STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. MICHAEL JACOB SMITH

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 4, 2023
• Docket: SD37886
• Status: Published

Opinion

Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District

In Division STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SD37886 ) Filed: December 4, 2023 MICHAEL JACOB SMITH, ) ) Defendant-Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CEDAR COUNTY

Honorable David R. Munton, Circuit Judge

AFFIRMED

Following a jury trial, Michael Smith (Defendant) appeals from his conviction for

the class A misdemeanor of resisting a lawful stop. See 575.150. 1 Presenting one point on

appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

Finding no merit in his point, we affirm.

In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, our review is on the merits, regardless

of whether that issue was raised at trial. State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 361-62 (Mo.

banc 2015); see State v. Hilleman, 634 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Mo. App. 2021). “Appellate

review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient

1 All statutory references are to RSMo (2016). evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found each element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Mo. banc 2014); see State v.

Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Mo. banc 2016). “This is not an assessment of whether

the Court believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but

rather a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational

fact-finder ‘could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011); State v. Bateman, 318

S.W.3d 681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010). We consider all evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and grant the State all reasonable inferences. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d at 632.

Contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. Id. “We defer to the jurors’ superior

position to weigh and value the evidence, determine the witnesses’ credibility and resolve

any inconsistencies in their testimony.” State v. Lopez-McCurdy, 266 S.W.3d 874, 876

(Mo. App. 2008). Viewed from this perspective, the following evidence was adduced at

trial.

Around 3 a.m. on June 11, 2020, Officer Frank Brumfield of the City of El Dorado

Springs Police Department was on patrol duty. He noticed a Toyota Highlander

(Highlander) driving in a manner that seemed “odd.” Specifically, he watched as the

Highlander “slowly crept” up the far-left turn lane of a road and stopped about 100 feet

before the intersection. According to the officer, the Highlander then suddenly turned right,

cutting across two lanes of traffic to do so.

Officer Brumfield decided to stop the Highlander for this traffic violation. He turned

on his red lights and activated his siren to initiate a traffic stop. The Highlander responded

by accelerating away from the officer, and he gave pursuit. During the middle of the pursuit,

the Highlander “suddenly slammed on [the] brakes[,]” which caused the officer to do so as

2 well to avoid a collision. The Highlander then went into reverse and came back toward the

officer, who had to veer into the oncoming traffic lane to avoid being hit.

The Highlander eventually backed into a ditch. Defendant then exited the vehicle

and fled on foot. Officer Brumfield followed Defendant in his patrol car as Defendant fled.

Defendant eventually came up to a large fence, at which point he turned around and headed

back in the direction of the approaching officer. Officer Brumfield exited his patrol car,

drew his taser, and told Defendant to stop and put his hands behind his back. Defendant

started arguing with the officer and did not initially comply. Officer Brumfield eventually

had to use the taser on Defendant several times to get him to stop struggling and stay on the

ground. The officer finally was able to get Defendant’s hands behind his back and place

Defendant in handcuffs.

Defendant was originally charged with the following three offenses: the class B

felony of attempted assault in the second degree, in violation of § 565.052 (Count 1); the

class E felony of resisting arrest, in violation of § 575.150 (Count 2), and the class A

misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of § 577.010 (Count 3). With

respect to Counts 1 and 3, the jury found Defendant not guilty of attempted assault as charged

in Count 1, but guilty of DWI as charged in Count 3. 2

With respect to the felony of resisting arrest charged in Count 2, the information

alleged that Defendant resisted by “creating a substantial risk of serious physical injury or

death”:

Officer Brumfield, a law enforcement officer, was making a stop of [Defendant] for a traffic violation, and [Defendant] knew or reasonably should have known that the officer was making a stop, and, for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the stop, resisted the arrest of

2 Defendant is not appealing his conviction for the DWI offense under Count 3. He appeals only his conviction under Count 2. 3 [Defendant] by creating a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death by driving at a speed in excess of 85 MPH and attempting to ram the patrol vehicle of Officer Brumfield.

(Emphasis added.) The jury did not find Defendant resisted in such manner, and therefore

did not find him guilty of the felony of resisting arrest. Instead, the jury found Defendant

guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor of “resisting a stop by fleeing” from the officer.

This appeal followed.

Defendant’s single point on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his conviction for the class A misdemeanor of resisting a lawful stop. According to

Defendant, “the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that, when [Defendant]

fled from the officer and backed his vehicle towards the officer’s vehicle, it was actually

[Defendant’s] purpose to prevent the officer from completing the stop of his vehicle.”

Defendant points to “undisputed evidence” that his aunt “lived across the street from where

he backed up and attempted to turn around before he accidently backed up his car into the

ditch” and argues that while his “actions may have had the effect of preventing the officer’s

stop, there was simply no evidence to show that it was [Defendant’s] ‘conscious object’ to

prevent the stop.” We disagree.

Section 575.150 sets out the elements for the offenses of resisting an arrest, detention,

or stop. Insofar as relevant here, this statute states that resisting a stop may be committed

by “fleeing”:

1. A person commits the offense of resisting or interfering with arrest, detention, or stop if he or she knows or reasonably should know that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest or attempting to lawfully detain or stop an individual or vehicle, and for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest, stop or detention, he or she:

4 (1) Resists the arrest, stop or detention of such person by using or threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such officer[.]

§ 575.150.1(1) (emphasis added). 3 Resisting a stop by fleeing “is a class A misdemeanor,

unless the person fleeing creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any

person, in which case it is a class E felony.” § 575.150.5. Thus, because the jury found that

Defendant did not create a substantial risk of serious physical injury as charged, the jury

needed only find that Defendant acted “for the purpose of preventing the officer from

effecting” the stop “by fleeing from such officer[.]” § 575.150.1(1); see State v. Pitiya, 623

S.W.3d 217, 221 (Mo. App. 2021).

Here, ample evidence supports a finding that Defendant acted with the purpose of

preventing the stop by fleeing. After Officer Brumfield turned on his red lights and activated

his siren to initiate a traffic stop, Defendant responded by: (1) accelerating his vehicle away

from the officer; (2) slamming on the brakes during the ensuing pursuit, causing the officer

to do so as well to avoid a collision; (3) reversing and backing up towards the officer, who

had to veer into the oncoming traffic lane to avoid being hit; (4) eventually backing into a

ditch; (5) exiting the vehicle and fleeing on foot; and (6) refusing to cooperate and put his

hands behind his back, requiring the officer to tase him several times to get him to comply

with instructions and to finally stop him. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the evidence

shows Defendant’s actions were in direct response to Officer Brumfield’s activation of his

lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop. Given these facts and circumstances, a juror could

reasonably infer that Defendant knew or should have known that the officer was pursuing

3 With respect to acting with “purpose,” § 562.016.2 provides that a person acts “with purpose, with respect to his or her conduct or to a result thereof when it is his or her conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.” Id. 5 him in an attempt to facilitate a lawful stop, and that he fled to avoid being apprehended.

§ 575.150.1(1); see, e.g., State v. Randle, 456 S.W.3d 535, 541-42 (Mo. App. 2015)

(sufficient evidence supporting defendant’s conviction for resisting a lawful stop by fleeing

includes the following actions by defendant after making eye contact with the detective:

defendant immediately ran the red light; sped away at a high rate of speed; drove erratically,

weaving in and out of traffic; ran several stop signs; violently swerved, barely avoiding a

collision; and when he reached a dead-end street, defendant abandoned the vehicle, led the

officers on a foot chase; and lastly, after being ordered to stop and advised that he was under

arrest, defendant continued running in the opposite direction until finally apprehended by

another officer and his canine partner).

We also reject Defendant’s argument, citing State v. Ajak, 543 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. banc

2018), that because Defendant was charged with actions while driving (i.e., speeding and

attempting to ram the patrol vehicle), his actions after Defendant left his vehicle “are

irrelevant in determining whether he resisted Officer Brumfield’s initial attempts to stop him,

because … the stop had already been completed at that point.” That argument fails for two

reasons.

First, Defendant’s actions while fleeing in his vehicle alone are sufficient to support

resisting a lawful stop by fleeing. See, e.g., Pitiya, 623 S.W.3d at 221 (evidence that

defendant was “fleeing at high rates of speed” in his vehicle sufficient to support charge that

defendant was fleeing the officer attempting the stop).

Second, Defendant’s actions of resistance while driving and on foot were continuous

until he was finally tased and handcuffed, unlike Ajak, which is factually distinguishable. In

Ajak, the defendant had been restrained by officers and placed under arrest in a kitchen.

Ajak, 543 S.W.3d at 50-51. Later, while being walked to the police vehicle, he “could not

6 have had the specific purpose of preventing an arrest” because “his arrest had been previously

effected when he was actually restrained by officers and under their control in the kitchen.

He was already under arrest and in custody when his alleged resistance occurred.” Id. at 51.

Here, unlike Ajak, Defendant had not been previously restrained, much less arrested.

Defendant first resisted by fleeing in the Highlander, then abandoned that vehicle and

continued to flee on foot until he was finally stopped. See Randle, 456 S.W.3d at 541-42.

Thus, the State introduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could

have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant acted with the purpose of preventing

a lawful stop by fleeing. See § 575.150.1(1). Defendant’s point is denied.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCUR

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, C.J. – CONCUR