In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED99531 ) Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Montgomery County v. ) ) CHRIS EDWARD REED, ) Honorable Wesley C. Dalton ) Defendant/Appellant. ) Filed: February 11, 2014
Introduction
Chris Edward Reed (Appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury verdict convicting him of attempt to manufacture a controlled substance. We
affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
The State charged Appellant with one count of attempt to manufacture a
controlled substance, as a prior and persistent offender.
On July 20, 2012, Appellant filed an Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence
seeking to suppress evidence of all items seized during a search of the vehicle in which
he was a passenger following a traffic stop, alleging the arresting officer lacked probable
cause to detain Appellant beyond the purpose of the initial traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, the State introduced the testimony of Corporal Chris
List (Cpl. List) of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department. On July 25, 2011, at
approximately 2:30 a.m., Cpl. List was driving on Co-op Road in New Florence when the
car in front of him swerved into the oncoming traffic lane several times. Cpl. List
initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle. As Cpl. List approached the vehicle on foot, he
observed the driver hand the passenger a bag and the occupants of the vehicle “moving
about and shuffling.” Cpl. List testified the driver, Katie Pittman (Pittman), and
passenger, Appellant, appeared nervous. While waiting for them to produce
identification, Cpl. List saw a bag sitting on the front passenger floorboard. The bag was
partially open and Cpl. List noticed it contained coffee filters and aquarium tubing. Cpl.
List testified that according to his training and experiences, these items can be used to
manufacture methamphetamine. Cpl. List further testified that a farmer’s co-op was
located on the road and there had been numerous anhydrous ammonia thefts in the area.
After receiving their identification, Cpl. List called the information into dispatch
to determine whether Pittman’s license was valid and whether she and Appellant had any
outstanding wants and warrants. Cpl. List questioned Pittman and Appellant about their
destination. Pittman initially stated they were just out driving around but then stated they
were visiting friends. When Cpl. List asked them who they were visiting, Appellant told
him that it was none of his business.
Cpl. List asked Pittman to exit the vehicle and she complied. Cpl. List asked
Pittman for consent to search the vehicle and Pittman consented. When asked on direct
examination whether he had gotten a response from dispatch on the license and warrants
check, Cpl. List stated, “I believe I was still waiting on it.” Cpl. List testified that it was
2 approximately five minutes from the time he stopped the vehicle until the time Pittman
consented to the search.
A search of the vehicle revealed a “dugout” in the center console with marijuana.
On the front passenger side was a small black bag containing aquarium tubing, coffee
filters, a jar, and a box for a bicycle inner tube. Underneath the front passenger’s seat
was a prescription bottle with Pittman’s name on it containing crushed blue pills, which
was later determined to contain 16.50 grams of pseudoephedrine. In the backseat, he
found a police scanner and a soft-walled cooler containing pliers and lithium batteries. In
the trunk he found a bottle of drain cleaner and a gasoline container. These items are
commonly used in the production of methamphetamine. Believing that Pittman and
Appellant were preparing to manufacture methamphetamine, Cpl. List arrested them.
Cpl. List further testified as follows:
Q. [By Defense Counsel] Okay. But when you made that decision to search the vehicle, you were no longer dealing with Ms. Pittman with respect to the traffic violation? A. I -- I suppose not. Q. Okay. And in fact you -- as you already testified, you told Ms. Pittman to get out of the car? A. Well, I would have -- wouldn’t have ordered her, “Get out of the car;” I would have asked her, “Ma’am, could you step out of the vehicle, please?” Q. Okay. But at that time, she was not free to leave? A. I suppose she could have asked what for, but, no, I -- I guess I would have --she was not free to leave, no. Q. Okay. A. Had she protested, she could have, but -- Q. Now, the reason for the original traffic stop, failing to stay on the right side of the road, was over at that point, wasn’t it? A. It would have been. …
Q. [By the Prosecutor] You’ve stated in cross-examination that the traffic stop was over when you requested consent to search the vehicle. Do you recall whether when you requested consent to search the vehicle you
3 had heard back from dispatch in regard to Ms. Pittman’s driver’s license or anything like that? A. I believe I was still waiting on that information. I actually don’t believe I received that back until after -- probably after I began searching the vehicle. Q. So in regard to your purposes for the initial traffic stop and requesting the information, do you standardly request the information from dispatch before – during a traffic stop -- this information from dispatch during a traffic stop? A. Yes, sir Q. And would you generally end a traffic stop before hearing back from dispatch? A. Absolutely not.
The court denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress and the cause proceeded to trial.
At trial, Cpl. List testified similarly to his pre-trial testimony. Michael Cheek, a
task force officer with the East Central Drug Task Force, testified a further search of the
vehicle revealed a bicycle inner tube and a garden hose attached together with black
electrical tape, both of which can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
The State also called Pittman who testified that on July 24-25, 2011, she drove to
Appellant’s home in Union, Missouri. Appellant told her he was going to make
methamphetamine because he needed rent money. Pittman did not know how to
manufacture methamphetamine. She and Appellant each bought one box of cold pills,
which Appellant crushed and stored in Pittman’s pill bottle. Later that night, they drove
to a co-op in a town near Montgomery City to check the surroundings so that Appellant
could steal some anhydrous ammonia to manufacture methamphetamine. Pittman
testified she consented to the search of her car and stated that before that night, there
were no lithium batteries, coffee filters, aquarium tubing or bicycle tubing in her car.
Pittman also testified she did not tape the bicycle tubing to the garden hose.
4 On October 4, 2012, the jury found Appellant guilty of the charged offense. On
January 14, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant to 20 years in prison. This appeal
follows.
Point on Appeal
On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court plainly erred in overruling his
Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence, and in admitting evidence seized from the car
and testimony concerning that evidence because it violated his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Missouri
Constitution, in that Cpl. List’s continued detention of Pittman and Appellant after the
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED99531 ) Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Montgomery County v. ) ) CHRIS EDWARD REED, ) Honorable Wesley C. Dalton ) Defendant/Appellant. ) Filed: February 11, 2014
Introduction
Chris Edward Reed (Appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury verdict convicting him of attempt to manufacture a controlled substance. We
affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
The State charged Appellant with one count of attempt to manufacture a
controlled substance, as a prior and persistent offender.
On July 20, 2012, Appellant filed an Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence
seeking to suppress evidence of all items seized during a search of the vehicle in which
he was a passenger following a traffic stop, alleging the arresting officer lacked probable
cause to detain Appellant beyond the purpose of the initial traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, the State introduced the testimony of Corporal Chris
List (Cpl. List) of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department. On July 25, 2011, at
approximately 2:30 a.m., Cpl. List was driving on Co-op Road in New Florence when the
car in front of him swerved into the oncoming traffic lane several times. Cpl. List
initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle. As Cpl. List approached the vehicle on foot, he
observed the driver hand the passenger a bag and the occupants of the vehicle “moving
about and shuffling.” Cpl. List testified the driver, Katie Pittman (Pittman), and
passenger, Appellant, appeared nervous. While waiting for them to produce
identification, Cpl. List saw a bag sitting on the front passenger floorboard. The bag was
partially open and Cpl. List noticed it contained coffee filters and aquarium tubing. Cpl.
List testified that according to his training and experiences, these items can be used to
manufacture methamphetamine. Cpl. List further testified that a farmer’s co-op was
located on the road and there had been numerous anhydrous ammonia thefts in the area.
After receiving their identification, Cpl. List called the information into dispatch
to determine whether Pittman’s license was valid and whether she and Appellant had any
outstanding wants and warrants. Cpl. List questioned Pittman and Appellant about their
destination. Pittman initially stated they were just out driving around but then stated they
were visiting friends. When Cpl. List asked them who they were visiting, Appellant told
him that it was none of his business.
Cpl. List asked Pittman to exit the vehicle and she complied. Cpl. List asked
Pittman for consent to search the vehicle and Pittman consented. When asked on direct
examination whether he had gotten a response from dispatch on the license and warrants
check, Cpl. List stated, “I believe I was still waiting on it.” Cpl. List testified that it was
2 approximately five minutes from the time he stopped the vehicle until the time Pittman
consented to the search.
A search of the vehicle revealed a “dugout” in the center console with marijuana.
On the front passenger side was a small black bag containing aquarium tubing, coffee
filters, a jar, and a box for a bicycle inner tube. Underneath the front passenger’s seat
was a prescription bottle with Pittman’s name on it containing crushed blue pills, which
was later determined to contain 16.50 grams of pseudoephedrine. In the backseat, he
found a police scanner and a soft-walled cooler containing pliers and lithium batteries. In
the trunk he found a bottle of drain cleaner and a gasoline container. These items are
commonly used in the production of methamphetamine. Believing that Pittman and
Appellant were preparing to manufacture methamphetamine, Cpl. List arrested them.
Cpl. List further testified as follows:
Q. [By Defense Counsel] Okay. But when you made that decision to search the vehicle, you were no longer dealing with Ms. Pittman with respect to the traffic violation? A. I -- I suppose not. Q. Okay. And in fact you -- as you already testified, you told Ms. Pittman to get out of the car? A. Well, I would have -- wouldn’t have ordered her, “Get out of the car;” I would have asked her, “Ma’am, could you step out of the vehicle, please?” Q. Okay. But at that time, she was not free to leave? A. I suppose she could have asked what for, but, no, I -- I guess I would have --she was not free to leave, no. Q. Okay. A. Had she protested, she could have, but -- Q. Now, the reason for the original traffic stop, failing to stay on the right side of the road, was over at that point, wasn’t it? A. It would have been. …
Q. [By the Prosecutor] You’ve stated in cross-examination that the traffic stop was over when you requested consent to search the vehicle. Do you recall whether when you requested consent to search the vehicle you
3 had heard back from dispatch in regard to Ms. Pittman’s driver’s license or anything like that? A. I believe I was still waiting on that information. I actually don’t believe I received that back until after -- probably after I began searching the vehicle. Q. So in regard to your purposes for the initial traffic stop and requesting the information, do you standardly request the information from dispatch before – during a traffic stop -- this information from dispatch during a traffic stop? A. Yes, sir Q. And would you generally end a traffic stop before hearing back from dispatch? A. Absolutely not.
The court denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress and the cause proceeded to trial.
At trial, Cpl. List testified similarly to his pre-trial testimony. Michael Cheek, a
task force officer with the East Central Drug Task Force, testified a further search of the
vehicle revealed a bicycle inner tube and a garden hose attached together with black
electrical tape, both of which can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
The State also called Pittman who testified that on July 24-25, 2011, she drove to
Appellant’s home in Union, Missouri. Appellant told her he was going to make
methamphetamine because he needed rent money. Pittman did not know how to
manufacture methamphetamine. She and Appellant each bought one box of cold pills,
which Appellant crushed and stored in Pittman’s pill bottle. Later that night, they drove
to a co-op in a town near Montgomery City to check the surroundings so that Appellant
could steal some anhydrous ammonia to manufacture methamphetamine. Pittman
testified she consented to the search of her car and stated that before that night, there
were no lithium batteries, coffee filters, aquarium tubing or bicycle tubing in her car.
Pittman also testified she did not tape the bicycle tubing to the garden hose.
4 On October 4, 2012, the jury found Appellant guilty of the charged offense. On
January 14, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant to 20 years in prison. This appeal
follows.
Point on Appeal
On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court plainly erred in overruling his
Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence, and in admitting evidence seized from the car
and testimony concerning that evidence because it violated his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Missouri
Constitution, in that Cpl. List’s continued detention of Pittman and Appellant after the
purpose of the original lawful traffic stop was effectuated constituted an illegal seizure.
Standard of Review
The trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is an interlocutory order that is
subject to change during trial. State v. Nylon, 311 S.W.3d 869, 884 (Mo. App. E.D.
2010). To preserve a claimed error for review, the defendant must make a specific
objection to the evidence when it is offered at trial. Id. If the defendant fails to properly
object at trial, the claimed error may only be reviewed for plain error. Id. Under the
plain error standard, we will reverse only when a plain error affecting a substantial right
results in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Id.; Rule 30.20.1 Here, Appellant
did not object to the evidence when it was introduced at trial. As such, Appellant failed
to preserve this issue for review and we review only for plain error.
At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the State has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the motion should be overruled. State v. Grayson, 1 All rule references are to Mo. R. Crim. P. 2012, unless otherwise indicated.
5 336 S.W.3d 138, 142 (Mo. banc 2011). In reviewing the trial court’s determination, this
Court considers the evidence presented both at the pre-trial hearing and at trial to
determine whether the court’s ruling is supported by sufficient evidence. Id. We view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling. State v. Mahsman, 157 S.W.3d 245, 248 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004). We
defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations and factual findings but review legal
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo. Grayson, 336
S.W.3d at 142.
Discussion
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual
from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; State v. Adams, 51
S.W.3d 94, 98 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001). The Constitution of Missouri provides
coextensive protection to the United States Constitution. Mo. Const. art. I, §15; Adams,
51 S.W.3d at 98.
“A routine traffic stop based on the violation of state traffic laws is a justifiable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Barks, 128 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. banc
2004). “‘[S]o long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and
objectively authorized to do, [the resulting stop or] arrest is constitutional.’” Id. quoting
State v. Slavin, 944 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). “The detention may only
last for the time necessary for the officer to conduct a reasonable investigation of the
traffic violation[.]” Barks, 128 S.W.3d at 516.
Appellant does not contest the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop but instead
asserts that Cpl. List continued to detain Pittman and Appellant and obtained consent to
6 search the vehicle after the purposes of the traffic stop had been completed. Appellant
contends the evidence seized during the search is tainted because it was found during the
subsequent illegal detention of the occupants after the traffic stop was complete.
Generally, warrantless seizures are unreasonable and unconstitutional. State v.
Norfolk, 366 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Mo. banc 2012). However, an officer may conduct a
brief investigative detention of an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion,
based on specific and articulable facts, that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.
Id., quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
In determining whether the seizure and search were unreasonable, a court must determine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. In evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must determine if the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Norfolk, 366 S.W.3d 528, 533-34.
Police officers may use all of the information available to them when forming a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. Id. at 534. “‘This
process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that
‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” Id. at 534 quoting State v. Hawkins, 137
S.W.3d 549, 558–59 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).
Here, Cpl. List’s testimony demonstrates that he did not illegally detain Pittman
and Appellant following the traffic stop. Cpl. List testified he believed he was still
waiting on a response from dispatch regarding the check on Pittman and Appellant when
he sought consent to search the vehicle and that a traffic stop is not complete until he
7 receives such response. Appellant contends that Cpl. List’s testimony during cross-
examination that the reason for the original traffic stop was over by the time he requested
Pittman to exit the vehicle leads to the conclusion that Cpl. List’s actions amounted to an
unlawful seizure. We disagree.
Although Cpl. List provided some conflicting testimony as to whether the traffic
stop was complete when he asked Pittman to exit the car and sought consent to conduct a
search, on appeal this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See Mahsman, 157 S.W.3d at 248.
Cpl. List repeatedly testified that he believed he was still waiting on a response from
dispatch and, therefore, the traffic stop was not complete when he requested Pittman’s
consent to search to vehicle. This testimony supports a finding that Cpl. List did not
detain Pittman or Appellant beyond the time necessary for him to conduct a reasonable
investigation of the traffic violation when he requested Pittman to exit the vehicle or for
consent to conduct a search.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Cpl. List’s request to search the vehicle did
occur after the purpose of the initial traffic stop had been completed, his testimony
demonstrates that shortly after pulling Pittman over for a traffic violation and before he
requested Pittman’s consent to search the vehicle, he had a reasonable suspicion that
Pittman and Appellant were preparing to manufacture methamphetamine. At 2:30 a.m.,
Pittman and Appellant were in an area where there had been numerous anhydrous
ammonia thefts. They did not live nearby and gave conflicting and evasive answers to
Cpl. List’s inquiries as to why they were in the region. Cpl. List testified that Pittman and
Appellant appeared nervous. While waiting for them to produce their identifications,
8 Cpl. List saw a partially open bag sitting on the floorboard containing coffee filters and
aquarium tubing which Cpl. List knew, from his training and experience, could be used to
manufacture methamphetamine.
Based on these facts, Cpl. List had a new, independent suspicion that Pittman and
Appellant were engaged in illegal activity, specifically attempting to manufacture
methamphetamine, justifying a brief investigative detention beyond the scope of the
initial traffic stop.
The State demonstrated that the evidence seized from the vehicle was obtained
during a lawful traffic stop and upon a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the
vehicle were engaged in illegal activity. The trial court did not plainly err in overruling
Appellant’s Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence. Appellant’s point on appeal is
denied.
Conclusion
The judgment and sentence of the trial court are affirmed.
_____________________________ Sherri B. Sullivan, J.
Lawrence E. Mooney, P.J., and Robert G. Dowd, Jr., J., concur.