In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District
DIVISION FOUR
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ED109731 )
Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) St. Louis County v. ) 19SL-CR07249-01 )
JEFFREY REUTER, ) Honorable Steven R. Ohmer )
Appellant. ) Filed: October 26, 2021
The State of Missouri (State) appeals from the trial court’s suppression of Jeffrey Reuter’s (Defendant) statements to a crisis negotiator during a barricaded standoff with police and to detectives while en route to the police station. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
The State charged Defendant with three counts of tampering with a judicial officer, alleging that Defendant engaged in conduct reasonably calculated to harass or alarm three circuit court judges by delivering a threatening manifesto to each judge’s residence. St. Louis County police officers travelled to Defendant’s house in Bonne Terre to execute an arrest warrant. Officers approached his front door, announced their presence, and requested that Defendant exit the house. Defendant stated that he would protect himself if the officers came through the door. The police retreated and surrounded Defendant’s house.
Detective Chris Koester (Detective Koester) was assigned to “crisis intervention and crisis negotiations,” and spoke with Defendant over the telephone during an hour-long standoff. Over the course of their conversation, Defendant frequently alluded to his willingness to defend himself against officers who might enter his house. Defendant was very upset about how “judges don’t follow the law,” and how judges did not treat him fairly. Defendant claimed he had exhausted every avenue to challenge his perceived judicial bias, but nothing worked. Detective Koester repeatedly asked him to surrender, suggested it would be in the best interest of his child, and enlisted Defendant’s mother to speak with him to effectuate a peaceful resolution.
When Defendant surrendered, he was handcuffed and placed into a police vehicle, but he was not advised of his Miranda 1 rights. Three detectives accompanied Defendant while he was transported to the police station. The detectives engaged in casual conversation with Defendant about topics such as football and dentistry. One detective thanked Defendant for his peaceful surrender. Defendant asked the detectives if they would have eventually made entry into his house, and a detective answered “yes.” Defendant then volunteered he was glad they did not because he had a firearm, but he took the magazine out of it prior to exiting the residence.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to police, including the statements through the door, over the telephone, and in the police vehicle, arguing they were obtained by custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress on all his statements to police.
This appeal follows.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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DISCUSSION
The State raises three points on appeal. First, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to police while he was in the residence because he was not “in custody.” Second, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to police while he was in the residence because neither the questioning through the door nor the telephone crisis negotiation were an “interrogation.” Third, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to police while he was being transported because the officers did not conduct an “interrogation.”
Standard of Review
“The State has ‘the burden at [a] suppression hearing to show by a preponderance of evidence that [a] motion to suppress should be denied and the evidence should be admitted.’” State v. Wright, 585 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting State v. Brooks, 185 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006)). “[A] trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.” Id. “[A] trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous if this court is left with a definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made.” Id.
In applying this standard of review, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, and consider all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. “However, whether the trial court’s factual findings and reasonable inferences establish that ‘the Fifth Amendment or any other provision of the United States Constitution [has been] violated is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.’” Id. (quoting State v. Stricklin, 558 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)).
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Point I
In Point I, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to the crisis negotiator while he was inside the residence during his standoff with law enforcement. The State asserts Defendant was not yet in custody because (1) Defendant did not submit to the officers’ authority when they informed him that they had come to arrest him; (2) Defendant did not open the door and instead avoided arrest and said he would protect himself if the officers entered the house; (3) while armed, Defendant remained inside the residence out of reach of the officers, with complete freedom of movement; (4) Defendant only talked to the police through the door and over the telephone; and (5) the officers did not arrest or physically seize Defendant or subject him to arrest-like restraints until after he exited the residence.
Analysis
The prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). “Custodial interrogation has two components: custody and interrogation.” State v. Little, 604 S.W.3d 708, 716 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). “Custodial interrogation” means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Here, both parties agree Defendant was not informed of his Miranda rights before he made statements to police through the door of his house and over the telephone. The question is whether Defendant was in custody when he made such statements.
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“Whether a suspect is in custody is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Little, 604 S.W.3d 708, 716 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). Our Supreme Court has identified several factors relevant to determine whether the totality of the circumstances establish that a suspect was in custody at the time of questioning: (1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to answer questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of questioning. State v. Werner, 9 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo. banc 2000). “Although determining custody is not limited to applying the factors listed above, their presence and absence guide courts in assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding interrogations.” Id. at 596.
This is a case of first impression because we find no Missouri cases addressing whether a suspect in a barricaded standoff with police officers is in custody for purposes of Miranda. However, this is not a novel issue, as courts from many other jurisdictions have addressed whether Miranda requires the suppression of statements by barricaded suspects who have not been informed of their rights. Regardless of how these courts reach their decisions, all appear to arrive at the same conclusion: Miranda does not mandate suppression. See e.g., U.S. v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1980) (no custody); West v. State, 923 P.2d 110 (Ala. App. 1996) (no custodial interrogation); State v. Stearns, 506 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. App. 1993) (Miranda does not require suppression); State v. Pejsa, 876 P.2d 963 (Wash. App. 1994) (no custodial
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interrogation); Atac v. State, 125 So.3d 806 (Fla. App. 2013) (no custody); State v. Cooper, 949 P.2d 660 (N.M. 1997) (no custodial interrogation); People v. Brewer, 720 P.2d 583 (Co. App. 1985) (no custodial interrogation); State v. Reimann, 870 P.2d 1346 (Kan. App. 1994) (no interrogation); People v. Treier, 630 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Monroe Cty. Ct. 1995) (no custody; no interrogation; and fell within exception to Miranda); Com. v. Jones, 683 A.2d 1181 (Pa. 1996) (no custody; no interrogation); State v. Bowen, 491 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. App. 1986) (no custodial interrogation); State v. Leonard, 802 A.2d 991 (Me. 2002) (no custody); State v. Patton, 2001 WL 112074 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2001) (no interrogation); State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967 (Wash. 1999) (public safety exception to Miranda applies).
In analyzing custody for the purpose of Miranda in a standoff situation, the courts consider whether a suspect: (1) can prevent law enforcement officials from exercising immediate control over his or her actions; (2) can move freely about the place in which they are barricaded; (3) is in the physical presence of an interrogating officer; (4) is able to terminate his or her conversation with police by putting down the phone; and (5) can control the direction of the conversation by discussing anything he or she wants. See e.g., Pejsa, 876 P.2d at 968 (citing Mesa, 638 F.2d at 586); Atac, 125 So.3d at 810; Brewer, 720 P.2d at 586.
A crisis negotiation with a barricaded suspect has been distinguished from the custodial setting at issue in Miranda. Mesa, 838 F.2d at 586. “[T]he key aspect of the custodial setting as described in Miranda is the isolation of the suspect in a room that is dominated by the law enforcement officials who will interrogate him,” which must be guarded against because “the suspect’s will [is] much more likely to be worn down when he [is] interrogated in an atmosphere controlled by the police.” Id. at 585-86. However, an armed, barricaded suspect exercises more control over the situation than an unarmed individual being interrogated in a police station. Id. at
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587. The law enforcement officials cannot physically restrain a barricaded suspect and subject him to whatever psychological techniques they think would be most effective. Id. Additionally, law enforcement officials do not have the same psychological advantage that is present in Miranda’s custodial setting because the barricaded suspect can threaten violence to keep the police at bay. Id. at 586.
Moreover, the primary goal of crisis negotiators in these circumstances is to peacefully resolve the standoff, not to collect incriminating evidence for later prosecution. Cooper, 949 P.2d at 667. Negotiators must build rapport with the suspect and obtain his or her trust in order to accomplish a peaceful resolution. Id. Indeed, if the suspect were to perceive that the crisis negotiator was asking questions merely seeking to incriminate the suspect, negotiations could break down and cause the suspect to become extremely dangerous. Id.
Here, Defendant prevented law enforcement from exercising immediate control over his actions by threatening the police officers if they entered his house to execute a warrant for his arrest, effectively barricading himself inside his house. Detective Koester informed Defendant over the phone that he was under arrest and that the police would not leave the premises until they retrieved him from the house. The police initiated contact by approaching Defendant’s house and speaking to him through his door, but they withdrew when Defendant announced that he would defend himself if they came through the door. The police reinitiated contact multiple times during the standoff by calling Defendant’s phone. Defendant’s freedom of movement was confined by the walls of his house. Yet, he was free to walk around inside, and was not subject to any arrest-like restraints until he exited his residence. He was able to refuse contact with the police by hanging up the phone at any time, and in fact did so twice during the hour-long standoff, which gave him control over the direction of his conversations with Detective Koester.
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In attempting to peacefully resolve the situation, Detective Koester enlisted the help of Defendant’s mother, who spoke to Defendant over the phone and begged him to surrender to the police. Detective Koester also asked Defendant to surrender for the sake of his child, of whom he had lost custody in his divorce proceedings. While the atmosphere outside Defendant’s house was police dominated, Defendant was not subject to domination because he was armed and inside his house when he spoke to Detective Koester. Defendant ultimately surrendered at the end of the crisis negotiation and was placed under arrest.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find Defendant was not in custody during crisis negotiations while in a standoff with law enforcement. Miranda does not require suppression of his statements to police through the door and over the telephone. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. Point I is granted.
We do not address the State’s second point regarding whether the statements through the door and over the telephone resulted from “interrogation” because the issue is rendered moot by our conclusion that Defendant was not in custody when he made those statements.
Point III
In Point III, the State argues the trial court clearly erred in finding a Miranda violation and suppressing the statements Defendant made to law enforcement officers while he was being transported to the police station. The State asserts that the officers did not conduct an “interrogation” by making statements that the officers should have known were “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,” in that (1) the officers merely thanked Defendant for peacefully surrendering and conversed with him about work and sports, (2) Defendant’s statements were not made in response to any question; and (3) it was Defendant who asked the
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officers whether they would have entered the house and who then volunteered information about the gun and ammunition.
Analysis
“‘Interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). However, the definition of interrogation does not extend to statements unexpectedly volunteered by a person in custody. Id. at 301-02. “‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Id. at 300.
In Innis, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of committing multiple crimes involving the use of a sawed-off shotgun, but police had not yet located the shotgun. Id. at 293- 94. The defendant was placed in a patrol vehicle and three officers accompanied him en route to the police station. Id. at 294. During the ride, two of the officers had a conversation in the presence of the defendant where one officer mentioned that there was a school for handicapped children nearby, and, “God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.” Id. at 294-95. As the officers discussed their search for the shotgun, the defendant interrupted and offered to show them where it was located. Id. at 295.
The United States Supreme Court held that these circumstances did not constitute an “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 302. The officers’ conversation between themselves was clearly not express questioning, nor was the defendant subjected to the “functional equivalent” by simply being in the presence of the officers’ conversation. Id. The Court stated, “[t]he case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a brief conversation, the
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officers should have known that the respondent would suddenly be moved to make a self- incriminating response.” Id. at 303. The Court held that the officers had no reason to know the defendant would so respond, and therefore, their brief remarks did not rise to the level of “interrogation.” Id.
Here, similar to Innis, Defendant was in a police vehicle with three detectives when he made the incriminating statements at issue. However, the detectives merely engaged the defendant in casual conversation about dentistry, the New England Patriots, and Tom Brady. One detective thanked Defendant for “coming out after barricading himself” and for “having a peaceful resolution for what could have [been] much worse.” Defendant asked the detectives if they would have made entry into his house if he had not surrendered, and a detective responded affirmatively. Defendant then stated he was glad they did not because he had a 9mm on him, but had taken the magazine out of the firearm prior to exiting the residence.
The record clearly shows that Defendant’s statements to the officers were not the product of an interrogation. Defendant’s voluntary statements were not in response to express questioning, nor was he subjected to the “functional equivalent” of interrogation. Defendant argues that the context of surrendering after an intense standoff created an environment where he was compelled to incriminate himself. We reject this argument and find any compulsion Defendant perceived in making his statements was not the result of any words or actions from the detectives, but was merely inherent to custody itself at best. The detective could not reasonably expect that thanking Defendant for his peaceful surrender would cause Defendant to volunteer incriminating statements. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements in the police vehicle. Point III is granted.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed.
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Lisa P. Page, Judge
Michael E. Gardner, P.J. and James M. Dowd, J., concur.