State of Minnesota v. Timothy Wayne Wells

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: June 3, 2024
• Docket: a230323
• Status: Published

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0323

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Timothy Wayne Wells, Appellant.

Filed June 3, 2024 Affirmed Slieter, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court File No. 18-CR-13-4855

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Jaqueline R. Fogal, Assistant County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mark D. Kelly, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Klaphake,

Judge. ∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation and the district court’s denial

of his postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without an evidentiary

hearing. Because the district court acted within its discretion to revoke appellant’s

probation and deny his postconviction petition, we affirm.

FACTS

In April 2015, the district court sentenced appellant Timothy Wayne Wells to 117

months’ imprisonment following his conviction of a second-degree controlled-substance

offense. The district court granted a downward dispositional departure and stayed

execution for 40 years, placing Wells on supervised probation. Clearwater County

probation agents supervised Wells for most of his probation while the originating agency,

Crow Wing County, monitored his probation.

Between September 2017 and February 2022, Wells violated the terms of his

probation by using methamphetamine on at least seven occasions, resulting in four formal

probation-violation hearings. During probation, Wells entered multiple treatment

programs but often used methamphetamine during or following treatment. Following each

of the four hearings, the district court reinstated Wells on probation and ordered Wells to

reenter treatment. In 2020, Wells moved to Hawaii with his wife and two young children,

without permission from his probation agent, and enrolled in treatment there. Wells

eventually obtained permission to reside in Hawaii but periodically reported in person to

2 his Clearwater County probation agent. He completed his most recent

chemical-dependency treatment in Hawaii in August 2022.

In October 2022, while in Minnesota to meet with his Clearwater County probation

agent, Wells admitted that he had used methamphetamine, an admission the agent

confirmed with a positive drug test. The agent filed the fifth formal probation-violation

report in this case shortly thereafter. In December 2022, the district court held a

probation-violation hearing during which Wells, who was represented by counsel, admitted

that he used methamphetamine and that he did so intentionally. The district court accepted

Wells’ admission and the matter proceeded to a contested probation-revocation hearing.

During the January 2023 revocation hearing, the state requested execution of Wells’

sentence and Wells requested to be reinstated on probation. The Crow Wing County

probation agent who had monitored Wells’ Clearwater County probation testified at the

hearing. The Clearwater County probation agent who supervised Wells, and whom the

parties expected would be present to testify, was unavailable.

The Crow Wing probation agent testified that he was familiar with Wells’ probation

file, had communicated with the Clearwater probation agent about Wells’ supervision once

per year, and had spoken with that agent about Wells’ October probation violation

regarding methamphetamine use. He agreed with the following statement that the

Clearwater probation agent made in the probation-violation report: “At this time, this agent

is uncertain as to what more can be done to help the Defendant address his ongoing

substance use and lack of self accountability.”

3 Wells testified that he had completed an outpatient treatment program sometime

between March and October 2022 but had not engaged in treatment since testing positive

at the end of October. When the district court asked whether probation had received

verification of Wells’ treatment in Hawaii, the Crow Wing probation agent stated that he

had not “seen any documentation that [Wells] has done any treatment in Hawaii.” And in

response to the district court’s question, Wells stated that the Clearwater probation agent

could provide that verification.

The district court revoked Wells’ probation and executed his 117-month sentence.

Wells retained new counsel and appealed to this court claiming that the district court abused

its discretion by revoking his probation. This court stayed the appeal to allow Wells to file

a postconviction petition in the district court to develop a record on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. The district court denied the postconviction petition without an

evidentiary hearing. Wells appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court acted within its discretion by revoking Wells’ probation.

When a defendant violates a condition of probation, a district court may revoke

probation and execute the previously stayed sentence, continue probation, or order

intermediate sanctions. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subds. 1(a), 3 (2022). The district court has

broad discretion in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to revoke probation, and

we will reverse only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d

246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). When revoking probation, a district court must (1) specify the

conduct or conditions that the probationer violated, (2) find that the violation was

4 intentional or inexcusable, and (3) find that the need for confinement outweighs the

policies favoring probation. Id. at 250. A district court must be mindful that “[t]he purpose

of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort.” Id.

Though Wells argues in his brief that the state did not establish the second Austin

factor, Wells admitted during the initial probation-violation hearing that he had used

methamphetamine intentionally. Therefore, the district court properly found that the

second Austin factor was met. See State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Minn. 2005)

(“Once a court has made findings that a violation has occurred and has found that the

violation was either intentional or inexcusable, the court must proceed to the third Austin

factor . . . .”). Therefore, we now consider Wells’ argument related to the third Austin

factor.

Regarding the third factor, the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring

probation if at least one of three subfactors is met:

(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or

(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or

(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.

Id. at 607 (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251).

The district court found that the third subfactor was met: that it would unduly

depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked. The record

supports the district court’s finding. Wells was granted a dispositional departure when he

5 was sentenced in 2015. See State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015),

aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016) (stating that the grant of a downward dispositional

departure is a proper consideration when deciding to revoke probation). Further, this is

Wells’ fifth probation violation that resulted in a formal report, and nearly all prior

violations involved the use of methamphetamine. The district court’s finding on the third

Modtland subfactor was well reasoned and supported by the record.

Wells argues that the district court abused its discretion because alternative options

for continued community supervision would impress upon Wells the need to avoid further

methamphetamine use and the importance of further treatment. But, as the district court

explained, Wells continued to use methamphetamine despite his extensive participation in

treatment and, moreover, failed to seek treatment after his most recent methamphetamine

use. The district court concluded that Wells’ difficulty staying sober, despite the serious

consequence—for him and his family—of having to serve his lengthy prison sentence,

supported the need to revoke his probation. The record supports the district court’s

determination.

And we are not persuaded otherwise by Wells’ claim that the violations were merely

“technical violations,” contravening Austin’s mandate that revocation “cannot be a

reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations.” See Austin, 295 N.W.2d at

251 (quotation omitted). He argues that his violations were merely technical because there

has been no allegation that he engaged in any behavior resulting in a criminal prosecution

or conviction, citing Minn. Stat. § 244.196, subd. 6 (2022) (defining “technical violation”

as “any violation . . . except an allegation of a subsequent criminal act that is alleged in a

6 formal complaint, citation, or petition”). But as this court recently observed, Austin does

not reference the statutory definition of “technical violation” and reiterated that any

violation of a condition relevant to the crime committed forms a proper basis upon which

to revoke probation. State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 321 n.2, 321-22 (Minn. App. 2023),

rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023).

In sum, the district court acted within its discretion by revoking Wells’ probation.

II. The district court acted within its discretion by denying Wells’ postconviction petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel without an evidentiary hearing.

“[W]e review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief, including a denial of

relief without an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Nicks, 831

N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). Legal issues raised in a postconviction petition are

reviewed de novo, and factual issues are reviewed for whether the record sufficiently

sustains the postconviction court’s findings. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn.

2015). We will not reverse an order denying postconviction relief “unless the

postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its

ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022), a district court must hold an

evidentiary hearing on a petition for postconviction relief “[u]nless the petition and the files

and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”

To obtain an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the

7 evidence, would satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d at 504 (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The postconviction court must

consider the allegations and the files and records in the light most favorable to the petitioner

and determine whether “facts material to the application of the Strickland test are in

dispute.” Id. at 506.

We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Edwards,

736 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2007). The

Strickland test requires a defendant to prove that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there was a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Nicks,

831 N.W.2d at 504 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

Wells argues that his original counsel’s performance was deficient because he

(1) failed to adequately prepare for the revocation hearing because he did not obtain certain

documents from the Clearwater probation agent and (2) should have requested a

continuance when the Clearwater probation agent did not appear to testify at the revocation

hearing.

Because there is no reasonable probability that the documents or testimony would

have changed the result of the proceeding, we affirm based upon the second Strickland

prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim

on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”).

As to the documents, Wells asserts that the Clearwater probation agent possessed

verification that Wells completed treatment in Hawaii sometime before October 2022. He

8 argues that these documents would support Wells’ credibility and refute the Crow Wing

probation agent’s testimony that the Clearwater agent never received that verification. But

whether Wells engaged in treatment before October was immaterial to the district court’s

decision to revoke probation. The district court based its decision on Wells’

methamphetamine use in October 2022, after Wells completed his most recent treatment in

August 2022, and his failure to reenter treatment prior to the January 2023 revocation

hearing. The district court also stated that it found Wells’ testimony, which included a

description of his completion of treatment in Hawaii, credible. And the Clearwater

probation agent’s violation report, which the district court reviewed, states that Wells

completed an outpatient program in August 2022. In sum, the district court had all the

information that Wells now claims it was error for his attorney not to obtain.

Regarding the need to obtain the Clearwater probation agent’s testimony, Wells

asserts that the Clearwater agent would have testified that he did not recommend revoking

probation. Even if we accept that as true, “[t]he district court is not required to adopt a

recommendation of the probation department when determining whether to revoke

probation and order imprisonment.” State v. Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 375 (Minn. App.

2023). Indeed, the district court did not cite probation’s recommendations as a basis for its

decision to revoke, and its order denying Wells’ postconviction petition demonstrates that

a contrary recommendation would not have affected its decision.

Therefore, Wells has not demonstrated that a reasonable probability exists that the

documents or the Clearwater probation agent’s testimony would have changed the result of

the proceeding. As a result, Wells has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of

9 counsel. The district court acted within its discretion by denying Wells’ postconviction

petition without an evidentiary hearing.

Affirmed.