State of Missouri v. Christopher Robert Sokolic

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 7, 2023
• Docket: ED110467
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ED110467 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Jefferson County v. ) 20JE-CR02088-01 ) CHRISTOPHER ROBERT SOKOLIC, ) Honorable Joseph A. Rathert ) Appellant. ) Filed: February 7, 2023

Christopher Sokolic appeals the judgment convicting him of one count of murder in the

first degree, section 565.020, RSMo 2016, 1 and sentencing to life in prison without the possibility

of parole. Sokolic argues the circuit court erroneously overruled his motion for judgment of

acquittal because there was insufficient evidence of deliberation. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the relevant evidence is as follows. 2 On

the morning of May 25, 2020, Sokolic messaged Alexandria Ayers, a friend with whom he had

dated on-and-off, asking her to meet up so he could tell her something. He contacted Ayers

repeatedly, sometimes sending multiple messages before she could respond. He said he was going

1 All statutory citations are to RSMo 2016. 2 State v. Stewart, 560 S.W.3d 531, 532-33 (Mo. banc 2018) (holding the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict). to be on the “six o’clock news,” that he needed to “get his head straightened out,” and that if Ayers

did not respond, she would never hear from him again. While Sokolic was prone to “dramatic”

behavior, Ayers testified his messages that morning were not typical. Ayers finally agreed to meet

him at a park near her subdivision.

Sokolic arrived around noon, hugged Ayers, jumped into the nearby creek and stated he

wanted to take “one last swim.” When he got out of the water, he told Ayers he would be back,

and then left in a white Chevy sedan driven by Zachary Tripp.

Sokolic and Tripp returned approximately thirty minutes later. Ayers got into the back

passenger seat. Sokolic was in the front passenger seat. Tripp was driving. They decided to go

to Sokolic’s grandfather’s house, a drive of approximately ten minutes. When they arrived,

Sokolic instructed Tripp to leave the main road to the house and drive behind a barn. Ayers

testified Sokolic “had asked [Tripp] to pull up, like, halfway down or halfway behind the barn

because there was some stuff that he wanted to get that was in the trunk that he didn't want anyone

seeing.” Ayers then testified “we kind of stopped and sat there for a second.”

Once the car was behind the barn, Sokolic began to stab Tripp. From the rear passenger

seat, Ayers witnessed Sokolic stab Tripp multiple times “in the chest, and then when his head

dropped, in the back of the neck.” Sokolic exited the vehicle and began to walk toward the driver’s

side. Ayers unlocked the car door, exited the vehicle, and fled. Video surveillance from a nearby

building showed the white sedan drive behind the barn, with Ayers running into view

approximately 30 seconds later. Ayers ran until she found a nearby residence, where a friend

picked her up and the police were called.

The investigating officers found Tripp lying face down on the ground about twenty-five

feet behind the barn. Tripp’s upper body and head were saturated with blood. A pocketknife in

2 the open, locked position was found lying in plain view next to Tripp’s body. Sokolic was not

present at the scene.

The officers also observed the white sedan was approximately thirty feet from Tripp’s

body. One of the officers testified the soft ground showed “marks in the grass where the tires had

spun,” indicating the vehicle had been “under heavy acceleration.” The tire tracks showed the

vehicle backed away from the body and then changed direction to proceed forward before being

stopped by a bush. There was a large amount of blood in the vehicle, as well as on both the

passenger and driver’s side doors.

The medical examiner performed an autopsy and identified twenty-seven stab wounds to

Tripp’s head, neck, chest and back. These wounds were on the front, back, right, and left sides of

Tripp’s body. The medical examiner also identified nine cut wounds on Tripp’s head, neck, right

shoulder, hand, and upper left extremity. Several of the stab wounds punctured Tripp’s chest

cavity. Tripp also sustained puncture wounds to his jugular vein and carotid artery.

On May 26, 2020, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Sokolic was arrested at his mother’s house.

While being transported to the police station, he asked the officer if Ayers was going to speak with

investigators about the murder. The officer informed him Ayers was being cooperative with the

investigation. Sokolic replied “she’s going to talk,” and then put his head down.

The State charged Sokolic with murder in the first degree and armed criminal action. The

case proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the State’s case, the circuit court overruled Sokolic’s

motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury returned a verdict finding him guilty of murder in the

first degree and armed criminal action. At sentencing, the State dismissed the armed criminal

action charge. The circuit court entered a judgment convicting Sokolic of murder in the first degree

and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

3 Sokolic appeals, claiming the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of

acquittal because “the evidence failed to prove that [he] caused the death of Zachary Tripp after

deliberation.”

Standard of Review

“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal under the same standard of

review used in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's guilty

verdict.” State v. Bennish, 479 S.W.3d 678, 684–85 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). An appellate court’s

“review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is limited to

determining whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 736 (Mo. banc

2022); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (holding “the relevant question is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original). “The

evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.” Minor, 648 S.W.3d at

736. This Court “does not act as a ‘super juror’ with veto powers, but gives great deference to the

trier of fact.” State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation omitted).

Analysis

The State must prove every element of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State

v. Seeler, 316 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Mo. banc 2010). The elements of murder in the first degree are

that a person: (1) knowingly (2) caused the death of another person (3) after deliberation on the

matter. State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 764 (Mo. banc 2002); Section 565.020.1. Sokolic argues

4 the State failed to prove deliberation, a necessary element of the crime of murder, because the time

was “simply too short” and there was “no evidence” of deliberation.

Time

Sokolic’s argument there was insufficient time to deliberate is foreclosed by the statutory

definition of “deliberation” and the relevant case law. Deliberation is “cool reflection for any

length of time no matter how brief[.]” Section 565.002(5). “Proof of deliberation does not require

proof that the defendant contemplated his actions over a long period of time, only that the killer

had ample opportunity to terminate the attack once it began.” State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702,

717 (Mo. banc 2004) (internal quotation omitted). “Deliberation is not a question of time—an

instant is sufficient—and the reference to ‘cool reflection’ does not require that the defendant be

detached or disinterested.” State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Mo. banc 2013). The fact

Sokolic attacked Tripp suddenly does not preclude a finding of deliberation. A reasonable juror

could conclude Sokolic had ample opportunity to terminate the attack during the time he asked

Tripp to drive behind the barn and proceeded to stab him twenty-seven times.

Evidence of deliberation

The argument there was “no evidence” of deliberation also lacks merit. “Ordinarily

deliberation is proved through evidence of circumstances surrounding the killing.” State v.

Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 841 (Mo. banc 1998); see also State v. Perkins, 600 S.W.3d 838, 847

(Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (noting deliberation may be proven with indirect evidence and reasonable

inferences from the circumstances). There is sufficient evidence in this case for a reasonable jury

to conclude Sokolic acted with deliberation.

First, deliberation “can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon on some vital part of

the victim's body.” State v. Mills, 623 S.W.3d 717, 725 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). The inference of

5 deliberation is strengthened when there is evidence the defendant inflicted “multiple wounds or

repeated blows.” State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 169 (Mo. banc 2002) (holding that evidence the

defendant stabbed the victim 21 times supported an inference of deliberation). 3 Sokolic inflicted

twenty-seven stab wounds to Tripp’s head, back, neck, and chest. Deliberation can be “readily

inferred from the … 27 stab wounds to a vital part of the body inflicted by a deadly weapon.”

State v. Hurt, 668 S.W.2d 206, 215 (Mo. App. S.D. 1984).

Second, instead of proceeding to Sokolic’s grandfather’s house as planned, Sokolic

directed Tripp to drive behind the barn, under the guise of needing to retrieve something from the

trunk. Rather than retrieving something from the trunk, Sokolic commenced his attack. A

reasonable jury could infer his deception is consistent with a deliberate plan to induce Tripp to

drive behind the barn so he could more readily conceal the attack.

Third, “[a]n inference of deliberation can also be strengthened by … flight without

providing aid to the victim.” State v. Mills, 623 S.W.3d 717, 725 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021); see also

State v. Oldham, 642 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022). Here, there was evidence that after

the attack, Sokolic exited the vehicle and walked to the driver’s side while Ayers ran to safety.

Additionally, the tire tracks showed the vehicle backed up and then traveled forward under heavy

acceleration before getting “hung up” on a bush and stopping approximately thirty feet away from

3 Missouri courts have consistently held that repetitive attacks with a deadly weapon support an inference of deliberation. See State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 514 (Mo. banc 2004) (noting “[d]eliberation may also be inferred when there are multiple wounds or repeated blows”); Tisius, 92 S.W.3d at 764 (noting deliberation may be inferred from “multiple wounds, or repeated blows”); State v. Sandles, 740 S.W.2d 169, 177-78 (Mo. banc 1987) (holding 20 stab and slash wounds supported a reasonable inference of deliberation); State v. Shaddox, 598 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Mo. App. S.D 2020) (internal quotation omitted) (noting “evidence of multiple stab wounds [or] repeated blows” may support an inference of deliberation); State v. Moore, 949 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (holding “[n]umerous cases support the prosecutor's argument that shooting [the victim] more than once indicates there was time for deliberation between shots”); State v. Barnes, 740 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987) (noting “[d]eliberation has been inferred from evidence of multiple wounds”); State v. Dickson, 691 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985) (holding the fact the defendant inflicted “12 or 13 stab wounds” supported an inference of deliberation).

6 Tripp’s body. Sokolic was not present when the officers arrived, and he left Tripp’s body lying

by the road, face down and saturated with blood. These facts indicate Sokolic fled the scene

without rendering aid and further strengthen the inference of deliberation.

Finally, a defendant’s statements prior to the commission of the crime also support an

inference the defendant acted with a culpable mental state. See State v. Meidle, 202 S.W.2d 79,

82 (Mo. 1947) (holding the defendant’s prior statements were “relevant and admissible to prove

the existence of a design and state of mind from which defendant's act of shooting proceeded, and

supports the inference of defendant's criminal purpose or intent in firing the fatal shot.”). 4 On the

morning of the murder, Sokolic told Ayers he needed to tell her something to clear his mind or she

would never hear from him again. Sokolic then said she would see him on the six o’clock news.

Within an hour of the murder, Sokolic told Ayers he jumped in the creek to take “one last swim.”

Sokolic’s statements further support the inference that when he stabbed Tripp twenty-seven times

after telling him to drive behind the barn, he did so deliberately, after a period of “cool reflection

for any length of time no matter how brief[.]” Section 565.002(5).

4 See also State v. Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d 877, 895 (Mo. banc 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. banc 2008) (holding deliberation may be inferred from the defendant’s statements implying a plan to inflict harm)); State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Mo. 1968) (holding a defendant’s statements may be “relevant and admissible to prove the existence of a state of mind on the part of defendant.”).

7 Conclusion

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and granting

all reasonable inferences to the State, we hold there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Sokolic acted with deliberation and is guilty of murder in the first

degree. The circuit court did not err by denying Sokolic’s motion for acquittal. We affirm the

judgment.

____________________________ Renée D. Hardin-Tammons, Judge

Lisa P. Page, P.J. and Thomas C. Clark, II, J., concur.