as authorized in article V, section 10
of the Missouri Constitution, the court of appeals transferred the case to this Court after
opinion.
Corpus Delicti Established
In her fourth point on appeal, Ms. Jones argues the trial court plainly erred in
admitting her out-of-court statements as substantive evidence of second-degree murder
because the state failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense. As Ms. Jones admits, this
point may be reviewed only for plain error because she failed to raise this objection to the
trial court. 4 Rule 30.20; State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 167 (Mo. banc 2011). Because
Ms. Jones’ statements were considered by the jury as evidence of her guilt, and, therefore,
will be considered when reviewing her claim that there was insufficient evidence presented
to convict her of second-degree murder, this Court first must address her claim that the trial
court should not have admitted her statements.
“‘The plain error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review
of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review.’” Letica, 356
S.W.3d at 167. This Court will exercise its discretion to conduct plain error review only
when the appellant’s request for plain error review establishes facially substantial grounds
for believing that the trial court’s error was “evident, obvious, and clear” and “that manifest
4 Ms. Jones filed a motion in limine to exclude her statements, but it was on the basis that they were not made voluntarily. The trial court overruled the motion. 6 injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.” State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607
(Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotations omitted). Unless the appellant makes this facial
showing, this Court will decline to review for plain error under Rule 30.20. State v. Brown,
902 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 1995). 5
“[O]ut-of-court confessions, statements, or admissions by the accused are generally
not admissible unless they are corroborated by independent evidence, either circumstantial
or direct, showing the corpus delicti of the crime.” State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 544
(Mo. banc 2003). In a homicide case, corpus delicti requires proof of the death of the victim
and evidence that the criminal agency of another person caused the death. Id. As discussed
by this Court in State v. Madorie, the corpus delicti rule does not require a high level of
proof:
5 See, e.g., State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 117 & n.3 (Mo. banc 2008) (declining to grant plain error review regarding a claim under article I, section 19 of the Missouri Constitution with respect to the timing of the defendant’s second trial); State v. Cella, 32 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo. banc 2000) (declining to grant plain error review regarding a claim that a law included more than one subject in violation of article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution); State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 123, 132 (Mo. banc 1998) (declining to undertake plain error review regarding allegedly improper comments by the prosecutor and alleged errors in admitting evidence); State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 177 (Mo. banc 1997) (quoting Brown and declining to grant plain error review regarding admission of testimony); State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 224 (Mo. banc 1997) (quoting Brown and declining to grant plain error review over all claims not objected to at trial or not raised in a motion for new trial); State v. Hudgins, 612 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Mo. 1981) (declining to grant plain error review of all of the defendant’s claims in a death penalty case when the defendant deliberately and intentionally failed to file a motion for new trial); State v. Scott, 487 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Mo. 1972) (declining to grant plain error review with respect to admission of testimony); State v. Turner, 458 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Mo. 1970) (declining to grant plain error review with respect to admission of exhibits into evidence); State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 59 (Mo. banc 1998) (declining to grant plain error review of a prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements during closing argument); State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 615 (Mo. banc 1998) (same); State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 592 (Mo. banc 1997) (same); State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Mo. banc 1995) (same); State v. Williams, 423 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Mo. 1968) (same). 7 [A]bsolute proof independent of [a defendant’s] statement or confession that a crime was committed is not required. All that is required is evidence of circumstances tending to prove the corpus delicti corresponding with the confession. Slight corroborating facts are sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. The determination of whether there is sufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti of an offense is fact specific and requires a case-by-case evaluation.
***
The State is only required to prove that someone committed the crime with [i]ndependent evidence of circumstances which correspond and interrelate with the circumstances described in the statement or confession.
156 S.W.3d 351, 355-56 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Uncorroborated statements that were improperly admitted into evidence are insufficient to
sustain a conviction. State v. Summers, 362 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Mo. 1962).
Here, Ms. Jones has not established facially substantial grounds for believing that
admitting her statements to police at trial was an “evident, obvious, and clear” error or that it
caused “manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.” Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d at 607.
Ms. Jones’s appellate brief to this Court, which sets forth her corpus delicti claim, concedes
the following facts from evidence presented at trial: Chief Collins, the first to arrive at the
scene, testified that he found S.J. lying on a twin size bed near the pillows; a bassinet was in
the room as well; Chief Collins observed that Ms. Jones’ demeanor was not consistent with
someone who just lost a child – he observed her to be “very calm;” Ms. Jones’ own expert
witness (a forensic pathologist) testified that S.J. died while lying face down; after
Ms. Jones’s admission, the medical examiner amended S.J.’s death certificate to list the
8 cause of death as a “homicide” by suffocation;6 the pediatric neurologist who treated S.J.
testified that it is “decidedly uncommon” for an infant of S.J.’s age to die from a seizure and
that S.J.’s seizure disorder was not life threatening; and, on previous occasions, hospital
medical staff and a children’s division worker had instructed Ms. Jones about safe sleeping
practices for a newborn – infants need to sleep in their own crib, bassinet, or infant bed on
their backs with no pillows or blankets near their heads.
Because these corroborating facts were in the record, Ms. Jones has failed to
establish facially substantial grounds for believing that it was an evident, obvious, and clear
error to admit her statements and that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has
occurred. Therefore, this Court declines to review for plain error. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d at
607-08; Brown, 902 S.W.2d at 284.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ms. Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions for
second degree murder, first degree endangering the welfare of a child, and second degree
assault. This Court’s review “is limited to a determination of whether there was sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal
quotations omitted). This Court will not weigh the evidence but accepts as true all evidence
6 Ms. Jones contends the medical examiner’s conclusion that S.J.’s death was a homicide cannot be used to establish the corpus delicti because he changed the cause of death based on Ms. Jones’ out-of-court confession. She cites no law that a change in a death certificate based on a defendant’s out-of-court confession cannot be used to corroborate the confession for purposes of proving the corpus delicti. On the contrary, an out-of-court confession may enable the discovery of corroborating evidence. State v. McQuinn, 235 S.W.2d 396, 297 (Mo. 1951). 9 and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction and ignores all contrary evidence and
inferences. Id.
Sufficient Evidence of Second-Degree Murder
Mother first argues the state failed to prove that she knew or was aware that her
conduct was practically certain to cause S.J.’s death. To obtain a conviction of second
degree murder, the state must prove that a defendant knowingly caused the death of another
person. See section 565.021.1.7 A person acts knowingly when “he is aware that his
conduct is practically certain to cause” a result. Section 562.016.3. See also State v.
Thomas, 161 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Mo. banc 2005). Intent often is proved by circumstantial
evidence and “may be inferred from surrounding facts or the act itself.” State v. Oliver, 293
S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009).
In Ms. Jones’ case, the state presented evidence from which a reasonable juror could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Jones was aware that laying S.J. on her stomach
with her face in a pillow was practically certain to cause S.J.’s death. The state offered
testimony showing that Ms. Jones was counseled on safe sleep practices. During S.J.’s visit
to the hospital on January 16, 2008, medical staff explained to Ms. Jones that infants need to
be in their own bed, whether in a crib, a bassinet or an infant bed, that they needed to be put
on their backs, and that there should not be pillows and blankets around them. During a
home visit on March 14, 2008, a social worker informed Ms. Jones that newborn infants
need to sleep in a crib on their backs with no other belongings in the crib and that blankets
should not be placed near the infant’s head. At the time, S.J. was lying on a couch with a
7 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2012, unless otherwise indicated. 10 fleece blanket. The social worker showed Ms. Jones how S.J. could move her head into the
blanket and explained that S.J. would be smothered. The social worker testified that
Ms. Jones appeared to appreciate the concern with suffocation. From this evidence, a
reasonable juror could find that Ms. Jones understood that S.J. would suffocate if she were
left on her stomach with her face in a pillow.
The jury also heard Ms. Jones’ statement to Detective Clayborn, in which she said
that she was feeling “overwhelmed” and “frustrated” by S.J.’s constant crying on the day
S.J. died. She stated that she tried to get S.J. to stop crying by feeding her, changing her
diaper and clothes, giving her a bath, rocking her, and putting her in her swing. She
confessed that she eventually became frustrated to the point that she felt like harming herself
or S.J. Ms. Jones then placed S.J. on her stomach with her face in a pillow on an adult bed
while S.J. was crying. She went downstairs, planning to commit suicide, and “didn’t think
twice about what was going to happen to [S.J.] or [herself].” She left S.J. lying on her
stomach on the bed with her face in a pillow for at least 15 or 20 minutes. Reasonable
jurors could conclude from Ms. Jones’ statement that she laid S.J. with her face in the pillow
knowing that S.J. would suffocate after becoming so frustrated with S.J.’s crying that she
wanted to harm her. Additionally, the length of time that Ms. Jones stated she left S.J. on
the bed also infers that she acted knowingly. Fifteen to 20 minutes is a considerable amount
of time, considering the warnings Ms. Jones had been given regarding the risk of suffocation
when placing an infant on her stomach with her face in a pillow. Yet, she did not check on
S.J. sooner.
11 Further, Ms. Jones’ conduct after finding S.J. raises an inference that she acted
knowingly. When Ms. Jones’ called 911, she reported that she had placed S.J. in the
bassinet and came back to find her not breathing. She later admitted that she had placed S.J.
on the adult bed. Ms. Jones’ false statement that she placed S.J. in the bassinet demonstrates
a consciousness of guilt and supports a guilty verdict. See State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212,
219 (Mo. banc 1987). There was also testimony that Ms. Jones’ demeanor when first
responders arrived was “pretty calm” and was not that of a mother who just lost her child.
Reasonable jurors could infer that Ms. Jones was not acting like a mother who just lost a
child because she knowingly caused her child’s death.
Ms. Jones points to the initial determination that S.J. died of a seizure disorder and
evidence of the numerous times she took S.J. to the hospital, arguing it shows that she was a
young mother seeking medical care for her child. Ms. Jones’ argument ignores the standard
of review. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court disregards any evidence
and inferences contrary to the verdict. State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Mo. banc
2012). Great deference is given to the jury’s verdict, and this Court will not act as a “super
juror.” Id. In reviewing the evidence in a light favorable to the guilty verdict, it is clear that
the state presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that
Ms. Jones was aware that laying S.J. on her stomach with her face in a pillow was
practically certain to cause her death. Therefore, Ms. Jones’ claim fails.
Sufficient Evidence of First-Degree Endangering the Welfare of a Child
Next, Ms. Jones asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction
of first degree endangering the welfare of a child because the state failed to prove she acted
12 knowingly. A person commits the offense of first degree child endangerment when the
person “knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk to the life, body, or health
of a child less than seventeen years old.” Section 568.045.1. A person acts knowingly
when the person is aware that his or her conduct is “practically certain to cause that result.”
Section 562.016.3. In a prosecution for first-degree child endangerment, it is not required
that the defendant be aware that the resulting harm was practically certain; rather, the state
must prove the practical certainty of the risk of harm. State v. Davis, 407 S.W.3d 721, 725
(Mo. App. 2013). Knowledge may be proven “by direct evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from the circumstances surrounding the incident.” State v. Burrell, 160 S.W.3d 798,
802 (Mo. banc 2005).
In this case, there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that
Ms. Jones knew that her conduct created a substantial risk to D.W. D.W. was admitted to
the hospital on January 20, 2009, for malnutrition, lethargy, and marginal dehydration.
Ms. Jones told hospital staff that she was having a hard time feeding D.W. at home and that
she was feeding him only 80 calories a day, which is much less than the 250-275 calories a
day that he needed. She later admitted that she had missed six feedings on January 19 and
20 before taking D.W. to the hospital. On January 23, Ms. Jones took D.W. home against
medical advice because she believed the hospital was force-feeding him after being warned
by medical staff that taking D.W. home put him at a risk for dehydration, starvation,
neurological disorders, or death.
While D.W. was in the hospital, medical staff educated Ms. Jones about proper
feeding and how much formula D.W. needed. Nonetheless, Ms. Jones continued to miss
13 D.W’s feedings at home; she missed five feedings on January 25 and 26. While she took
D.W. back to the hospital on January 30 for an unrelated reason, hospital staff were
concerned that Ms. Jones was still under-feeding him, and D.W. was placed in protective
custody.
When Ms. Jones took D.W. out of the hospital against medical advice, she was aware
that her conduct was putting D.W.’s health and life at serious risk because the medical staff
informed her about the serious health risks. Furthermore, she continued to miss his feedings
at home, despite knowing D.W. was malnourished and being informed about how to feed
him properly. Ms. Jones argues that she took D.W. out of the hospital because she believed
the hospital was force-feeding D.W. with the nasogastric tube, which she believed to be
wrong.8 Her belief about the feeding program, nevertheless, does not negate the fact that
she was aware of the risks when she brought D.W. home against medical advice. She
admitted when interviewed by Detective Clayborn that she felt overwhelmed and was
sleeping, so she would not feed him every three hours as directed but, instead, would feed
him only when he cried. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that
Ms. Jones knowingly created a substantial risk to D.W.’s life and health when she removed
him from the hospital against medical advice and continued to miss his feedings at home.
8 The record is clear that the feeding program was the reason why Ms. Jones checked D.W. out of the hospital, but it also shows that she was not always so against the nasogastric tube feeding program. Hospital records indicate that when staff tried to wake up Ms. Jones so that she could feed D.W., she wanted him to be fed with the nasogastric tube or she wanted a nurse to feed him. She did not want to feed him herself. 14 Sufficient Evidence of Second-Degree Assault
Finally, Ms. Jones asserts there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of
second-degree assault. A person commits second degree assault if that person “[r]ecklessly
causes serious physical injury to another person.” Section 565.060. “A person ‘acts
recklessly’ . . . when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the
situation.” Section 562.016.4. Ms. Jones contests whether the state sufficiently proved she
acted recklessly.
The state presented Ms. Jones’ statement that she was burping D.W. on her lap with
his face to the side and a burp rag in her hand. She diverted her attention to the television,
and when she looked back at D.W., his face was in the burp rag and he was not breathing.
She also stated that his face had turned blue. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that
Ms. Jones was aware of the dangers of leaving an infant face down on a soft object, such as
a pillow or a blanket, because she already had lost a child to suffocation due to being placed
face down in a pillow.
Ms. Jones claims that, at best, the evidence shows negligence or carelessness, rather
than a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Her argument suggests
that she was distracted inadvertently by the television. Such a finding, however, requires an
inference that is contrary to the jury’s verdict, which this Court must disregard under its
standard of review. Rather, a reasonable inference from Ms. Jones’s statement that supports
the verdict is that Ms. Jones consciously stopped paying attention to her newborn infant
15 lying on her lap to watch television. By her own admission, the burp rag was in her hand;
yet she claimed not to notice that D.W. was pressing his face into the rag with sufficient
pressure to cut off his breathing. Moreover, Ms. Jones stated that D.W.’s face was blue by
the time she noticed he was not breathing, and the state produced expert testimony that a
child who is suffocating would not change colors until the child’s breathing is restricted for
at least a minute or longer. A reasonable juror could find from the evidence that Ms. Jones
consciously disregarded the risk of suffocation when she placed D.W. on her lap with his
face near a burp rag and ignored him for a period of time long enough for him to stop
breathing and turn blue.
Conclusion
Because the state’s evidence corroborated that S.J. died as a result of criminal
agency, Ms. Jones failed to establish facially substantial grounds for believing that it was
evident, obvious, and clear error to admit her statements and that manifest injustice or a
miscarriage of justice has occurred. Therefore, the Court declines to review for plain error.
Further, Ms. Jones’ challenges to her convictions of second degree murder, first degree
endangering the welfare of a child, and second degree assault also fail. Construing all
inferences in favor of the verdict, the record contains sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable juror could find Ms. Jones possessed the requisite intent for each of those
offenses. Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.
_________________________________ PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE
All concur. 16