STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. BRANDON WILLIE WALLS, Defendant-Appellant

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: SD38786
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District

In Division

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. No. SD38786

BRANDON WILLIE WALLS, Filed: October 14, 2025

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY Honorable Philip Fuhrman

AFFIRMED

Following a bench-trial, the circuit court found Brandon Willie Walls

(“Defendant”) guilty of the class-B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated (see

section 577.010, RSMo Supp. 2017). Defendant’s sole point on appeal claims the circuit

court plainly erred by failing to sua sponte suppress the evidence that supported

Defendant’s conviction because that evidence was the fruit of an unlawful traffic stop in

that it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Because Defendant has not

1 demonstrated a facial showing of manifest injustice, we decline plain-error review and

affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Standard of Review & Governing Law

“Generally, this Court does not review unpreserved claims of error.” State v.

Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525-26 (Mo. banc 2020). “Rule 30.20 alters the general

rule by giving appellate courts discretion to review ‘plain errors affecting substantial

rights may be considered in the discretion of the court … when the court finds that

manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.’” Id. at 526 (quoting

Rule 30.20).

“Plain error review is discretionary, and this Court will not review a claim for

plain error unless the claimed error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing

that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.” Id. (quoting State v. Clay,

533 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotation omitted)). “Unless manifest

injustice or a miscarriage of justice is shown, an appellate court should ‘decline to review

for plain error under Rule 30.20.’” Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 427 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Mo.

banc 2014)). “‘[T]he defendant bears the burden of demonstrating manifest injustice’

entitling him to plain error review.” Id. (quoting State v. Oates, 540 S.W.3d 858, 863

(Mo. banc 2018)).

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of

the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Smith, 595

S.W.3d 143, 145 (Mo. banc 2020). “A temporary, noncustodial traffic stop constitutes an

‘unreasonable’ ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment unless the stop is supported by

2 reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Id. “[A]ny traffic violation, even a minor one,

gives an officer probable cause to stop the violator.” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Bell, 86 F.3d

820, 822 (8th Cir. 1996)).

The Evidence

On the night of March 11, 2022, a Springfield Police Department officer

(“Officer”) was stopped at an intersection for a red light. While waiting for the light to

turn green, Officer noticed that a gray Jeep stopped at the red light on the other side of

the intersection did not have its headlights on. Officer testified at trial that it was the time

of night when headlights are required to be illuminated. Before the light turned green, the

driver of the Jeep turned the vehicle’s headlights on. In Officer’s experience, headlight

violations are common in cases that involve intoxicated drivers.

When the light turned green, the Jeep slowly creeped forward into the middle of

the intersection and then stopped abruptly. While the Jeep was stopped in the middle of

the intersection, blocking travel lanes, the vehicle’s tires were squealing and spinning

while the vehicle remained in place. Based upon that observation, Officer believed that

the driver of the Jeep was operating the vehicle with its parking brake engaged. The Jeep

remained in the middle of the intersection when the traffic light turned back to red. At

3 that point, Officer activated his emergency lights and conducted the traffic stop at issue. 1

When Officer walked up to the Jeep, Officer noticed that Defendant was the driver

and sole occupant of the vehicle. Officer believed that Defendant was unaware that

Officer was approaching the vehicle as Defendant continued to attempt to drive the

vehicle forward. When Officer finally caught Defendant’s attention, Defendant rolled his

window down. Officer confirmed Defendant’s emergency parking brake was engaged,

and Officer also smelled a strong odor of intoxicating liquors emanating from Defendant.

Defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy, both of which indicated intoxication based

upon Officer’s training and experience. When Officer asked Defendant if he had

consumed any alcohol, Defendant said that he didn’t have anything to drink.

1 “Sections 307.040 and 307.020(9), RSMo 2000 provide that vehicles must display

‘lighted lamps’ ‘at any time from a half-hour after sunset to a half-hour before

sunrise[.]’” State v. McIntosh, 159 S.W.3d 505, 508 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005); accord

SPRINGFIELD, MO., section 106-16 (1981) (“No person shall drive a vehicle during the

period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise without front and

rear lights, which shall meet all the requirements of state law”). “Except when necessary

to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of a police

officer or official traffic control device, no person shall: (1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle:

… (c) [w]ithin an intersection[.]” Section 300.440.1(a)(3), RSMo 2016; accord

SPRINGFIELD, MO., section 106-300 (2000) (“No person shall stop, stand or park a

vehicle … [w]ithin an intersection”).

4 Officer then conducted four field-sobriety tests, each of which produced indicators

of intoxication. Defendant refused to submit to a breath test. Officer arrested Defendant

for driving while intoxicated, and after a warrant was obtained, a blood sample revealed

that Defendant’s blood alcohol content was .145%, greater than the legal limit of .08%.

See section 577.012.1, RSMo 2016, including, as applicable, statutory changes effective

January 1, 2017.

Analysis

Defendant’s sole point claims:

The trial court plainly erred by not suppressing and by considering the evidence of the stop of [Defendant’s] vehicle and the evidence subsequently derived from that seizure, because this violated [Defendant’s] right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution, in that the seizure was not based on reasonable suspicion because nothing in [Defendant’s] behavior prior to [Officer]’s initial show of authority in stopping [Defendant’s] vehicle rose to the level of articulable facts or inferences that would lead a reasonable officer in [Officer]’s position to conclude that criminal activity was afoot. Because the evidence of the stop and all evidence that was derived from the stop were absolutely necessary to prove [Defendant] committed the offense as charged, [Defendant] suffered manifest injustice by the trial court’s failure to sua sponte suppress this evidence.

Prior to conducting the traffic stop, Officer observed that Defendant’s headlights

were not on when they were required to be illuminated, and Defendant stopped in the

middle of an intersection. Because even a minor traffic violation constitutes reasonable

suspicion for a traffic stop, Defendant has failed to facially demonstrate that Officer’s

traffic stop produced a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.

5 Accordingly, we decline plain-error review and affirm the presumed-correct

judgment of the circuit court.

DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – CONCURS