Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) WD86624 Respondent, ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) SCOTTY GENE REYNOLDS, ) May 6, 2025 ) Appellant. ) )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Linn County, Missouri The Honorable Terry Alan Tschannen, Judge
Before Division Three: W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, Karen King Mitchell, Judge, and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Linn County, 1 Scotty Reynolds
(“Reynolds”) was convicted of two counts of first-degree statutory rape, six counts of
first-degree statutory sodomy, four counts of second-degree child molestation, one count
of first-degree child molestation, and one count of second-degree statutory sodomy. He
raises four points on appeal. In his first three points, he argues that the trial court erred in
excluding evidence. In his fourth point, he argues the trial court plainly erred in
impermissibly commenting on the testimony of a witness. The judgment is affirmed.
1 In November of 2020, the venue of the case was transferred to Linn County. Background 2
At one time, Mother and Reynolds were married. 3 In 2016, Victim 1, Victim 2,
Victim 3, Victim 4, and Victim 5 came to live with Reynolds and Mother in Florida. At
some point, Reynolds and Mother obtained guardianship of the children. In December of
2018, Mother and Reynolds and the five children moved to Missouri. They initially
stayed with Mother’s parents and then moved into a house in Randolph County in May of
2019.
In July of 2019, Mother and Reynolds separated following an argument. Reynolds
left the home with his belongings. On one afternoon in the following days, Victim 1
reported to Mother that Reynolds had been “having sex with [her]” and that when she
“started saying no to him,” “he went to [her] sisters.” Mother reported this information to
a hotline.
An investigation ensued. The children gave forensic interviews recounting
repeated sexual abuse perpetrated by Reynolds. Victim 6, a child relative of Mother’s,
also disclosed that Reynolds had sexually abused her on two separate occasions. At some
point, a consent search of Mother’s home was conducted and a bottle of “lube” was found
2 Reynolds does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Campbell, 600 S.W.3d 780, 784 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (citing State v. Brand, 309 S.W.3d 887, 890 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)). 3 We avoid using identifying information of victims and witnesses pursuant to provisions regarding confidentiality. See §§ 595.226 and 509.520.
2 above a ceiling tile above the bed of one of the children as described in the forensic
interview.
Reynolds was charged with having committed multiple acts of sexual abuse
against six different victims. At trial, Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 3, Victim 5, and Victim
6 testified to being sexually abused by Reynolds. Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 3, and
Victim 5 also testified to abuse that they witnessed Reynolds inflict upon their sisters.
Portions of forensic interviews were also played for the jury.
Following a two-day jury trial in June of 2023, the jury convicted Reynolds on all
fourteen counts in the amended information. The jury recommended sentences of a term
of life imprisonment on each of Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, X, XII; a term of fifteen
years of imprisonment on each of Counts VI, VII, IX, XI, and XIII; and a term of seven
years on Count XIV. The trial court sentenced Reynolds in accordance with the jury’s
recommendations.
Reynolds now appeals to this court.
Analysis
Reynolds raises four points on appeal. In his first three points, he argues that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence of prior sexual abuse perpetrated against Victim 1,
Victim 2, and Victim 3. In his fourth point, Reynolds argues that the trial court plainly
erred by abandoning its duty of neutrality when asking a question and repeating the
answer in the presence of the jury.
3 Points One, Two, & Three
In his first three points on appeal, Reynolds argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding evidence that Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 3, and their sisters were
removed from their biological mother’s house because of sexual abuse. Reynolds argues
that, despite section 491.015, it was necessary for him to present evidence of prior sexual
abuse suffered by Victims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in order to rebut the inference that these
children had sexual knowledge because the allegations against Reynolds were true.
Applicable in certain prosecutions, “[s]ection 491.015, commonly referred to as
the ‘rape shield’ statute, creates a presumption that evidence of a victim’s prior sexual
conduct is irrelevant.” McIntosh v. State, 413 S.W.3d 320, 331 (Mo. banc 2013). Section
490.015.1 enumerates four exceptions to this presumption in recognition of the limited
circumstances in which prior sexual conduct may be relevant. See id.
Reynolds concedes that the exceptions enumerated in section 491.015.1 do not
apply to the evidence he sought to introduce. Reynolds instead argues that the evidence
he sought to introduce falls within a “judicially created exception based on a criminal
defendant’s right to a fair trial required by the concept of due process.” See State v.
Cooper, 581 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019). Under this narrow exception, if
“the State seeks to introduce evidence to prove a defendant’s guilt or draw for the jury an
inference from which to show a defendant’s guilt, the rape shield statute may not be used
to prohibit the defendant from introducing contrary evidence without violating a
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” See Cooper, 581 S.W.3d at 681-82
4 (quoting State v. Gorman, 468 S.W.3d 428, 433-34 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)). Missouri
courts have indicated that, where the State attempts to use evidence of a child witness’s
precocious sexual knowledge to draw an inference that the child’s knowledge was proof
that the alleged abuse by the defendant had occurred, the defendant may be
constitutionally entitled to put on a defense showing an alternative source for such
knowledge. See State v. Samuels, 88 S.W.3d 71, 81 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); State v. Sales,
58 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001). But, “[i]f the state does not attempt to use
evidence of a victim’s unusual sexual knowledge to establish Defendant’s guilt, the
Defendant is not constitutionally entitled to present evidence about any past abuse or
present other evidence of that abuse.” State v. Sittner, 294 S.W.3d 90, 91 (Mo. App. E.D.
2009) (citing Sales, 58 S.W.3d at 559).
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine that sought to exclude evidence of
prior sexual abuse of the victims, arguing that none of the exceptions under section
491.015 were applicable. Reynolds filed a notice of intent to present evidence of prior
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Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) WD86624 Respondent, ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) SCOTTY GENE REYNOLDS, ) May 6, 2025 ) Appellant. ) )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Linn County, Missouri The Honorable Terry Alan Tschannen, Judge
Before Division Three: W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, Karen King Mitchell, Judge, and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Linn County, 1 Scotty Reynolds
(“Reynolds”) was convicted of two counts of first-degree statutory rape, six counts of
first-degree statutory sodomy, four counts of second-degree child molestation, one count
of first-degree child molestation, and one count of second-degree statutory sodomy. He
raises four points on appeal. In his first three points, he argues that the trial court erred in
excluding evidence. In his fourth point, he argues the trial court plainly erred in
impermissibly commenting on the testimony of a witness. The judgment is affirmed.
1 In November of 2020, the venue of the case was transferred to Linn County. Background 2
At one time, Mother and Reynolds were married. 3 In 2016, Victim 1, Victim 2,
Victim 3, Victim 4, and Victim 5 came to live with Reynolds and Mother in Florida. At
some point, Reynolds and Mother obtained guardianship of the children. In December of
2018, Mother and Reynolds and the five children moved to Missouri. They initially
stayed with Mother’s parents and then moved into a house in Randolph County in May of
2019.
In July of 2019, Mother and Reynolds separated following an argument. Reynolds
left the home with his belongings. On one afternoon in the following days, Victim 1
reported to Mother that Reynolds had been “having sex with [her]” and that when she
“started saying no to him,” “he went to [her] sisters.” Mother reported this information to
a hotline.
An investigation ensued. The children gave forensic interviews recounting
repeated sexual abuse perpetrated by Reynolds. Victim 6, a child relative of Mother’s,
also disclosed that Reynolds had sexually abused her on two separate occasions. At some
point, a consent search of Mother’s home was conducted and a bottle of “lube” was found
2 Reynolds does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Campbell, 600 S.W.3d 780, 784 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (citing State v. Brand, 309 S.W.3d 887, 890 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)). 3 We avoid using identifying information of victims and witnesses pursuant to provisions regarding confidentiality. See §§ 595.226 and 509.520.
2 above a ceiling tile above the bed of one of the children as described in the forensic
interview.
Reynolds was charged with having committed multiple acts of sexual abuse
against six different victims. At trial, Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 3, Victim 5, and Victim
6 testified to being sexually abused by Reynolds. Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 3, and
Victim 5 also testified to abuse that they witnessed Reynolds inflict upon their sisters.
Portions of forensic interviews were also played for the jury.
Following a two-day jury trial in June of 2023, the jury convicted Reynolds on all
fourteen counts in the amended information. The jury recommended sentences of a term
of life imprisonment on each of Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, X, XII; a term of fifteen
years of imprisonment on each of Counts VI, VII, IX, XI, and XIII; and a term of seven
years on Count XIV. The trial court sentenced Reynolds in accordance with the jury’s
recommendations.
Reynolds now appeals to this court.
Analysis
Reynolds raises four points on appeal. In his first three points, he argues that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence of prior sexual abuse perpetrated against Victim 1,
Victim 2, and Victim 3. In his fourth point, Reynolds argues that the trial court plainly
erred by abandoning its duty of neutrality when asking a question and repeating the
answer in the presence of the jury.
3 Points One, Two, & Three
In his first three points on appeal, Reynolds argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding evidence that Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 3, and their sisters were
removed from their biological mother’s house because of sexual abuse. Reynolds argues
that, despite section 491.015, it was necessary for him to present evidence of prior sexual
abuse suffered by Victims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in order to rebut the inference that these
children had sexual knowledge because the allegations against Reynolds were true.
Applicable in certain prosecutions, “[s]ection 491.015, commonly referred to as
the ‘rape shield’ statute, creates a presumption that evidence of a victim’s prior sexual
conduct is irrelevant.” McIntosh v. State, 413 S.W.3d 320, 331 (Mo. banc 2013). Section
490.015.1 enumerates four exceptions to this presumption in recognition of the limited
circumstances in which prior sexual conduct may be relevant. See id.
Reynolds concedes that the exceptions enumerated in section 491.015.1 do not
apply to the evidence he sought to introduce. Reynolds instead argues that the evidence
he sought to introduce falls within a “judicially created exception based on a criminal
defendant’s right to a fair trial required by the concept of due process.” See State v.
Cooper, 581 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019). Under this narrow exception, if
“the State seeks to introduce evidence to prove a defendant’s guilt or draw for the jury an
inference from which to show a defendant’s guilt, the rape shield statute may not be used
to prohibit the defendant from introducing contrary evidence without violating a
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” See Cooper, 581 S.W.3d at 681-82
4 (quoting State v. Gorman, 468 S.W.3d 428, 433-34 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)). Missouri
courts have indicated that, where the State attempts to use evidence of a child witness’s
precocious sexual knowledge to draw an inference that the child’s knowledge was proof
that the alleged abuse by the defendant had occurred, the defendant may be
constitutionally entitled to put on a defense showing an alternative source for such
knowledge. See State v. Samuels, 88 S.W.3d 71, 81 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); State v. Sales,
58 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001). But, “[i]f the state does not attempt to use
evidence of a victim’s unusual sexual knowledge to establish Defendant’s guilt, the
Defendant is not constitutionally entitled to present evidence about any past abuse or
present other evidence of that abuse.” State v. Sittner, 294 S.W.3d 90, 91 (Mo. App. E.D.
2009) (citing Sales, 58 S.W.3d at 559).
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine that sought to exclude evidence of
prior sexual abuse of the victims, arguing that none of the exceptions under section
491.015 were applicable. Reynolds filed a notice of intent to present evidence of prior
sexual abuse experienced by Victim 1, Victim 2, Victim 3, Victim 4, and Victim 5.
Reynolds indicated that the children had been removed from their biological mother’s
home prior to being placed with Reynolds and Mother. Reynolds argued that he
anticipated that the alleged victims would provide graphic descriptions of sexual acts at
trial and that the jury might infer that the only way that they would have such knowledge
would be if they had been abused by Reynolds. Reynolds indicated that he sought to
5 present evidence of prior sexual abuse to rebut the inference that the sexual knowledge of
the alleged victims meant that the allegations against Reynolds were true.
By pre-trial order, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine. The trial
court’s order indicated that Reynolds would be barred from making statements or
inquiries regarding past sexual abuse inflicted upon the alleged victims unless a further
ruling was made. The trial court indicated that it would hear argument on the issue
pending the State’s presentation of evidence and would consider proposed evidence by
Reynolds in light of the limited holding of State v. Douglas, 797 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1990), and State v. Sales, 58 S.W.3d 554 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001).
At trial, following Victim 1’s testimony, Reynolds made an offer of proof. During
the offer of proof, Victim 1 testified that she had lived with her biological mother in
Texas prior to living with Reynolds and Mother. Regarding abuse that may have
occurred in the home of Victim 1’s biological mother, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Okay. Part of the reason you were removed from [your biological mother’s] home was because there was a physical abuse; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. There was also some sexual abuse; is that right?
Following the offer of proof, Reynolds requested that the trial court reconsider its earlier
ruling based on the offer of proof. Reynolds did not then make an argument as to the
6 relevance of the testimony or why it would be admissible. The trial court denied
admission of the testimony elicited from Victim 1 in the offer of proof.
Following Victim 2’s testimony, Reynolds made a similar offer of proof. Victim 2
testified that she used to live with her biological mother in Texas and that she and her
sisters were removed from her biological mother’s home. The following exchange then
occurred:
Q. You were removed, in part, because of some physical abuse; is that right?
Following this offer of proof, the trial court asked defense counsel: “[I]s there anything
else you want to tell me?” Defense counsel stated: “Yes, Judge. We’d renew our request
to have this evidence submitted to the jury.” Reynolds did not at that time make any
argument regarding the relevance of the testimony. The trial court denied admission of
the testimony Victim 2 provided in the offer of proof.
Following Victim 3’s testimony, Reynolds made another offer of proof. Victim 3
testified that she lived in Texas with her biological mother and that she and her sisters
were removed from that home. The following exchange then took place:
Q. You were moved, in part, because there some – some physical abuse; is that right?
7 Q. There was also some sexual abuse going on there; is that right?
Following the offer of proof, Reynolds renewed his request “to have that evidence
presented to the jury.” No argument was made at that time regarding the relevance of the
evidence or why it was admissible. The trial court denied admission of Victim 3’s
testimony that was provided in the offer of proof.
We review the evidentiary rulings of the trial court for abuse of discretion. State v.
Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Mo. banc 2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs only if
the circuit court’s ruling admitting or excluding evidence is clearly against the logic of
the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks
the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful deliberate consideration.” State v.
Loper, 609 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotations omitted).
“To preserve a claim of improperly excluded evidence, the proponent must attempt
to present the excluded evidence at trial and, if it remains excluded, make a sufficient
offer of proof.” State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 263 (Mo. banc 2014). “The purpose of
an offer of proof is to preserve the evidence so the appellate court understands the scope
and effect of the questions and proposed answers.” Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted). “Offers of proof must show what the evidence will be, the purpose and object
of the evidence, and each fact essential to establishing admissibility.” Id. “The offer of
proof must demonstrate the relevancy of the offered testimony, must be specific, and
8 must be definite.” State v. Shutters, 697 S.W.3d 13, 21 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (quoting
State v. Murphy, 534 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)).
In this matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying admission of
the testimony in the offers of proof. The offers of proof were lacking in the specificity
required of offers of proof and failed to provide a basis for concluding that the testimony
in the offers of proof was both logically and legally relevant. The offers of proof were
not accompanied with any specific argument as to why the specific testimony in the
offers of proof was logically and legally relevant. Reynolds made no argument regarding
how the trial court’s ruling might limit the inferences permissible for the State to argue
during closing argument. Rather, Reynolds relied on his general arguments in his pre-
trial motion without even presenting evidence that would provide factual support for the
assertions in the motion. In particular, the offers of proof were so nonspecific that they
failed even to indicate the victim or victims of the prior sexual abuse that had apparently
occurred in the home of the biological mother of the victims. The offer of proof made at
the end of the testimony of both Victim 1 and Victim 2 indicated that “[t]here was . . .
some sexual abuse” that had occurred, but did not indicate the victim or victims of such
abuse. The offer of proof made at the end of Victim 3’s testimony indicated that there
was “some sexual abuse going on” in the biological mother’s home, but likewise did not
indicate the victim or victims of the abuse. None of the offers of proof provided any
detail concerning the nature of the abuse that had previously occurred in the biological
mother’s home so as to provide a basis for assessing the relevance of the testimony in the
9 offers of proof. Given the lack of specificity underlying these offers of proof, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying admission of the testimony in the offers of
proof.
Point Four
In his fourth point on appeal, Reynolds argues that the trial court plainly erred by
abandoning its duty of neutrality by asking a question of a witness and repeating the
answer given by the witness. Reynolds argues that the trial court impermissibly
commented on the evidence. Reynolds made no objection to the trial court’s comments.
Therefore, our review, if at all, can only be for plain error.
Generally, appellate courts do not review unpreserved claims of error. State v.
Jackson-Bey, 690 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Mo. banc 2024) (citing State v. Brandolese, 601
S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020)). However, Rule 30.20 provides that “plain errors
affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the
court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” Plain
error review is discretionary. Rule 30.20; Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526. Appellate
courts will not review for plain error “unless the claimed error facially establishes
substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
resulted.” See Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
During the State’s examination of Victim 1 at trial, Victim 1 was asked whether
she witnessed things happen to anyone else, and the following exchange occurred:
The State: Okay. And what did you see happen?
10 Victim 1: Well, there was once with [Victim 2]. 4 She was in the kitchen giving him head, in the kitchen.
The State: Okay. And when you say that – I think I know what you mean when you say that.
Victim 1: Her mouth is going back and forth on the penis.
The State: Okay. And that would be Mr. Reynolds?
Victim 1: Yes.
The State: Okay. And you –
The Court: Who was the child?
Victim 1: [Victim 2].
The Court: [Victim 2].
The State: Okay. Any other time that you saw something happened?
Reynolds raised no objection to the trial court’s comment. On appeal, Reynolds
argues that the trial court impermissibly commented on the evidence and tipped the scales
against him.
We decline to exercise our discretion to review for plain error as there is no basis
for believing a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted from the trial
court’s limited involvement in the trial testimony of Victim 1.
4 The three bracketed references to Victim 2 during this exchange were references to Victim 2’s first name, which we do not provide in this opinion due to numerous provisions of law regarding confidentiality. See §§ 595.226 and 509.520.
11 Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
___________________________________ Thomas N. Chapman, Judge
All concur.