In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FOUR
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED98875 ) Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) City of St. Louis vs. ) ) Honorable Thomas C. Clark II CHRISTOPHER SONNIER, ) ) Defendant/Appellant. ) Filed: February 11, 2014
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Christopher Sonnier was convicted by jury in the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis of resisting arrest, section 575.150, R.S.Mo. (Cum. Supp. 2010),
property damage in the second degree, section 569.120, R.S.Mo. (2000), and assault of a
law enforcement officer in the third degree, section 565.083, R.S.Mo. (Cum. Supp.
2010). On appeal, Sonnier argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion for
acquittal at the close of all evidence, because there was insufficient evidence to convict
him of resisting arrest by “fleeing” from officers, as was specified in the jury’s
instruction, and (2) by failing to declare a mistrial, because he was prejudiced when
members of the jury panel observed him being escorted to the courtroom in handcuffs.
We affirm Sonnier’s conviction for resisting arrest. We decline plain error review
of his second point. FACTS
On May 11, 2011, Officer Ltonya Love observed Sonnier fall from his bicycle in
the parking lot of Union Station in St. Louis. As Sonnier fell, a plastic bag slipped from
his clothing onto the ground. Sonnier rode off unaware, and Love retrieved the bag. Upon
finding that the bag contained narcotics, Love flagged down Officers LaQuesha Lewis
and Daniel Berger, who were riding in a nearby patrol car, and asked the officers to help
detain Sonnier.
Sonnier initially cooperated with the officers and allowed Lewis to place him in
handcuffs. When Love produced the bag of narcotics, however, Sonnier began to
struggle. In the ensuing fray, Sonnier dragged Lewis a short distance across the parking
lot, kicked Berger in the chest, and damaged Lewis and Berger’s patrol car.
A jury convicted Sonnier of resisting arrest, assault on a law enforcement officer
in the third degree, and property damage in the second degree. The trial court sentenced
Sonnier as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent terms of imprisonment of four
years for resisting arrest, six months for property damage in the second degree, and one
year for assault of a law enforcement officer in the third degree. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
In his first point, Sonnier argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict
him of resisting arrest by “fleeing” from officers, as was specified in the instruction to the
jury. While Sonnier concedes that the State presented evidence that he struggled with
officers during the arrest, he contends that no evidence showed he “fled” within the plain
and ordinary meaning of that word. The State, on the other hand, contends that a
2 reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sonnier’s actions were “for the purpose of
fleeing.”
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a court-tried criminal case, the
appellate court’s role is limited to a determination of whether the State presented
sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could have reasonably found the defendant
guilty.” State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005). “The evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.” State v. Belton, 153
S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005). “The state has the burden and must prove each and
every element of a criminal case,” State v. Dixon, 70 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Mo. App. W.D.
2002) (quoting State v. Smith, 33 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)), and if “the
State ‘fail[s] to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, the judgment of the
trial court is reversed,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. West, 21 S.W.3d 59,
61 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)).
Section 575.150 provides, in pertinent part:
A person commits the crime of resisting . . . arrest . . . if, knowing that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest . . . for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest . . . the person . . . [r]esists the arrest . . . by using or threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such officer.
Accordingly, “a person can resist arrest either by using or threatening to use physical
violence or physical force, or by fleeing.” State v. Nylon, 311 S.W.3d 869, 879 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2010).
Here, with the consent of the defendant, the trial court submitted an instruction
based upon M.A.I.-CR.3d 329.60 which requires that the jury determine whether Sonnier
3 resisted arrest by “fleeing.” Our statutes do not define the term “fleeing” for the purposes
of section 575.150. “In the absence of a statutory definition, words will be given their
plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary.” State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d
437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009). Consequently , we may turn to the dictionary definition of the
term “flee,” which is “to run away, as from trouble or danger,” “to pass swiftly away,”
“vanish,” or “to run away from.” Nylon, 311 S.W.3d at 879-880 (quoting The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 672 (4th ed. 2006)); see also Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 445 (10th ed. 1995) (defining “flee” as “to run away
often from danger or evil,” “fly,” “to hurry toward a place of security,” “to pass away
swiftly,” “vanish,” “run away from”).
The evidence presented at trial shows that Sonnier violently struggled with
Officers Love, Lewis, and Berger. Love testified that initially Sonnier’s “hands were
behind his back in the handcuffs . . . [and] Officer Lewis . . . had a hold of him [with] her
hand on his arm.” Lewis testified that Sonnier then began to “pull[] so hard” that he
dragged her along the ground “[m]aybe about four—three or four feet,” but she “wasn’t
going to let him go because he had on [her] handcuffs.” Berger testified that when he and
Love reached the fray, they managed to “pull[] [Sonnier] back near the car,” where
Sonnier then “rocked back on the car and kicked out . . . with both [of] his feet,” striking
Berger in the chest. Berger was then forced to use his taser on Sonnier three times before
Sonnier finally ceased struggling.
We first observe that this evidence would readily support a conviction for
resisting arrest “by using or threatening the use of violence or physical force,” section
575.150, and M.A.I.-CR.3d 329.60 contains a pattern instruction applicable to just such
4 conduct: “Fourth, that for the purpose of preventing the law enforcement officer(s) from
making the arrest, the defendant (resisted) (interfered) by (using) (threatening the use of)
(violence) (or) (physical force) (or) (physical interference).” However, for reasons the
record does not reveal, the trial court submitted M.A.I.-CR.3d 329.60’s alternate
instruction for “fleeing,” rather than the instruction which refers to “the use of violence
or physical force.”
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FOUR
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED98875 ) Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) City of St. Louis vs. ) ) Honorable Thomas C. Clark II CHRISTOPHER SONNIER, ) ) Defendant/Appellant. ) Filed: February 11, 2014
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Christopher Sonnier was convicted by jury in the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis of resisting arrest, section 575.150, R.S.Mo. (Cum. Supp. 2010),
property damage in the second degree, section 569.120, R.S.Mo. (2000), and assault of a
law enforcement officer in the third degree, section 565.083, R.S.Mo. (Cum. Supp.
2010). On appeal, Sonnier argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion for
acquittal at the close of all evidence, because there was insufficient evidence to convict
him of resisting arrest by “fleeing” from officers, as was specified in the jury’s
instruction, and (2) by failing to declare a mistrial, because he was prejudiced when
members of the jury panel observed him being escorted to the courtroom in handcuffs.
We affirm Sonnier’s conviction for resisting arrest. We decline plain error review
of his second point. FACTS
On May 11, 2011, Officer Ltonya Love observed Sonnier fall from his bicycle in
the parking lot of Union Station in St. Louis. As Sonnier fell, a plastic bag slipped from
his clothing onto the ground. Sonnier rode off unaware, and Love retrieved the bag. Upon
finding that the bag contained narcotics, Love flagged down Officers LaQuesha Lewis
and Daniel Berger, who were riding in a nearby patrol car, and asked the officers to help
detain Sonnier.
Sonnier initially cooperated with the officers and allowed Lewis to place him in
handcuffs. When Love produced the bag of narcotics, however, Sonnier began to
struggle. In the ensuing fray, Sonnier dragged Lewis a short distance across the parking
lot, kicked Berger in the chest, and damaged Lewis and Berger’s patrol car.
A jury convicted Sonnier of resisting arrest, assault on a law enforcement officer
in the third degree, and property damage in the second degree. The trial court sentenced
Sonnier as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent terms of imprisonment of four
years for resisting arrest, six months for property damage in the second degree, and one
year for assault of a law enforcement officer in the third degree. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
In his first point, Sonnier argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict
him of resisting arrest by “fleeing” from officers, as was specified in the instruction to the
jury. While Sonnier concedes that the State presented evidence that he struggled with
officers during the arrest, he contends that no evidence showed he “fled” within the plain
and ordinary meaning of that word. The State, on the other hand, contends that a
2 reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sonnier’s actions were “for the purpose of
fleeing.”
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a court-tried criminal case, the
appellate court’s role is limited to a determination of whether the State presented
sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could have reasonably found the defendant
guilty.” State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005). “The evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.” State v. Belton, 153
S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005). “The state has the burden and must prove each and
every element of a criminal case,” State v. Dixon, 70 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Mo. App. W.D.
2002) (quoting State v. Smith, 33 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)), and if “the
State ‘fail[s] to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, the judgment of the
trial court is reversed,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. West, 21 S.W.3d 59,
61 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)).
Section 575.150 provides, in pertinent part:
A person commits the crime of resisting . . . arrest . . . if, knowing that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest . . . for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest . . . the person . . . [r]esists the arrest . . . by using or threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such officer.
Accordingly, “a person can resist arrest either by using or threatening to use physical
violence or physical force, or by fleeing.” State v. Nylon, 311 S.W.3d 869, 879 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2010).
Here, with the consent of the defendant, the trial court submitted an instruction
based upon M.A.I.-CR.3d 329.60 which requires that the jury determine whether Sonnier
3 resisted arrest by “fleeing.” Our statutes do not define the term “fleeing” for the purposes
of section 575.150. “In the absence of a statutory definition, words will be given their
plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary.” State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d
437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009). Consequently , we may turn to the dictionary definition of the
term “flee,” which is “to run away, as from trouble or danger,” “to pass swiftly away,”
“vanish,” or “to run away from.” Nylon, 311 S.W.3d at 879-880 (quoting The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 672 (4th ed. 2006)); see also Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 445 (10th ed. 1995) (defining “flee” as “to run away
often from danger or evil,” “fly,” “to hurry toward a place of security,” “to pass away
swiftly,” “vanish,” “run away from”).
The evidence presented at trial shows that Sonnier violently struggled with
Officers Love, Lewis, and Berger. Love testified that initially Sonnier’s “hands were
behind his back in the handcuffs . . . [and] Officer Lewis . . . had a hold of him [with] her
hand on his arm.” Lewis testified that Sonnier then began to “pull[] so hard” that he
dragged her along the ground “[m]aybe about four—three or four feet,” but she “wasn’t
going to let him go because he had on [her] handcuffs.” Berger testified that when he and
Love reached the fray, they managed to “pull[] [Sonnier] back near the car,” where
Sonnier then “rocked back on the car and kicked out . . . with both [of] his feet,” striking
Berger in the chest. Berger was then forced to use his taser on Sonnier three times before
Sonnier finally ceased struggling.
We first observe that this evidence would readily support a conviction for
resisting arrest “by using or threatening the use of violence or physical force,” section
575.150, and M.A.I.-CR.3d 329.60 contains a pattern instruction applicable to just such
4 conduct: “Fourth, that for the purpose of preventing the law enforcement officer(s) from
making the arrest, the defendant (resisted) (interfered) by (using) (threatening the use of)
(violence) (or) (physical force) (or) (physical interference).” However, for reasons the
record does not reveal, the trial court submitted M.A.I.-CR.3d 329.60’s alternate
instruction for “fleeing,” rather than the instruction which refers to “the use of violence
or physical force.”
Nevertheless, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict
supports a conviction for resisting arrest by fleeing. Before Officers Berger and Love
were able join Officer Lewis in her attempt to subdue Sonnier, Sonnier physically
dragged a fallen Lewis four feet. In light of this fact, we believe that Sonnier at least
briefly managed to “run away from” Berger and Love, albeit with Lewis in tow.1
The facts in State v. Nylon, 311 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010), which Sonnier
cites in support of the proposition that he did not flee, are distinguishable from those of
the instant case. In Nylon, this Court observed that the State “merely established that
Defendant attempted to crawl away but that [the officer] maintained his grasp of
Defendant.” Id. at 880. Here, Sonnier did more than attempt to crawl away. He in fact
succeeded in dragging away one officer before a second and third officer were able to
reach him. Accordingly, we affirm Sonnier’s conviction for resisting arrest by fleeing.
In his second point, Sonnier argues that the trial court erred by failing to declare a
mistrial, because he was prejudiced when members of the jury panel observed him being
escorted to the courtroom in handcuffs. Specifically, two deputies of the St. Louis
1 At least one popular southern rock song assumes three steps will suffice: “Gimme three steps, Gimme three steps mister, And you’ll never see me no more.” Allen Collins & Ronnie Van Zant, Gimme Three Steps, on Lynyrd Skynyrd (MCA Records 1973).
5 Sheriff’s Department escorted Sonnier in handcuffs approximately thirty feet down a
hallway and into the courtroom while the jury panel waited to enter the courtroom in the
same hallway. The deputies reported this matter to the trial court, and the court concluded
that the jury panel’s brief, inadvertent exposure to Sonnier in handcuffs did not deprive
him of a fair trial. In particular, the court noted that Sonnier was wearing a collared shirt
and khaki pants, not an orange prison jumpsuit, and was handcuffed, not shackled hand
and foot.
Sonnier did not request a mistrial when the trial court raised this issue in a side
conference during voir dire, and he did not include it in his motion for a new trial.
Therefore, at Sonnier’s request, we review only for plain error. See State v. Pennington,
24 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). “Plain errors affecting substantial rights may
be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or
miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” Rule 29.12(b). Nonetheless, “[t]he plain
error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of every point
that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review.” State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d
157, 167 (Mo. banc 2011) (quoting State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 59 (Mo. banc
1998)). Here, we decline to exercise our discretion to review for plain error. Cf. State v.
Snowden, 285 S.W.3d 810, 815 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (“[A] brief, inadvertent exposure
of the jury to a handcuffed defendant while [the] defendant is being escorted from one
place to another does not deprive [the] defendant of a fair trial.” (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Sanders, 903 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995))); State v. Beal,
470 S.W.2d 509, 516 (Mo. banc 1971); State v. Clements, 849 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Mo.
App. S.D. 1993).
6 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sonnier’s conviction for resisting arrest and
decline to exercise plain error review of Sonnier’s second point on appeal. Affirmed.
______________________________ Lisa S. Van Amburg, Presiding Judge
Patricia L. Cohen, J., and Philip M. Hess, J., concur.