This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-1259
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Terence Duane Maurstad, Appellant.
Filed July 6, 2026 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Reyes, Judge
Mille Lacs County District Court File No. 48-CR-24-1004
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Tara Reese Duginske, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Corey Haller, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges the district court’s (1) admission of
testimony under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 613(b); (2) admission of expert testimony
regarding domestic violence; (3) entry of judgment of conviction and sentencing on two counts of assault against one victim; and (4) allocation of jail credit to the last sentence
imposed. Appellant raises additional arguments in a self-represented supplemental brief.
We reverse the fifth-degree-assault conviction and remand with instructions to vacate that
conviction and sentence and to apply the jail credit to the first sentence imposed. We
otherwise affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Terence Duane Maurstad with
four counts of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1 (2022) (counts I-IV); one amended count of fifth-
degree assault in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 2(b) (Supp.
2023) (count V); and one count of felony domestic assault in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2022) (count VI).
The following facts are based on evidence received at trial, including the testimony
of an expert witness, an officer that responded to the incident, and assault victims A., L.,
and D.
A. and L. testified to substantially similar versions of the incident from which
appellant’s criminal charges arose, which we restate here. One evening, A. and L. were at
the home of L.’s cousin when D. walked in, limping and crying with red marks on her
body. A. walked outside and saw the driver of a truck “revving the exhaust loud,”
“yelling,” and “throwing [D.’s] stuff out of the windows.” At that time, A. and L. did not
know the identity of the driver or his relationship to D.
2 A. and L. left the cousin’s home sometime later. A little after midnight, L. was
driving the two of them in her car when they saw someone walking alongside the highway.
A truck drove behind the pedestrian, and the driver “exchang[ed] words” with the
pedestrian. A. and L. thought they saw the truck “bump[]” or hit the pedestrian. A.
recognized the pedestrian as D.
L. turned her car around and told D. to get in. “[D.] ran, jumped in the car, and then
at that point the loud truck started to ride [L.’s car] so close if [L.] hit the brakes it would
have been into the back of [her car].” A. observed that L. and D. had anxious and frantic
demeanors. D. was also “hyperventilating.”
L. drove to a police station. On the way, she tried to make a turn but because the
truck was following her so closely, she “couldn’t slow down enough” and drove halfway
into a ditch. The truck pulled over behind L.’s car. A. got out of the car and saw that
appellant was the driver of the truck. A. saw appellant “start[] reaching for something” in
his truck “[s]o in fear for [his] life [A.] turned around and got in the car and told [L.] to
take off.” They resumed their drive to the station, and appellant continued to follow them.
Appellant stopped following them shortly before they pulled into the station’s
parking lot, where L. called law enforcement. D. was crying in the backseat, but she
ultimately exited the car and walked away before law enforcement arrived.
After A. and L. testified, the state called D. to testify. D. stated that she and
appellant “g[o]t intimate” and had a sexual relationship, “but [they] were never in a
committed relationship.” D. did “[n]ot really” want to be there that day because she did
not “feel [appellant] did anything wrong.” D. provided a version of events that differed
3 substantially from those provided by the other two victims, A. and L. D. testified that,
when she had arrived at the home of L.’s cousin in appellant’s truck, appellant said
something that irritated her. D. testified that she tried to get out of the truck but “[appellant]
didn’t want me to walk away from him, so—without saying something, which is, you
know, it was disrespectful for me to just do that. I need to learn not to do that.” D. stayed
at the house for a few hours but eventually left on foot. While walking alongside the
highway with her headphones on and loud music playing, appellant pulled up alongside
her. Appellant tried to talk to her, but D. “wasn’t hearing him because [of her] ear buds,
so [she] was basically ignoring him.” D. then “heard this female’s voice holler, ‘hey,’”
and she saw L., who told D. to get into her car. D. described her response to L. as follows:
I’m like, “What? Why?” You know, so I just—I did [get in the car] and we went straight to the [station]. I’m, like, “What’s going on? What are we doing?” She’s like, “Well, he tried to hit you.” And I was, like, “Who?” Really. And he was, as far as I know, was just riding alongside me, trying to talk to me, and I was being a b-tch and ignoring him.
When asked about what occurred while she was in L.’s car, D. testified that she had her
headphones on and was not paying attention.
When the state asked D. about a statement she gave to an officer later that evening,
D. testified that she remembered giving the statement but did not remember what she told
the officer. She also testified that, in her past experiences related to “abusive partners,” D.
“found that law enforcement has been more harmful for [her] than helpful,” so she
preferred “not [to] talk to them.”
4 After the conclusion of D.’s testimony, the state presented testimony from an officer
that responded to L.’s call. The officer explained that he arrived at the station and took
statements from A. and L. there. A. told the officer that he had observed what looked like
appellant “trying to hit [D.]” and D. “yelling for [appellant] to stop and leave her alone.”
A. also told the officer that he and L. picked up D., after which appellant began “following
extremely close to their vehicle.” The officer testified that A. and L.’s statements were
consistent with each other.
The officer located D. at a casino later in his shift. D. told him that she left the
station before officers arrived because she was scared to talk to law enforcement as doing
so “has hurt her in the past.” D. also told the officer that appellant drove closely behind
her while she was walking, was trying to intimidate her, and attempted to hit her with his
truck multiple times. D. stated that, after she got in L.’s car, appellant “was attempting to
rear-end” the car and “trying to intimidate them.”
The officer also testified about a lethality assessment that he performed with D. The
assessment consists of a list of questions that law enforcement asks victims of domestic
assault. D. told the officer that appellant had used a weapon or object to threaten her before,
he tried to control most of her daily activities, she “[a]bsolutely” believed that appellant
was capable of killing her, appellant’s behavior had escalated quickly over the past two
weeks, and she had ended their relationship within the last six months. D. stated multiple
times that she feared appellant.
5 The state’s last witness, Melissa Scaia, testified “as an expert in counterintuitive
behaviors in domestic violence victims.” Scaia works with victims of domestic violence
of all ages and genders as well as men who have committed acts of domestic violence.
Scaia testified generally about “the combination of physical and non-physical tactics
used” by people who commit acts of domestic violence as well as the motivations
underlying those tactics. 1 Individuals will use “coercion and threats” to “attempt to
dominate” victims and “get them to do” what the individual wants. For example,
individuals may tell a victim who wants to call law enforcement, “Why would anyone
believe you, but you go ahead and you’ll see what will happen to you.”
Scaia further testified that victims who call law enforcement themselves may be
more likely to cooperate than those who do not initiate that contact. A victim may also
become less cooperative if they realize that that their “continued participation” in a case
may result in an end to the relationship because, while “a lot of victims want the violence
to end, . . . they don’t want the relationship to end.” Scaia also shared that victims often
recant, blame themselves, and minimize or deny incidents of harm.
The jury found appellant guilty on all counts charged. The district court entered
convictions on counts II through V only. It imposed consecutive sentences totaling 180
months in prison on counts II, III, and IV. It also imposed a 364-day sentence on count V,
with 364 days of credit for time served.
1 Scaia referred to a “Power and Control Wheel” throughout her testimony, which she described as “a visual graphic of the most common behaviors that victims have experienced.” The district court admitted a depiction of the Power and Control Wheel into evidence.
6 This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s (1) admission of the officer’s testimony
about D.’s prior statements; (2) admission of Scaia’s expert testimony; (3) conviction and
sentencing on two counts of assault against A.; and (4) award of jail credit to the last
sentence imposed. We discuss these issues in turn, then address separately arguments
raised in a self-represented supplemental brief.
I. The district court plainly erred by admitting the officer’s testimony about D.’s prior statements, but this error did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.
Appellant argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting the officer’s
testimony about D.’s prior statements under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 613(b). While
we agree, we conclude that the plain-error standard does not mandate reversal in this case
because appellant’s substantial rights were not affected.
As an initial matter, appellant contends that he objected at trial to the admission of
the officer’s testimony about D.’s prior statements. For support, he relies on an objection
he made to the admission of body-worn-camera footage of witness statements. However,
“an objection preserves review only for the stated basis for the objection or a basis
apparent from the context of the objection.” State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752, 757 (Minn.
2025) (quotation omitted). Here, the record shows no objection from appellant to the
admission of the officer’s trial testimony about D.’s prior statements.
Because appellant failed to preserve the issue with an appropriate objection, this
court reviews the evidentiary challenge under the plain-error standard. See id. Under that
7 standard, the appellant must first establish an error that is plain. Id. “An error is plain if
it is clear or obvious, which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a
rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017)
(quotations omitted). The appellant then bears the “heavy burden” of showing that the
plain error affected their substantial rights. State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). If the appellant successfully carries that burden, appellate
courts “may correct the error only when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Martens, 18 N.W.3d at 757 (quotation omitted). But
if an appellate court “conclude[s] that any prong of the plain error analysis is not satisfied,
[it] need not consider the other prongs.” Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 620.
A party may introduce “extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement” to
impeach a declarant-witness if (1) the party “submit[s] a foundation that the statements are
actually inconsistent, or that the [declarant-witness] fails to recollect the prior statement,”
State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 224 (Minn. 2000) (quotations and citation omitted), and
(2) “the [declarant-witness] is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the
[statement] and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the [declarant-
witness] thereon,” Minn. R. Evid. 613(b). “If the prior statement is embodied in a writing,
the [declarant-witness] should be allowed to examine it.” Price v. Grieger, 70 N.W.2d
421, 425 (Minn. 1955). Extrinsic evidence admissible under rule 613(b) may include
another witness’s testimony about the prior inconsistent statements. See, e.g., Martin, 614
N.W.2d at 224-25.
8 During direct examination, the state asked D. if she recalled talking to the officer
and pointed out to her the inconsistencies between her testimony and her prior statements
to the officer. However, the state did not attempt to elicit an admission, denial, or
explanation from D. concerning those inconsistencies. The admission of the officer’s
testimony about D.’s prior statements was therefore plainly erroneous. See, e.g., State v.
Graham, 764 N.W.2d 340, 354 (Minn. 2009) (holding inadmissible officer’s written
summary of interview with witness because, although witness “was asked whether he
recalled” it, witness had no “opportunity to admit, deny, or explain specific statements” in
summary); Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 787 (providing that error is plain if it “contravenes case
law, a rule, or a standard of conduct”).
The state also failed to lay a proper foundation to admit the officer’s testimony about
D.’s answers to the lethality assessment. The state did not mention D.’s responses to the
assessment during direct examination, so those responses could not be inconsistent with
D.’s trial testimony, and D. could not claim that she did not recall giving them. See Martin,
614 N.W.2d at 224 (requiring actual inconsistency between statements or failure to recall
prior statement to admit rule 613(b) evidence). The admission of the officer’s testimony
about D.’s answers to the lethality assessment contravened caselaw and was therefore
plainly erroneous. See Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 787.
We next consider whether appellant carried the “heavy burden” of showing that the
plain error affected his substantial rights. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 620 (quotation omitted).
“An error affects substantial rights if the error is prejudicial—that is, if there is a reasonable
9 likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d
681, 688 (Minn. 2002).
Two factors favor the conclusion that the plain error affected appellant’s substantial
rights. Appellant could not effectively counter the erroneously admitted testimony about
D.’s prior statements because the state introduced that testimony after D. was dismissed.
See State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 59 (Minn. 2024) (concluding that defendant “did not
effectively counter the inadmissible evidence” and this favored conclusion that error was
not harmless); see also State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011) (stating that
substantial-rights analysis “is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis”). The testimony
also had high persuasive value because it directly contradicted the only exculpatory
evidence identified by the parties: D.’s testimony. See Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 57-59
(concluding that high persuasive value of erroneously admitted evidence favored
defendant).
However, two other factors weigh against appellant. The state presented eyewitness
testimony from two other victims of the assaults, and those victims testified to substantially
similar versions of events. See id. at 60 (“Strong evidence of guilt undermines the
persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” (quotation omitted)). The erroneously
admitted evidence was also not given undue prominence at trial. See id. at 56 (stating that
manner presented favored state when challenged statements “span[ned] about 12 pages of”
300-page trial transcript).
Weighing the factors favoring appellant against those favoring the state, we
conclude that the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect appellant’s substantial
10 rights. We therefore do not assess the last prong of the modified plain-error standard. See
Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 620.
II. Even if the district court abused its discretion by admitting the expert testimony, there is no reasonable possibility that its admission significantly affected the verdict.
Appellant challenges the admission of Scaia’s testimony, arguing that it was not
helpful to the jury and it “invited the jury to infer that, because [appellant’s] conduct fit the
profile of a male domestic abuser, then [appellant] must be a domestic abuser.” We are
not convinced that appellate relief is warranted.
Appellate courts review preserved challenges to a district court’s evidentiary
determination for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 464 (Minn.
2024). “Admitting expert testimony is an abuse of discretion if the district court’s decision
to admit is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” Id. at 466 (quotation omitted). However, an appellant must establish both an
abuse of discretion and prejudice. State v. Bonnell, 31 N.W.3d 527, 549 (Minn. 2026).
“To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility
that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
To be admissible, expert testimony must be helpful to the jury. Minn. R. Evid. 702.
For example, in State v. Fravel, the supreme court affirmed a district court finding that
expert testimony about counterintuitive behaviors of victims of domestic violence would
“assist the jury in its determinations as to,” among other things, “the trustworthiness of [a
victim’s] statements related to past instances of domestic abuse.” 34 N.W.3d 309, 325
11 (Minn. 2026) (quotation omitted). However, evidence offered to show that “a defendant
fits a certain profile” is inadmissible because “the unfair prejudice to the defendant” caused
by its admission “outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” Heller, 12 N.W.3d at
466.
We need not assess the helpfulness of Scaia’s testimony because there is no
reasonable possibility that its admission significantly affected the verdict. See Bonnell, 31
N.W.3d at 549. The jury heard limited evidence about appellant’s conduct toward D.,
which included only what occurred the evening of the assault, that D. and appellant had a
sexual relationship, and D.’s positive feelings toward appellant. No substantive evidence
placed appellant within the parameters of a “profile” of people who commit domestic
assault. Heller, 12 N.W.3d at 466. For that reason, the jury was not “asked to infer from
the fact that the defendant shares some of the characteristics of these third persons that he
shares their guilt of [domestic assault].” Id. at 466-67 (quotations omitted).
We also need not assess whether Scaia’s testimony about offender behavior was
“akin to character evidence.” The supreme court in Fravel was presented with a similar
argument concerning similar expert testimony. See 34 N.W.3d at 323-25, 327-29. The
supreme court concluded that, even if the expert testimony was inadmissible, “[u]nder
these facts, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the absence of this testimony would
have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 329. It explained that “the expert
did not provide testimony” about the defendant or “describe [him] in any way.” Id. The
same is true here. Scaia did not mention appellant or discuss the facts of appellant’s case.
12 We conclude that the admission of Scaia’s testimony about offender behavior did
not significantly affect the verdict, and appellant is not entitled to appellate relief. See
Bonnell, 31 N.W.3d at 549.
III. The district court erred by convicting appellant of and sentencing him on two counts of assault against A.
Appellant and the state agree that the district court erred by convicting him of and
sentencing him on count V, fifth-degree assault against A., because count V is an included
offense of count IV, second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon against A. We also
agree.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1(1) (2022), prohibits convicting a
defendant of both a crime charged and an “included offense,” the latter of which includes
“a lesser degree of the same crime.” The word “degree” in that subdivision “refer[s] to
offenses within an ordinal statutory scheme.” State v. Bradley, 4 N.W.3d 105, 113 (Minn.
2024).
Second-degree assault and fifth-degree assault are two parts of the ordinal statutory
scheme for assault. Accordingly, fifth-degree assault is an “included offense” of second-
degree assault because it is a “lesser degree” of assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(1).
The district court erred by entering a judgment of conviction on count V, fifth-degree
assault, because it is an included offense of count IV, second-degree assault. We therefore
remand with instructions to vacate the conviction and sentence on count V. 2
2 Because we conclude that the conviction and sentence for fifth-degree assault must be vacated, we decline to address whether the sentence for fifth-degree assault is permissible under Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 (2022).
13 IV. The district court erred by awarding jail credit to the last sentence imposed.
Appellant and the state also agree that the district court erred by awarding jail credit
to the last sentence imposed rather than the first sentence imposed. The parties are correct.
When imposing consecutive sentences, “the [district] court must apply . . . jail credit to the
first sentence only.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines § 3.C.2.b (2022). We therefore remand to
the district court with instructions to apply the jail credit to count II, the first count
sentenced.
V. The arguments in appellant’s self-represented supplemental brief do not merit relief.
Appellant makes several arguments in a self-represented supplemental brief. We
reorder them for ease of reference and address each in turn.
Appellant first argues that the district court abused its discretion by “overlook[ing]
direct appearance of drug influenced/intoxicated witness” and “den[ying] the drug testing
of [an] intoxicated witness.” Appellant requested at trial that the district court drug test D.,
providing as a basis for the request her “reputation, her conviction record and things
[appellant has] heard in the community.” The district court determined that it did not have
a lawful basis to drug test D. at that time, but that it would “keep a watchful eye on that.”
We decline to address appellant’s argument because he did not support it with legal
argument or authority. See State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 588 (Minn. 2013) (declining
to address appellant’s claims because he “fail[ed] to cite any evidence in the record or legal
authority to support” them).
14 Appellant also appears to argue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
“Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be raised in a postconviction
petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal.” State v. Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321
(Minn. 2000). We may nonetheless consider an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on
direct appeal if the record is adequately developed. Voorhees v. State, 627 N.W.2d 642,
649 (Minn. 2001). Here, the record is inadequate for review of appellant’s claim. We
therefore decline to consider its merits. We preserve appellant’s right to pursue an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a postconviction proceeding subject to the
requirements and standards prescribed by law. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 726 N.W.2d
454, 463 (Minn. 2007) (denying ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim “without prejudice
to [appellant’s] right to raise them in a postconviction proceeding”).
Appellant’s next argument states only: “Improper jury; Not a peer present.” “The
United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a
jury pool that reflects a fair cross-section of the community.” Andersen v. State, 940
N.W.2d 172, 181 (Minn. 2020). But to establish a violation of that right, an appellant must
satisfy the three-prong test established in State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn.
1994). See Anderson, 940 N.W.2d at 181-82. Because appellant does not provide an
analysis addressing the three-prong test, his argument is inadequately briefed, so we
decline to address it. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn.
App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017).
We decline to address appellant’s remaining arguments because they lack support
in the record or law. See Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 588. Appellant challenges: (1) his lack of
15 legal representation provided by Band Member Legal Services based on its determination
that appellant was not a registered band member; (2) the district court’s rejection of the
deliberating jury’s request to see a map not entered into evidence; (3) prosecutorial
misconduct; (4) admission of Scaia’s expert testimony; (5) the district court’s amendment
of its sentencing order; (6) the district court’s calculation of jail credit; and (7) the ability
of an impeached witness to testify.
In sum, we affirm appellant’s convictions of second-degree assault and felony
domestic assault but reverse his conviction of fifth-degree assault. We remand to the
district court with instructions to (1) vacate the fifth-degree-assault conviction and
sentence, leaving the jury’s finding of guilt on that count intact and (2) apply appellant’s
jail credit to count II, the first count sentenced.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.