In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112815 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Washington County vs. ) Cause No. 23WA-CR00278-01 ) NARVEL S. HARMON, ) Honorable Wendy W. Horn ) Appellant. ) Filed: July 29, 2025
Introduction
Narvel Harmon (“Defendant”) appeals the circuit court’s judgment after a jury found him
guilty of first-degree harassment. In his sole point on appeal, Defendant argues the circuit court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a “trigger-like” gesture he made during his
preliminary hearing because it was speculative to interpret Defendant’s gesture as a threat. This
Court holds the circuit court did not err in admitting the evidence of Defendant’s gesture because
it was a threat toward the victims, which was admissible to show Defendant’s consciousness of
guilt. Point I is denied. The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict are:1 Brayden Burns and
1 State v. Townsend, 649 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). Haley Juliette (collectively, “Victims”) were neighbors with Defendant, who was also Juliette’s
distant cousin. In the past, Victims regularly provided Defendant with food, water, and a place to
shower.
In the evening of August 8, 2023, Victims were at home with their one-year-old daughter
when Defendant came into their house irate and unannounced, speaking incomprehensibly. Juliette
testified Defendant said he was Jesus and other “totally ludicrous” things. To de-escalate the
situation, Victims told Defendant they were going to Juliette’s sister’s house for dinner. Defendant
left their house within minutes.
Again unannounced, Defendant returned shortly afterwards. After coming into their house,
Defendant “flung his shirt off,” said he was Jesus and Jesse James, and said he was hot because a
man named Rico was coming after him. Defendant threatened to kill Victims and Juliette’s
grandmother. Defendant claimed to own Victims’ house and threatened to burn it down. Burns
stated, “I was pretty scared. I’m not too scared of much, but I was constantly scared. Felt
threatened. Very, very, very threatened.” Juliette stated, “It’s terrifying. When someone comes in
right next to your baby, that’s terrifying.” For five to ten minutes, Victims repeatedly requested
Defendant leave. After Defendant left their home, Victims went to Juliette’s sister’s house and
called the police.
Deputy Ethan Haworth of the Washington County Sheriff’s Office spoke to Defendant later
in the evening. Defendant admitted he entered Victims’s home. Deputy Haworth testified
Defendant stated he “did not make a claim that he was going to kill someone, just that he wanted
to kill someone.” The State charged Defendant with first-degree harassment and first-degree
burglary.
2 At Defendant’s preliminary hearing, Deputy Austin Huett of the Washington County
Sheriff’s Office sat in the courtroom behind Victims. After the hearing concluded, Defendant was
being escorted out of the courtroom. When he walked in front of Victims, Deputy Huett saw
Defendant raise his hands to under his chin and move his thumb in a “trigger-like” manner. Deputy
Huett testified the gesture was directed at Victims.
Defendant objected to the admission of Deputy Huett’s testimony at trial, arguing it was
more prejudicial than probative. The circuit court overruled the objection and admitted Deputy
Huett’s testimony. During closing argument, the State said, “If you have any doubt, any doubt at
all, it’s expelled by the fact that almost two months later he’s in court, in shackles, going like this,
trying to intimidate them even more, trying to still harass them.” The jury acquitted Defendant of
first-degree burglary, but convicted him of first-degree harassment. Defendant was sentenced to
seven years’ imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
Standard of Review
“The general rule for the preservation of error is an objection stating specific grounds must
be made at trial, the same grounds must be set out in the motion for new trial, and these grounds
must be renewed in the appellate brief.” State v. Young, 603 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Mo. App. E.D.
2020). Here, Defendant objected to the admission of Deputy Huett’s testimony at trial, renewed
the objection in his motion for new trial, and raised the issue in his appellate brief. Accordingly,
the issue is properly preserved.
Because the issue is properly preserved, “[a] [circuit] court’s decision regarding the
admissibility of evidence for relevance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Taylor, 466
S.W.3d 521, 528 (Mo. banc 2015). “A [circuit] court abuses its discretion only if its decision to
3 exclude evidence is ‘clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to
indicate a lack of careful consideration.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 675
(Mo. banc 2010)). “[I]f reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the
[circuit] court, then it cannot be said that the [circuit] court abused its discretion.” State v.
Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 533 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State v. Brown, 939 S.W.2d 882, 883–
84 (Mo. banc 1997)). “[This Court] review[s] [circuit] court decisions regarding the admissibility
of evidence for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that
it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Tolen, 295 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Mo. App. E.D.
2009). “The [circuit] court’s discretionary ruling is presumed to be correct and the burden is on
the defendant to overcome that presumption.” State v. Adams, 443 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Mo. App. E.D.
2014).
Discussion
Point I: Alleged Prior Bad Act Evidence Party Positions
Defendant argues the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Deputy Huett’s
testimony regarding the “trigger-like” gesture. He contends this evidence was more prejudicial
than probative because it was speculative to interpret his gesture as a threat. The State asserts
Deputy Huett’s testimony was admissible to show Defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The State
also argues even if Deputy Huett’s testimony was improperly admitted, Defendant was not
prejudiced because it presented overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
Evidence must be logically and legally relevant to be admissible. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d at
528. “Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less
probable.” Id. (quoting State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 756 (Mo. banc 2014)). Logical
relevance is a “low-level test that is easily met.” State v. Thomas, 628 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Mo. App.
4 E.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Banks, 582 S.W.3d 919, 924–25 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). “Evidence
is legally relevant when its probative value outweighs ‘unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112815 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Washington County vs. ) Cause No. 23WA-CR00278-01 ) NARVEL S. HARMON, ) Honorable Wendy W. Horn ) Appellant. ) Filed: July 29, 2025
Introduction
Narvel Harmon (“Defendant”) appeals the circuit court’s judgment after a jury found him
guilty of first-degree harassment. In his sole point on appeal, Defendant argues the circuit court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a “trigger-like” gesture he made during his
preliminary hearing because it was speculative to interpret Defendant’s gesture as a threat. This
Court holds the circuit court did not err in admitting the evidence of Defendant’s gesture because
it was a threat toward the victims, which was admissible to show Defendant’s consciousness of
guilt. Point I is denied. The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict are:1 Brayden Burns and
1 State v. Townsend, 649 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). Haley Juliette (collectively, “Victims”) were neighbors with Defendant, who was also Juliette’s
distant cousin. In the past, Victims regularly provided Defendant with food, water, and a place to
shower.
In the evening of August 8, 2023, Victims were at home with their one-year-old daughter
when Defendant came into their house irate and unannounced, speaking incomprehensibly. Juliette
testified Defendant said he was Jesus and other “totally ludicrous” things. To de-escalate the
situation, Victims told Defendant they were going to Juliette’s sister’s house for dinner. Defendant
left their house within minutes.
Again unannounced, Defendant returned shortly afterwards. After coming into their house,
Defendant “flung his shirt off,” said he was Jesus and Jesse James, and said he was hot because a
man named Rico was coming after him. Defendant threatened to kill Victims and Juliette’s
grandmother. Defendant claimed to own Victims’ house and threatened to burn it down. Burns
stated, “I was pretty scared. I’m not too scared of much, but I was constantly scared. Felt
threatened. Very, very, very threatened.” Juliette stated, “It’s terrifying. When someone comes in
right next to your baby, that’s terrifying.” For five to ten minutes, Victims repeatedly requested
Defendant leave. After Defendant left their home, Victims went to Juliette’s sister’s house and
called the police.
Deputy Ethan Haworth of the Washington County Sheriff’s Office spoke to Defendant later
in the evening. Defendant admitted he entered Victims’s home. Deputy Haworth testified
Defendant stated he “did not make a claim that he was going to kill someone, just that he wanted
to kill someone.” The State charged Defendant with first-degree harassment and first-degree
burglary.
2 At Defendant’s preliminary hearing, Deputy Austin Huett of the Washington County
Sheriff’s Office sat in the courtroom behind Victims. After the hearing concluded, Defendant was
being escorted out of the courtroom. When he walked in front of Victims, Deputy Huett saw
Defendant raise his hands to under his chin and move his thumb in a “trigger-like” manner. Deputy
Huett testified the gesture was directed at Victims.
Defendant objected to the admission of Deputy Huett’s testimony at trial, arguing it was
more prejudicial than probative. The circuit court overruled the objection and admitted Deputy
Huett’s testimony. During closing argument, the State said, “If you have any doubt, any doubt at
all, it’s expelled by the fact that almost two months later he’s in court, in shackles, going like this,
trying to intimidate them even more, trying to still harass them.” The jury acquitted Defendant of
first-degree burglary, but convicted him of first-degree harassment. Defendant was sentenced to
seven years’ imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
Standard of Review
“The general rule for the preservation of error is an objection stating specific grounds must
be made at trial, the same grounds must be set out in the motion for new trial, and these grounds
must be renewed in the appellate brief.” State v. Young, 603 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Mo. App. E.D.
2020). Here, Defendant objected to the admission of Deputy Huett’s testimony at trial, renewed
the objection in his motion for new trial, and raised the issue in his appellate brief. Accordingly,
the issue is properly preserved.
Because the issue is properly preserved, “[a] [circuit] court’s decision regarding the
admissibility of evidence for relevance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Taylor, 466
S.W.3d 521, 528 (Mo. banc 2015). “A [circuit] court abuses its discretion only if its decision to
3 exclude evidence is ‘clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to
indicate a lack of careful consideration.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 675
(Mo. banc 2010)). “[I]f reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the
[circuit] court, then it cannot be said that the [circuit] court abused its discretion.” State v.
Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 533 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State v. Brown, 939 S.W.2d 882, 883–
84 (Mo. banc 1997)). “[This Court] review[s] [circuit] court decisions regarding the admissibility
of evidence for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that
it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Tolen, 295 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Mo. App. E.D.
2009). “The [circuit] court’s discretionary ruling is presumed to be correct and the burden is on
the defendant to overcome that presumption.” State v. Adams, 443 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Mo. App. E.D.
2014).
Discussion
Point I: Alleged Prior Bad Act Evidence Party Positions
Defendant argues the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Deputy Huett’s
testimony regarding the “trigger-like” gesture. He contends this evidence was more prejudicial
than probative because it was speculative to interpret his gesture as a threat. The State asserts
Deputy Huett’s testimony was admissible to show Defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The State
also argues even if Deputy Huett’s testimony was improperly admitted, Defendant was not
prejudiced because it presented overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
Evidence must be logically and legally relevant to be admissible. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d at
528. “Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less
probable.” Id. (quoting State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 756 (Mo. banc 2014)). Logical
relevance is a “low-level test that is easily met.” State v. Thomas, 628 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Mo. App.
4 E.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Banks, 582 S.W.3d 919, 924–25 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). “Evidence
is legally relevant when its probative value outweighs ‘unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.’” Taylor, 466 S.W.3d at 528
(quoting Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Mo. banc 2013)).
“[C]onduct and declarations of a defendant that are relevant to show consciousness of guilt
or a desire to conceal the offense are admissible because they tend to establish the defendant’s
guilt of the charged crime.” State v. Butler, 642 S.W.3d 364, 370 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (quoting
State v. Speaks, 298 S.W.3d 70, 84 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). “Evidence that the defendant threatened
a witness is admissible to show consciousness of guilt.” Id. The circuit court does not err in
admitting evidence of a defendant’s conduct or declarations that “reasonably can be interpreted as
threatening harm to a witness.” Id. at 370-71 (holding a defendant asking a friend to “take [them]
out to eat” on a jail phone call could reasonably be interpreted as a threat toward the witnesses
against him and is admissible, even given alternate explanations).
Here, Defendant argues the “trigger-like” gesture was not a threat but was an expression
of suicidal despair at his predicament. This Court disagrees. Like the statement in Butler, the
“trigger-like” gesture could reasonably be interpreted as Defendant threatening to harm Victims.
The gesture imitated the firing of a gun, occurred “when [Defendant] got in front of the [V]ictims,”
and Deputy Huett testified it was directed at Victims. The gesture also occurred during the
preliminary hearing, before Victims testified at trial, supporting the inference the gesture was
intended to threaten them. Because the gesture could reasonably be interpreted as a threat, it is
admissible, even given alternate explanations. Hence, because evidence of Defendant’s gesture is
logically and legally relevant, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Deputy
Huett’s testimony.
5 Even if the evidence were irrelevant—which it is not—Defendant suffered no prejudice
because the State presented overwhelming evidence of his guilt. “In a criminal case involving
improperly admitted evidence, the test for prejudice is whether the error was outcome-
determinative.” Thomas, 628 S.W.3d at 691 (quoting State v. Yung, 246 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Mo.
App. S.D. 2008)). Prejudice is outcome-determinative if “there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.” Id. at 694.
A first-degree harassment conviction requires the State prove the defendant “without good
cause, engages in any act with the purpose to cause emotional distress to another person, and such
act does cause such person to suffer emotional distress.” § 565.090.1.2 “Intent is rarely susceptible
to proof by direct evidence and is most often inferred circumstantially.” State v. Lammers, 479
S.W.3d 624, 633 (Mo. banc 2016). “The defendant’s mental state may be determined from
evidence of the defendant’s conduct before the act, from the act itself, and the defendant’s
subsequent conduct.” State v. McClain, 685 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting State
v. Hineman, 14 S.W.3d 924, 927–28 (Mo. banc 1999)).
Here, Burns testified Defendant came into his house unannounced, threatened to kill him,
Juliette, and Juliette’s grandmother. Defendant also threatened to burn their house down because
Defendant thought he owned it. Defendant’s actions made Burns feel threatened and scared.
Juliette testified Defendant came into their house unannounced, took his shirt off, and said he was
Jesus and Jesse James. Defendant’s threats made Juliette feel terrified, especially because
Defendant was so close to her baby. Deputy Haworth testified Defendant stated he “did not make
a claim that he was going to kill someone, just that he wanted to kill someone.” Given this
testimony, even if the circuit court improperly admitted evidence of Defendant’s gesture, he
2 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016.
6 suffered no prejudice because the State presented overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the “trigger-like” gesture.
Point I is denied.
Conclusion
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
_______________________________ Philip M. Hess, Judge
Michael S. Wright, P.J. and Virginia W. Lay, J. concur.