State of Minnesota v. Zachary Jaymz Edberg-Anderson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: December 29, 2025
• Docket: a250615
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0615

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Zachary Jaymz Edberg-Anderson, Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2025 Affirmed Wheelock, Judge

Scott County District Court File No. 70-CR-22-3380

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Kirk,

Judge. *

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WHEELOCK, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that

the district court abused its discretion because it revoked his probation without first

imposing intermediate sanctions. We affirm.

FACTS

In February 2022, officers executed a search warrant for narcotics at a Scott County

residence in which they found appellant Zachary Jaymz Edberg-Anderson as well as

multiple firearms, drug paraphernalia, and substances that tested positive for

methamphetamine. Appellant and his girlfriend were living in one of the rooms at the

residence, in which officers found numerous items belonging to appellant, including a

credit card, clothing, a FedEx box with his name on it, and a passport. In the room’s closet,

officers found over 25 grams of methamphetamine in a tampon box and a Glock handgun

magazine that contained a single 9mm round. Appellant is ineligible to possess

ammunition or a firearm because he has a previous conviction for a crime of violence.

The officers arrested appellant, and respondent State of Minnesota charged him with

one count of second-degree possession of methamphetamine in violation of Minn. Stat.

§ 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm or

ammunition in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020).

Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree controlled-substance possession, and the

state agreed to dismiss the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition. The

2 plea agreement included a presumptive 58-month stayed prison sentence and up to three

years of probation.

At the sentencing hearing on November 15, 2023, the state informed the district

court that, due to an increase in appellant’s criminal-history score, the correct presumptive

sentence was an executed prison sentence of 58 to 81 months. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines

4.C (Supp. 2021). However, the parties agreed that appellant would move for a

dispositional departure to a stayed 58-month sentence and the state would not object.

The district court granted appellant’s motion for a dispositional departure because

it found he was “particularly amenable to probation based on his amenability to treatment”

as he was in programming at Evergreen Recovery and was “doing well.” Thus, it imposed

a 58-month stayed sentence and placed appellant on probation with multiple conditions,

including the following:

• no alcohol/controlled substance use with the exception of prescribed medications; • follow all instructions of probation; • contact your probation officer as directed; • remain law abiding; • tell your probation officer within 72 hours if you change your address, employment, or telephone number; • submit to random chemical testing per probation; and • complete chemical assessment and follow all recommendations including completing current treatment program.

Soon after the sentencing hearing, however, appellant’s alleged probation violations

began. Appellant’s probation officer reported that he refused to meet with her after his

sentencing, failed to return her phone calls, and did not provide her with his current address.

3 The probation officer spoke with appellant’s counselor at Evergreen Recovery, who

informed her on November 22 that appellant had “numerous” positive drug tests and was

not attending treatment sessions.

In December, the probation officer filed a probation-violation report alleging that

appellant failed to

• refrain from the use of illegal substances; • maintain contact with his supervising agent; • provide a valid address, and his whereabouts were unknown; • submit to random drug testing for the county; • attend scheduled office visits; and • comply with the recommendations from his chemical-use assessment, including by not remaining sober.

The district court issued a warrant for his arrest, but appellant was not arrested until about

a year later. On January 27, 2025, the probation officer filed an amended

probation-violation report that included an additional violation: “[appellant] has failed to

complete chemical dependency programming and was terminated from programming.”

Appellant admitted to failing to refrain from the use of illegal substances but denied

the rest of the alleged violations. On January 30, 2025, appellant appeared for a contested

revocation hearing. At the hearing, the probation officer testified that she never met with

appellant because “he refused to come in for probation appointments” and told her that “he

didn’t have to.” She also testified that his treatment counselor reported that appellant was

not sober and not complying with treatment and was therefore eventually terminated from

the program. The probation officer testified that, although appellant entered another

4 treatment program afterwards, he was also terminated from it after “about a month” for

continued use of illegal substances and for not attending treatment sessions.

The probation officer testified that she did not believe appellant was amenable to

probation or treatment. The probation officer stated that she believed appellant “meets

every Austin factor” 1 and “needs to be in custody” for the safety of the public, to receive

proper treatment, and so as not to depreciate the seriousness of the violations. Counsel for

the state recommended, based on the probation officer’s testimony and appellant’s conduct,

that the district court revoke probation and execute the stayed sentence.

Appellant’s counsel argued that appellant had wanted to transfer his probation to

Hennepin County because he had trust issues with Scott County, he did not have

transportation to reach the probation offices, and Evergreen turned out to be a “bad place”

for appellant that probation should have prevented him from attending.

During the probation officer’s testimony, she explained that appellant’s probation

could have been transferred to a different county eventually but that he had to be in a sober

residence for 60 days before that was possible. She also noted that the first probation

meeting is required to be at her office for safety reasons and that she tried to send appellant

a letter regarding office appointments but it was “returned to sender” after she mailed it.

When the probation officer informed appellant of this, he said that her “office was stupid

1 The Austin factors refer to the three findings a district court must make before it may revoke a defendant’s probation following a violation. See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). “[T]he court must 1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id.

5 and that [they] can’t get anything right.” The probation officer sent a second letter to a

new address appellant gave to her, but that letter was returned as well. The probation

officer also testified that she did not select the Evergreen program and had shared her

concerns about the program but that appellant “didn’t want to leave Evergreen; he was able

to use there.”

Appellant’s counsel requested an intermediate sanction of a 60- to 90-day jail term

instead of revocation of his probation, arguing that Scott County should have assisted

appellant with enrollment in an abstinence-only treatment center. His counsel also argued

that this was appellant’s first violation hearing and that it was “only fair” to give him

another chance.

After the hearing, the district court issued a written order revoking probation in

which it found that appellant had violated several probation conditions, many of them

“almost immediately after [he] was sentenced.” The district court specifically found that,

from the start of probation, appellant failed to meet with his probation officer, refused to

answer her phone calls, blocked her number, did not give her a valid address, did not submit

to drug testing through probation, attended the Evergreen program against his probation

officer’s advice, consistently tested positive for drugs, did not attend treatment sessions

regularly, and was terminated from two separate treatment programs.

Based on these violations, the district court found that revocation of appellant’s

probation was appropriate and executed appellant’s 58-month sentence.

This appeal follows.

6 DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant’s probation without first imposing intermediate sanctions.

If the district court finds that a probationer has violated probation, it may continue

the existing stay and order probation or revoke probation and execute a sentence. Minn.

R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(2)(b). The district court “has broad discretion in determining if

there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation”; however, it must make specific findings

before doing so, based on the Austin factors. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50. These factors

require the district court to (1) identify the specific condition of probation violated,

(2) determine that the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and (3) determine whether

the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id. at 250. If the

district court determines that it should revoke probation pursuant to the Austin factors,

appellate courts will reverse only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion. Id. at 249-50.

When analyzing the third Austin factor, the district court must balance the

“probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and

the public safety.” Id. at 250; see also State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn.

2005). The district court must find only one of the following subfactors to determine that

the balance weighs in favor of revocation:

(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or

7 (iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d

317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023) (concluding that “[o]nly one Modtland subfactor is necessary

to support revocation”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023). “Courts must seek to convey

their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” Modtland,

695 N.W.2d at 608. The decision to revoke probation “cannot be a reflexive reaction to an

accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior

demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin,

295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotations omitted).

Appellant does not challenge any of the district court’s findings regarding the

Austin-Modtland factors; rather, he claims that, although the district court properly found

that all of the factors were satisfied, it erred because it was required to either impose

intermediate sanctions before revoking his probation or at least “discuss the 90-day jail

sanction” that he proposed.

Appellant relies on State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. 2008), to argue

that probation revocation is not appropriate when rehabilitation is still possible, but his

reliance is misguided. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the Minnesota Supreme Court

recognized in Cottew that the district court “has broad discretion in determining whether

to impose an intermediate sanction.” 746 N.W.2d at 638 (holding that the district court

was not required to analyze the Austin factors before imposing intermediate sanctions in a

probation hearing). Ultimately, appellant does not cite any caselaw to support his assertion

8 that the district court was required to consider his suggestion of a jail sanction before

ordering a probation revocation, nor are we aware of any.

A district court only “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous

view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Currin, 974 N.W.2d

567, 571 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Our review of the record persuades us that the

district court’s findings are based on the record and support the probation-revocation order

here.

The record contains evidence that appellant was terminated from multiple treatment

programs for consistently using methamphetamine despite being on probation for a

methamphetamine-possession charge, 2 refused to keep in contact with his probation

officer, 3 absconded from all probation requirements for over a year, repeatedly tested

positive for illegal substances, did not provide a valid address, and failed to appear for drug

testing and office visits with the county. Based on that evidence, the district court found

that, although appellant has other treatment options available in the community, his

behavior and conduct on probation demonstrate that he is not amenable to treatment or

2 See also State v. Ziesemer, No. A23-0492, 2023 WL 7119091 (Minn. App. Oct. 30, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). This court in Ziesemer considered the fact that the appellant was continuing to use methamphetamine, despite being on probation for possession of methamphetamine, as supporting probation revocation. Id. at *3. Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority, but Ziesemer is cited here for its persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). 3 See also State v. Rottelo, 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011). This court in Rottelo concluded that a district court properly revoked an appellant’s probation based on his failure to remain in contact with his probation officer, even though it was his first violation and he committed no new crimes while on probation.

9 probation and would best be served by receiving treatment in confinement. As the district

court stated in its order, quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251, “it is ‘not unreasonable to

conclude that treatment ha[s] failed’ when a probationer ‘has been offered treatment but

has failed to take advantage of the opportunity or to show a commitment to rehabilitation.’”

Thus, we conclude that the district court acted within its broad discretion when it

revoked appellant’s probation based on its determination that the Austin factors and

Modtland subfactors were satisfied, and we conclude that it was not required to specifically

address appellant’s request for intermediate sanctions.

Affirmed.