IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) WD83558 ) ABRAHAM J. GILBERT, ) Opinion filed: May 25, 2021
) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI THE HONORABLE MARCO ROLDAN, JUDGE
Division Three: Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge
Abraham Gilbert appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson
County convicting him of two counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree and five
counts of child molestation in the first degree. In his six points on appeal, Gilbert
claims that the trial court erred in (1) overruling his Batson challenge; (2) denying
his motion for new trial based on juror misconduct; and (3) overruling his motions for
judgment of acquittal. We affirm. Factual and Procedural History
Abraham Gilbert (“Gilbert”), A.G. (the “Victim”), and A.G.’s biological brother
were each adopted as children from an orphanage in Mexico by the same adoptive
parents (“Parents”). Victim’s date of birth is February 11, 1991. Gilbert’s date of
birth is August 11, 1985, making Gilbert approximately five and a half years older
than Victim.
Gilbert began abusing Victim when she was in the fifth grade by rubbing his
hand on her vagina over her clothing. Over time, the abuse increased to where
Gilbert inserted his fingers in Victim’s vagina, put his mouth on her vagina, and
touched Victim’s breasts underneath her clothing with his hand and mouth.
In the summer of 2002, between Victim’s fifth and sixth grade year, she and
Gilbert began mowing neighbors’ lawns to make money. Later that year while Victim
was resisting Gilbert’s sexual assault, Gilbert asked Victim, “[w]hat do you want?”
In response, Victim told Gilbert she wanted $50, believing that he would not have the
money, “so then he wouldn’t be able to do it because . . . it was during the winter and
we weren’t mowing lawns anymore and so I [didn’t] know how else he was going to
get money.” To Victim’s surprise, Gilbert had the money and paid her that same
night. Gilbert’s abuse of Victim became both more frequent and intense following
Victim’s mistaken belief that a demand of money would cease Gilbert’s misdeeds.
Gilbert made Victim rub his penis with her hand and put his penis in her mouth.
Gilbert also put his mouth on Victim’s breasts and vagina underneath her clothing
and inserted his fingers in her vagina. Gilbert’s abuse of Victim continued for the
2 next “couple of years.” During the final act of abuse, Gilbert penetrated Victim’s
vagina with the tip of his penis and Victim was able to resist his further efforts. The
abuse ceased around the time Gilbert found a girlfriend at school that was his own
age.
Victim did not disclose the abuse until, as an adult, she told her parents that
something had happened between her and Gilbert when she was younger, but did not
provide any detail. It was Parents’ understanding that “[Gilbert] had done something
of a sexual nature to her.” When the parents approached Gilbert about what Victim
had told them, Gilbert “confirmed that he had done something to [Victim][.]”
Eventually Victim felt her parents were not supporting her and she reported Gilbert’s
actions to the police. At some point thereafter, Gilbert wrote Victim a letter. In it,
Gilbert apologized to Victim “from the bottom of [his] heart for everything that [he]
put [Victim] through as a sibling,” and stated further that Victim “should never have
been subjected to the worst sides of [Gilbert’s] childhood and adolescence.” Gilbert’s
letter to Victim was admitted into evidence at trial.
A jury trial began on November 18, 2018. During voir dire, the State exercised
a peremptory strike to remove Venireperson 45, an African-American female, from
the jury. In response, Gilbert’s counsel raised a Batson challenge. The State
explained that it struck Venireperson 45 because she was nodding in agreement
throughout defense counsel’s questioning. Following arguments from the parties, the
trial court overruled Gilbert’s Batson challenge and Venireperson 45 was struck.
3 Gilbert neither testified nor presented any evidence at trial. The jury found
Gilbert guilty of two counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree and five counts of
child molestation in the first degree.1 The court sentenced Gilbert in accordance with
the jury’s recommendation to fifteen years on each count of child molestation in the
first degree, and 17 and 34 years respectively on the two counts of statutory sodomy
in the first degree. The court ordered the sentences on the two counts of statutory
sodomy be served consecutively to each other and concurrently to the child
molestation counts, which were ordered to be served concurrently to each other, for a
total sentence of 51 years imprisonment.
Gilbert appeals. Further factual details will be provided as relevant in the
analysis below.
Point I
In his first point on appeal, Gilbert contends that the trial court clearly erred
in overruling his Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of an African-
American venireperson. Gilbert specifically argues that following the State striking
Venireperson 45 from Gilbert’s jury, the State’s proffered explanation that it struck
Venireperson 45 because she nodded throughout defense counsel’s voir dire was
pretextual under the totality of the circumstances.
1 Three of the child molestation counts were charged as such in the information. However, one count (Count I) was returned as a lesser-included offense of statutory rape in the first degree, and another count (Count II) was returned as a lesser-included offense of statutory sodomy in the first degree. (LF156:1-2) (LF147:8&12).
4 Standard of Review
“When reviewing a ruling on a Batson challenge, we accord ‘great deference’ to
the circuit court ‘because its findings of fact largely depend on its evaluation of
credibility and demeanor.’” State v. Evans, 490 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)
(quoting State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010)). Therefore, we will
reverse the circuit court’s decision only if we find it was clearly erroneous. State v.
Jackson, 385 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). To find it was clearly erroneous,
we must have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State
v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d at 687 (quoting State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Mo.
banc 2007)).
Analysis
“The Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution prohibits
parties from using a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror on the basis of
race.”2 State v. Boyd, 597 S.W.3d 263, 269 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting State v.
Meeks, 495 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Mo. banc 2016)). “In Batson, the Supreme Court
described a three-step, burden-shifting process for challenging a peremptory strike
on this basis.” State v. Meeks, 495 S.W.3d at 172 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 96-98 (1986)). “The Supreme Court, however, ‘decline[d] . . . to formulate
particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a
prosecutor’s challenges.” Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 99). To fill that
2 The Equal Protection Clause similarly prevents the use of peremptory strikes to exclude potential jurors on the basis of gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994). Gilbert makes no claim that Venireperson 45 was struck on the basis of her gender.
5 void, the Missouri Supreme Court articulated a three-step procedure for trial courts
to use in evaluating a Batson challenge:
First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard to one or more specific venirepersons struck by the [S]tate and identify the cognizable racial group to which the venireperson or persons belong. The trial court will then require the [S]tate to come forward with reasonably specific and clear race-neutral explanations for the strike. Assuming the prosecutor is able to articulate an acceptable reason for the strike, the defendant will then need to show that the [S]tate’s proffered reasons for the strikes were merely pretextual and that the strikes were racially motivated.
State v. Meeks, 495 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.
banc 1992)).
“If the proponent of the strike articulates an acceptable non-discriminatory
reason for the strike, then, at the conclusion of the third step, the circuit court must
decide whether the party challenging the strike ‘has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.’” State v. Jackson, 385 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)
(quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). “To prove purposeful racial
discrimination, the party challenging the strike must demonstrate that the proffered
reason for the strike was merely pretextual and that the strike was, in fact, motivated
by race.” Id. (citing State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Mo. banc 2010)). “To
meet this standard, the party challenging the strike ‘must present evidence or specific
analysis’ showing that the proffered reason was pretextual.” Id. (quoting State v.
Johnson, 930 S.W.2d 456, 460 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)).
This Court considers a non-exclusive list of factors in determining whether
pretext exists, including: “the explanation in light of the circumstances; similarly
6 situated jurors not struck; the relevance between the explanation and the case; the
demeanor of the state and excluded venire members; the court’s prior experiences
with the prosecutor’s office; and objective measures relating to motive.” State v.
McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 739 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State v. Johnson, 284
S.W.3d 561, 571 (Mo. banc 2009)).
Here, at the close of voir dire, the State exercised a peremptory strike to remove
Venireperson 45, who identified herself as African-American, to which defense
counsel raised a Batson challenge. In response to defense counsel’s Batson challenge,
the prosecutor explained that:
[T]he reason . . . is that during [defense counsel’s] questioning, [Venireperson 45] was nodding along to just about every single question that [defense counsel] asked, and that’s the reason that I want to strike her off count. [Venireperson 45] sat and nodded in agreement with everything that defense counsel said.
The trial court then questioned the State as to whether there were any similarly-
situated venire members that were also nodding in agreement with defense counsel.
The prosecutor responded that “[t]here was a few that nodded in agreement with him;
they ended up being struck for cause. Based on who is left after strikes for cause and
within that number, that’s the only one that I noted was nodding in agreement with
him throughout his entire questioning.” Defense counsel responded that because
“no record was made about it,” he was unaware which potential jurors were nodding
in agreement with him, but acknowledged that Venireperson 45 “may have been one
of them.” Defense counsel added that he didn’t know whether he “said anything that
would indicate a prejudice in nodding along with it,” and insisted further that if he
7 was explaining a right, such as the right to remain silent, and the juror nodded their
head, then he “fail[s] to see the logical connection with agreeing with the explanation
of a right and a cause for strike or a peremptory cause for strike.”
In response, the prosecutor stated:
The observations of how a juror is receptive to one side over the other, having no facts or anything like that, those observations are basis for whether or not, given the other available jurors, if that’s somebody that’s different that we would strike for that reason, based on the observations. And so it has nothing to do with her race. It has everything to do with her sitting there and nodding along in agreement with everything [defense counsel] said.
We’re the State. This is an adversarial process. I don’t want a juror on there who’s sitting there nodding along, acting like, I’m in total agreement, I’m on your side, with every single thing that you’re saying throughout the entire process. ... There’s no other similarly-situated jurors and I’m striking only those types of people.
Defense counsel responded stating that he doesn’t “know how to identify similarly-
situated people who the prosecuting attorney also noticed” when “talking about
private observations of opposing counsel.” The trial court thereafter overruled
Gilbert’s Batson challenge.
Here, Gilbert met step one of the three-step procedure by asserting a Batson
challenge on the State’s strike of Venireperson 45, an African-American. The State
then met step two of the procedure by offering the race-neutral justification that the
strike was due to Venireperson 45 nodding in agreement with defense counsel
throughout voir dire. After Gilbert challenged this reason as pretextual, the
8 prosecutor provided a more extensive race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
strike of Venireperson 45. Step three of the Batson process was complete when, based
on this explanation from the State, the court deemed the strike race-neutral and
Gilbert failed to prove pretext.
We find nothing clearly erroneous with the court’s ruling. The prosecutor
explained that similarly-situated venire members – those that also nodded in
agreement with defense counsel throughout voir dire – had already been struck for
cause, leaving only Venireperson 45. Importantly, a venireperson’s “body language
during questioning” is a “legitimate basis for using a peremptory strike.” State v.
Dow, 375 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d
100, 114 (Mo. banc 1998)). “One of the differences between a peremptory strike and
a challenge for cause is that, in choosing to exercise a peremptory strike, an attorney
or party ‘is allowed a subjective evaluation of the honesty and accuracy of the
statement of the venireperson.’” Id. (quoting State v. Rollins, 321 S.W.3d 353, 368
(Mo. App. W.D. 2010). “[T]he exercise of peremptory challenges is the product of the
subjective analyses of a wide variety of character and personality traits perceived by
counsel. Batson does not prohibit ‘hunch’ challenges so long as racial animus is not
the motive.” State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 67 (Mo. 1987). “Hence, [b]ecause
weighing the legitimacy of the State’s explanation for a peremptory strike is, by
nature, a subjective exercise, we place great reliance in the trial court’s judgment.”
State v. Dow, 375 S.W.3d at 850 (quoting State v. Brown, 246 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo.
App. S.D. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted).
9 In sum, Gilbert failed to meet his burden in proving purposeful discrimination
by the State. The trial court did not clearly err in overruling Gilbert’s Batson
challenge. Point I is denied.
Point II
In his second point, Gilbert contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. Despite acknowledging Missouri’s
general rule governing the impeachment of a jury verdict, Gilbert urges this Court to
create a new exception applicable to a jury’s improper consideration of a defendant’s
failure to testify in reaching a verdict.
Standard of Review
This Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial
based on juror misconduct unless the trial court abused its discretion. State v. West,
425 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its
ruling ‘is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of
careful consideration.’” Id. (citing Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d
81, 86-87 (Mo. banc 2010)).
The “well-founded and long-established rule” governing impeachment of a
verdict, referred to in Missouri as the Mansfield Rule, is that a “juror’s testimony
about jury misconduct allegedly affecting deliberations may not be used to impeach
10 the jury’s verdict.” State v. West, 425 S.W.3d at 154 (citing State v. Herndon, 224
S.W.3d 97, 103 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007)).
The rule is perfectly settled, that jurors speak through their verdict, and they cannot be allowed to violate the secrets of the jury room, and tell of any partiality or misconduct that transpired there, nor speak of the motives which induced or operated to produce the verdict. Missouri law has long held that a juror may not impeach a unanimous, unambiguous verdict after it is rendered. . . . Further, a motion court is not required to hear testimony from jurors to rule on a motion for new trial that is brought on allegations of juror misconduct.
State v. West, 425 S.W.3d at 154-55 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In
other words, “juror testimony is improper if it merely alleges that jurors acted on
improper motives, reasoning, beliefs, or mental operations, also known as ‘matters
inherent in the verdict.’” State v. Bolden, 371 S.W.3d 802, 805 n.2 (Mo. banc 2012)
(quoting Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d at 87).
There are two major policy considerations for this rule. First, there would be no end to litigation if verdicts could be set aside because one juror reportedly did not correctly understand the law or accurately weigh the evidence. Second, there is no legitimate way to corroborate or refute the mental process of a particular juror.
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d at 87-88 (internal citation omitted).
Two narrow exceptions have been recognized to this general rule. State v.
West, 425 S.W.3d at 155. First, “it is permissible to elicit testimony about juror
misconduct that occurred outside the jury room, such as the gathering of extrinsic
evidence.” State v. West, 425 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d at
130)). Second, it is likewise permissible to elicit testimony about jury misconduct
that occurred during deliberations where “a juror makes statements evincing ethnic
11 or religious bias or prejudice during deliberations . . . .” State v. West, 425 S.W.3d at
155 (quoting Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d at 88).
Gilbert made an oral offer of proof regarding the alleged juror misconduct. The
evidence Gilbert sought to present would have consisted solely of “intrinsic” evidence
relating to the thought processes of the jury, and, as a result, is subject to the rule
that a juror’s testimony may not be used to impeach the jury’s verdict. State v. West,
425 S.W.3d at 155. While he acknowledges that neither exception applies to the facts
of this case, Gilbert urges this Court to create a new exception encompassing a jury’s
improper consideration of a defendant’s failure to testify in reaching its verdict. We
decline to do so. In so doing, we are mindful of the wise words spoken by the United
States Supreme Court when approving the exception for statements made during
deliberations indicating racial bias. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867-
68 (2017). There, the Court warned that creating further exceptions to the general
rule could create havoc: “[t]o attempt to rid the jury of every irregularity of this sort
would be to expose it to unrelenting scrutiny. It is not at all clear . . . that the jury
system would survive such efforts to perfect it.” Id. at 868 (internal citations and
quotations omitted). We heed the Court’s warning.
Further, it is evident that Gilbert’s jury gave due consideration to the evidence
presented, and not simply the absence of Gilbert’s testimony. Indeed, the jury’s
careful consideration of the evidence presented at trial was demonstrated by its
verdict, which returned guilty verdicts of child molestation – both lesser-included
12 offenses to the charges of statutory rape in the first degree and statutory sodomy in
the first degree.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion for new
trial. Point II is denied.
Points III, IV, V, and VI
In his third, fourth, fifth, and sixth points, Gilbert argues that the trial court
erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, a new
trial, for the charge of first degree statutory sodomy and three charges of first degree
child molestation, respectively. We address these points together as they are based
on the common premise that the State failed to prove that the charged acts occurred
during the time period stated in the information.
“To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a
conviction and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, [a reviewing c]ourt
does not weigh the evidence but, rather, ‘accept[s] as true all evidence tending to
prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and
ignore[s] all contrary evidence and inferences.’” State v. Vickers, 560 S.W.3d 3, 21
(Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Mo. banc
2016)). “Our ‘review is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. banc 2011).
“This is not an assessment of whether [we] believe[] that the evidence at trial
13 established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light
of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting State v.
Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011).
A charging document satisfies the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. Every information or indictment puts the defendant on notice, for due process purposes, of all offenses included in the offense charged. A criminal defendant, as a matter of due process, is entitled to notice of the charges against him and may not be convicted of any offense of which the information or indictment does not give him fair notice.
State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 466 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Rule 23.01(b)(3)3 requires that the indictment or information “[s]tate the date
and place of the offense charged as definitely as can be done. If multiple counts
charge the same offense on the same date or during the same time period, additional
facts or details to distinguish the counts shall be stated[.]” However, “[t]ime is not
essential in child sexual abuse cases because it can be impossible to ascertain specific
dates of the sexual abuse.” State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d at 464 (citations omitted).
“[T]he State is not confined in its evidence to the precise date stated in the
3 All Rule references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018), unless otherwise
indicated.
14 information, but may prove the offense to have been committed on any day before the
date of the information and within the period of limitation.”4 Id. (quoting State v.
Bunch, 289 S.W.3d 701, 703 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009)). Indeed, “[a]ppellate courts in
previous cases have held that periods of time ranging anywhere from a 24-day period
to a span of four years and six months were sufficient for notice and due process
purposes.” State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d at 466 (citations omitted).
Here, Gilbert was charged with statutory sodomy in the first degree for
penetrating the Victim’s vagina with his finger (Point III); with child molestation in
the first degree for placing his hand on Victim’s breasts (Point IV); with child
molestation in the first degree for placing his mouth on Victim’s breasts (Point V);
and with child molestation in the first degree for placing his hand on Victim’s vagina
(Point VI). Each count in the information alleged that the charged conduct occurred
between August 28, 2002, and February 10, 2004. The verdict directing instruction
mirrored those allegations, including the date range for the offenses.
At trial, Victim testified to specific markers in time from which the jury could
reasonably find that the charged conduct occurred within the time period alleged by
the State: Victim testified that her date of birth was February 11, 1991; that she
started kindergarten when she was five-years-old, which would have been in the fall
of 1996; and that she was in the fifth grade when the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, (“9/11”) occurred. Thus, she would have started the sixth grade in the fall
4 Missouri case law has, however, recognized that exceptions may exist if there are issues
with alibi, access to the victim, or the statute of limitations. State v. Bunch, 289 S.W.3d 701, 703 n.5 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (citing State v. Carney, 195 S.W.3d 567, 571 n.7 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006)). Gilbert raised no such defense in this case.
15 of 2002. Victim further testified that she learned to mow lawns when she was eleven-
years-old, which would have been the summer of 2002. The following winter, Victim
told Gilbert that she would stop resisting his sexual advances if he paid her $50 under
the mistaken belief that he would have no money. Victim testified that after such
payment was made in late 2002, Gilbert put his fingers in Victim’s vagina (Point III);
Gilbert placed his mouth on Victim’s breasts (Point V); and Gilbert touched the skin
of Victim’s vagina (Point VI). There was, therefore, a logical timeline sufficient for a
reasonable juror to conclude that such acts occurred during the charged period of
August 28, 2002, to February 10, 2004.
As to Point IV, we preliminarily address Gilbert’s argument that he was under
the age of 17 until August 11, 2002, and thus, this matter should have preceded
through the juvenile court. This argument was never presented to the trial court,
was not contained in a point relied on, and is argued for the first time in his reply
brief. “We will not entertain points and arguments first raised on appeal in a reply
brief.” State v. Brown, 406 S.W.3d 460, 465 n.9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing Coyne
v. Coyne, 17 S.W.3d 904, 906 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000)). Similarly, “[w]e do not consider
arguments raised in the argument portion of the brief that were not encompassed in
the points relied on.” State v. Irby, 254 S.W.3d 181, 195 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) (citing
State v. Daggett, 170 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005)). We do not address this
argument.
We proceed in addressing whether there was sufficient evidence to find that
Gilbert touched the Victim’s breasts within the charged period. Victim clearly
16 testified that Gilbert touched her breasts with his hand underneath her clothing on
multiple occasions throughout the period of sexual abuse. She also testified that the
sexual abuse by Gilbert began during her fifth grade year, which commenced in
August 2001 and lasted until Gilbert began dating a girl in his class at school, which
was established as occurring in the Fall of 2003. Gilbert argues that Victim’s
testimony therefore established that such conduct could have occurred before August
28, 2002, the commencement of the time period stated in the information as to when
the abuse began. He states Victim’s testimony places the act as occurring as much
as one year prior to the time as that alleged in the information. While correct, even
if the act did occur as much as a year prior to the period alleged in the information,
Gilbert was still provided sufficient notice and due process by the information. See
State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d at 466 (periods of up to four and one-half years prior to
the period alleged in the information have been held sufficient for notice and due
process purposes) (citations omitted).
Accepting as true all evidence tending to prove Gilbert’s guilt together with all
reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignoring all contrary evidence and
inferences, we find sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vickers, 560 S.W.3d at 21.
Points III, IV, V, and VI are denied.
17 Conclusion
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
__________________________________________ W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGE All concur.