STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. DAVID L. WILLIAMS
This text of STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. DAVID L. WILLIAMS (STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. DAVID L. WILLIAMS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District
In Division
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SD37474 ) DAVID L. WILLIAMS, ) Filed: January 24, 2023 ) Defendant-Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY
Honorable David A. Dolan
AFFIRMED
A jury found David L. Williams (“Defendant”) guilty of one count of possessing a
weapon inside the Department of Corrections.1 The circuit court sentenced Defendant to
serve 25 years in prison, and that sentence was to run consecutively to any other sentences
that Defendant was currently serving. Defendant’s single point on appeal claims the circuit
court abused its discretion in denying his request for a mistrial after a State’s witness
volunteered that Defendant had “an aggressive nature with staff and [had been involved in]
multiple staff assaults.” Finding no merit in that claim, we affirm.
1 See section 221.111. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016.
1 Standard of Review
“A mistrial is a drastic remedy to be exercised only in those extraordinary
circumstances in which the prejudice to the defendant cannot otherwise be removed.” State
v. Ward, 242 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Mo. banc 2008). We review a circuit court’s refusal to grant
a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling
is clearly against the logic of the circumstances before it and when the ruling is so arbitrary
and unreasonable as to shock the appellate court’s sense of justice and indicate a lack of
careful consideration.” Id. We review for prejudice -- not mere error -- and we will reverse
only if the error is so prejudicial that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Norris,
237 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007).
The Evidence
On January 30, 2020, Aaron Raines (“Officer Raines”) was working as a correctional
officer at Southeast Correctional Center. While performing security checks, Officer Raines
walked past Defendant’s cell and looked inside. Defendant was standing relatively close to
the cell window, blocking the officer’s view of the rest of the cell. Officer Raines asked
Defendant to step away from the window so he could determine whether Defendant had a
cellmate. Defendant did not have a cellmate, but when Defendant stepped away from the
window, Officer Raines saw that Defendant was holding a “prison-made weapon in his
right[] hand.” The weapon was a tan piece of plastic that had been broken and sharpened,
and it had what “appeared to be a sheet or T-shirt as a handle.” Officer Raines described the
weapon as six inches in length and approximately one to one-and-a-half inches wide. When
Officer Raines instructed Defendant to submit to restraints, Defendant told Officer Raines to
call a sergeant or lieutenant, which he did.
2 Once a supervisor arrived, the supervisor and Officer Raines placed Defendant in
restraints and removed him from his cell. As Defendant was being escorted “down the
walk[,]” he removed the weapon from the rear of his pants, dropped it on the ground, and
attempted to kick it away from him. Officer Raines recovered the weapon.
On cross-examination at trial, counsel for Defendant questioned Officer Raines about
wording in his Conduct Violation Report that indicated he had recovered the weapon
“later[.]” Officer Raines testified that he had recovered the weapon “on scene.” On
redirect, counsel for the State asked Officer Raines to clarify what he had meant by “later[,]”
to which Officer Raines replied:
A. A few seconds, few minutes.
Q. [The weapon] wasn’t kicked around the pods, right?
A. No. I watched exactly where he kicked it. I followed the escort -- after he kicked it I followed the escort up until the weapon, due to [Defendant] having an aggressive nature with staff and multiple staff assaults.
Defense counsel objected to Officer Raines’s answer and requested a mistrial. The
circuit court sustained the objection but denied the request for a mistrial.
Analysis
Defendant’s point claims the circuit court abused its discretion in overruling his
request for a mistrial “after [Officer] Raines volunteered that [Defendant] had ‘an aggressive
nature with staff and multiple staff assaults’” because the jury should not have been allowed
to consider that Defendant had a generally violent character in deciding whether he was
guilty of the specific charge against him. Defendant essentially argues that this comment
prejudiced him in that the jury may have improperly used this information in convicting
him. We disagree.
3 Courts have developed a five-factor balancing test to analyze the prejudicial effect of
uninvited evidence of other crimes. State v. Graves, 619 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Mo. App. E.D.
2021). The five-factor test is as follows:
1) whether the statement was, in fact, voluntary and unresponsive [to the prosecutor’s questioning if the prosecutor asked the question] ... or whether the prosecution “deliberately attempted to elicit” the comments ...; 2) whether the statement was singular and isolated, and whether it was emphasized or magnified by the prosecution, ...; 3) whether the remarks were vague and indefinite, or whether they made specific reference to crimes committed by the accused, ...; 4) whether the court promptly sustained defense counsel’s objection to the statement, ... and instructed the jury to disregard the volunteered statement, ...; and 5) whether in view of the other evidence presented and the strength of the state’s case, it appeared that the comment “played a decisive role in the determination of guilt.”
Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 934 S.W.2d 318, 320-21 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)).
The circuit court is in the best position to determine whether prejudice resulted from
improper commentary. Id. at 575. Regarding factors one and two, the State’s question did
not attempt to elicit a reference to any prior bad acts committed by Defendant, and the State
did not make any reference to the statement after the objection was sustained. Officer
Raines’s remarks were brief, isolated, and they were not highlighted for the jury in any way.
As to factor three, Officer Raines’s statement that Defendant had “an aggressive
nature with staff and multiple staff assaults” was a vague reference to misconduct rather
than clear evidence of Defendant’s involvement in a prior crime. While “evidence that
‘definitely associate[s]’ the defendant with another crime is inadmissible to show the
defendant has a propensity to commit crimes[,] . . . [v]ague and indefinite references to
misconduct do not warrant a mistrial unless the reference is clear evidence of the
defendant’s involvement in another crime.” State v. Turner, 367 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo.
App. S.D. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
4 As to factor four, whether the court promptly sustained the objection – it did. And
Defendant did not request a curative instruction. The potential prejudice that may occur
from improper commentary can normally be cured by an instruction to the jury. State v.
Wheeler, 219 S.W.3d 811
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. DAVID L. WILLIAMS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-missouri-plaintiff-respondent-v-david-l-williams-moctapp-2023.