State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Desmond Harris, Appellant.

CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 27, 2025
DocketED112670
StatusPublished

This text of State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Desmond Harris, Appellant. (State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Desmond Harris, Appellant.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Desmond Harris, Appellant., (Mo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Point II – Sentencing

In Point II, Harris asserts that the trial court plainly erred in considering at sentencing his

prior charges. Harris argues that because no evidence of the prior charges was presented, the trial

court could not have determined by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed those

offenses, and that because the trial court based its decision on that consideration, manifest injustice

occurred. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

Harris acknowledges that he did not preserve this issue, but requests we review this claim

under Rule 30.20,1 which gives us the discretion to review a plain error affecting substantial rights

if we find it has resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. State v. Hill, 697 S.W.3d

885, 888 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). We will not review claims of plain error “unless the claimed error

facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of

justice has resulted.” State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal

quotation omitted). Plain error review is a two-step analysis where we first determine “whether

there was ‘evident, obvious, and clear’ error ‘affecting substantial rights’” and, if so, “whether that

plain error resulted in ‘manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.’” Hill, 697 S.W.3d at 888

(quoting State v. Kendrick, 550 S.W.3d 117, 120-21 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)).

B. Discussion

Trial courts are “allowed to rely on a wide range of evidence at sentencing, including

evidence of the history and character of the defendant.” Childs v. State, 440 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Mo.

App. E.D. 2014). Evidence that may be considered includes conduct for which a defendant has

been acquitted “so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”

1 All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024).

7 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam); State v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 598,

602 (Mo. banc 2006) (per curiam). Generally, this burden of proof can be satisfied when the

acquitted charges were part of the same case, or when the State presents evidence of the acquitted

charges. See State v. Davis, 422 S.W.3d 458, 463-64 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (court considered

acquitted conduct which had been part of the same underlying case); Clark, 197 S.W.3d at 599-

600 (State introduced testimonial and forensic evidence of acquitted conduct at sentencing). Mere

evidence that a defendant was charged with an offense is irrelevant to establish that he or she

actually committed that offense. See State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Mo. banc 2008)

(holding that an indictment was not “history and character” evidence and therefore inadmissible

because it was not relevant to prove that the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged in the

indictment).

Harris has established that the court’s mistake was evident, obvious, and clear. The trial

court was correct in that it could consider Harris’s prior charges, but omitted the important qualifier

– that they must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. There was no evidence before the

trial court that could have established that Harris committed the prior charges, even by a lower

standard of proof. Harris’s prior case was not part of the same underlying case, and was presided

over by a different judge. The present case is unlike Davis, where the acquitted charges were part

of the same case, thus heard by the same judge. 422 S.W.3d at 464. Furthermore, the State, at the

direction of the trial court, merely summarized the charging language from the prior charges. If

an indictment is an improper way to prove that a defendant committed conduct alleged therein, so

too is a paraphrasing of its language.

Respondent argues that it was not improper for the trial court to consider the prior charges

because courts routinely consider the contents of police reports and sentencing assessment reports.

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Related

United States v. Watts
519 U.S. 148 (Supreme Court, 1997)
State v. Clark
197 S.W.3d 598 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2006)
State v. Fassero
256 S.W.3d 109 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2008)
Robert Childs v. State of Missouri
440 S.W.3d 580 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2014)
State v. Davis
422 S.W.3d 458 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2014)
State v. Kendrick
550 S.W.3d 117 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2018)

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State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Desmond Harris, Appellant., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-missouri-respondent-vs-desmond-harris-appellant-moctapp-2025.