In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112281 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Shelby County v. ) Cause No. 21SB-CR00149-01 ) SARA E. DODD, ) Honorable Frederick P. Tucker ) Appellant. ) Filed: April 22, 2025
Introduction
Appellant Sara Dodd was found guilty of one count of statutory rape in the first degree
and one count of child molestation in the first degree, and was sentenced to a total of 45 years
imprisonment. In three points on appeal, Appellant challenges the logical and legal relevance of
photographs admitted during trial and the circuit court’s denial of her motion to sever her trial
from Codefendant’s. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
Background
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged on appeal. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the relevant evidence presented at trial is as follows. State v. Stewart,
560 S.W.3d 531, 532-33 (Mo. banc 2018).
On September 18, 2020, Victim, who was six years old at that time, arrived at school
“acting more sad than usual” and holding her vaginal area in pain. When questioned by school staff, Victim first reported that she fell on the bus that morning, and then later said she hurt
because her mother made her take a shower that morning with her younger brother, who hits and
tickles her bottom a lot. Victim told the school nurse that other people in her house also hit and
tickle her private areas, and that sometimes her family would “go into a trance,” and would “hurt
and touch her there,” indicating her private areas, and that her hands had superpowers to stop
them from touching her, but it did not always work. While the nurse and the school principal
were assisting Victim with using the bathroom, which was a common occurrence as Victim dealt
with incontinence and wore pull-ups, they noticed blood in Victim’s pull-up and on the toilet
seat. The school made a hotline call to the Children’s Division for possible sexual abuse.
Later that day, a Children’s Division investigator followed up on the hotline call and did
a home visit at Appellant and Codefendant’s home. Appellant and Codefendant are the parents
of Victim and four other children. While at the home, the investigator observed unsanitary
conditions inside the home, despite the fact that the family had a recent family-centered services
case that included an intensive in-home services component based on prior hotlines for lice and
bedbugs. As a result of the investigation, the investigator decided to remove all of the children
from the home and immediately took them to an urgent care, where it was determined that all of
the children had lice and one child had open sores on his legs.
Once Victim was moved to foster care, she slowly began disclosing abuse committed by
Appellant and Codefendant. In November 2020, Victim disclosed to a child psychiatrist that
Codefendant had touched her private areas on more than 10 occasions. The psychiatrist
diagnosed Victim with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, secondary to complex trauma;
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; oppositional defiant disorder; and encopresis and
2 enuresis, or incontinence. The psychiatrist testified at trial that Victim’s diagnoses can be linked
to sexual abuse.
Later in November 2020, while Victim’s first foster mother (“First Foster Mother”) was
helping Victim clean herself up after she had accidentally defecated on herself, Victim inserted
her fingers into her anus and defecated on herself again. When First Foster Mother asked Victim
why she had done that, Victim stated “I just miss my daddy sometimes,” and disclosed that
Codefendant would stick his fingers into her vagina and anus. Victim further disclosed that
Codefendant would rub his penis and rub and kiss Victim’s vagina. On another occasion, while
First Foster Mother was giving Victim a bath, Victim stated that “mommies don’t give girls
baths,” and that “daddies give little girls baths,” and disclosed how Codefendant would rub her
vagina when he gave her baths.
In December 2020, a respite foster mother (“Respite Foster Mother”) was assisting First
Foster Mother with Victim’s bedtime routine when Victim began recounting prior disclosures
made about Codefendant. When Respite Foster Mother asked where Appellant was when
Codefendant was abusing her, Victim told them that Appellant was also in the room while the
abuse was happening and that Appellant was doing “the same things as daddy.” Victim then
disclosed that Appellant and Codefendant would hold her down and that “she would scream loud
enough for the whole world to hear but nobody came.”
In January 2021, Victim gave her first Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”) interview, where
she disclosed that Codefendant put his penis and fingers in her vagina and that it hurt. Victim
told the interviewer that Appellant was in bed with her and Codefendant when it happened but
that Appellant was asleep and did not wake up.
3 In February 2021, Victim had a sexual assault forensic examination after she had
disclosed that an adult had put his fingers and penis in her vagina.
In March 2021, after moving foster homes, Victim told her permanent foster mother
(“Permanent Foster Mother”) that Codefendant used to put his penis in her anus when she slept
in the bed with Codefendant and Appellant. Victim stated that Appellant told him not to do that,
but that Codefendant refused and told Appellant to shut up. In May 2021, Victim told Permanent
Foster Mother that Codefendant and Appellant would watch bad movies on Codefendant’s
phone, and then Appellant would teach Victim “how to be a big girl for when she got married”
and “how to be a big girl with daddy…with her vagina.” In July 2021, Victim further disclosed
that Appellant once called her in sick to school so that Appellant, Codefendant, Victim’s
younger sister, and Victim could have a “girls’ day.” Victim reported that she became afraid and
tried to hide under the bed, but that Codefendant pulled her out from underneath the bed. Victim
told Permanent Foster Mother that Codefendant and Appellant then held her by the neck while
they spanked her with a belt. Victim stated that Codefendant then raped her while Appellant held
her down, covered her mouth, told her not to scream, and threatened that if Victim ever told
anybody, Appellant and Codefendant would go to jail and Victim would not have any parents or
a place to live or food to eat.
In August 2021, Victim gave a second CAC interview, during which she disclosed that
Appellant held her hand over Victim’s mouth while Codefendant put his penis in Victim’s
vagina and his fingers in Victim’s anus.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to consolidate Appellant’s and Codefendant’s cases.
Appellant filed a motion to sever, arguing that a joint trial would result in prejudice because the
parties had adverse defenses which could impede her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
4 The circuit court denied the motion. The parties stipulated to the admission of evidence pursuant
to Section 491.075, which allowed nine witnesses to testify to Victim’s disclosures. 1
Appellant was found guilty as charged following a jury trial, and was sentenced to
consecutive terms of 30 years for statutory rape and 15 years for child molestation, for a total of
45 years. This appeal follows.
Points I & II: Admission of Photographs of Appellant’s House
In her first and second points on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in
overruling her objection to the admission of photographs of the unclean state of Appellant and
Codefendant’s home at the time Victim and her siblings were removed from the home on
September 18, 2020, because the photographs lacked logical and legal relevance and were highly
prejudicial. 2 Specifically, Appellant argues that the photographs were irrelevant because they did
not help prove any element of the charges of statutory rape or child molestation. Therefore, the
potential for unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value in that the images led the jury to
believe Appellant was a bad mother and must have been guilty of the charged crimes. Appellant
further argues that the prejudice caused by the admission of the photographs warrants a reversal
because the photographs so misled the jury on the pertinent issues that there is a reasonable
probability that Appellant would have been acquitted but for the erroneously admitted
photographs.
1 All Section References are to the Missouri Revised Statutes (2020). 2 Appellant’s first and second points relied on posit that the “[t]he trial court erred in overruling Ms. Dodd’s objections made during [the investigator’s] testimony regarding the unclean condition of the Dodd family residence, and to the admission of the State’s Exhibits 3 through 20A,” however, Appellant’s discussions of both points do not include any argument related to the investigator’s testimony regarding the condition of the home. This Court must therefore presume that such argument is abandoned.
5 “The general rule in Missouri is that evidence must be both logically and legally relevant
in order to be admissible.” State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Mo. banc 2002). “Evidence is
logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence, or if it tends to corroborate evidence which itself is relevant and bears on the principal
issue of the case.” Id. (quoting State v. Mathews, 33 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000)).
“Logical relevance is a very low threshold.” Kappel v. Prater, 599 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Mo. banc
2020) (quoting State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 277 (Mo. banc 2002)). “The determination of
legal relevance—the balancing of the probative value of the proffered evidence against its
prejudicial effect on the jury—rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. “If the
prejudice of the logically relevant evidence outweighs its probative value, it should be
excluded.” State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Mo. banc 2017). We review the admission of
evidence for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only “if the error so influenced the jury
that, when considered with and balanced against all of the evidence properly admitted, there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion without the error.”
State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Mo. banc 2022).
There are 36 photographs at issue, including 18 unique images and 18 enlarged
duplicates, which were taken by the Children’s Division investigator and depict the inside and
outside of Appellant and Codefendant’s home during the investigator’s walkthrough on
September 18, 2020, which precipitated the children being taken into protective custody on that
day. The photographs were admitted over Appellant and Codefendant’s objections for relevance
during the investigator’s testimony. The photographs generally show unsanitary conditions
6 within the home, including trash, feces, blood, stagnant water, bedbugs, dirty carpeting, and a
dirty kitchen.
Here, even if the evidence was inadmissible for relevance, which this Court need not
determine, reversal is not warranted because Appellant has not demonstrated that she would have
been acquitted but for the admission of the photographs in light of the overwhelming evidence of
guilt against her. “In a criminal trial involving improperly admitted evidence, the test for
prejudice is whether the error was outcome-determinative.” State v. Denham, 686 S.W.3d 357,
373 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Thomas, 628 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Mo. App. E.D.
2021)). “A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice expresses a judicial conclusion that the
erroneously admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced
against all evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have
acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Thigpen, 548 S.W.3d
302, 319 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)). “Prejudice is not outcome-determinative when evidence of
guilt is otherwise overwhelming.” Id. (quoting State v. Duncan, 397 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2013)).
At trial, the jury heard from multiple witnesses who described Victim’s detailed
disclosures of Appellant’s conduct in aiding Codefendant’s sexual abuse against Victim. Both
the school nurse and the school principal testified that Victim told them that her family would go
into a “trance” and that they would hurt her and touch her “there,” indicating her groin area, and
that sometimes her hands had “super powers” to stop it, but “sometimes it doesn’t work and they
hurt her there.” The school nurse and principal also testified to Victim’s disclosure that, on the
morning of September 18, 2020, after they discovered blood in Victim’s pull-up and on the toilet
7 seat after Victim used the restroom, Victim disclosed that Appellant had given her a shower that
morning because “she hurt down there.”
Next, Victim’s foster mothers testified to Victim’s various disclosures regarding
Appellant’s role in the abuse committed against Victim. First, Respite Foster Mother testified to
Victim’s disclosure that Appellant was not only present while Codefendant abused Victim, but
that Appellant was doing “the same things as daddy,” as well as Victim’s disclosure that
Appellant and Codefendant would hold her down and cover her mouth while Codefendant
abused and raped her, and that Victim would “scream loud enough for the whole world to hear
but nobody came.” Permanent Foster Mother testified to additional disclosures, including that
Victim was made to sleep with Appellant and Codefendant, which she did not like, and that
Codefendant would put his penis in her anus, even when Appellant told him to stop. Permanent
Foster Mother further testified to Victim’s disclosure that Codefendant and Appellant would
watch porn, and then Appellant would teach Victim “how to be a big girl for when she got
married” and “how to be a big girl with daddy…with her vagina.” Finally, Permanent Foster
Mother testified to Victim’s disclosure about the day Appellant called her in sick to school for a
“girls’ day,” and that, when she became afraid and tried to hide under the bed, Codefendant
pulled her out from underneath the bed and then he and Appellant held her by the neck while
they spanked her with a belt. Victim disclosed that Codefendant then raped her while Appellant
held her down, covered her mouth, told her not to scream, and threatened her. Permanent Foster
Mother described how Victim referred to the abuse as if it occurred frequently rather than
incidentally.
Victim’s two CAC interviews were also admitted into evidence and played for the jury,
in which Victim specifically described an instance when Codefendant put his penis and fingers
8 in her vagina and anus while Appellant was asleep in the bed with them, and the instance where
Appellant held her down and put her hand over Victim’s mouth to keep her from screaming
while Codefendant raped her.
Additionally, extensive evidence was admitted describing the emotional and physical
impact of the abuse on Victim, including testimony from the child psychiatrist who treated
Victim explaining how Victim had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder secondary
to complex trauma, oppositional defiant disorder, and encopresis and enuresis, or incontinence,
all of which can stem from trauma or sexual abuse. Multiple witnesses testified to Victim’s
difficulties with incontinence, which resulted in between 15-20 accidents per day, which was
likely the result of sexual abuse. Finally, Victim’s own statements demonstrated sexual
knowledge far beyond what would be expected of or appropriate for a six-year-old child, with no
other reasonable explanations provided for how she learned such information.
On this record, this Court is unpersuaded that the photographs of Appellant’s home so
influenced the jury that there is a reasonable probability that Appellant would not have been
found guilty but for their admission, as the evidence of guilt is undeniably overwhelming. See
Denham, 686 S.W.3d at 373. Accordingly, Points I and II are denied.
Point III: Motion to Sever Trial
In her third and final point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in
failing to grant her motion to sever her trial from Codefendant’s because Codefendant’s
additional charge of child molestation for touching Victim’s anus with his hand allowed for the
introduction of evidence that would have been inadmissible against Appellant in a separate trial.
Appellant posits that she was prejudiced by the joint trial because the evidence related to the
charge only against Codefendant was not only inadmissible specifically against her, but it also
9 muddled the evidence related to when Appellant acted with Codefendant, and the jury was thus
unable to compartmentalize the evidence related only to Appellant.
While Appellant argues that the circuit court’s denial of her motion to sever was in error
due to prejudice caused by Codefendant’s additional charge, this argument was not properly
preserved, as Appellant raised different arguments in both her motion to sever and her motion for
new trial than she raises now on appeal.
Appellant’s pretrial motion to sever raised two potential sources of prejudice: the
possibility of antagonistic defenses with Codefendant and that a joint trial could prejudice her
Fifth Amendment right not to testify against herself. In her motion for new trial, Appellant
argued that prejudice was created by joinder with Codefendant, who had an additional charge,
because joinder had occurred only two months before trial. Now on appeal, Appellant has
abandoned the arguments raised in the motions below and raises entirely new arguments related
to Codefendant’s additional charge resulting in prejudice from inadmissible evidence against
Appellant and potential confusion of the evidence by the jury. Because these arguments were not
raised in the motion to sever, at trial during the admission of evidence, nor in the motion for a
new trial, these arguments are not preserved and are reviewable only for plain error.
This Court does not generally review unpreserved claims of error. State v. Brandolese,
601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020). Rule 30.20 provides an exception allowing that “plain
errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court
finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” 3 Id. (quoting Rule
30.20). Rule 30.20 makes clear that plain error review is a discretionary, two-step process. See
3 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2023), unless otherwise indicated.
10 Minor, 648 S.W. at 731. The first step is to determine whether the claim of error facially
establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
resulted. State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. banc 2009). Plain errors are those that are
evident, obvious, and clear. Id. In the absence of such a determination, an appellate court should
decline to review for plain error. See Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526. If plain error is found on
the face of the claim, then the court may proceed to the second step to determine whether the
claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. See Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d
at 607.
“The decision to sever a joint trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
State v. Mack, 624 S.W.3d 436, 452 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d
876, 885 (Mo. banc 1993)). “An appellate court will not disturb that ruling unless there is an
abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice.” Id. “The defendant on appeal bears the burden of
affirmatively showing that the joint trial prejudiced his right to a fair trial.” Id. (citing State v.
Denzmore, 436 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)).
“Missouri courts generally favor joint trials because they further the interests of justice by
avoiding inconsistent verdicts and lead to more accurate assessments of relative culpability—
advantages which sometimes operate to the defendant’s benefit.” Isa, 850 S.W.2d at 885
(quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1987)) (internal quotations omitted).
Severance is appropriate when “the court finds that the probability for prejudice exists in a joint
trial.” Section 545.880.2. “A motion to sever is appropriate only where there is a serious risk of
compromise of the defendant’s rights or the jury’s ability to make a reliable judgment about guilt
or innocence.” Mack, 624 S.W.3d at 452. The probability for prejudice exists where:
(1) At least one but not all of the defendants jointly charged is, if convicted subject to jury assessment of punishment; . . .
11 (2) There is, or may reasonably be expected to be, material and substantial evidence admissible against less than all of the joint defendants; (3) There exists an out of court statement of a codefendant which makes reference to another of the joint defendants, but is not admissible against that defendant; ... (4) Severance of the joint defendants is necessary to achieve a fair determination of guilt or innocence of any defendant.
Section 545.880; Rule 24.06.
“Severance is required when the proof is such that a jury could not be expected to
compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to the separate defendants.” Denzmore, 436 S.W.3d
at 640 (quoting State v. Oliver, 791 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990)). The purpose of
severance is to “protect defendants in joint trials from being convicted on evidence that would be
inadmissible against them in a separate trial.” State v. Ward, 782 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1989). “Severance is not required when a less drastic course, such as the provision of proper
jury instructions, will prevent prejudice to the defendant.” Mack, 624 S.W.3d at 453.
Here, Appellant’s unpreserved arguments fail to meet her burden to prove that the denial
of her motion to sever resulted in an abuse of discretion, let alone manifest injustice necessary
for a finding of plain error. First, contrary to Appellant’s conclusory statement that all evidence
related to Codefendant’s additional charge would be inadmissible against her in a separate trial,
the evidence would have been admissible to show a complete and coherent picture of the charged
offenses, in that it provided the full context of the abuse being alleged by Victim and the timeline
of Victim’s various disclosures. See State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 474 (Mo. banc 2012); see
also Oliver, 791 S.W.2d at 786 (allowing evidence of kidnapping by codefendant to be
introduced in a murder trial under the ‘complete story’ exception despite implicating defendant
in uncharged crime); State v. Hamilton, 892 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995) (“The state may
paint a complete picture of the crime charged and need not sift and separate the evidence.”).
12 Additionally, the evidence would also have been admissible as relevant to Victim’s credibility,
in that it tended to show consistency in Victim’s disclosures as well as Victim’s age-
inappropriate sexual knowledge. State v. Shade, 657 S.W.3d 282, 293 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)
(“Anything that has the legitimate tendency to throw light on the accuracy, truthfulness, and
sincerity of a witness is proper for determining the credibility of the witness.”).
Appellant next argues that the evidence was complex, confusing to the jury, and therefore
prevented the jury from fairly determining guilt. Appellant first points to a potential
inconsistency in Victim’s testimony, however, Appellant does not identify how a separate trial
would make the inconsistencies in a minor’s testimony less confusing. See N.J.K. v. Juvenile
Officer, 139 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (“[I]n cases involving such young victims
and sensitive and embarrassing subject matter, it is not uncommon for children’s accounts of the
abuse to contain some variations, contradictions or lapses in memory.”) (internal citations
omitted). While inconsistencies are a factor in the totality of the circumstances examined to
determine admissibility of a child’s testimony, id. at 256, Appellant stipulated to the
admissibility of the testimony, and therefore any inconsistencies more properly go to credibility,
State v. Sprinkle, 122 S.W.3d 652, 663 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).
Finally, Appellant argues that prejudice exists because the evidence was not clear as to
when the specific acts of child molestation occurred, in that the State failed to clearly distinguish
the evidence admissible against Codefendant on the additional charge from the rest of the
evidence. Appellant relies on State v. Denzmore, where the State used the exact dates the crimes
in question occurred as well as emphasized the difference in charges between the two
codefendants during trial. 436 S.W.3d at 640. Unlike in Denzmore, the crimes at issue here were
not isolated incidents that can be readily contained to a single date, but rather a pattern of
13 ongoing abuse. In the instant case, the State was not required to establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt on which date the abuse occurred, only that it occurred within the date range
established in the information. Section 566.032; Section 566.067. Consequentially, the specific
date was not relevant to the jury’s finding of guilt.
Even if we were to imagine that error occurred here, Instruction No. 11 dashes hope that
Appellant would prevail on this argument. Instruction No. 11 directed the jurors to separately
consider each count, and the jury is presumed to follow instructions. Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 731.
Severance is not appropriate when a less drastic measure will suffice. Isa, 850 S.W.2d at 885.
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the evidence was outcome determinative,
or “so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all of the evidence
properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different
conclusion but for the erroneously admitted evidence.” State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 592
(Mo. banc 1997). Thus, Appellant’s claim fails under both abuse of discretion and plain error
review. Point III is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment is affirmed.
Renée D. Hardin-Tammons, J.
Philip M. Hess, P.J., and Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., concur.