This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-0326
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Timothy Alvis Gayles, Sr., Appellant.
Filed January 5, 2014 Affirmed Stauber, Judge
Olmsted County District Court File No. 55-CR-12-5660
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Melissa V. Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAUBER, Judge
On appeal from his convictions of felony pattern of stalking behavior and five
counts of misdemeanor domestic assault, appellant argues that the district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of his prior bad acts as relationship
evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2012). We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2013, appellant Timothy Alvis Gayles was charged with one felony
count of pattern of stalking behavior and two counts of misdemeanor domestic assault.
The complaint was later amended to add four additional counts of misdemeanor domestic
assault. The charges arose from three separate incidents involving appellant and M.S.
that occurred on April 10, 2011, July 11, 2012, and August 22, 2012.
At trial, evidence and testimony was presented establishing that appellant and
M.S. have been in an on-again, off-again romantic relationship for approximately 30
years. The state also presented evidence that law enforcement was dispatched to M.S.’s
residence on the dates of the three incidents. The responding officers testified that on
each occasion when they arrived at the scene, M.S. complained of being hit and
threatened by appellant.
The state also introduced, under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, three other incidents that
occurred between M.S. and appellant. First, the state introduced evidence that on
November 22, 1988, M.S. applied for an order for protection (OFP) based on her claim
that appellant had pushed, hit, and choked her during an argument. Second, the state
introduced evidence that on July 22, 1991, M.S. applied for an OFP based on allegations
that appellant hit and threatened her during an argument. Third, the state introduced
evidence that on October 7, 1991, appellant approached M.S. in a parking lot, grabbed
2 her hair, hit her, yelled at her, and drove her and one of their sons out of the state against
her will.
Appellant testified and denied hitting or threatening M.S. on the charged dates.
M.S. also testified, and claimed that she is not afraid of appellant and has repeatedly
asked the district court to lift the no-contact order issued because of the current charges.
M.S. further testified that despite what she told police, appellant did not hit her during
any of the charged incidents. According to M.S., the allegations were taken out of
context because of her intoxicated exaggerations.
The jury found appellant guilty of pattern of stalking behavior and five of the six
counts of misdemeanor assault and acquitted appellant of one of the misdemeanor
domestic-assault charges. The district court stayed imposition of a 23-month prison
sentence for the pattern of stalking behavior conviction, and placed appellant on
probation for five years. The misdemeanor charges were then dismissed as lesser
included offenses. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to admit evidence of his prior
bad acts as relationship evidence under section 634.20. “Evidentiary rulings rest within
the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court
abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658
N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citations omitted).
3 Generally, evidence of prior crimes or bad acts, known as Spreigl evidence, is not
admissible as character evidence to show that the person acted in conformity with that
character. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see generally State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139
N.W.2d 167 (1965). But under Minn. Stat. § 634.20,
[e]vidence of similar conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic abuse . . . is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Similar-conduct evidence is admissible to “demonstrate the history of the relationship
between the accused and the victim of domestic abuse” and to place the offense in the
appropriate context. State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App. 2008); see also
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004).
Relationship evidence is treated differently than other “collateral” evidence, partly
because “[d]omestic abuse is unique in that it typically occurs in the privacy of the home,
it frequently involves a pattern of activity that may escalate over time, and it is often
underreported.” Id. at 161. Thus, the stringent procedural requirements of Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b) do not apply to relationship evidence admitted under section 634.20. State
v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. App. 2008). Section 634.20 “specifically
provides for the admission of evidence of ‘similar conduct’ by the accused unless it fails
to meet a balancing test that considers whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159.
For purposes of section 634.20, unfair prejudice “is not merely damaging evidence, [or]
4 even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635,
641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Here, in finding the evidence of appellant’s prior bad acts admissible under section
634.20, the district court did “not find the probative value [of the evidence] to be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Appellant’s only argument
is that the district court abused its discretion in making this finding. But, the probative
value of such evidence is high because “evidence showing how a defendant treats his
family or household members, such as his former spouses or other girlfriends, sheds light
on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how the
defendant may interact with the victim.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn.
App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). And McCoy establishes that the
district court’s ruling reflects a permissible use of relationship evidence under Minn. Stat.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-0326
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Timothy Alvis Gayles, Sr., Appellant.
Filed January 5, 2014 Affirmed Stauber, Judge
Olmsted County District Court File No. 55-CR-12-5660
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Melissa V. Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAUBER, Judge
On appeal from his convictions of felony pattern of stalking behavior and five
counts of misdemeanor domestic assault, appellant argues that the district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of his prior bad acts as relationship
evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2012). We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2013, appellant Timothy Alvis Gayles was charged with one felony
count of pattern of stalking behavior and two counts of misdemeanor domestic assault.
The complaint was later amended to add four additional counts of misdemeanor domestic
assault. The charges arose from three separate incidents involving appellant and M.S.
that occurred on April 10, 2011, July 11, 2012, and August 22, 2012.
At trial, evidence and testimony was presented establishing that appellant and
M.S. have been in an on-again, off-again romantic relationship for approximately 30
years. The state also presented evidence that law enforcement was dispatched to M.S.’s
residence on the dates of the three incidents. The responding officers testified that on
each occasion when they arrived at the scene, M.S. complained of being hit and
threatened by appellant.
The state also introduced, under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, three other incidents that
occurred between M.S. and appellant. First, the state introduced evidence that on
November 22, 1988, M.S. applied for an order for protection (OFP) based on her claim
that appellant had pushed, hit, and choked her during an argument. Second, the state
introduced evidence that on July 22, 1991, M.S. applied for an OFP based on allegations
that appellant hit and threatened her during an argument. Third, the state introduced
evidence that on October 7, 1991, appellant approached M.S. in a parking lot, grabbed
2 her hair, hit her, yelled at her, and drove her and one of their sons out of the state against
her will.
Appellant testified and denied hitting or threatening M.S. on the charged dates.
M.S. also testified, and claimed that she is not afraid of appellant and has repeatedly
asked the district court to lift the no-contact order issued because of the current charges.
M.S. further testified that despite what she told police, appellant did not hit her during
any of the charged incidents. According to M.S., the allegations were taken out of
context because of her intoxicated exaggerations.
The jury found appellant guilty of pattern of stalking behavior and five of the six
counts of misdemeanor assault and acquitted appellant of one of the misdemeanor
domestic-assault charges. The district court stayed imposition of a 23-month prison
sentence for the pattern of stalking behavior conviction, and placed appellant on
probation for five years. The misdemeanor charges were then dismissed as lesser
included offenses. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to admit evidence of his prior
bad acts as relationship evidence under section 634.20. “Evidentiary rulings rest within
the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court
abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658
N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citations omitted).
3 Generally, evidence of prior crimes or bad acts, known as Spreigl evidence, is not
admissible as character evidence to show that the person acted in conformity with that
character. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see generally State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139
N.W.2d 167 (1965). But under Minn. Stat. § 634.20,
[e]vidence of similar conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic abuse . . . is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Similar-conduct evidence is admissible to “demonstrate the history of the relationship
between the accused and the victim of domestic abuse” and to place the offense in the
appropriate context. State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App. 2008); see also
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004).
Relationship evidence is treated differently than other “collateral” evidence, partly
because “[d]omestic abuse is unique in that it typically occurs in the privacy of the home,
it frequently involves a pattern of activity that may escalate over time, and it is often
underreported.” Id. at 161. Thus, the stringent procedural requirements of Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b) do not apply to relationship evidence admitted under section 634.20. State
v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. App. 2008). Section 634.20 “specifically
provides for the admission of evidence of ‘similar conduct’ by the accused unless it fails
to meet a balancing test that considers whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159.
For purposes of section 634.20, unfair prejudice “is not merely damaging evidence, [or]
4 even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635,
641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Here, in finding the evidence of appellant’s prior bad acts admissible under section
634.20, the district court did “not find the probative value [of the evidence] to be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Appellant’s only argument
is that the district court abused its discretion in making this finding. But, the probative
value of such evidence is high because “evidence showing how a defendant treats his
family or household members, such as his former spouses or other girlfriends, sheds light
on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how the
defendant may interact with the victim.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn.
App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). And McCoy establishes that the
district court’s ruling reflects a permissible use of relationship evidence under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20. In McCoy, the supreme court stated:
This case illustrates the difficulties that can arise in prosecuting domestic abuse crimes. The victim, respondent’s wife, testified that she could not remember what she told the police regarding respondent’s alleged assault. No one else was able to provide eyewitness testimony regarding the events that transpired. The district court’s ruling allowing the admission of evidence of respondent’s alleged prior assault of his wife allowed the state to present evidence that, if believed by the jury, could have assisted the jury by providing a context with which it could better judge the credibility of the principals in the relationship.
682 N.W.2d at 161.
5 Similar to the victim in McCoy, M.S. testified that she is not afraid of appellant
and that despite what she told police, appellant did not hit her during any of the charged
incidents. M.S.’s testimony was also consistent with appellant’s trial testimony. In light
of appellant’s and M.S.’s testimony, the relationship evidence was probative to establish
the context of appellant’s and M.S.’s relationship. See State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752,
756 (Minn. App. 2008) (“Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the
victim and the defendant or which places the event in context bolsters its probative
value.”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). Although it was also very prejudicial for
the same reason, it did not persuade by illegitimate means or give the state an unfair
advantage. See Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (stating that unfairly prejudicial evidence “is not
merely damaging evidence, [or] even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair
prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair
advantage.”). Rather, the testimony was offered to provide the context of appellant’s
relationship with M.S., and appellant had notice that the state would offer the relationship
evidence.
Moreover, the danger of unfair prejudice in this case was low because the district
court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury. See State v. Waino, 611 N.W.2d 575, 579
(Minn. App. 2000) (stating that the prejudicial effect of admitting relationship evidence
can be mitigated by a cautionary instruction). We assume that juries follow instructions
given by the district court and properly consider evidence. State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d
566, 578 (Minn. 2009). The district court’s cautionary instructions here “lessened the
probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” See State v.
6 Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998). The district court therefore did not abuse
its discretion by determining that the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Olkon, 299
N.W.2d 89, 101 (Minn. 1980) (noting that rulings on evidentiary matters, including
whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence, rest within the district court’s discretion).
Affirmed.