SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Opinion issued August 15, 2023 ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC99719 ) CAITLYN CORDELL WILLIAMS, ) ) Appellant. )
and
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC99823 ) TAMARAE LYNN LARUE, ) ) Appellant. )
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LACLEDE COUNTY The Honorable Steve Jackson, Judge The Honorable Larry Winfrey, Judge
Caitlyn Williams was convicted of failing to cause her daughter, E.P., to attend
school on a regular basis in violation of Missouri’s compulsory attendance law. Tamarae
LaRue was convicted of failing to cause her son, A.L., to attend school on a regular basis
in violation of Missouri’s compulsory attendance law. Williams and LaRue (“Parents”) appeal from their judgments of conviction, raising two claims of insufficient evidence and
challenging section 167.031.1 1 as being unconstitutionally vague. Relying on the plain
meaning of the language in that statute in the context of school attendance, this Court holds
section 167.031.1 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Parents. Under the
appropriate standard of review, sufficient evidence existed to find Parents knowingly failed
to cause their children to attend school on a regular basis after their children were enrolled.
The circuit court’s judgment in each case is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural Background
Caitlyn Williams
The State charged Williams with the class C misdemeanor of violating the
compulsory attendance law, alleging Williams, in violation of section 167.031, knowingly
failed to cause a child under her custody or control to attend a required academic program
on a regular basis on or between August 23, 2021, and February 15, 2022. Williams filed
a motion to quash and dismiss, alleging the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The
motion was overruled. At a bench trial, the State introduced testimony from school
employees and documentation regarding the child’s attendance.
During the 2021-2022 school year, Williams’ daughter, who was born in December
2014, was enrolled in first grade at Esther Elementary in Lebanon. Williams was the
child’s sole custodian. When Williams completed her child’s online registration for school,
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise specified.
2 she checked a box indicating she had read the student handbook. The attendance portion
of the handbook provided:
The Lebanon R-III School District believes that regular classroom attendance is important to the instructional process, and that frequent absences disrupt the learning process. The state mandates that students maintain 90% or higher attendance each year in school and that continued and valuable learning cannot take place without regular attendance. Poor attendance may limit accomplishments and reinforce a habit, which will handicap the individual in future education or employment. Therefore, in accordance with the laws of the state of Missouri, the Lebanon R-III School District requires regular attendance of all school age children each day school is in session.
The handbook required parents to “[e]ncourage their student to … attend school every
day[;]” “[m]ake every effort to schedule appointments for students when school is not in
session (it is understood that this is not always possible, but should be attempted)[;]” and
“[n]otify school with every absence, tardy or early withdrawal.” “Absences caused by
personal illness or injury, illness within the family which necessitates that a student be
absent, and perhaps other extenuating circumstances, need to be communicated to the
student’s school.” Vacation time was suggested to be taken when school was not in
session.
Per the policy outlined in the handbook, when E.P. reached six absences in
November 2021, the school sent Williams a letter. The letter informed Williams of the
number of absences and that her daughter’s attendance percentage was approximately 85
percent. According to the letter, “The Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education states that students should have a 90% or higher attendance percentage.”
3 The letter also stated: “If you have documentation indicating the reason for an absence,
please submit it to your child’s school office.” Another letter was sent to Williams in early
December when her child accumulated nine absences. In early March 2022, the school
sent Williams a letter advising her that her child had missed 15 days of school.
Parent contact regarding the reason a student is not at school is recorded. E.P.’s
official attendance record included the following full days of absences during the charged
period of time, 2 along with the reasons provided for the absence: 9/1/21 (“mom left vm out
ill today”); 9/29/21 (“Mom called- ear infection”); 10/13/21 (“Mom called- sick”);
10/14/21 (“Mom called- bad cough”); 10/20/21 (“Mom called- dentist appointment”);
11/8/21 (“Mom called- ringworm”); 11/11/21 (no reason provided); 11/12/21 (no reason
provided); 12/3/21 (no reason provided); 12/14/21 (no reason provided); 12/15/21 (no
reason provided); 3 1/25/22 (no reason provided); 1/27/22 (no reason provided); 1/31/22
(no reason provided); and 2/1/22 (no reason provided). The child had nine absences that
were unexcused/unverified in the charged time period. Williams failed to contact the
school regarding the reasons her child did not attend these days.
According to the assistant principal, the child’s lack of attendance affected her
performance in the classroom. The assistant principal was never made aware of any
2 The record also includes multiple late check-ins. 3 On December 15, 2021, Williams brought her child to the school to collect donations the staff had accumulated for the family. The teacher requested the child to stay at school, but she was not allowed to stay.
4 medical reason preventing the child from attending school. The attendance advisor for the
school district testified she talked with Williams “about the need to get her child to school,
and to – and to make it a [sic] regular.” Williams never articulated to the attendance advisor
any specific reasons why her child could not be at school.
The circuit court found Williams guilty. She was sentenced to serve seven days in
the Laclede County jail with the sentence to run concurrently with another sentence she
was already serving. Williams appeals. 4
Tamarae LaRue
The State charged LaRue with the class C misdemeanor of violating the compulsory
attendance law, alleging LaRue, in violation of section 167.031, knowingly failed to cause
a child under her custody or control to attend a required academic program on a regular
basis on or between August 23, 2021, 5 and February 16, 2022. LaRue filed a motion to
quash and dismiss, alleging the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The motion was
overruled. At a bench trial, the State introduced testimony from school employees and
documentation regarding the child’s attendance.
During the 2021-2022 school year, LaRue’s son, who was born in October 2015,
was enrolled in kindergarten at Esther Elementary in Lebanon. LaRue was the child’s sole
custodian. When LaRue completed her child’s online registration for school, she checked
4 Because Williams challenges the constitutional validity of section 167.031.1, appeal is directly to this Court. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. 5 The information erroneously stated the beginning date as August 23, 2022.
5 a box indicating she had read the student handbook. The attendance portion of the
handbook was the same as that set forth above.
LaRue’s son did not enroll in kindergarten until September 9, 2021. His attendance
issues began the same month he enrolled, and the assistant principal had a conversation
with LaRue to determine what support the school could provide to assist the child in
attending. LaRue was informed her child was missing important things when he was not
at school. Per the policy outlined in the handbook, when A.L. reached six absences in
November 2021, the school sent LaRue a letter. The letter informed LaRue of the number
of absences and that her son’s attendance percentage was approximately 86 percent.
According to the letter, “The Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education states that students should have a 90% or higher attendance percentage.” The
letter also stated: “If you have documentation indicating the reason for an absence, please
submit it to your child’s school office.” Another letter was sent to LaRue in mid-January
when her child accumulated nine absences.
Parent contact regarding the reason a student is not at school is recorded. The child’s
official attendance record included the following full days of absences during the charged
period of time, 6 along with the reasons provided for the absence: 9/9/21 (“mom had car
troubles”); 9/14/21 (“dr appt per mom”); 9/15/21 (“fever per mom”); 10/25/21 (“Mom
called- at dad’s in Iowa”); 10/29/21 (no reason provided); 11/19/21 (no reason provided);
12/15/21 (no reason provided); 1/5/22 (“overslept and sick per mom-- dr appt 1/6/22”);
6 The record also includes multiple late check-ins.
6 1/11/22 (“per mom choice”); 1/12/22 (no reason provided); 1/13/22 (“Check-In at 11:45
am by mom”); 1/18/22 (no reason provided); 1/27/22 (no reason provided); 1/28/22 (no
reason provided). The child had seven absences that were unexcused/unverified in the
charged time period. LaRue failed to contact the school regarding the reasons the child did
not attend these days.
The assistant principal was never made aware of any medical reason preventing the
child from attending school. If the assistant principal had received information that the
child had a medical issue, the issue of absences would not have been pursued. The
attendance advisor for the school district testified she talked with LaRue multiple times
about attendance issues.
The circuit court found LaRue guilty. She was sentenced to serve fifteen days in
the Laclede County jail. The circuit court suspended execution of the sentence and placed
LaRue on probation for a term of two years. LaRue appeals. 7
Analysis
Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in two regards. First, they contend
the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that their conduct was a purposeful or
knowing violation of the statute. Second, they argue the State did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the children’s attendance was not sufficiently “regular” to constitute
a violation of the statute. In their final points relied on, Parents assert section 167.031.1 is
7 Because LaRue challenges the constitutional validity of section 167.031.1, appeal is directly to this Court. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.
7 unconstitutionally vague because the statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden and allows for arbitrary and
discriminatory application. This Court considers these points in reverse order.
Section 167.031.1 Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied Here
This Court reviews de novo the legal issue of the constitutional validity of a statute.
State v. Richard, 298 S.W.3d 529, 531 (Mo. banc 2009). A challenge to the constitutional
validity of a statute must overcome the presumption that a statute is constitutional. State
v. Young, 695 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Mo. banc 1985). “Statutes must, if possible, be construed
as consistent with the Constitution; doubts are to be resolved in favor of validity[.]” Id.
(citations omitted).
“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Mo. banc 2011). “The test in
enforcing the doctrine is whether the language conveys to a person of ordinary intelligence
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices.” Cocktail Fortune, Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 994
S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. banc 1999). The language is to be evaluated by applying it to the
facts at hand, not to hypothetical scenarios. Id. at 958-59.
As applicable to the age of the children in this case, 8 section 167.031.1 provides:
8 Williams’ child was six years old at the beginning of the academic year. LaRue’s child was five years old at the time he was enrolled.
8 Any parent, guardian or other person who enrolls a child between the ages of five and seven years in a public school program of academic instruction shall cause such child to attend the academic program on a regular basis, according to this section. Nonattendance by such child shall cause such parent, guardian or other responsible person to be in violation of the provisions of section 167.061, except as provided by this section.
(Emphasis added). Violation of section 167.031 is a class C misdemeanor. Section
167.061. Two exceptions relieve the party responsible for enrolling such child from
violating the statute due to a child’s nonattendance. First, once enrolled, a child between
five and seven years old can be excused from attendance at school upon a written request
the child be removed from the school’s rolls. Section 167.031.1(3). Second, section
167.031.1(1) provides:
A child who, to the satisfaction of the superintendent of public schools of the district in which he resides, or if there is no superintendent then the chief school officer, is determined to be mentally or physically incapacitated may be excused from attendance at school for the full time required, or any part thereof[.]
According to Parents, section 167.031.1 fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his or her contemplated conduct is forbidden insofar as it fails
to clearly define the phrase “a regular basis” and lacks sufficient specificity to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Parents posit the school district itself, per the
handbook, has defined “regular” as 90 percent attendance. The State contends the phrase
requires daily attendance on those days of the week that school is in session.
Although the phrase “regular basis” is not defined by statute, “phrases shall be taken
in their plain or ordinary and usual sense.” Section 1.090. The court of appeals has
examined the plain meaning of the phrase “regularly provides home day care services” in
9 the context of a home day care exception in a homeowners policy. Union Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 809 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Mo. App. 1991). In Brown, the home day care services were
provided every Tuesday and Thursday with some deviation, and the argument was asserted
that such provision was not “regular”. Id. at 146. The court of appeals rejected the
argument, reasoning:
Giving the word “regular” its plain meaning, we find that this was a regular provision of services. In the context of this exclusion, the definition of “regular” as “steady or uniform in course, practice or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation” and “returning, recurring or received at stated, fixed or uniform intervals” is appropriate. Webster’s Third International Dictionary. It was not necessary that the care be full time. “The word, ‘regularly,’ is not synonymous with constantly or continuously.” Fowler v. Baalmann, Inc., 361 Mo. 204, 234 S.W.2d 11, 14 (1950). The fact that care was not provided on holidays or during illness or that days were occasionally shifted does not defeat the regularity of the arrangement since these are expected and rational exceptions to any day care arrangement.
Id.
In the context of a public school program of academic instruction, the phrase “to
attend the academic program on a regular basis” means to attend school on those days the
school is in session. This abides by the ordinary meaning of “regular” as “steady or
uniform in course, practice or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational
variation” and “returning, recurring or received at stated, fixed or uniform intervals.” 9 See
id. Academic calendars for the school districts in Missouri establish the intervals at which
9 This also conforms with the synonyms for “regular,” which include “normal,” “typical,” and “natural.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1913 (3d ed. 2002). Children attending school according to the academic year, subject to holidays, sick days, and other necessary excusals, is engrained in our modern society.
10 attendance occurs: typically, although not exclusively, a five-day school week. See section
171.031.1. Section 167.031.1 defines the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. When measured by common
understanding and practices, no Missouri parent would conclude attendance “on a regular
basis” means anything less than having their child go to school on those days the school is
in session.
Of course, the statute enumerates certain exceptions that would prevent a parent
from running afoul of the statutory mandate for their child’s attendance, but such
exceptions are not present based on the record in this case. Parents never elected to remove
their children from the school’s rolls. See section 167.031.1(3). Parents likewise failed to
demonstrate their children were mentally or physically incapacitated to the satisfaction of
school officials. See section 167.031.1(1). Williams’ daughter missed nine days of school
with no explanation to the school. LaRue’s son missed seven days of school with no
explanation to the school. These absences constitute irregular attendance. 10 Section
167.031.1 adequately conveys the meaning of “on a regular basis” under the facts here.
This Court also finds that, on the record here, section 167.031.1’s requirement that
the attendance be “on a regular basis” does not permit arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Parents reference differences between the attendance policy presented in this
10 Given the occurrence of absences without explanation, this Court does not address whether the absences for which Parents contacted the school constituted exceptions under section 167.031.1(1).
11 school district and that discussed in State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756 (Mo. banc 2005), a case
in which this Court declined to address the purported vagueness issue of section 167.031.1.
Comparing the policy of another district as it existed nearly two decades ago to the current
policy of the Lebanon R-III School District is insufficient to demonstrate arbitrary
enforcement. See id. at 760-61 (“If the record before this Court in fact showed that the
statute was so indefinite and confusing that the various school districts in this State took
contradictory positions as to the meaning of the statutory phrase … and that it was being
interpreted to make a parent criminally responsible simply upon a showing that the parent’s
child had failed to attend school on a number of occasions that varied significantly in
number from district to district, and further that this caused confusion and problems for the
parties in the case then brought before the court, then serious constitutional questions about
the statute would be presented.”). Moreover, a school’s attendance policy does not change
the common or customary meaning of the word “regular.” The vagueness challenge by the
Parents fails.
In concluding that “to attend the academic program on a regular basis” means to
attend school on those days the school is in session, this Court is aware of the implication
of such meaning if taken to an extreme. Nevertheless, this Court is bound by its duty “to
ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and to consider the words
used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d
660, 665 (Mo. banc 2010). In addition to the statute providing authority for school officials
to excuse attendance when a child is mentally or physically unable to attend, section
12 167.031.1(1), the potential of enforcement of the law in marginal cases of noncompliance
is ameliorated both by the discretion of school officials to choose not to report minor
noncompliance and of prosecutors to choose not to prosecute in those cases.
Sufficient Evidence Supported the Convictions
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court assesses whether sufficient
evidence existed from which the trier of fact could have reasonably found guilt. State v.
Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. banc 2014). “All evidence and inferences favorable to
the State are accepted as true, and all evidence and inference to the contrary are rejected.”
Parents assert the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that their children’s
attendance, at a certain percentage, was not sufficiently “regular” to constitute a violation
of the statute. Parents rely on the handbook’s reference to attendance of 90 percent or
higher for the school year. Given the date both were charged, Parents argue their children
could have met the requisite attendance rate over the course of the entire year. Parents
further question why the percentage is set at 90 percent.
Because section 167.031.1 does not mandate a child attend a certain percentage of
a school term, this Court finds any discussion of percentages to be of little relevance.
Parents were required to cause their children to attend the academic program on a regular
basis. See section 167.031.1. As discussed previously, each child had multiple absences
for which the parent failed to provide any explanation to the school for why the child was
not attending. Consequently, this nonattendance was not excused pursuant to the statute.
13 Id. (“Nonattendance by such child shall cause such parent, guardian or other responsible
person to be in violation of the provisions of section 167.061, except as provided by this
section.”).
Parents further contend the State failed to prove they acted knowingly or purposely
in causing their child not to attend school regularly. “[T]he necessity of proof of some
level of scienter is implicit in the requirement that the parent ‘cause’ their child to regularly
attend school.” Self, 155 S.W.3d at 762. This Court has previously held the State is
required to prove the party responsible for the child “acted knowingly or purposely in
causing her child not to attend school regularly.” Id.
In Self, the parent’s conviction was reversed upon this Court’s determination that a
fact-finder could not have reasonably found the parent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 763-64. In that case, a 15-year-old student missed approximately 40 days of school
over the course of roughly six months. Id. at 758. The student handbook, which outlined
the absence policy of the district, and the student’s attendance record were admitted as
evidence. Id. at 759. The student’s attendance record indicated the student was pregnant.
Id. at 764. This Court relied on the student’s physical incapacitation due to her pregnancy,
which had been shown to the satisfaction of the school authorities, to show the State failed
to prove a culpable mental state on behalf of the parent. Id. Various statements in the
attendance policy suggested consequences for failure to attend would not apply if school
officials determined the child was not attending due to prolonged illness. Id.; see also
section 167.031.1(1), RSMo 2000. “No contrary evidence was presented that Ms. Self did
14 know that, despite the excused nature of most of [the child’s] absences due to physical
incapacity caused by her pregnancy, her absences could put her in violation of the
compulsory attendance laws, or that she otherwise caused the excessive absences.” Self,
155 S.W.3d at 764.
The cases at bar are unlike Self. Each involves a young student with no physical
incapacitation. Neither Williams nor LaRue was provided information by the school to
suggest there would be no consequences for each child’s failure to attend. Rather, school
officials consistently communicated that regular attendance was required. This
communication occurred through the handbook, through the letters sent, and through
conversations with school officials.
Williams asserts her conduct in allowing her child to be absent from school was not
a purposeful or knowing violation of the statute because she notified the school her child
was sick on six occasions and the handbook did not inform parents that absences caused
by illness are unexcused. Williams argues if these six occasions are not counted as
absences, her child’s attendance percentage is above 90 percent. LaRue makes a similar
argument, suggesting that if her child’s sick days and verified absences are removed from
consideration, her child’s attendance was at 90 percent. Again, however, a child’s
percentage of attendance is not determinative. Williams’ child was absent on nine
occasions without any communication to the school detailing the reason for the absence.
LaRue’s child was absent on seven occasions without any communication to the school
detailing the reason for the absence. This nonattendance was not excused by any
15 circumstance provided for in the statute. Given the notice provided to each parent and that
each parent was in control of their young child, evidence existed to support the inference
that each parent knowingly failed to cause their child to attend school on a regular basis.
Unlike in Self, such inference is not unreasonable. See id.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court’s judgment in each case is affirmed.
___________________________________ Robin Ransom, Judge
Russell, C.J., Powell, Breckenridge, Fischer and Wilson, JJ., concur. Draper, J., not participating.