In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112524 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cape Girardeau County vs. ) Cause No. 22CG-CR00023-01 ) JOSHUA L. STOKES, ) Honorable Benjamin F. Lewis ) Appellant. ) FILED: April 22, 2025
Introduction
Joshua Stokes (Stokes) appeals his conviction of second-degree burglary and stealing.
Stokes appeals only the denial of his Batson1 challenge during jury selection. Finding the State
provided a race-neutral reason for using their peremptory strike and Stokes failed to prove the
reason was pretextual, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Factual and Procedural Background
Stokes was arrested on January 5, 2022 and charged with burglary and stealing. His case
proceeded to jury trial. Venireperson 15 remained silent, made no comment, nor answered any
questions during voir dire. The State made no attempt to elicit any information or statement from
1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Venireperson 15. Following voir dire, the State moved to use a peremptory strike against the
potential juror.
Stokes, a Black male, objected to the State’s peremptory strike of Venireperson 15, a Black
female, claiming she was stricken based on her race in violation of Batson. The circuit court heard
arguments on the Batson claim and denied the challenge. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found Stokes guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. This
appeal follows.
Standard of Review
This Court may only overturn a Batson challenge if the circuit court’s findings were clearly
erroneous. State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Mo. banc 2006). A decision is clearly
erroneous if we are left with the definite and firm opinion that a mistake has been made. Id.
Discussion
In his sole point on appeal, Stokes claims that the circuit court clearly erred by overruling
his objection to the State’s peremptory strike of Venireperson 15, arguing the strike was racially
pretextual and a violation of his equal protection rights. We disagree.
“The Equal Protection Clause prevents parties from using peremptory challenges to strike
potential jurors on the basis of race.” State v. Carter, 415 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Mo. banc 2013) (citing
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)). Determining whether a Batson violation has occurred
involves a three-step procedure. Id. First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard
to the venirepersons struck by the State and identify the cognizable racial group to which the
venireperson belongs. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The State must then provide a reasonably specific
and clear race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. at 98 & n.20. The burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that the State’s proffered reasons for the strikes were merely pretextual and that
the strikes were racially motivated. See State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. banc 1987).
2 Our role is not to “identify additional reasons why the prosecutor could have stricken the
venireperson but rather [to] look at whether the reason or reasons given by the prosecutor are race-
neutral and, if so, at whether the defendant has shown that the seemingly race-neutral reason or
reasons are merely pretextual.” State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 690 (Mo. banc 2010) (emphasis
omitted).
The reason proffered by the State after a Batson challenge is presumedly race-neutral
unless there is an inherently discriminatory intent. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo.
banc 1992). Batson allows the State to use its peremptory challenges based on the prosecutor’s
“hunches” as long as it is not racially motivated. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 65. However, the State
is not shielded from constitutional scrutiny simply because they leave one or more minorities on
the jury or do not use all their peremptory challenges on minorities. See Bateman, 318 S.W.3d at
690; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940. “[T]o hold that mere tokenism satisfied Batson would fly in the
face of its purpose.” State v. Hunter, 802 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991). Additionally,
because vague references to attributes like demeanor are largely irrelevant to an individual’s
capability to sit on a jury, they are heavily scrutinized. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d at 655.
Nevertheless, “race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror’s
demeanor (e.g., nervousness, inattention), making the trial court’s firsthand observations of even
greater importance.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008). Therefore, when reviewing
a decision regarding a Batson challenge, the circuit court is given significant deference as the
finder of fact because its findings largely depend on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Bateman, 318 S.W.3d at 687.
Stokes fails to establish circuit court error in denying the Batson challenge because he has
not shown the State’s reason for the preemptive strike was racial pretext. In response to Stokes’s
3 Batson challenge, the State initially cited the remaining presence of Venireperson 17, a Black
female, on the jury. This answer does not satisfy the Batson standard or shield the State from a
claim of racial pretext. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d at 690. Had this been the State’s only response, it
would have been a clear violation of Batson.
However, the State further clarified that Venireperson 15 was quiet, disinterested, and
inattentive during voir dire. This Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri have found demeanor
such as silence and inattentiveness to be a valid race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. See
State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Miller, 162 S.W.3d 7, 16 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2005). Therefore, the State has met its duty to tender an adequate reason for the strike.
In response to the State’s proffered reason, Stokes counters that Venireperson 15 was a
similarly situated juror to those of a different race that were kept on the jury, the State chose not
to address any of the stated concerns during voir dire, and that defense counsel did not personally
view the juror as being uninterested.
The existence of similarly situated jurors is undoubtedly probative of racial pretext.
Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940. There were seven white jurors that sat for the trial despite not speaking
during voir dire. However, Venireperson 15 was not stricken solely because she did not speak.
Her silence was a contributive factor that, when combined with her inattentiveness and disinterest,
influenced the peremptory strike. There is no evidence or argument submitted that the other silent
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112524 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cape Girardeau County vs. ) Cause No. 22CG-CR00023-01 ) JOSHUA L. STOKES, ) Honorable Benjamin F. Lewis ) Appellant. ) FILED: April 22, 2025
Introduction
Joshua Stokes (Stokes) appeals his conviction of second-degree burglary and stealing.
Stokes appeals only the denial of his Batson1 challenge during jury selection. Finding the State
provided a race-neutral reason for using their peremptory strike and Stokes failed to prove the
reason was pretextual, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Factual and Procedural Background
Stokes was arrested on January 5, 2022 and charged with burglary and stealing. His case
proceeded to jury trial. Venireperson 15 remained silent, made no comment, nor answered any
questions during voir dire. The State made no attempt to elicit any information or statement from
1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Venireperson 15. Following voir dire, the State moved to use a peremptory strike against the
potential juror.
Stokes, a Black male, objected to the State’s peremptory strike of Venireperson 15, a Black
female, claiming she was stricken based on her race in violation of Batson. The circuit court heard
arguments on the Batson claim and denied the challenge. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found Stokes guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. This
appeal follows.
Standard of Review
This Court may only overturn a Batson challenge if the circuit court’s findings were clearly
erroneous. State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Mo. banc 2006). A decision is clearly
erroneous if we are left with the definite and firm opinion that a mistake has been made. Id.
Discussion
In his sole point on appeal, Stokes claims that the circuit court clearly erred by overruling
his objection to the State’s peremptory strike of Venireperson 15, arguing the strike was racially
pretextual and a violation of his equal protection rights. We disagree.
“The Equal Protection Clause prevents parties from using peremptory challenges to strike
potential jurors on the basis of race.” State v. Carter, 415 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Mo. banc 2013) (citing
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)). Determining whether a Batson violation has occurred
involves a three-step procedure. Id. First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard
to the venirepersons struck by the State and identify the cognizable racial group to which the
venireperson belongs. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The State must then provide a reasonably specific
and clear race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. at 98 & n.20. The burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that the State’s proffered reasons for the strikes were merely pretextual and that
the strikes were racially motivated. See State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. banc 1987).
2 Our role is not to “identify additional reasons why the prosecutor could have stricken the
venireperson but rather [to] look at whether the reason or reasons given by the prosecutor are race-
neutral and, if so, at whether the defendant has shown that the seemingly race-neutral reason or
reasons are merely pretextual.” State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 690 (Mo. banc 2010) (emphasis
omitted).
The reason proffered by the State after a Batson challenge is presumedly race-neutral
unless there is an inherently discriminatory intent. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo.
banc 1992). Batson allows the State to use its peremptory challenges based on the prosecutor’s
“hunches” as long as it is not racially motivated. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 65. However, the State
is not shielded from constitutional scrutiny simply because they leave one or more minorities on
the jury or do not use all their peremptory challenges on minorities. See Bateman, 318 S.W.3d at
690; Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940. “[T]o hold that mere tokenism satisfied Batson would fly in the
face of its purpose.” State v. Hunter, 802 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991). Additionally,
because vague references to attributes like demeanor are largely irrelevant to an individual’s
capability to sit on a jury, they are heavily scrutinized. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d at 655.
Nevertheless, “race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror’s
demeanor (e.g., nervousness, inattention), making the trial court’s firsthand observations of even
greater importance.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008). Therefore, when reviewing
a decision regarding a Batson challenge, the circuit court is given significant deference as the
finder of fact because its findings largely depend on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Bateman, 318 S.W.3d at 687.
Stokes fails to establish circuit court error in denying the Batson challenge because he has
not shown the State’s reason for the preemptive strike was racial pretext. In response to Stokes’s
3 Batson challenge, the State initially cited the remaining presence of Venireperson 17, a Black
female, on the jury. This answer does not satisfy the Batson standard or shield the State from a
claim of racial pretext. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d at 690. Had this been the State’s only response, it
would have been a clear violation of Batson.
However, the State further clarified that Venireperson 15 was quiet, disinterested, and
inattentive during voir dire. This Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri have found demeanor
such as silence and inattentiveness to be a valid race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. See
State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Miller, 162 S.W.3d 7, 16 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2005). Therefore, the State has met its duty to tender an adequate reason for the strike.
In response to the State’s proffered reason, Stokes counters that Venireperson 15 was a
similarly situated juror to those of a different race that were kept on the jury, the State chose not
to address any of the stated concerns during voir dire, and that defense counsel did not personally
view the juror as being uninterested.
The existence of similarly situated jurors is undoubtedly probative of racial pretext.
Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940. There were seven white jurors that sat for the trial despite not speaking
during voir dire. However, Venireperson 15 was not stricken solely because she did not speak.
Her silence was a contributive factor that, when combined with her inattentiveness and disinterest,
influenced the peremptory strike. There is no evidence or argument submitted that the other silent
jurors shared the additional contributive factors that the State identified from Venireperson 15.
Therefore, there were not similarly situated jurors kept on the jury because of their race.
Furthermore, the State’s voir dire may be considered to support or refute an accusation of
racial pretext. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Neither the State nor Stokes went further than asking
potential jurors during voir dire if they had any conflicts or problems sitting for the case. The
4 circuit court is responsible for considering the entire circumstances of the voir dire objectively and
subjectively. State v. Andrews, 770 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989). Here, the circuit
court found no error in the State’s voir dire. On this record, we cannot find otherwise.
Moreover, there are conflicting accounts as to whether Venireperson 15 appeared to be
disinterested or inattentive. Each side claims they witnessed the demeanor in their favor. We look
again to the original decision, as it is the circuit court’s duty to observe jurors’ demeanors and
determine the credibility of the strike. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477. Because the circuit court denied
the challenge, we defer to its superior position to assess and rely on the legitimacy of the State’s
explanation. See State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 114.
However, we are deeply concerned with the overall lack of record on this challenge. The
State neither commented, nor raised any concerns of the juror’s demeanor until the Batson
challenge. Similarly, the circuit court provided no reasoning behind any of its decisions on the
record. Nevertheless, the circuit court found the peremptive strike was founded on an acceptable
race-neutral reason and there has been nothing to demonstrate that this decision was clearly
erroneous.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
________________________ Virginia W. Lay, J.
Lisa P. Page, P.J., concurs. Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, J., concurs.