State of Missouri v. Eric J. Devalkenaere
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Opinion
Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) WD85232 Respondent, ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) ERIC J. DEVALKENAERE, ) October 17, 2023 ) Appellant. ) )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable J. Dale Youngs, Judge
Before Division Two: W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, Thomas N. Chapman, Judge, and Janet Sutton, Judge
Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Eric Devalkenaere
(“Devalkenaere”) was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree and
armed criminal action. He appeals. The judgment is affirmed.
Background
In criminal cases, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
State v. Hendricks, 619 S.W.3d 171, 173 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). Under this standard,
we accept as true all evidence tending to prove guilt along with all reasonable inferences
that support the verdict, and we disregard evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.
State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Mo. banc 2015). On December 3, 2019, A.H., T.S., and Devalkenaere were working as detectives
for the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department in the Violent Offender Squad. These
detectives wore plainclothes and drove unmarked vehicles that were not equipped with
lights and sirens. KCPD policy prohibited members of the Violent Offender Squad from
using their unmarked vehicles in a pursuit.
On December 3, 2019, A.H. was in his vehicle and exiting a parking lot on 43rd
Street when he saw a maroon-colored Mustang moving eastbound toward him at a high
rate of speed. A red pickup truck followed the Mustang at a high rate of speed. The
vehicles went through a green light at the intersection of 43rd and Cleveland heading
eastbound. A.H. did not call for uniformed officers to stop the vehicles, but he did report
to dispatch that there was a red truck chasing a maroon-colored Mustang. A.H. was
unable to report a make or model of the red truck. A.H. wondered about the location of
the police helicopter that day and mentioned that the two vehicles almost caused several
accidents. The police helicopter responded that it was above 35th and Hardesty and
asked for A.H.’s location. A.H. mentioned that he was at 43rd and Spruce and that the
vehicles that he had previously seen were going fast.
Officer E.V. was conducting surveillance in the police helicopter. Per KCPD
policy, the police helicopter does not engage in pursuits. Approximately 86 seconds after
the red pickup had passed A.H. going eastbound on 43rd Street, E.V. reported that he saw
a red pickup going westbound on 45th. At this time there were numerous red pickups in
the area. E.V. reported that the red pickup on 45th street was speeding, and that it was
2 going to run a red light and go northbound. 1 E.V. reported that there was not a Mustang
around the red pickup. E.V. believed that there was reasonable suspicion, but not
probable cause, that the red pickup going westbound on 45th street was the same pickup
that A.H. had seen. 2
A uniformed tactical officer reported to the police helicopter that he saw a red
truck drive past him and that the driver of the red truck was a black male driver with a
bright blue shirt and a stocking cap. This officer did not attempt to make a stop of the red
pickup.
At some point, Devalkenaere briefly followed the truck and reported the license
plate of the truck to dispatch. Devalkenaere made no attempt to stop the truck.
E.V. continued to monitor the red pickup from the helicopter. The red pickup
stopped at a residence on College Street. At that time, no police officer had attempted to
stop the red truck. The red pickup slowly positioned itself in the street to back into the
narrow driveway of the residence. The red pickup then began very slowly backing into
the driveway. The red pickup spent approximately 90 seconds slowly turning around in
the street and backing down the driveway. It then turned into the backyard of the
1 Video footage from the police helicopter was introduced as an exhibit at trial. The footage did not capture the reported speeding on 45th Street. 2 Probable cause must be particularized: “Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
3 residence. No attempt was made to stop the red pickup while it was slowly backing
down the driveway.
While the red truck backed down the driveway, E.V. reported over the radio that
the red truck was backing into the driveway of a residence and listed two potential street
addresses. Devalkenaere made a request to dispatch regarding whether any information
had come back on the license plate number he had reported but had not received an
answer. As the red pickup began to move into the backyard of the residence, T.S. radioed
to Devalkenaere that T.S. was at 39th and Indiana if Devalkenaere wanted to go to the
residence with T.S. Devalkenaere responded that he needed to put on a police vest first.
After the red truck had moved into the backyard of the residence, T.S. radioed that
he was at 41st and College. Devalkenaere radioed that he was nearby and would follow
T.S. in. T.S. reported over the radio that he and Devalkenaere were in plainclothes, but
were wearing vests. The red truck began backing under a carport, which was located in
the backyard of the residence and was attached to the house.
T.S. arrived at the residence more than two minutes after the red truck arrived and
while the truck was backing under the carport in the backyard. T.S. arrived prior to
Devalkenaere. T.S. parked in the driveway of the residence. He drew his gun and exited
his vehicle. A female, R.M., who lived with Victim at the residence, was standing on the
porch in a pink robe. T.S. assumed the woman lived at the residence, but he did not seek
any information from the woman. T.S. had already decided that he was going to enter the
backyard of her property to conduct an investigation regardless of whether the woman
4 consented to it. T.S. testified that he was there to investigate his suspicion that the driver
of the red truck had committed a crime more serious than traffic violations. T.S. admitted
that he did not have probable cause that such a crime was committed, but wanted to
investigate further based on the information A.H. put out over the radio. T.S. walked to
the back of the residence with his gun drawn. T.S. stated that his objective in going into
the backyard was to observe and learn. T.S. wanted to speak with the driver of the red
truck because it was possible that there was a victim of an unknown crime, a suspicion
which T.S. was basing on A.H.’s report of a red truck chasing a Mustang. After
proceeding into the backyard along the south side of the house, T.S. walked across the
yard toward where the red truck was slowly backing under the carport awning, which was
connected to the garage and basement of the house. T.S. followed the truck under the
awning.
Devalkenaere arrived at the residence shortly after T.S., as T.S. was already
walking toward the backyard. Devalkenaere was there to conduct an investigation and to
assist T.S.
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Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) WD85232 Respondent, ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) ERIC J. DEVALKENAERE, ) October 17, 2023 ) Appellant. ) )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable J. Dale Youngs, Judge
Before Division Two: W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, Thomas N. Chapman, Judge, and Janet Sutton, Judge
Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Eric Devalkenaere
(“Devalkenaere”) was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree and
armed criminal action. He appeals. The judgment is affirmed.
Background
In criminal cases, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
State v. Hendricks, 619 S.W.3d 171, 173 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). Under this standard,
we accept as true all evidence tending to prove guilt along with all reasonable inferences
that support the verdict, and we disregard evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.
State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Mo. banc 2015). On December 3, 2019, A.H., T.S., and Devalkenaere were working as detectives
for the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department in the Violent Offender Squad. These
detectives wore plainclothes and drove unmarked vehicles that were not equipped with
lights and sirens. KCPD policy prohibited members of the Violent Offender Squad from
using their unmarked vehicles in a pursuit.
On December 3, 2019, A.H. was in his vehicle and exiting a parking lot on 43rd
Street when he saw a maroon-colored Mustang moving eastbound toward him at a high
rate of speed. A red pickup truck followed the Mustang at a high rate of speed. The
vehicles went through a green light at the intersection of 43rd and Cleveland heading
eastbound. A.H. did not call for uniformed officers to stop the vehicles, but he did report
to dispatch that there was a red truck chasing a maroon-colored Mustang. A.H. was
unable to report a make or model of the red truck. A.H. wondered about the location of
the police helicopter that day and mentioned that the two vehicles almost caused several
accidents. The police helicopter responded that it was above 35th and Hardesty and
asked for A.H.’s location. A.H. mentioned that he was at 43rd and Spruce and that the
vehicles that he had previously seen were going fast.
Officer E.V. was conducting surveillance in the police helicopter. Per KCPD
policy, the police helicopter does not engage in pursuits. Approximately 86 seconds after
the red pickup had passed A.H. going eastbound on 43rd Street, E.V. reported that he saw
a red pickup going westbound on 45th. At this time there were numerous red pickups in
the area. E.V. reported that the red pickup on 45th street was speeding, and that it was
2 going to run a red light and go northbound. 1 E.V. reported that there was not a Mustang
around the red pickup. E.V. believed that there was reasonable suspicion, but not
probable cause, that the red pickup going westbound on 45th street was the same pickup
that A.H. had seen. 2
A uniformed tactical officer reported to the police helicopter that he saw a red
truck drive past him and that the driver of the red truck was a black male driver with a
bright blue shirt and a stocking cap. This officer did not attempt to make a stop of the red
pickup.
At some point, Devalkenaere briefly followed the truck and reported the license
plate of the truck to dispatch. Devalkenaere made no attempt to stop the truck.
E.V. continued to monitor the red pickup from the helicopter. The red pickup
stopped at a residence on College Street. At that time, no police officer had attempted to
stop the red truck. The red pickup slowly positioned itself in the street to back into the
narrow driveway of the residence. The red pickup then began very slowly backing into
the driveway. The red pickup spent approximately 90 seconds slowly turning around in
the street and backing down the driveway. It then turned into the backyard of the
1 Video footage from the police helicopter was introduced as an exhibit at trial. The footage did not capture the reported speeding on 45th Street. 2 Probable cause must be particularized: “Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
3 residence. No attempt was made to stop the red pickup while it was slowly backing
down the driveway.
While the red truck backed down the driveway, E.V. reported over the radio that
the red truck was backing into the driveway of a residence and listed two potential street
addresses. Devalkenaere made a request to dispatch regarding whether any information
had come back on the license plate number he had reported but had not received an
answer. As the red pickup began to move into the backyard of the residence, T.S. radioed
to Devalkenaere that T.S. was at 39th and Indiana if Devalkenaere wanted to go to the
residence with T.S. Devalkenaere responded that he needed to put on a police vest first.
After the red truck had moved into the backyard of the residence, T.S. radioed that
he was at 41st and College. Devalkenaere radioed that he was nearby and would follow
T.S. in. T.S. reported over the radio that he and Devalkenaere were in plainclothes, but
were wearing vests. The red truck began backing under a carport, which was located in
the backyard of the residence and was attached to the house.
T.S. arrived at the residence more than two minutes after the red truck arrived and
while the truck was backing under the carport in the backyard. T.S. arrived prior to
Devalkenaere. T.S. parked in the driveway of the residence. He drew his gun and exited
his vehicle. A female, R.M., who lived with Victim at the residence, was standing on the
porch in a pink robe. T.S. assumed the woman lived at the residence, but he did not seek
any information from the woman. T.S. had already decided that he was going to enter the
backyard of her property to conduct an investigation regardless of whether the woman
4 consented to it. T.S. testified that he was there to investigate his suspicion that the driver
of the red truck had committed a crime more serious than traffic violations. T.S. admitted
that he did not have probable cause that such a crime was committed, but wanted to
investigate further based on the information A.H. put out over the radio. T.S. walked to
the back of the residence with his gun drawn. T.S. stated that his objective in going into
the backyard was to observe and learn. T.S. wanted to speak with the driver of the red
truck because it was possible that there was a victim of an unknown crime, a suspicion
which T.S. was basing on A.H.’s report of a red truck chasing a Mustang. After
proceeding into the backyard along the south side of the house, T.S. walked across the
yard toward where the red truck was slowly backing under the carport awning, which was
connected to the garage and basement of the house. T.S. followed the truck under the
awning.
Devalkenaere arrived at the residence shortly after T.S., as T.S. was already
walking toward the backyard. Devalkenaere was there to conduct an investigation and to
assist T.S. with the investigation that T.S. was performing. He exited his vehicle and
proceeded across the front lawn on the north side of the house toward the back, which he
did as T.S. proceeded down the driveway on the south side of the house and into the
backyard. Devalkenaere saw the resident of the home standing on her front porch in a
pink bathrobe. Although the woman was simply standing on her front porch in a robe,
5 Devalkenaere pointed his gun at her and told her not to move. 3 Devalkenaere did not
stop to talk to her as he proceeded to the back of the house, but asked the resident how
many people were in the back of the house as he proceeded. Devalkenaere did not ask
the resident for her permission to enter her private property because he was going into the
backyard regardless of whether she consented. 4 Devalkenaere was there to help
investigate a possible crime but he did not know what crime. Devalkenaere testified that
he was aware that he was on private property with his gun drawn without a warrant and
without probable cause that the driver of the red truck had committed a crime other than a
traffic violation. A fence-like barricade blocked Devalkenaere from entering the
backyard of the house. Devalkenaere kicked over this barricade and entered the
backyard.
Nine seconds after T.S. approached the carport after having walked across the
backyard, Devalkenaere fired four shots at Victim. 5 One shot hit Victim in the leg, and
one shot hit Victim in the chest and was fatal. T.S. was underneath the carport and
standing directly in front of the truck on the driver’s side when Devalkenaere began
3 Devalkenaere denied that this occurred. However, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. R.M. testified that Devalkenaere pointed his gun at her. 4 Devalkenaere testified that he was going into the backyard regardless of whether he had R.M.’s consent because T.S. was going to be in the backyard and T.S. would be anticipating that Devalkenaere would be in a position to assist with the investigation. 5 The exhibit containing the helicopter surveillance footage shows that the helicopter camera zoomed out approximately two seconds before the gunshots and zoomed out further upon hearing the gunshots.
6 shooting. T.S. testified that, in the nine seconds after he approached the vehicle, he had
attempted to instruct Victim to put the truck in park, had tried to explain that the truck
was not going to fit in the garage, and had attempted to inform Victim that the mirrors on
the truck stuck out too far. T.S. was unsure if Victim could hear him over the sound of
the truck, and T.S. testified that T.S. was not shouting. Regarding what happened at the
time of the shooting, T.S. testified that he was instructing Victim to put the truck in park,
when he heard Devalkenaere say “he’s got a gun, he’s got a gun” and then immediately
begin firing at Victim. T.S. gave a statement hours after the shooting, in which T.S. stated
that, as he attempted to speak with the driver, he saw the driver’s left hand on the steering
wheel and the driver was looking at him. T.S. could see Victim’s left hand waving at T.S.
in an open position when Devalkenaere said Victim had a gun (which Devalkenaere later
testified was in Victim’s left hand) and immediately began firing at Victim. T.S. never
saw Victim in possession of a gun and never saw Victim make a motion that he was
reaching for a gun. At no point did T.S. believe his life was threatened until he heard
Devalkenaere begin firing his gun. T.S. testified that he saw Victim’s body tilt toward the
passenger side of the truck after hearing the shots fired by Devalkenaere.
Devalkenaere testified that, prior to the shooting, he saw Victim lean to the
passenger side of the truck and reach into his waistband and pull out a gun with his left
hand. Devalkenaere testified that he then saw Victim position the gun between his legs
underneath the steering wheel. Devalkenaere testified that he then saw Victim raise the
7 gun with his left hand around the left side of the steering wheel, at which point
Devalkenaere fired four shots at Victim. 6
Victim was right-handed.
After Devalkenaere shot Victim, the truck rolled backward down a decline from
the carport area and into the open garage door, which was attached to and which opened
up into the basement of the house. The officers radioed that shots had been fired and
requested assistance. Numerous police cars arrived, and eventually a sweep of the garage
occurred.
In the light most favorable to the verdict, Victim was not in possession of a gun at
the time of the shooting. R.M. testified that, prior to Victim returning to the house, she
saw a gun that belonged to Victim on the third-to-the-bottom step of the stairs in the
basement/garage area, indicating that the gun was not in Victim’s possession at the time
of the shooting. The gun was later found on the ground near the driver’s side door of the
truck where the truck came to rest, which was a few feet from the basement stairs.
Although T.S. testified that he saw Victim slump to the right/passenger side of the truck
after the shots were fired, photos taken after the sweep showed Victim’s body leaned
6 Devalkenaere’s testimony in this regard was contrary to the verdict. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we disregard evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict. State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Mo. banc 2015). Thus, although provided for context, this testimony is disregarded under our prescribed standard of review.
8 toward the driver’s (left) side window, with his left arm dangling out of the window.
Photos showed the gun on the ground nearby. 7
Minutes after the shooting, Devalkenaere stated over the police radio: “When we
arrived here the lady in pink was telling us that the Mustang had come over here prior
with guns, and that’s what led to the pursuit witnessed by [A.H.]” However, neither T.S.,
nor Devalkenaere received such information from the resident when they arrived, nor did
they attempt to gather any such information from her when they arrived. 8
The State charged Devalkenaere with involuntary manslaughter in the first degree
for recklessly causing the death of Victim by shooting him. Devalkenaere was also
charged with armed criminal action. Devalkenaere waived his right to a jury trial. A
bench trial began on November 8, 2021. On November 11, 2021, the trial court judge
visited and examined the scene of the shooting. Following the close of the evidence and
closing arguments on November 12, 2021, the trial court took the matter under
advisement.
7 Less than four hours after the shooting on December 3, 2019, KCPD issued a media report indicating that a detective had shot a male subject inside the subject’s vehicle. The report indicated that the deceased male’s left arm and head were hanging out of the driver window of the vehicle and that a handgun was found in the vicinity of where the driver’s left hand was hanging. Devalkenaere first gave an initial statement on December 5, 2019, two days after the incident. 8 Devalkenaere agreed that he did not learn any such information prior to the shooting. He testified that he overheard such information after the shooting and put it out over the radio. Therefore, Devalkenaere’s broadcasted statement shortly after the incident, which suggested he had information prior to his entry onto Victim’s private property (with gun drawn) was false to the extent it suggested he had such information prior to (and justifying) his entry onto Victim’s private property.
9 On November 19, 2021, the trial court entered its verdict, which found
Devalkenaere guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter in the
second degree and guilty of armed criminal action. The trial court also made an oral
announcement of the verdict on that day which included legal conclusions and findings
on some of the factual issues presented. In the trial court’s oral announcement, the trial
court stated that there were numerous significant and troubling issues of fact which had
been presented in the case, and that the case involved issues of law for the trial court’s
determination including issues of law relating to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. The trial court found that there was a lack of any real dispute that
Devalkenaere and T.S. had no probable cause to believe that Victim had committed a
crime; that Devalkenaere and T.S. had no arrest warrant for Victim; that they were not at
the location of the shooting to arrest Victim; that they did not have probable cause to
obtain an arrest warrant for Victim; that they had no search warrant for the residence or
the red truck or probable cause to obtain one; that they did not have consent to be on the
property of the residence; that they were not engaged in a pursuit of Victim, fresh, hot, or
otherwise; and that no exigent circumstances justified the presence of T.S. and
Devalkenaere on the private property of the residence. The trial court concluded that the
backyard of the residence, and particularly the carport, driveway, and garage areas were
areas included within the curtilage of the residence, and that Victim had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in those areas such that they could not be deemed places that were
open to the public. The trial court determined that T.S. and Devalkenaere were not
10 lawfully present in the backyard/carport area. The trial court found that T.S. and
Devalkenaere were initial aggressors in the encounter with Victim and that they had a
duty to retreat prior to using force. The trial court found that Devalkenaere was not
acting in lawful self-defense when he shot and killed Victim; that Devalkenaere was not
acting in lawful defense of T.S. when he shot and killed Victim; and that, because
Devalkenaere and T.S. were not effecting an arrest, Devalkenaere did not lawfully utilize
deadly force as a law enforcement officer under applicable Missouri use of force laws.
The trial court found that Devalkenaere acted with criminal negligence in causing
Victim’s death.
On March 4, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing after which
Devalkenaere was sentenced to a term of three years on the conviction for involuntary
manslaughter in the second degree and a term of six years on the conviction for armed
criminal action, with the sentences to run concurrently.
Devalkenaere now appeals to this court.
Analysis
Devalkenaere was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree and
armed criminal action. The trial court also found that Devalkenaere was not acting in
lawful self-defense when he shot and killed Victim, that Devalkenaere was not acting in
lawful defense of T.S., and that Devalkenaere was not lawfully utilizing deadly force as a
law enforcement officer under applicable Missouri laws.
11 “A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree
if he or she acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person.” §
565.027.1. 9 Thus, in order to convict Devalkenaere of involuntary manslaughter in the
second degree, the prosecution was required to establish that Devalkenaere caused
Victim’s death, and that Devalkenaere acted with criminal negligence in doing so. A
person acts with criminal negligence “when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would
exercise in the situation.” § 562.016.5.
Additionally, Devalkenaere injected the issue of whether the shooting was justified
in defense of a third person (of fellow officer T.S.) under section 563.031. Generally,
section 563.031 contains provisions regarding when a person may use force in self-
defense or in defense of others. The defendant has the burden of injecting the issue of
justification under section 563.031. See § 563.031.5. Once the defendant has properly
injected the issue of justification, the state has the burden of proving the absence of such
justification beyond a reasonable doubt. See § 556.061(3). In other words, once the
defendant properly injects the issue, such that it can be submitted to the trier of fact, the
prosecution has the burden of persuading the trier of fact of the absence of justification
beyond a reasonable doubt. See § 556.061(3)(b) (“If the issue is submitted to the trier of
9 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as updated through the 2018 cumulative supplement.
12 fact any reasonable doubt on the issue requires a finding for the defendant on that issue”);
see also State v. Clark, 486 S.W.3d 479, 490 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (once defendant
injects issue of self-defense, burden shifts to state to prove absence of self-defense
beyond reasonable doubt). The trial court found that Devalkenaere was not justified in
shooting and killing Victim.
Devalkenaere raises eight points on appeal, five of which challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence (points 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7), two of which appear to present legal challenges
(points 1 and 3), and one point challenging his armed criminal action conviction on the
ground that his involuntary manslaughter conviction must be reversed (point 8). For ease
of analysis we address these points out of order. We first address Devalkenaere’s points
five and two, which challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the elements
that constitute involuntary manslaughter in the second degree. We then address
Devalkenaere’s fourth, sixth, and seventh points together, which challenge the evidence
regarding the trial court’s finding that the shooting was not justified under section
563.031. We then address Devalkenaere’s first point, which appears to present a legal
challenge to the trial court’s conclusion that Devalkenaere unlawfully entered Victim’s
curtilage. We then address Devalkenaere’s third point which presents a jumbled
argument that appears to be a legal challenge to the trial court’s finding that the shooting
was not justified. We conclude by addressing Devalkenaere’s eighth point, which
challenges his armed criminal action conviction on the basis that his armed criminal
13 action conviction cannot stand unless his involuntary manslaughter conviction is
affirmed.
Before addressing the points raised on appeal, we first address the standard of
review in this case as well as arguments raised in this appeal regarding what that standard
of review entails.
Standard of Review
Article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution provides “that in every
criminal case any defendant may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury trial and
submit the trial of such case to the court, whose finding shall have the force and effect of
a verdict of a jury.” See also Rule 27.01(b). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
in a court-tried criminal case, an appellate court applies the same standard used in a jury-
tried case. State v. Niederstadt, 66 S.W.3d 12, 13 (Mo. banc 2002). “[T]he appellate
court’s role is limited to a determination of whether the State presented sufficient
evidence from which a trier of fact could have reasonably found the defendant guilty.”
State v. Twitty, 506 S.W.3d 345, 346 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State v. Vandevere, 175
S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005)). “This is not an assessment of whether the Court
believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a
question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-
finder ‘could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 543-44 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State v. Nash, 339
S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011)). “[T]his Court does not weigh the evidence but,
14 rather, accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable
inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidence and inferences.”
State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Mo. banc 2015) (quotations, brackets, and
citation omitted); see also State v. Willis, 654 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Mo. banc 1983) (“We, of
course, take the evidence in the manner most favorable to the judgment and, where there
are no specific findings, assume that the trial judge made such findings, when supported
by evidence, as are consistent with the result he reached.”).
Devalkenaere argues that the evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to him. This argument appears to be based on a statement that the trial court
made at sentencing when addressing a mitigating factor. At sentencing, the trial court
stated:
The circumstances of the events as described during the trial, however, also provide the Court with the mitigating factor. I found as I considered the evidence of the case that the defendant Eric Devalkenaere testified credibly at trial. He was rushing to provide cover for [T.S.] who had rushed into the backyard with his weapon drawn prompting the defendant to do the same from the other side of the house. Although not in the Court’s view, again rightly or wrongly, beginning his obligation to act with reasonable care as the Court found he has failed to do, his natural reaction to protect his partner is a factor for me to also consider.
This statement was made by the trial court in assessing punishment rather than in
adjudicating guilt. This statement was made more than three months after the verdict had
been announced and entered. Devalkenaere’s guilt had already been adjudicated by that
time such that the trial court’s statement did not affect the verdict. See State v. Clark, 486
S.W.3d 479, 492 n.10 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (oral statements made by trial court at
15 sentencing in bench trial are not relevant to verdict where statements are made after trial
court has fully adjudicated guilt); see generally § 557.036 (guilt stage and punishment
stages of trial are separate). Devalkenaere cites to no legal authority whereby a trier of
fact in a bench trial may amend a verdict after it has been entered. The Missouri
Constitution requires that a verdict in a bench trial “shall have the force and effect of a
verdict of a jury.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 22(a). Additionally, there is no indication that the
trial court was attempting to amend its verdict, but instead was assessing factors related
to sentencing.
Further, at least with respect to Devalkenaere’s sufficiency of the evidence
challenges, it is no accident that courts regularly speak in terms of what “any” rational
trier of fact “could have” or “might have” found when assessing a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge. Sufficiency of the evidence challenges in Missouri have long echoed
“the due process standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).” State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 1998)
(quoting State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc 1993)). Jackson v. Virginia made
clear that, in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, “the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). Sufficiency of the evidence challenges
are regularly discussed in terms of whether the prosecution made a submissible case,
because “[s]ufficiency review essentially addresses whether the government’s case was
16 so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury.” Musacchio v. United
States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, “[a]ll that
a defendant is entitled to on a sufficiency challenge is for the court to make a ‘legal’
determination whether the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury at all.” Id. at 244.
Although Musacchio was a federal jury-tried case, the Missouri Supreme Court
has long held that the standard for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is the same in a
court-tried criminal case as it is in a jury-tried case, which is consistent with the Missouri
Constitution. See Niederstadt, 66 S.W.3d at 13; Mo. Const. art. I, § 22(a) (in court-tried
cases, the court’s “finding shall have the force and effect of a verdict of a jury”). And,
the Missouri Supreme Court has twice cited Musacchio with approval when delineating
the standard for sufficiency of the evidence challenges in Missouri. See State v. Clark,
490 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Mo. banc 2016); see also State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801,
809 (Mo. banc 2016). Because the question in a sufficiency challenge is whether the
evidence was sufficient to reach the trier of fact at all, what a particular trier of fact found
is not the focus of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, and is not necessarily
indicative of what another trier of fact could have found based on the evidence. See
Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d at 809 (quoting Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243). Instead, such a
challenge asks what any reasonable trier of fact could have found based on the evidence.
Id. In other words, if the evidence is sufficient for the case to be submitted to the trier of
17 fact (because a trier of fact could reasonably find guilt), a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge will invariably fail. 10
Moreover, Devalkenaere’s argument that we must review the verdict in the light
most favorable to him completely disregards the context of the statement made at
sentencing. Even if we were to consider the trial court’s oral statements at sentencing as
affecting the verdict (which we do not), the statement on which Devalkenaere relies does
not indicate that the trial court believed all of Devalkenaere’s testimony at trial, as he
argues. The trial court’s statement at sentencing was made with regard to a mitigating
factor and must be read in context. The specific mitigating factor that the court found
was that, even though Devalkenaere acted with criminal negligence in rushing into the
backyard, he did so out of genuine concern for T.S., who had already unreasonably
rushed into the backyard. The trial court’s comment regarding credibility must be read in
context. The trial court’s comment was made in the context of assessing mitigating and
aggravating factors, and the comment related to Devalkenaere’s state of mind in entering
the backyard.
We reject Devalkenaere’s arguments that we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to him, as his arguments are contrary to our prescribed standard of review.
10 This is not to suggest that what a particular fact-finder found in adjudicating guilt could not be relevant to a legal challenge separate and distinct from a sufficiency of the evidence challenge; however, a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is a distinct legal challenge that asks whether a defendant is entitled to acquittal as a matter of law because the evidence was so lacking that the case never should have been submitted to the trier of fact at all. See Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 244.
18 Point Five
In his fifth point, Devalkenaere argues that there was insufficient evidence to
prove the indispensable element that Devalkenaere’s negligence caused Victim’s death.
Devalkenaere’s fifth point on appeal is comprised of two paragraphs of arguments, which
fail to crystallize precisely what Devalkenaere is arguing. However, Devalkenaere’s
point relied on indicates that it is a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to an
indispensable element, which we understand to be the element of causation. Accordingly,
we address whether there was sufficient evidence that Devalkenaere caused Victim’s
death. We note that Devalkenaere fails to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict rendering his arguments analytically useless. Additionally, despite being such
a short argument section, Devalkenaere fails to support factual assertions in his argument
section with specific page references to the record on appeal in violation of Rule
84.04(e). In any case, we address the issue on the merits.
Devalkenaere was charged with causing Victim’s death by shooting Victim. The
evidence at trial was that Devalkenaere shot Victim twice, and that the gunshot wounds
were the cause of Victim’s death. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of
fact to find that Devalkenaere caused Victim’s death.
Point five is denied.
Point Two
In his second point on appeal, Devalkenaere argues that the trial court erred in
convicting him of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree because there was
19 insufficient evidence to establish that Devalkenaere acted with criminal negligence.
More specifically, Devalkenaere argues that there was no evidence that he grossly
deviated from any established standard of care.
Aside from the fact that Devalkenaere’s behavior that day was in conflict with his
training and many KCPD policies, 11 and aside from the fact that Devalkenaere’s entry
into the curtilage of the Victim’s residence was not lawful (as discussed in our analysis of
point one below), Devalkenaere’s second point fails to address the evidence that he
knowingly shot and killed Victim. There was evidence (including Devalkenaere’s own
testimony) that Devalkenaere intended to fire his gun and that he intended to strike
Victim at center mass, such as would be sufficient to support a finding that Devalkenaere
knowingly caused Victim’s death by shooting him. Section 562.021.4 provides, in
pertinent part: “If the definition of an offense prescribes criminal negligence as the
culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts purposely or knowingly or
11 Devalkenaere had been trained that the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in the home of a person and in the curtilage of the home. He had been trained that curtilage examples included “[a]ll outbuildings used in connection with the residence, such as garages, carport connected to house, sheds or barns connected with or in close vicinity of the residence. Clearly the arm’s length around the house.” Devalkenaere had been trained that if something was in the curtilage of a residence, it should be pictured as being inside the house. KCPD policies instructed Devalkenaere that an arrest can be made without a warrant in a private place where a person expects privacy only if there is probable cause and consent to enter; probable cause and exigent circumstances; or probable cause and officers had begun to physically effect an arrest in a public place, which the suspect attempts to defeat by escaping to a private place. The policies listed examples of exigent circumstances as: (1) a reasonable belief that unless the officer enters, there is an immediate threat of injury or death; (2) fresh pursuit of a fleeing suspect that the officer has probable cause to arrest for a serious felony freshly committed; (3) probable cause to believe that critical evidence will be destroyed unless an arrest is made immediately.
20 recklessly. . . .” Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that Devalkenaere acted
negligently in causing Victim’s death by shooting Victim.
Point Two is denied.
Points Four, Six, Seven
In his fourth, sixth, and seventh points, Devalkenaere contends that there was
insufficient evidence for the trial court to have found that his actions were not justified in
defense of another under section 563.031. In his fourth point, Devalkenaere contends
that the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to find that he was an initial
aggressor. In his sixth point, Devalkenaere makes the conclusory assertion that there was
insufficient evidence that his shooting of Victim was not justified. In his seventh point,
Devalkenaere argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that his
belief that he needed to shoot Victim was unreasonable.
The use of physical force in self-defense or in defense of others is justified in
certain circumstances delineated in section 563.031. Generally, a person is authorized to
“use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably
believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from
what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by
such other person . . . .” § 563.031.1. However, section 563.031.1 provides that there are
certain circumstances under which a person is not entitled to rely on the general
authorization of self-defense or defense of others. One such circumstance exists when
the person claiming justification was the initial aggressor in the encounter that led to the
21 use of force. § 563.031.1(1). If the person claiming justification is found to be the initial
aggressor, then such person is only justified in using such force if:
(a) He or she has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened use of unlawful force; or
(b) He or she is a law enforcement officer and as such is an aggressor pursuant to section 563.046; or
(c) the aggressor is justified under some other provision of [Chapter 563] or other provision of law[.]
§ 563.031.1(1). Additionally, a person using force in defense of a third person is not
justified in using such force under the general provisions of section 563.031.1 if: “Under
the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he or she
seeks to protect would not be justified in using such protective force[.]” §
563.031.1(2). 12
In addition to these general requirements regarding the use of force in defense
under section 563.031, there are further limitations on the use of deadly force in defense
of self or others. § 563.031.2. Section 563.031.2 provides:
A person shall not use deadly force upon another person under the circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless:
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to protect himself, or herself or her unborn child, or another against death, serious physical injury, or any forcible felony;
12 Additionally, a person is not justified in using force under section 563.031.1 if the person claiming justification “was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a forcible felony.” § 563.031.1(3).
22 (2) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle lawfully occupied by such person; or
(3) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is owned or leased by an individual, or is occupied by an individual who has been given specific authority by the property owner to occupy the property, claiming a justification of using protective force under this section.
Deadly force is “physical force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which
he or she knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury[.]”
§ 563.011(2).
The trial court found that T.S. and Devalkenaere were initial aggressors who were
not entitled to use force in their encounter with Victim without first retreating. The trial
court found that Devalkenaere did not act in lawful self-defense or in lawful defense of
T.S. when Devalkenaere shot and killed Victim. The trial court also found Devalkenaere
was not entitled to use force as a law enforcement officer under Missouri use of force
laws applicable to such officers (i.e., section 563.046) because it was conceded that
neither T.S. nor Devalkenaere were effecting an arrest of Victim.
“A person is entitled to acquittal as a matter of law on the basis of self-defense
only if there is undisputed and uncontradicted evidence clearly establishing self-defense.”
State v. Williams, 608 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). “Where there is conflicting evidence or when different inferences can
reasonably be drawn from the evidence, whether the defendant acted in defense of
23 another is a question for the trier of fact.” Id. (internal quotations, brackets, and citation
omitted).
Devalkenaere argues in his seventh point that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that Devalkenaere did not reasonably believe that his use of force was necessary
to defend against what he reasonably believed was the use or imminent use of unlawful
force.
As an initial matter, Devalkenaere argues that this was an indispensable element of
his conviction. This assertion is incorrect. Although it is indispensable that the trier of
fact find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s properly injected defense of
justification fails, a defense of justification may fail for more than one alternative reason.
For example, (and as pertinent to this case), force used by a defendant claiming that his
use of force was justified in defense of others may fail (1) because the trier of fact
determines the defendant was the initial aggressor (without being subject to an exception
under section 563.031.1(1)), or (2) because the trier of fact determines that the defendant
did not reasonably believe such force was necessary to defend another from what he or
she reasonably believed to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by another
person, or (3) because the trier of fact determines the defendant did not reasonably
believe the use of deadly force was necessary to defend another against death, serious
physical injury or a forcible felony, or (4) because the trier of fact determines that the
defendant did not reasonably believe that there were circumstances under which the
person whom the defendant sought to protect would be justified in using the force used
24 by the defendant. See § 563.031.1-2. If the trier of fact finds that the defense of
justification fails for any of these reasons, then it is not necessary for the trier of fact to
address whether the other circumstances required for the conduct to be justified were
present. In other words, when there are multiple circumstances that must all be present
for the use of force to be justified, then the finding by the trier of fact that any one of
them are absent dispenses with the necessity that the trier of fact address the others. As a
corollary, to establish that there was insufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that the
defense of justification failed, so as to be entitled to acquittal, a defendant must establish
that there was insufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find the absence of any of the
necessary circumstances that were in issue. This is true even if the trier of fact made no
specific findings on that element. See Willis, 654 S.W.2d at 79 (“We, of course, take the
evidence in the manner most favorable to the judgment and, where there are no specific
findings, assume that the trial judge made such findings, when supported by evidence, as
are consistent with the result he reached.”).
Thus, a defendant cannot establish that he or she is entitled to an acquittal by
showing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of the absence of only
one of the necessary circumstances; instead, the defendant must show that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding of the absence of each of the necessary
circumstances. Accordingly, Devalkenaere’s assertion that a single element of a multi-
element defense of justification is an indispensable element is incorrect. See State v.
Sinks, 652 S.W.3d 322, 339 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (even if defendant is not the initial
25 aggressor, claim of justifiable self-defense fails when the record contains sufficient
evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably could find that defendant lacked a
reasonable belief that he or she needed to use deadly force to protect against an imminent
use of unlawful force by the victim).
The trial court found against Devalkenaere on his defense of justification under
section 563.031. There was conflicting evidence as to whether Devalkenaere reasonably
believed that his use of deadly force was necessary to protect T.S. from serious physical
injury. There was conflicting evidence as to whether Devalkenaere reasonably believed
his use of force was necessary to defend against what he reasonably believed was the use
or imminent use of unlawful force by Victim. Accordingly, these factual questions were
in issue at trial. The trial court’s oral findings accompanying the verdict indicate that the
trial court found that Devalkenaere was not entitled to use force in defense of T.S.
because T.S. and Devalkenaere were initial aggressors and had a duty to retreat. The trial
court went on to find Devalkenaere was not acting in lawful defense of T.S. when he shot
and killed Victim. The trial court’s oral announcement did not make specific factual
findings regarding the other elements of Devalkenaere’s justification defense that were in
issue; thus, such issues are considered as having been found in accordance with the
verdict. When addressing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Thus, we consider whether the trial court
26 could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Devalkenaere did not reasonably
believe that his use of deadly force was necessary to protect T.S. from death or serious
physical injury and whether the trial court could have found that Devalkenaere did not
reasonably believe Victim was using or would imminently use unlawful force so as to
give rise to a reasonable belief that his own use of force was necessary to protect T.S.
Devalkenaere does not in any point on appeal challenge whether there was
insufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not
reasonably believe that deadly force was necessary to protect T.S. against death or serious
physical injury. This failure to address his use of deadly force is fatal to his claim that his
shooting of Victim was justified in defense of T.S.
In any case, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to reject
Devalkenaere’s defense of justification, as there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
trier of fact to find that Devalkenaere shot Victim at a time when he did not reasonably
believe that his use of deadly force was necessary to protect T.S. against death or serious
physical injury or that Devalkenaere did not reasonably believe Victim was using or
would imminently use unlawful force. Even though Devalkenaere’s arguments fail to
present the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and are therefore
analytically useless and insufficient to establish error, and even though Devalkenaere
does not properly address the sufficiency of the evidence on the deadly force
requirement, we address this point on the merits.
27 As there was conflicting evidence, and as different inferences could be drawn from
the evidence, whether Devalkenaere was justified in acting in defense of another was a
question of fact. See Williams, 608 S.W.3d at 209. In the light most favorable to the
verdict, there was evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could determine that
Devalkenaere shot Victim at a time when Victim was unarmed and not threatening force.
There was evidence indicating that Victim’s left hand was waving at T.S. with an open
palm when Devalkenaere said Victim had a gun and immediately began shooting.
Devalkenaere testified that he saw Victim pull a gun from his waistband with his left
hand and point it at T.S. when Devalkenaere began shooting. However, this evidence is
contrary to the verdict and is disregarded. But, if Devalkenaere did not see a gun in
Victim’s left hand at the time of the shooting because Victim’s left hand was waving at
T.S. with an open palm – a finding supported by evidence – then a reasonable trier of fact
could clearly conclude that Devalkenaere did not reasonably believe that Victim was
threatening force such as would have caused death or serious physical injury so as to give
rise to a reasonable belief that his use of deadly force was necessary.
Further, there was also evidence from Victim’s co-resident, R.M., that Victim had
left the gun that belonged to him (and which was later found near where Victim’s truck
came to rest in his garage) on the stairs in his basement, such that the gun would have
been on the stairs in the basement (which was close in proximity to where the gun was
eventually found) rather than in his possession when the shooting occurred. Keeping in
mind that “this Court does not weigh the evidence but, rather, accepts as true all evidence
28 tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and
ignores all contrary evidence and inferences[,]” Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d at 362, a rational
trier of fact could conclude that Victim was unarmed at the time of the shooting, that
Victim did not engage in the behavior of pointing a gun at T.S., and that Devalkenaere did
not reasonably believe Victim was threatening deadly force at the time of the shooting.
Point seven is denied.
In his fourth point on appeal, Devalkenaere argues that there was insufficient
evidence that he was an initial aggressor because trespass is not an attack or a threat to
attack. The arguments following this point fail to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict making these arguments analytically useless. Further, as is
frequently the case throughout his briefing, Devalkenaere fails to provide page references
to factual assertions in his argument in violation of Rule 84.04(e). Further, Devalkenaere
completely neglects to address the entirety of the evidence supporting a finding that T.S.
and Devalkenaere were initial aggressors beyond their unlawful entry into the
backyard/carport area of Victim’s residence. They were two uninvited men, in the
backyard of a stranger, and were approaching with guns in their hands. Devalkenaere
kicked over a barricade in entering Victim’s backyard. As discussed above, there was
further evidence from which the trier of fact could find that Victim never threatened force
at any time during the encounter. When there is contradictory evidence regarding who
was an initial aggressor in an encounter, the issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact
to decide. State v. Barriere, 556 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). The evidence
29 was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that Devalkenaere was the initial
aggressor in the encounter.
Point four is denied.
In his sixth point on appeal, Devalkenaere argues that there was insufficient
evidence of an indispensable element for his involuntary manslaughter conviction
because the State failed to prove that his shooting of Victim was unjustified. This point
indicates that Devalkenaere is arguing that the State failed to prove an element of a
defense but fails to indicate what element was lacking. Instead, Devalkenaere’s
arguments on this point (which are comprised of two confusing paragraphs that amount
to less than one page of his brief) simply argue that the State failed to prove that the
shooting was not justified without providing sufficient support as to why. These
conclusory assertions fail to establish error.
Point six is denied.
Point One
In his first point on appeal, Devalkenaere argues:
The Circuit Court erred in convicting Appellant of involuntary manslaughter because Appellant was authorized by the Fourth Amendment, Section 544.216 and Section 563.046 to enter the decedent's curtilage, in that Appellant and his fellow officer had probable cause to stop this motorist, and in December, 2019, Supreme Court precedent did not prohibit their entry upon the curtilage of a suspect's property to do so.
30 Devalkenaere’s first point relied on is quite vague and does not provide this court with
any explanation of why, in the context of the case, this point would constitute reversible
error. Rule 84.04(d) provides:
(1) Where the appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court, each point shall: (A) Identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) State concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (C) Explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.
Devalkenaere’s first point appears to try to raise a challenge to a legal conclusion of the
trial court but fails to identify a specific legal conclusion, instead arguing his conviction
was in error. Devalkenaere’s point also fails to explain why, in the context of the case,
his legal reasons support a claim of reversible error. The point appears to assert that he
was authorized to enter Victim’s curtilage by sections 563.046 and section 544.216, as
well as the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. However, the
argument section following the point does not include any discussion of section 563.046.
Section 544.216 is simply cited, once, for the proposition that an officer may generally
arrest a person when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has violated
an ordinance or law of the state. Of course, that statute is largely irrelevant if no arrest is
attempted to be made, as was found by the trial court. 13 Further, Devalkenaere seems to
13 In this matter, there was no testimony at trial that either T.S. or Devalkenaere were entering Victim’s property to make an arrest, as both officers testified they were going into the backyard to conduct an investigation.
31 make arguments that an officer may do on private property whatever the officer may do
on public property. In this matter, there is little dispute that Victim could have been
subject to a traffic stop for committing traffic violations had such a stop been initiated in
a public place, but that did not occur in this case. However, there are clearly limits in the
law regarding when an officer may invade the sanctity of the home. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (“[T]he reasons for upholding warrantless arrests in a
public place do not apply to warrantless invasions of the privacy of the home.”). For
example, if an arrest is made in a place where the officer is not lawfully present, the arrest
is illegal, such that probable cause alone is insufficient to justify the arrest. See State v.
Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Mo. banc 2014) (“The lawfulness of the arrest was
dependent on the lawfulness of the forced entry into the residence because if Deputy
Hunt unlawfully entered, his very presence in the residence was illegal and so was the
arrest.”).
Devalkenaere then argues that the Fourth Amendment authorized the arrest. The
Fourth Amendment, however, protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. It does not authorize police conduct. Moreover, Devalkenaere’s argument
following his first point fails to make a legitimate attempt to set forth the law regarding
when an officer may enter a place in which an individual has a constitutionally protected
privacy interest. Devalkenaere’s point on appeal, thus, fails to provide any analysis that
would support a claim of reversible error. It also fails to directly point to any particular
legal conclusion of the trial court he is challenging. The trial court’s determination that
32 T.S. and Devalkenaere made an unlawful entry into Victim’s private curtilage was based
on numerous legal and factual conclusions, and Devalkenaere makes no attempt to
specify which of those he takes issue with in his point relied on. “Rule 84.04(d) prohibits
a point relied on that groups together multiple contentions not related to a single issue
and such a point is subject to dismissal.” State v. S.F., 483 S.W.3d 385, 389 n.5 (Mo.
banc 2016). The arguments that follow Devalkenaere’s point relied on include numerous
unrelated theories that could not be predicted from the point relied on. “Errors raised in
the argument portion of a brief but not raised in the points relied on need not be
considered by this Court.” State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 636 n.13 (Mo. banc 2016).
We have discretion to excuse technical violations in a brief and review points on
the merits, which is our preference. Devalkenaere’s arguments are nevertheless
insufficient to establish trial court error.
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “The right of people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “It is a basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1982) (internal
quotations omitted). “The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend beyond a house
itself, to the curtilage of a house.” State v. Bates, 344 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Mo. App. S.D.
2011) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). “[T]he curtilage is the
area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home
33 and the privacies of life, and therefore has been considered part of the home itself for
Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). “[T]he key issue in determining the legitimacy of police entry into a particular
area is whether the occupant of the premises has somehow exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that area.” State v. Edwards, 36 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Mo. App. W.D.
2000).
In this appeal, it is undisputed that T.S. and Devalkenaere entered the curtilage of
Victim’s residence, that the shooting occurred on the curtilage, and that Victim was
underneath the carport in his backyard and backing into the open garage door attached to
his residence at the time of the shooting. The trial court found that Victim had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area that the officers entered and that the area
was not open to the public.
Although the curtilage is entitled to constitutional protection under the Fourth
Amendment where the resident has a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts have
recognized an exception to the warrant requirement where law enforcement officers can
show both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; Kirk
v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (“Police officers need either a warrant or probable
cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home.”).
As best as we can discern, the only real argument Devalkenaere makes regarding
exigent circumstances is that he was in hot or fresh pursuit of Victim. The rationale of
the hot pursuit doctrine as an exigent circumstance exception that may allow warrantless
34 entries into private places in which an individual has constitutional protection is that “a
suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by the
expedient of escaping to a private place.” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43
(1976). The trial court found that Devalkenaere was not in pursuit of Victim, hot, fresh,
or otherwise. There was no evidence whatsoever that an arrest of Victim was set in
motion in a public place or that Victim fled from an attempt to stop or arrest him. None
of the officers at trial testified that they had attempted to stop or arrest Victim in a public
place or indicated that they were engaging in a hot pursuit of Victim, as both T.S. and
Devalkenaere testified that their purpose in entering the backyard of Victim’s property
was to conduct an investigation.
Devalkenaere also cites to section 544.157 as authorizing him to engage in “fresh
pursuit.” However, beyond arguing that the statute authorizes fresh pursuit, and making
the conclusory assertion that he was doing so, Devalkenaere makes no legitimate attempt
to set forth the law of what constitutes fresh pursuit. Although Devalkenaere cites to
section 544.157.3 regarding the meaning of fresh pursuit, he omits and fails to address
critical language of the statute, such as the language of the provision that states that
“fresh pursuit” “shall imply instant pursuit.” § 544.157.3. In any event, Missouri case
law clearly indicates that what occurred on December 3, 2019 would not qualify as fresh
pursuit under section 544.157. See City of Ash Grove v. Christian, 949 S.W.2d 259, 264
(Mo. App. S.D. 1997) (“[T]o show ‘fresh pursuit’ in accordance with the statutory
mandate of section 544.157, police pursuit must be initiated within the peace officers’
35 jurisdiction, must be immediate and without delay, consistent with reasonable police
safety practices, and should be accompanied with a purpose to stop the vehicle.”). 14 The
trial court did not err in determining that Devalkenaere was not engaging in hot or fresh
pursuit of Victim so as to be entitled to enter property in which Victim had constitutional
protection.
Although it is not clear that it is encompassed in his vague and general point on
appeal, Devalkenaere further argues that officers may enter the curtilage of a resident’s
house when that area is open to the public. Even if we broadly construe his point to
include this claim, his argument nevertheless fails. Courts have determined that “there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy subject to Fourth Amendment protection where the
public at large is welcome.” Edwards, 36 S.W.3d at 27 (quoting State v. Kriley, 976
S.W.2d 16, 22 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998)). In this matter, the trial court found that Victim
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard/carport area, and that the area
was not open to the general public. The trial court’s conclusion is not erroneous.
Devalkenaere has presented this court with no arguments indicating that the trial court’s
conclusion is in error. The trial judge visited the residence and saw first hand whether the
location would be considered open to the public. We have also viewed the photograph
exhibits and footage of the location and find that the location on which Devalkenaere
14 Although Christian interpreted the version of section 544.157 that was in effect in 1995, the legislature has not changed the definition of “fresh pursuit” that is currently contained in section 544.157.3 since the time that the Christian court interpreted it. Compare § 544.157.3 RSMo. 1994 Cum. Supp. with § 544.157.3 RSMo. 2016.
36 intruded would not be considered open to the public. Devalkenaere makes no arguments
as to how he simply made an entrance into the backyard in a manner that was open to the
public when his entry into the backyard was blocked by a fence-like barricade that he had
to kick over to enter the backyard.
The trial court did not err in determining that T.S. and Devalkenaere were not
lawfully present in Victim’s backyard/carport area.
Point one is denied.
Point Three
In his third point on appeal, Devalkenaere argues that the trial court erred because
trespassing 15 is irrelevant as to whether a shooting is justified under section 563.046 (and
MAI Cr.4th 406.08) because trespassing does not summarily render an officer an “initial
aggressor.” Devalkenaere’s arguments in his third point misrepresent the trial court’s
determination as to why section 563.046 was inapplicable. The trial court found that
Devalkenaere “did not lawfully utilize deadly force as a law enforcement officer under
Missouri use of force laws applicable to such officers.” The reason the trial court gave
for rejecting this defense of justification was that it was “conceded that [Devalkenaere]
and [T.S.] were not effecting an arrest of [Victim] or preventing [Victim’s] escape after an
arrest.” Devalkenaere does not argue in his third point that these findings were incorrect.
15 The trial court’s oral findings made at the announcement of the verdict do not actually use the term “trespassing.” The trial court did, however, find that T.S. and Devalkenaere unlawfully entered Victim’s property.
37 He neglects the actual reason why the trial court found that he was not entitled to the
initial aggressor exception referenced in section 563.031.1(1)(b), and instead suggests,
contrary to the trial court’s findings, that the trial court determined that trespassing
summarily rendered an officer an initial aggressor such that the trial court failed to
consider section 563.046.
Further, Devalkenaere does not provide briefing adequate to establish error on his
third point. Devalkenaere’s arguments following this point are quite confusing, as he
never makes clear whether he is arguing that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense
of justification under section 563.031 (defense of third persons) or under section 563.046
(force used by law enforcement officers in making an arrest). These are separate
defenses of justification that contain separate factual issues. By failing to make clear
which of the two separate defenses of justification provided the grounds for his asserted
error, but instead seemingly arguing both, Devalkenaere’s arguments render his point
multifarious, preserving nothing for appeal. See S.F., 483 S.W.3d at 389 n.5 (“Rule
84.04(d) prohibits a point relied on that groups together multiple contentions not related
to a single issue and such a point is subject to dismissal.”). As with most of his briefing,
Devalkenaere fails to support his factual assertions with citations to the record in
violation of Rule 84.04(e). Further, Devalkenaere makes factual arguments without
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Devalkenaere’s
arguments stray radically from what is presented in his point relied on. “Errors raised in
the argument portion of a brief but not raised in the points relied on need not be
38 considered by this Court.” Lammers, 479 S.W.3d at 636 n.13. As Devalkenaere fails to
preserve his arguments with proper briefing, his point on appeal is subject to dismissal.
See Rule 30.20.
Our best efforts at understanding his arguments would indicate that he is making a
legal challenge, arguing that the trial court found that he and T.S. had unlawfully entered
Victim’s property and therefore were initial aggressors without considering that an officer
may be an initial aggressor when effecting an arrest pursuant to section 563.031.1(b) and
section 563.046. However, as noted, this assertion of legal error is based on a
misrepresentation of the trial court’s findings and does not address the trial court’s actual
reason for finding that section 563.046 was inapplicable.
Even if we were to attempt to address Devalkenaere’s confusing arguments
regarding section 563.046 as best we can, they would nevertheless fail, as Devalkenaere
makes no legitimate attempt to accurately portray the contents of section 563.046.
Generally, an initial aggressor is not entitled to use force in defense of others unless that
initial aggressor falls within an exception that makes the actor’s use of force nevertheless
justifiable. § 563.031.1. One such exception to this general rule is present if the initial
aggressor “is a law enforcement officer and as such is an aggressor pursuant to section
563.046[.]” § 563.031.1(1)(b). As pertinent to the initial aggressor inquiry under section
563.031.1(1)(b), section 563.046.1 provides: “A law enforcement officer need not retreat
or desist from efforts to effect the arrest, or from efforts to prevent the escape from
custody, of a person he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense because
39 of resistance or threatened resistance of the arrestee.” Clearly this provision’s
applicability is limited to circumstances when the officer is making efforts to effect an
arrest or efforts to prevent an escape from custody. As noted, Devalkenaere makes no
attempt to establish error with the trial court’s stated reason why the provision was
inapplicable. The use of force under section 563.046.1 is subject to numerous other
restrictions, which Devalkenaere’s arguments ignore. 16 Section 563.046.2 provides that
16 Section 563.046 provides in full:
1. A law enforcement officer need not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the arrest, or from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense because of resistance or threatened resistance of the arrestee. In addition to the use of physical force authorized under other sections of this chapter, a law enforcement officer is, subject to the provisions of subsections 2 and 3, justified in the use of such physical force as he or she reasonably believes is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape from custody. 2. The use of any physical force in making an arrest is not justified under this section unless the arrest is lawful or the law enforcement officer reasonably believes the arrest is lawful, and the amount of physical force used was objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the particular facts and circumstances confronting the officer on the scene, without regard to the officer’s underlying intent or motivation. 3. In effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from custody, a law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force only: (1) When deadly force is authorized under other sections of this chapter; or (2) When the officer reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or prevent an escape from custody and also reasonably believes that the person to be arrested: (a) Has committed or attempted to commit a felony offense involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury; or (b) Is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or (c) May otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury to the officer or others unless arrested without delay. 4. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification under this section.
40 an officer’s use of physical force in making an arrest is not justified under section
563.046 unless the arrest is lawful or the law enforcement officer reasonably believes the
arrest is lawful. 17 Devalkenaere makes no attempt to address this requirement. Further,
the amount of force used must be objectively reasonable. § 563.046.2. There are
additional limitations on the use of deadly force under section 563.046. § 563.046.3.
Devalkenaere fails to make a legitimate attempt to address these limitations. 18
Devalkenaere misrepresents the contents of section 563.046, fails to preserve his
point on appeal with proper briefing, and fails to address the trial court’s actual reason for
concluding that section 563.046 was inapplicable. He fails to establish legal error.
Point three is denied.
Point Eight
In his eighth point, Devalkenaere argues that he cannot be convicted of armed
criminal action if his conviction for involuntary manslaughter was in error. Because
17 If an officer makes an arrest in a place where the officer is unlawfully present, the arrest is illegal. See State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Mo. banc 2014) (“The lawfulness of the arrest was dependent on the lawfulness of the forced entry into the residence because if Deputy Hunt unlawfully entered, his very presence in the residence was illegal and so was the arrest.”). 18 In addition to misrepresenting the trial court’s verdict, Devalkenaere also misrepresents the contents of section 563.046 as they pertain to deadly force. To this court’s dismay, Devalkenaere argues: “Section 563.046 permits police to use deadly force without retreat when engaging with someone who an officer reasonably believes has committed an offense, and who is resisting or threatening to resist the officer.” Section 563.046 clearly contains limitations on the use of deadly force under section 563.046. See § 563.046.3. When an officer argues that a use of deadly force was justified under section 563.046, a factual question arises regarding whether the officer reasonably believed such use of deadly force was necessary. Nevertheless, Devalkenaere’s arguments appear to construe section 563.046 in a manner which would allow a law enforcement officer to use deadly force whether or not the officer reasonably believes it is necessary.
41 Devalkenaere has failed to establish error with respect to his conviction for involuntary
manslaughter, his arguments regarding his armed criminal action conviction also fail.
Point eight is denied.
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
Thomas N. Chapman, Judge
All concur.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State of Missouri v. Eric J. Devalkenaere, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-missouri-v-eric-j-devalkenaere-moctapp-2023.