This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1379
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Ryan Roy Becker, Appellant.
Filed April 11, 2016 Affirmed Kirk, Judge
McLeod County District Court File No. 43-CR-13-719
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Daniel R. Provencher, Assistant County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Kirk, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s restitution order, arguing that the claimed
losses were not directly caused by the crime of which he was convicted and that the court
improperly considered bail paid by his father. We affirm. FACTS
In January 2014, appellant Ryan Roy Becker pleaded guilty to possession of substances
with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, on or about May 5, 2013. As part of the factual
basis for the plea, appellant admitted that he was “in possession of chemical reagents or
precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine,” and that “chemical reagents or
precursors,” means “items, substances, that are used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine.” He reserved the right to challenge restitution.
The City of Lester Prairie sought restitution in the amount of $30,576.54, for losses
related to inspecting and remediating the methamphetamine contamination of appellant’s
home, along with attorney fees for the city attorney of Lester Prairie. The district court held
a restitution hearing in April 2015. The parties stipulated to a record.
Based upon that stipulated record, in January 2013, law enforcement received a report
indicating that appellant’s brother may be smoking or cooking methamphetamine in
appellant’s basement in Lester Prairie. When investigating the report, an officer “detected a
strong chemical odor emitting from the residence.” Later that month, an employee at a nearby
Fleet Supply store reported that appellant and his then-girlfriend were purchasing chemicals
up to three times a week, leading the employee to suspect that they were manufacturing
methamphetamine.
In May 2013, law enforcement found components of a methamphetamine lab in both
a vehicle appellant was driving and in his house. When officers entered the home, there was
a strong chemical odor and a haze in the air. Numerous lab-related items were recovered from
the house, including a Coleman fuel container, a mineral spirits bottle, isopropyl alcohol
2 containers, potassium iodide, muriatic acid, drain cleaner, a digital pH tester, and plastic
tubing.
In June 2015, the district court issued an order requiring appellant to pay restitution in
the amount claimed.1 This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in ordering restitution for methamphetamine- contamination inspection and remediation costs.
A district court has broad discretion to award restitution. State v. Tenerelli, 598
N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999). However, “determining whether an item meets the statutory
requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully reviewable by the appellate court.”
State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“A request for restitution may include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses
resulting from the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2014). “The burden of
demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense and the
appropriateness of a particular type of restitution is on the prosecution.” Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2014). Restitution must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
“[A] compensable loss must be ‘directly caused by the conduct for which the defendant
was convicted.’” Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 347 (quoting State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105
(Minn. App. 1999)). For example, in Latimer, we held that the district court may not order
1 Later that month, the district court entered an order redirecting restitution payments to Wells Fargo Bank, which held a mortgage on the property at the time of the offense, because it had reimbursed the City of Lester Prairie in full.
3 restitution for losses directly attributable to a murder against a defendant who helped conceal
the murder after it occurred, but otherwise took no part in it. 604 N.W.2d at 105. However,
a restitution order need not precisely match the offense of which the defendant was convicted,
as long as the claimed loss is supported by the record. See State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280,
283 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a district court may order a defendant to pay restitution
exceeding the monetary parameters of the theft offense of which he was convicted, but only
if the higher amount is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Olson,
381 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming restitution award for money stolen where
defendant was convicted of burglary but acquitted of theft charge stemming from same
incident).
Here, appellant pleaded guilty to violating Minn. Stat. § 152.0262, subd. 1(a) (2012),
for “possess[ing] any chemical reagents or precursors with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine.” Minn. Stat. § 152.0275, subd. l(b) (2012), specifically allows a district
court to “require a person convicted of manufacturing or attempting to manufacture a
controlled substance or of an illegal activity involving a precursor substance” to pay
restitution to public entities for the “reasonable costs” of their participation in any “emergency
response” to the crime. For purposes of the statute, “‘emergency response’ includes, but is
not limited to, removing and collecting evidence, securing the site, removal, remediation, and
hazardous chemical assessment or inspection of the site where the relevant offense or offenses
took place . . . .” Id., subd. l(a)(2) (2012).
The district court did not find credible appellant’s claim that the contamination of his
home was caused by a prior resident or an unknown person. Generally, appellate courts defer
4 to district-court credibility determinations, and we extend this deference to the evaluation of
written statements. See, e.g., Straus v. Straus, 254 Minn. 234, 235, 94 N.W.2d 679, 680
(1959) (stating that conflicts in the evidence, even though presented in affidavits, are to be
resolved by the district court). Here, the record amply supports the district court’s conclusion.
Appellant’s crime of possessing chemical reagents or precursors with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine is closely and logically linked to the methamphetamine
contamination of appellant’s home. The stipulated record supports a conclusion, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that appellant was possessing and/or manufacturing
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1379
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Ryan Roy Becker, Appellant.
Filed April 11, 2016 Affirmed Kirk, Judge
McLeod County District Court File No. 43-CR-13-719
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Daniel R. Provencher, Assistant County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Kirk, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s restitution order, arguing that the claimed
losses were not directly caused by the crime of which he was convicted and that the court
improperly considered bail paid by his father. We affirm. FACTS
In January 2014, appellant Ryan Roy Becker pleaded guilty to possession of substances
with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, on or about May 5, 2013. As part of the factual
basis for the plea, appellant admitted that he was “in possession of chemical reagents or
precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine,” and that “chemical reagents or
precursors,” means “items, substances, that are used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine.” He reserved the right to challenge restitution.
The City of Lester Prairie sought restitution in the amount of $30,576.54, for losses
related to inspecting and remediating the methamphetamine contamination of appellant’s
home, along with attorney fees for the city attorney of Lester Prairie. The district court held
a restitution hearing in April 2015. The parties stipulated to a record.
Based upon that stipulated record, in January 2013, law enforcement received a report
indicating that appellant’s brother may be smoking or cooking methamphetamine in
appellant’s basement in Lester Prairie. When investigating the report, an officer “detected a
strong chemical odor emitting from the residence.” Later that month, an employee at a nearby
Fleet Supply store reported that appellant and his then-girlfriend were purchasing chemicals
up to three times a week, leading the employee to suspect that they were manufacturing
methamphetamine.
In May 2013, law enforcement found components of a methamphetamine lab in both
a vehicle appellant was driving and in his house. When officers entered the home, there was
a strong chemical odor and a haze in the air. Numerous lab-related items were recovered from
the house, including a Coleman fuel container, a mineral spirits bottle, isopropyl alcohol
2 containers, potassium iodide, muriatic acid, drain cleaner, a digital pH tester, and plastic
tubing.
In June 2015, the district court issued an order requiring appellant to pay restitution in
the amount claimed.1 This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in ordering restitution for methamphetamine- contamination inspection and remediation costs.
A district court has broad discretion to award restitution. State v. Tenerelli, 598
N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999). However, “determining whether an item meets the statutory
requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully reviewable by the appellate court.”
State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“A request for restitution may include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses
resulting from the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2014). “The burden of
demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense and the
appropriateness of a particular type of restitution is on the prosecution.” Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2014). Restitution must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
“[A] compensable loss must be ‘directly caused by the conduct for which the defendant
was convicted.’” Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 347 (quoting State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105
(Minn. App. 1999)). For example, in Latimer, we held that the district court may not order
1 Later that month, the district court entered an order redirecting restitution payments to Wells Fargo Bank, which held a mortgage on the property at the time of the offense, because it had reimbursed the City of Lester Prairie in full.
3 restitution for losses directly attributable to a murder against a defendant who helped conceal
the murder after it occurred, but otherwise took no part in it. 604 N.W.2d at 105. However,
a restitution order need not precisely match the offense of which the defendant was convicted,
as long as the claimed loss is supported by the record. See State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280,
283 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a district court may order a defendant to pay restitution
exceeding the monetary parameters of the theft offense of which he was convicted, but only
if the higher amount is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Olson,
381 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming restitution award for money stolen where
defendant was convicted of burglary but acquitted of theft charge stemming from same
incident).
Here, appellant pleaded guilty to violating Minn. Stat. § 152.0262, subd. 1(a) (2012),
for “possess[ing] any chemical reagents or precursors with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine.” Minn. Stat. § 152.0275, subd. l(b) (2012), specifically allows a district
court to “require a person convicted of manufacturing or attempting to manufacture a
controlled substance or of an illegal activity involving a precursor substance” to pay
restitution to public entities for the “reasonable costs” of their participation in any “emergency
response” to the crime. For purposes of the statute, “‘emergency response’ includes, but is
not limited to, removing and collecting evidence, securing the site, removal, remediation, and
hazardous chemical assessment or inspection of the site where the relevant offense or offenses
took place . . . .” Id., subd. l(a)(2) (2012).
The district court did not find credible appellant’s claim that the contamination of his
home was caused by a prior resident or an unknown person. Generally, appellate courts defer
4 to district-court credibility determinations, and we extend this deference to the evaluation of
written statements. See, e.g., Straus v. Straus, 254 Minn. 234, 235, 94 N.W.2d 679, 680
(1959) (stating that conflicts in the evidence, even though presented in affidavits, are to be
resolved by the district court). Here, the record amply supports the district court’s conclusion.
Appellant’s crime of possessing chemical reagents or precursors with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine is closely and logically linked to the methamphetamine
contamination of appellant’s home. The stipulated record supports a conclusion, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that appellant was possessing and/or manufacturing
methamphetamine in the home. Appellant’s conduct directly caused the city’s investigation
and remediation of the contamination of appellant’s home. Further, the city’s claimed losses
constitute reasonable costs related to removing and collecting evidence of methamphetamine
manufacturing, securing the site, inspecting, and remediating the contamination of appellant’s
home. Minn. Stat. § 152.0275, subd. 1(a)(2), (b). Therefore, the district court did not err in
ordering restitution.
II. The district court properly considered the cash bail posted by appellant’s father in determining appellant’s ability to pay restitution.
In ordering restitution, the district court shall consider “the income, resources, and
obligations of the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2014). Whether a district
court may consider bail in awarding restitution is a question of law, which we review de novo.
See State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. 2014).
Appellant argues that the district court erred in considering that appellant posted
$7,500 in cash bail because it was paid by his father. “Money bail is the property of the
5 accused, whether deposited by that person or by a third person on the accused’s behalf.”
Minn. Stat. § 629.53 (2014). Further, a district court is specifically authorized to apply a
convicted defendant’s bail deposit towards any restitution obligation. Id. (“In case of
conviction, the judge may order the money bail deposit to be applied to any fine or restitution
imposed on the defendant by the court . . . .”); see also Minn. Stat. § 485.018, subd. 5 (2014)
(acknowledging that forfeited bail may be paid directly to victims).
Based upon this statutory language, the district court did not err in considering the
$7,500 in bail paid by appellant’s father in ordering restitution. Notably, the district court did
not indicate that the bail was evidence that appellant had other income or resources available
for restitution. Under Minn. Stat. § 629.53, the bail was a legitimate resource to consider in
awarding restitution.
Affirmed.