State of Missouri v. Scott J. Parrish

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 11, 2025
• Docket: WD86669
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) WD86669 ) SCOTT J. PARRISH, ) Opinion filed: February 11, 2025 ) Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BATES COUNTY, MISSOURI THE HONORABLE MICHAEL B. BAKER, JUDGE

Division Three: W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, Karen King Mitchell, Judge and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge

Scott J. Parrish (“Parrish”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment and

sentence for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of section 589.400,

RSMo 2018, and section 589.425. 1 In his single Point on Appeal, Parrish

contends the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the offense charged and

sentencing him accordingly because there was insufficient evidence to support

a factual finding that Parrish acted knowingly. We affirm.

1 All statutory citations are to RSMo (2017), unless otherwise noted. Factual and Procedural History 2

On May 6, 1993, Parrish pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Missouri to the felony of transporting a minor across the

state line to engage in sexually explicit conduct. Parrish was sentenced to a

term of incarceration followed by supervised release. Parrish was released

from supervision in the fall of 1997. Since then, Parrish has lived at the same

residence in Bates County, Missouri.

In 2019, the Missouri State Highway Patrol notified the Bates County

Sheriff (“Sheriff”) that Parrish had been convicted of a sex offense such that he

was required to register as a sex offender. On July 23, 2019 Sheriff sent Parrish

a letter advising Parrish of his obligation to register as a sex offender. Parrish

received the letter and sent Sheriff a responsive letter stating his objection to

and disagreement with the registration requirement.

After receiving Parrish’s response, Sheriff sent Parrish two additional

letters informing him of his obligation and responsibility to register as a sex

offender. At least one of these letters was returned to Sheriff by the postal

service because it was refused by the recipient. Sheriff did not receive a

response to either letter, and Parrish did not register as a sex offender.

On November 1, 2022, Parrish was charged with committing the class E

felony of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of sections 589.400

State v. Barac, 2 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to the conviction.”

558 S.W.3d 126, 128 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citing State v. Sutton, 427 S.W.3d 359, 359 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)). 2 and 589.425, in that on or about July 30, 2019 Parrish knowingly failed to

register as a sex offender in Bates County while being a resident thereof.

Parrish entered a plea of not guilty and subsequently waived his right to a trial

by jury. On August 8, 2023, the trial court conducted a bench trial.

Sherriff testified on behalf of the State. Through his testimony, the July

23, 2019 letter Sheriff sent to Parrish and Parrish’s reply letter were introduced

as evidence and admitted without objection. Sherriff testified that this letter

informed Parrish that “he was required to register as a sex offender.”

Parrish testified in his own defense. Parrish testified that he received

the letter from Sheriff informing him that he had to register as a sex offender.

When asked why he did not register upon the receipt of that letter, Parrish

stated: “Because the [federal] District Court did not stipulate . . . that was a

requirement[.]” Parrish then offered “four legal documents” that he “printed

off the internet” as Defense Exhibits 1 through 4. 3 In explanation of his

independent legal research, Parrish testified that he did not register because

the federal court “did not say [he] had to register.” During cross-examination,

Parrish agreed that he believed he was not required to register as a sex

3 These exhibits are not a part of the record on appeal. “Where . . . exhibits are not made a part of the record on appeal, such evidentiary omissions will be taken as favorable to the trial court’s ruling and unfavorable to the appeal.” City of Kansas City v. Cosic, 540 S.W.3d 461, 464 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Navarro v. Navarro, 504 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). 3 offender, and as a result, he intentionally decided not to register upon receipt

of Sheriff’s letter.

At the conclusion of the parties’ submission of evidence, the trial court

took the matter under advisement. On September 25, 2023, the trial court

found Parrish guilty of the offense of failing to register as a sex offender.

Parrish was sentenced to six months in the county jail, the execution of which

was suspended and he was placed on three years of supervised probation.

Parrish appeals.

Standard of Review

“Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence for a criminal conviction

in a court-tried case is determined by the same standard as in a jury-tried case:

whether or not there was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could

have reasonably found guilt.” State v. Besendorfer, 439 S.W.3d 831, 834 (Mo.

App. W.D. 2014) (citing State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. banc

1992)). Appellate review of sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal

conviction defers greatly to the trier of fact and seeks a determination of

whether “a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Weaver, 481 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Mo. App. W.D.

2016) (quoting State v. Neal, 328 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)). “In

applying this standard, we accept all evidence and inferences favorable to the

judgment as true, and we disregard all . . . inferences to the contrary.” State v.

Hicks, 526 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).

4 Analysis

Parrish raises one Point on Appeal, claiming the trial court erred in

entering judgment and sentence for failure to register as a sex offender,

pursuant to sections 589.400 and 589.425, because there was insufficient

evidence to support a finding of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Parrish

specifically argues the trial court erred because there was insufficient evidence

to support a factual finding that Parrish acted knowingly.

“A person commits the crime of failing to register as a sex offender when

the person is required to register under sections 589.400 to 589.425 and fails

to comply with any requirement of sections 589.400 to 589.425.” Section

589.425. Section 589.425 does not specify the requisite mental state for the

elements of the crime. When “the definition of an offense does not expressly

prescribe a culpable mental state for any elements of the offense, a culpable

mental state is nonetheless required and is established if the person acts

purposefully or knowingly[.]” Section 562.021.3, RSMo 1997.

“A person ‘acts knowingly’, or with knowledge” “when he or she is aware

of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances exist” or “when

he or she is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that

result.” Section 562.016.3. In establishing knowledge as an element of the

crime of failure to register as a sex offender, the State is not required to show

that the defendant “knew all of the intricacies of Missouri’s registration

5 statute,” only that the defendant “knew he had some obligation under the law.”

State v. Graham, 549 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).

Here, Parrish argues that the State failed to prove his failure to register

was committed knowingly because he believed he was not required to register

as a sex offender under Missouri law. We disagree. As an initial matter,

Parrish’s argument rests on the assumption that the circuit court believed his

claim that he believed he was not required to register because the federal court

did not impose that requirement on him. Under our standard of review,

however, we are required to disregard any evidence contrary to the verdict.

See, e.g., State v. Bumby, 699 S.W.3d 459, 466 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). The

circuit court, as fact-finder, was fully entitled to reject Parrish’s self-serving

testimony that he believed he was not legal required to register. See, e.g., State

v. Shaddox, 598 S.W.3d 691, 694 n.2 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020). Missouri courts

have found that once a defendant knows of their obligation to register, their

failure to do so becomes a knowing failure. State v. Graham, 549 S.W.3d at

538. Section 589.425’s knowing requirement “simply require[s] . . . some

evidence . . . that the defendant was aware of his obligation to register.” Id.;

State v. Shands, 661 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (finding a

defendant was properly convicted of knowingly failing to change his residence

as a sex offender when that defendant “was aware of his obligation[.]”).

The record supports the finding that Parrish possessed the requisite

mental state for committing the crime of failure to register as a sex offender

6 because he was aware of his obligation when he committed the crime. At trial,

Sherriff and Parrish both testified that on July 23, 2019, Sherriff sent Parrish

a letter at his residence in Bates County, Missouri, informing Parrish of his

obligation to register as a sex offender. The two then testified that Parrish

received the letter, evidencing his awareness of his requirement to register.

Parrish testified that upon his receipt of the letter, he responded to Sherriff,

informing Sherriff that Parrish did not believe he was required to register.

This, too, evidences Parrish had been made aware of his obligation to register

as his response evidences he did indeed receive the Sheriff’s initial letter.

Parrish also agreed that he did not accidentally forego compliance with the

Sherriff’s letters, and instead, relied on his belief that the Sherriff was mistaken

about Parrish’s particular registration requirement. Accordingly, it is clear

from the testimony of both Sherriff and Parrish that Parrish’s decision not to

register as a sex offender was not due to lack of awareness but rather was done

knowingly.

Parrish, however, claims that he “relied upon his own legal research” and

while such “reliance may have been misinformed, it nonetheless prevented him

from being aware that his previous conviction required him to register as a sex

offender in Bates County Missouri.” After receiving Sherriff’s letter, Parrish

conducted his own review of his federal court judgment and commitment

papers, and did his own legal research, all of which led to his unilateral

determination that the sex offender registry did not apply to his offense. In

7 short, Parrish concedes that he resided in Bates County and that he received

notice of his duty to register as a result of being convicted of a certain sex

offense, but by his own research he “misinformed” himself of his obligations.

This does not aid Parrish’s cause.

Here, Parrish’s situation is similar to that in State v. Younger, 386

S.W.3d 848 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012), where it was evident Younger knew that

upon a change of residence he was to register with authorities as a sex offender

as he had done so previously. Id. at 858. In Younger, “the “knowingly” mens

rea attached to whether Younger “knowingly” changed his residence and

“knowingly” failed to notify the authorities. It did not attach to whether he

knowingly broke the law. Section 562.031.1.[ 4]” Id. Indeed, “a person is not

4 In its entirety, Section 562.031 states:

1. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he or she engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact or law unless such mistake negatives the existence of the mental state required by the offense. 2. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he or she believes his or her conduct does not constitute an offense unless his or her belief is reasonable and: (1) The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him or her and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him or her, and he or she could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him or her; or (2) He or she acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in: (a) A statute; (b) An opinion or order of an appellate court; or (c) An official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense made by a public official or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute, regulation or order. 3. The burden of injecting the issue of reasonable belief that conduct does not constitute an offense under subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 2 of this section is on the defendant. 8 guilty of an offense unless he or she acts with a culpable mental state, . . . as the

statute defining the offense may require with respect to the conduct, the result

thereof or the attendant circumstances which constitute the material elements

of the crime.” Section 562.016.1. (emphasis added).

As in Younger, the “knowingly” mens rea did not attach to whether

Parrish knowingly broke the law. Rather, there was sufficient evidence at trial

that, after the Sheriff’s notice to him of his obligation to register, Parrish

“knowingly” resided in Bates County, and “knowingly” failed to register with

the authorities. Parrish was well aware of his prior conviction, he even testified

that he studied his federal court judgment and commitment papers. He knew

that he resided in Bates County. Further, he possessed knowledge of the

requirement that he must register in his county of residence pursuant to the

Bates County Sheriff’s notice (and repeated reminders) to him, a notice he

obviously received given that he sent the Sheriff a reply to same. Parrish’s

beliefs as to the law’s applicability to him were not sufficient to negate the

“knowingly” mens rea with respect to each element of Parrish’s failure to

register charge.

Parrish also argues that his case is similar to State v. Graham, 549

S.W.3d at 533, and State v. Wilder, 457 S.W.3d 354 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015). In

Graham, this Court reversed a defendant’s conviction for failure to register as

a sex offender because that defendant’s failure to register was not a knowing

failure. Id. at 538. The Graham defendant’s underlying sex offense was

9 committed in Iowa, where he was required to register as a sex offender upon

his release from supervision. Id. at 534. In 2006, however, the Iowa

Department of Public Safety notified the defendant that he was no longer

required to register as a sex offender in Iowa. Id. Later, the defendant moved

to Harrison County, Missouri. Id. at 535. The Harrison County Sherriff

determined Graham was required to register as a sex offender under Missouri

law. Id. Upon making this determination, the Sherriff informed the defendant

that he was required to register as a sex offender in Missouri and, at the same

time, arrested him for his failure to do so. Id. At the defendant’s trial, the

evidence established that the defendant was not aware of his Missouri

registration requirement until the very moment he was arrested. Id. at 536.

The defendant’s conviction was reversed because the evidence did not establish

that the defendant was aware of his obligation to register in Missouri at any

point prior to the time of his arrest, meaning he could not have knowingly

failed to register. Id. at 535, 538.

Likewise, in Wilder, the defendant had previously been convicted of

forcible rape in California. State v. Wilder, 457 S.W.3d at 355. The defendant

later moved to Missouri. Id. Then, in 2010, the defendant was arrested in

Missouri, again for forcible rape. Id. At the time of his 2010 arrest, the officer

informed him he was required to register as a sex offender for his California

rape conviction, and thus he was also being charged with failing to register as

a sex offender. Id. As in Graham, the Wilder court reversed the conviction

10 because the defendant was not aware of his obligation to register until the

moment he was charged for failing to comply with that requirement. Id. at

356–57.

We find Parrish’s reliance on Graham and Wilder misplaced. In those

cases, no evidence was offered at trial which established that defendant had

knowledge of the requirement to register until the moment he was arrested for

failing to do so. Conversely, here, Parrish’s trial testimony established that he

became aware of his obligation to register as a sex offender when the Sherriff

sent him a letter notifying him of same, well before his arrest. Parrish simply

did not agree with Sheriff’s pronouncement. Because Parrish was aware that

he was obligated to register, regardless of whether he agreed with that

requirement, his conviction is distinguishable from the convictions reversed in

Graham and Wilder.

Based on the foregoing, we find that there was sufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s finding that Parrish’s failure to register as a sex

offender was committed knowingly.

Point I is denied.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

___________________________ W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGE All concur.