This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0313
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Steven Craig Morrow, Appellant.
Filed March 4, 2024 Affirmed Klaphake, Judge *
Itasca County District Court File No. 31-CR-20-2780
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this appeal from appellant Steven Craig Morrow’s conviction for receiving stolen
property, Morrow challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction.
Morrow also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay
restitution for the stolen property. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
verdict and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Morrow to pay
restitution, we affirm.
DECISION
Morrow challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction,
arguing that the state failed to sufficiently prove that he knew or had reason to know that
the property was stolen. Morrow also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding restitution, contending that his conviction for receiving stolen property was not
a direct cause of the victim’s damages. We address each argument in turn.
I. There was sufficient evidence to prove Morrow knew the welder was stolen.
Morrow first argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction, specifically that he knew or had reason to know that he possessed stolen
property. As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to what standard governs our
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review on appeal. Morrow contends that the circumstantial-
evidence standard applies because a defendant’s state of mind is generally proved through
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn. 2010).
The state disagrees and argues that this is the rare case where direct evidence proved
2 Morrow’s state of mind. Direct evidence is evidence “based on personal knowledge or
observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (citations and quotations omitted).
Circumstantial evidence on the other hand is evidence “based on inference and not on
personal knowledge or observation and all evidence that is not given by eyewitness
testimony.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted).
Here, D.P., testifying pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, stated that he and
Morrow went to the victim’s house and stole a garbage bag full of “little tractor parts.”
Once there, Morrow noticed a welder on the property and believed that “it was expensive
[] and that . . . he knew he could make money off of it.” D.P. further testified that he and
Morrow returned a second time to the victim’s house with Morrow’s vehicle and trailer
and loaded the welder onto the trailer and drove it back to Morrow’s house. D.P.’s
testimony is direct evidence of the receiving-stolen-property charge: it is based on personal
observation and, if true, proves that Morrow knew the welder was stolen because he took
part in its theft. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599. The state also offered the testimony of
L.W., who went with Morrow to sell the welder and drop it off at the buyer’s farm. After
deciding not to sell the welder, L.W. and Morrow returned to the buyer’s farm and picked
it up. L.W. testified that “there was wind of [the welder] being stolen” and that he urged
Morrow to bring the welder to the police, which Morrow declined to do. L.W.’s testimony
is circumstantial evidence of Morrow’s knowledge because it requires the jury to infer that
Morrow, based on L.W.’s statements, knew or should have known that the welder was
stolen. See Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 477 n.11. The state therefore used both direct and
3 circumstantial evidence to prove that Morrow knew or should have known that the welder
was stolen.
When the state proves an element of the offense with both direct and circumstantial
evidence, but direct evidence alone adequately supports the element, the direct-evidence
standard governs the insufficiency challenge. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn.
2016) (applying the direct-evidence standard because the direct evidence presented by the
state was sufficient by itself to support the disputed element). We therefore apply the direct-
evidence standard to Morrow’s evidence-insufficiency challenge.
When evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we “examine the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the offense.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). A
verdict will not be overturned if the jury, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence
and the state’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, “could have
reasonably found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
Morrow was convicted of receiving stolen property. See Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd.
1 (2020). To be convicted, Morrow had to both (1) possess stolen property and (2) know
or have “reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery.” Id. Morrow only
challenges the second element of the offense, arguing that the state failed to produce
sufficient evidence that he knew or had reason to know that the property he possessed was
stolen. We are not persuaded.
4 D.P. testified that he and Morrow stole the welder, loaded it up on a trailer, and
drove it back to Morrow’s house. D.P.’s testimony alone supports the jury’s verdict.
Morrow contends that we may not consider D.P.’s testimony because the jury
acquitted him of burglary and theft and therefore discredited the testimony. But we have
rejected this argument before. See State v. Montermini, 819 N.W.2d 447, 461 (Minn. App.
2012), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 20, 2012). In Montermini, we observed that “acquittals
shed no light on which circumstances the jury believed or disbelieved . . . [and] only
demonstrate that the jury believed the state failed to establish the elements of [the acquitted
charges].” Id.; see also State v. Holbrook,
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0313
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Steven Craig Morrow, Appellant.
Filed March 4, 2024 Affirmed Klaphake, Judge *
Itasca County District Court File No. 31-CR-20-2780
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this appeal from appellant Steven Craig Morrow’s conviction for receiving stolen
property, Morrow challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction.
Morrow also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay
restitution for the stolen property. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
verdict and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Morrow to pay
restitution, we affirm.
DECISION
Morrow challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction,
arguing that the state failed to sufficiently prove that he knew or had reason to know that
the property was stolen. Morrow also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding restitution, contending that his conviction for receiving stolen property was not
a direct cause of the victim’s damages. We address each argument in turn.
I. There was sufficient evidence to prove Morrow knew the welder was stolen.
Morrow first argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction, specifically that he knew or had reason to know that he possessed stolen
property. As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to what standard governs our
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review on appeal. Morrow contends that the circumstantial-
evidence standard applies because a defendant’s state of mind is generally proved through
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn. 2010).
The state disagrees and argues that this is the rare case where direct evidence proved
2 Morrow’s state of mind. Direct evidence is evidence “based on personal knowledge or
observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (citations and quotations omitted).
Circumstantial evidence on the other hand is evidence “based on inference and not on
personal knowledge or observation and all evidence that is not given by eyewitness
testimony.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted).
Here, D.P., testifying pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, stated that he and
Morrow went to the victim’s house and stole a garbage bag full of “little tractor parts.”
Once there, Morrow noticed a welder on the property and believed that “it was expensive
[] and that . . . he knew he could make money off of it.” D.P. further testified that he and
Morrow returned a second time to the victim’s house with Morrow’s vehicle and trailer
and loaded the welder onto the trailer and drove it back to Morrow’s house. D.P.’s
testimony is direct evidence of the receiving-stolen-property charge: it is based on personal
observation and, if true, proves that Morrow knew the welder was stolen because he took
part in its theft. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599. The state also offered the testimony of
L.W., who went with Morrow to sell the welder and drop it off at the buyer’s farm. After
deciding not to sell the welder, L.W. and Morrow returned to the buyer’s farm and picked
it up. L.W. testified that “there was wind of [the welder] being stolen” and that he urged
Morrow to bring the welder to the police, which Morrow declined to do. L.W.’s testimony
is circumstantial evidence of Morrow’s knowledge because it requires the jury to infer that
Morrow, based on L.W.’s statements, knew or should have known that the welder was
stolen. See Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 477 n.11. The state therefore used both direct and
3 circumstantial evidence to prove that Morrow knew or should have known that the welder
was stolen.
When the state proves an element of the offense with both direct and circumstantial
evidence, but direct evidence alone adequately supports the element, the direct-evidence
standard governs the insufficiency challenge. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn.
2016) (applying the direct-evidence standard because the direct evidence presented by the
state was sufficient by itself to support the disputed element). We therefore apply the direct-
evidence standard to Morrow’s evidence-insufficiency challenge.
When evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we “examine the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the offense.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). A
verdict will not be overturned if the jury, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence
and the state’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, “could have
reasonably found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
Morrow was convicted of receiving stolen property. See Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd.
1 (2020). To be convicted, Morrow had to both (1) possess stolen property and (2) know
or have “reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery.” Id. Morrow only
challenges the second element of the offense, arguing that the state failed to produce
sufficient evidence that he knew or had reason to know that the property he possessed was
stolen. We are not persuaded.
4 D.P. testified that he and Morrow stole the welder, loaded it up on a trailer, and
drove it back to Morrow’s house. D.P.’s testimony alone supports the jury’s verdict.
Morrow contends that we may not consider D.P.’s testimony because the jury
acquitted him of burglary and theft and therefore discredited the testimony. But we have
rejected this argument before. See State v. Montermini, 819 N.W.2d 447, 461 (Minn. App.
2012), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 20, 2012). In Montermini, we observed that “acquittals
shed no light on which circumstances the jury believed or disbelieved . . . [and] only
demonstrate that the jury believed the state failed to establish the elements of [the acquitted
charges].” Id.; see also State v. Holbrook, 233 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1975) (reasoning
that there “are several possible explanations, logical and otherwise, for the jury’s finding
defendant guilty only on [one charge]. The jury in the exercise of its power of lenity could
have believed all of [the witness’s] testimony and yet have convicted defendant on only
the possession charge”). Here, the jury’s acquittals say nothing about whether it credited
D.P.’s testimony, and we assume the jury believed the state’s witness, State v. Foreman,
680 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Minn. 2004). We conclude that sufficient evidence supports
Morrow’s conviction for receiving stolen property.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Morrow to pay restitution.
Morrow contends that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered him to
pay restitution for the stolen welder. This court reviews a restitution award for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Anderson, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). A district court abuses
5 its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or its decision “is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
As part of a felony sentence, a district court may order an offender to pay restitution.
Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2020). When determining the amount of restitution,
the district court is required to consider the loss sustained by the victim as a result of the
offense. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2020). But restitution may be ordered only
“for losses that are directly caused by, or follow naturally as a consequence of, the
defendant’s crime.” State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Minn. 2019).
The district court ordered Morrow to pay $2,671.88 in restitution to the victim for
his lost welder. The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The record
establishes that Morrow picked up the welder from the would-be buyer’s farm, brought it
home, and gave it to D.P. The victim in this case never received his welder back, and
Morrow, who knew it was stolen, possessed the welder and took no actions to bring it to
police or return it to its rightful owner. Morrow’s crime directly caused the victim’s losses.
Morrow argues that the district court imposed the incorrect legal standard when it
found that Morrow’s crime was “not tangential” to the victim’s loss and that the case must
therefore be remanded for application of the direct-causation standard in Boettcher. While
the district court used the “not tangential” language from this court’s decision in State v.
Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. App. 2014) (predating Boettcher), the district court
also cited to Boettcher in its order and found that the damages were a “direct cause” of the
6 victim’s loss. The district court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its
discretion by ordering Morrow to pay restitution for the stolen welder.
Affirmed.