State of Minnesota v. Ryan Timothy Kellen

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: April 8, 2024
• Docket: a230716
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0716

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Timothy Kellen, Appellant.

Filed April 8, 2024 Affirmed Johnson, Judge

Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-20-376

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, River D. Thelen, Assistant County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and

Klaphake, Judge. ∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

A Stearns County jury found Ryan Timothy Kellen guilty of five counts of first-

degree assault of a peace officer based on evidence that he used a pistol to shoot at an

armored vehicle that was occupied by five police officers. We conclude that the evidence

is sufficient to prove that Kellen intentionally used deadly force against the officers.

Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

In January 2020, the state charged Kellen with two counts of felony domestic

assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2018), and five counts of first-

degree assault of a peace officer, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 2(a) (2018).

The charges are based on the following series of events, as described by the state’s trial

witnesses.

In the early morning hours of January 12, 2020, Kellen physically assaulted his then-

wife at their home in the city of Sauk Centre. Kellen’s wife left the house to go to work at

approximately 6:00 a.m. Soon thereafter, Kellen began sending her text messages. In

response to one of Kellen’s messages, his wife wrote that police officers were “going to

end up at the house.” Kellen responded, “They will find me drunk with a loaded gun with

a kid in the house.” In subsequent messages, he wrote: “I’ll pull a loaded gun on them. Go

ahead, call them,” and “You’ll have a blood bath on your doorstep.”

At approximately 6:30 a.m., Kellen’s wife called 911. She told the dispatcher about

Kellen’s assault of her and the text messages that she had received from him. She also

2 stated that Kellen was “drunk,” that he had “a loaded handgun,” and that his nine-year-old

son was asleep in an upstairs bedroom. She further stated that Kellen had “talked about

killing himself” and “doesn’t wanna go to jail.”

Two Sauk Centre police officers responded to the 911 call. One officer spoke with

Kellen’s wife, while the other officer kept watch outside Kellen’s house. At 7:35 a.m., a

patrol sergeant placed two telephone calls to Kellen. Kellen did not answer the first call.

After answering the second call, Kellen told the sergeant to “f-ck off” and hung up. The

sergeant requested the assistance of negotiators and a special-weapons-and-tactics

(SWAT) team. The Stearns and Benton County SWAT team responded.

At 8:24 a.m., a police negotiator placed a telephone call to Kellen. Kellen was

“angry” and “belligerent” and told the negotiator that he had a loaded “single stack 1911”

with nine rounds and that he “would shoot” if police “came to the house.”

At 10:02 a.m., the negotiator placed another call to Kellen. During this call, Kellen

stated: “There’s only two ways this is gonna end. One of you f-ckers dead or me dead.”

He also stated, “You either leave me the f-ck alone . . . or I’m gonna start shootin’.” Kellen

told the negotiator that he would “open fire” if he saw police officers approach his house.

At approximately noon, Kellen allowed his son to leave the home. A police officer

at the scene used a public-announcement system to inform Kellen that he was under arrest

and was required to walk outside and surrender. Kellen did not do so.

Shortly before noon, the St. Cloud Police Department’s SWAT team arrived at the

scene. At 12:21 p.m., five members of the SWAT team approached the east side of

Kellen’s house in an armored vehicle. At 12:28 p.m., the negotiator heard a gunshot while

3 he was speaking with Kellen. Multiple other officers at the scene also heard the gunshot.

During the negotiator’s call, Kellen demanded to speak with his wife and said that he would

“open fire again” if he was not allowed to speak to her within four minutes. Kellen told

the negotiator that he is “a very good shot.”

At 2:18 p.m., Kellen walked outside and surrendered to law enforcement. Police

officers later searched his house pursuant to a warrant. They found a .45 caliber Taurus

1911 pistol and ammunition. Officers also observed a bullet hole in the glass and screen

of a kitchen window, approximately 32 feet from the St. Cloud SWAT team’s armored

vehicle. During the investigation, multiple officers observed a fresh dent in the armored

vehicle just behind the front left wheel, a mark in the snow beneath the armored vehicle,

and a bullet in the alleyway behind the house. One officer testified that, given its trajectory,

the bullet found in the alley was fired through the kitchen window, hit the armored vehicle,

and ricocheted off the ground before stopping in the alley.

After his arrest, Kellen gave a statement to police officers. He admitted that he

owned the pistol that was found in his house. When asked about the gunshot, Kellen said

that his pistol “accidentally went off.” Kellen explained that he “pointed the gun at the

window” so that officers could see that he had a gun and “that’s when it went off.”

The case was tried on four days in November and December 2022. The state called

27 witnesses and introduced 142 exhibits. In addition to the testimony described above, a

scientist from the bureau of criminal apprehension (BCA) testified that the pistol that was

found in the house was fully functional and would not have discharged without the trigger

being pulled. Kellen did not testify and did not introduce any evidence.

4 The jury found Kellen guilty on all counts. In February 2023, the district court

imposed a prison sentence of 12 months and one day on the first conviction of felony

domestic assault; two consecutive prison sentences of 120 months on the first two

convictions of first-degree assault of a peace officer; and three concurrent prison sentences

of 120 months on the three remaining convictions of first-degree assault of a peace officer.

Kellen appeals.

DECISION

Kellen argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of

first-degree assault of a peace officer. Kellen does not challenge his convictions of felony

domestic assault.

To establish Kellen’s guilt of first-degree assault of a peace officer, the state was

required to prove that he assaulted a peace officer “by using or attempting to use deadly

force against the officer” while the officer was “engaged in the performance of a duty

imposed by law, policy, or rule.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 2(a). The term “deadly

force” is defined by statute to mean “force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing,

or which the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial risk of causing, death or

great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.066, subd. 1 (2018) (referenced by Minn. Stat.

§ 609.221, subd. 2(c)(2)). The statutory definition of deadly force includes “[t]he

intentional discharge of a firearm . . . at a vehicle in which another person is believed to

be.” Id. (emphasis added).

In analyzing an argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction,

this court ordinarily undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether

5 the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.”

State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that

“the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State

v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We will not overturn

a verdict if the jury, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the

requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the

defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.

The above-described standard of review applies so long as a conviction is

adequately supported by direct evidence. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016).

Direct evidence is “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that,

if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,

599 (Minn. 2017) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence, on

the other hand, is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute

existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). A conviction depends on circumstantial

evidence if proof of the offense, “or a single element of the criminal offense, is based solely

on circumstantial evidence.” State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014).

If a conviction depends on circumstantial evidence, we apply a heightened standard

of review with a two-step analysis. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). “The

first step is to identify the circumstances proved.” Id. The second step is to “examine

independently the reasonableness of [the] inferences that might be drawn from the

circumstances proved” and “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent

with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (alteration

6 in original) (quotations omitted). At the second step, we do not give deference to the jury’s

verdict. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).

Kellen contends that the state’s evidence is insufficient on the ground that it does

not prove that he intentionally fired his pistol at the armored vehicle occupied by five police

officers (rather than unintentionally firing the pistol or intentionally firing it merely in the

general direction of the armored vehicle). To determine whether Kellen intended to shoot

at the armored vehicle, we must consider the state’s circumstantial evidence. See State v.

Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997).

At the first step of the circumstantial-evidence test, we must “identify the

circumstances proved.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88. “In identifying the circumstances

proved, we assume that the jury resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent

with the . . . verdict.” Id. In this case, the numerous circumstances proved are fully stated

above. See supra 2-5. The most significant circumstantial evidence consists of Kellen’s

own statements, which were admitted into evidence through the testimony of police

officers. For example, only minutes before his pistol was fired, Kellen threatened to “open

fire” if police approached his house. Shortly thereafter, Kellen threatened to “open fire

again” if he was not allowed to speak with his wife. Kellen later admitted in a post-arrest

statement that he “pointed the gun” before it fired.

At the second step of the circumstantial-evidence test, we must “examine

independently the reasonableness of [the] inferences that might be drawn from the

circumstances proved” and “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent

with guilt.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). Kellen does not contend that

7 the circumstances proved are inconsistent with guilt. The state contends that the

circumstances proved are consistent with guilt. We agree with the state that the

circumstances proved would support a reasonable inference that Kellen intended to fire his

pistol at the armored vehicle.

At the second step of the circumstantial-evidence test, we also must determine

“whether the circumstances proved are . . . inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except

that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). Kellen contends that the circumstances proved do

not eliminate three rational hypotheses of his being not guilty: (1) the pistol discharged

accidentally, (2) he intentionally fired the pistol without aiming or looking to see what he

was firing at or toward, and (3) he intentionally fired the pistol toward the ground.

Kellen’s first hypothesis—that he did not intentionally fire the pistol because it

discharged accidentally—is inconsistent with the circumstances proved. The state

introduced ample evidence of Kellen’s threats to shoot police officers. The state also

introduced evidence that, in the minutes following the gunshot, Kellen stated to the

negotiator that he would “open fire again” if police officers did not acquiesce to his demand

to speak with his wife. (Emphasis added.) Although “a defendant’s statements as to his

intentions are not binding . . . if his acts demonstrated a contrary intent,” we may infer that

a person “intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.” Cooper, 561

N.W.2d at 179. In addition, a BCA scientist testified that Kellen’s pistol would not have

discharged unless Kellen had pulled the trigger. In light of Kellen’s own statements both

before and after the shooting and the BCA scientist’s testimony, a jury could not rationally

conclude that Kellen did not intend to fire his pistol.

8 Kellen’s second hypothesis—that he intentionally fired the pistol without aiming or

looking to see where he was firing it—is inconsistent with his post-arrest statement, in

which he admitted to pointing the pistol at the window in response to seeing the SWAT

team. One officer specifically testified that, based on the trajectory of the bullet, the pistol

was “aimed towards the armored vehicle.” Another officer testified that a bullet fired from

Kellen’s pistol actually hit the armored vehicle. In light of Kellen’s own statements, the

evidence of the trajectory of the bullet, and the evidence that the armored vehicle actually

was struck by the bullet, a jury could not rationally conclude that Kellen did not aim the

Kellen’s third hypothesis—that he intentionally fired the pistol toward the ground—

is inconsistent with the circumstances proved for the same reasons that apply to his second

hypothesis.

Given the circumstances proved, there is not a reasonable hypothesis that Kellen did

not intentionally fire his pistol at the armored vehicle. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to

support Kellen’s convictions of first-degree assault of a peace officer.

Affirmed.