STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-1283
Court of Appeals Hudson, C.J. Took no part, Gaïtas, J. State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: November 13, 2024 Office of Appellate Courts Robert Lee Baker, III,
Appellant.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant. ________________________
S Y L L A B U S
The proper standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury
instruction on self-defense or defense of others is whether the defendant produced
reasonable evidence to support their claim, and, if so, whether such evidence was sufficient
to shift the burden to the State to disprove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. A
defendant’s burden is satisfied if they have presented sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable juror could have found defendant acted in self-defense.
1 Applying the proper standard, appellant was entitled to his requested jury
instructions on self-defense and defense of others, and the district court’s failure to give
these instructions was not harmless.
Reversed and remanded.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Chief Justice.
This case requires us to decide whether the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others. The decedent, Maurice
Anderson, and an accomplice robbed appellant Robert Lee Baker, III, and his girlfriend in
a car at gunpoint. As Anderson and the accomplice were carrying away Baker’s property,
Baker got out of the car with a firearm and demanded the return of his property. In response
to the demand, Anderson raised his firearm. Baker then shot and killed Anderson. Based
on his actions, the State charged Baker with second-degree intentional murder.
At trial, Baker claimed self-defense and defense of others, but the district court
concluded that Baker was not entitled to jury instructions on those defenses. Explaining
its decision, the district court stated that Baker failed to establish two elements of his
defenses: that he was not the initial aggressor and that he did not have a reasonable means
to retreat.
The court of appeals affirmed, but on different grounds. After acknowledging that
the evidence about whether Baker was the initial aggressor and whether he had a reasonable
means to retreat was “somewhat muddled,” the court of appeals affirmed because it
2 concluded that Baker’s use of deadly force was unreasonable as a matter of law. State v.
Baker, No. A22-1283, 2023 WL 8013919, at *3 (Minn. App. Nov. 30, 2023).
We disagree. We conclude that Baker presented sufficient evidence to satisfy his
burden to obtain jury instructions on self-defense and defense of others. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on
self-defense and defense of others. This error was not harmless, and therefore we reverse
the decision of the court of appeals and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
The State charged Baker with one count of second-degree intentional murder, see
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1 (2022), for causing the death of Maurice Anderson with intent
but without premeditation. 1 The following evidence was established at trial.
On November 9, 2020, at 8:58 p.m., police received reports of gunshots fired near
a hotel in Eagan, Minnesota. A police officer traveling to the scene pulled over a car
matching the description of the suspect’s car. The car’s occupants—Baker and his
girlfriend—were arrested. Inside the car, officers found a Sig Sauer BB gun and a
.40-caliber Glock handgun. During the arrest, Baker appeared distressed and mentioned
that men had jumped into the car.
1 Baker was also charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2 (2022). Baker pleaded guilty to the possession charge and proceeded to a jury trial only on the second-degree murder charge. The possession conviction is not an issue before this court and is not impacted by the disposition of this case.
3 Meanwhile, police found Anderson’s body near the hotel’s parking lot. Anderson
had been shot 11 times, resulting in his death. Seven bullets entered Anderson’s body from
back to front, with one entering the back of his neck, three entering his back, and three
entering the back of his thighs. Sixteen .40-caliber cartridge casings were recovered from
the scene, along with the girlfriend’s purse containing approximately $2,200.
Baker did not testify at trial, so the following testimony was established from three
different Mirandized statements Baker made to the police following his arrest. On the
evening of November 9, Baker made his first statement, when he initially reported the
following facts. Baker and his girlfriend were picking up the girlfriend’s friend at another
nearby hotel when three men entered the car and robbed them at gunpoint. The girlfriend
was the driver, Baker was in the passenger seat, the friend was in the backseat, and the
assailants jumped into the backseat. The assailants instructed the girlfriend to drive and
told her to stop a few feet from the hotel’s entryway. They took Baker’s keys and wallet,
over $2,000 in cash, and the girlfriend’s purse. Baker reported that “after they took
everything shortly after that ah there was—there was some gunfire.” He claimed that he
did not know where the gunfire came from, that he did not see the shooting happen, and
that he never got out of the car.
During the interview, Baker asked to talk to his mom. After speaking with her,
Baker’s story about the circumstances of the shooting changed. He stated:
Maybe 30 seconds after [the friend] got in the car two males came, got in the car with guns. Put one to my girl’s head and put one to mine. Told us to pull off. We pulled off. They told me to put my hands in the air. The whole time I had one hand in the air. At—after they took everything they got out of the
4 car and they walked off. After that I got out of the car and kind of chased ’em.
Baker confirmed that he had a gun and told the assailants to “[g]ive him [his] s*** back.”
Then, Anderson raised his gun, and Baker started shooting. Once Baker saw Anderson fall
down, Baker got back in the car, and the car drove off.
On November 10, the detectives talked to Baker again. Baker recounted that the
assailants made the girlfriend drive to the hotel and park in the street. Once parked, the
assailants got out of the car, went to the driver’s side where the girlfriend was sitting, and
demanded that she give them her keys. 2 After this exchange with the girlfriend, the
assailants began walking away with the stolen items. At that point, Baker jumped out of
the car and demanded the assailants return Baker’s and the girlfriend’s items. Baker had
his firearm in his hand. 3 In response, one of the assailants, Anderson, “upped the gun.”
Baker estimated that Anderson was approximately 30 feet away, and that Baker himself
was approximately seven feet from the car. Baker began to shoot at Anderson. After
Anderson went down, Baker went over to Anderson and grabbed the girlfriend’s phone
2 Because the girlfriend was able to drive the car away after the altercation ended, it logically follows that she did not end up giving the assailants her keys. 3 In the transcript of the interview, Baker appears to demonstrate how he was holding the gun in his hand, but it is not described well in the transcript:
RB: So I have my gun in my hand the whole time DT: Ok RB: Like, I’m like this DT: Ok RB: You know what I’m saying, but I didn’t want to put them in harm’s way
5 and Anderson’s gun. 4 Baker then ran back to the car. When asked how he got blood on
his shirt, Baker stated, “[A]fter I seen him like going down I was like closer.” He also said
that he wanted to make sure the assailants were away from the girlfriend’s side of the car
in case they began shooting.
Detectives took Baker’s third statement on November 11, 2020. In his third
statement, Baker provided the following information about his proximity to the assailants
during the shooting. First, Baker denied that he started chasing Anderson before firing his
gun. He explained that he got out of the car as the assailants were “walking and exchanging
items” and asked the assailants to “give our s*** back.” In response to his demand, both
assailants raised their guns, Baker started firing, 5 and then Baker “took off running and
chased after them.” Baker explained that when he first started shooting, he was standing
still, but then Anderson “got out of [Baker’s] visual,” and that is when Baker took off
running. He stated, “I started firing and he took off, there was a car right here it was like
we were still facing each other when he took off and like like if he was gonna run back to
me but then he like bolted off to the right.” Baker agreed with the investigator that he
started moving “because [Anderson] was going in through a car,” and at that point, Baker
was not aiming but just shooting. Baker estimated that the closest he was firing at
Anderson was from three or four feet away, and that he stopped shooting when he was
maybe two to three feet away from Anderson, who had “just hit the ground.”
4 The gun was in fact a Sig Sauer BB gun made to look like a real firearm. 5 Baker estimated that he started shooting about 45 seconds after the assailants exited the car.
6 In addition to the Mirandized statements, Baker also made numerous jail calls. In a
conversation with the girlfriend, Baker reflected that when the girlfriend tried to grab him
to prevent him from getting out of the car, “it was already over with, I was out of the car
already . . . I got this slammin on their ass. Oh they real they thought they was sweet. They
pissed me off.” He said that he was “mad as hell the other [man] got away.” He continued,
saying, “I think [the police are] lying they say the mother f***** got a 11 polka dots . . . I
didn’t know the mother f***** got a party thrown on him until the mother f***** started
doing the worm . . . went down . . . then it was it was over with after that.” Baker also said,
“[the man] was still running” and “shorty was eating em joints at first. On my life . . . he
was still running.” When talking with an unidentified man, Baker said, “So they talking . . .
because I chased the mother f***** it’s going to be hard to prove self-defense.”
As part of the investigation, a forensic scientist at the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension examined the 16 cartridge casings found at the scene and determined that all
16 casings came from the same firearm. At trial, the scientist testified that a shooter could
have fired the 16 rounds in just over five seconds. He also stated that it is difficult to tell,
based on where a cartridge casing is found, exactly where the shooter might have been.
Similarly, the medical examiner could not give a definite opinion on how far away Baker
was when each shot was fired. This constituted the sole forensic testimony introduced at
trial.
Before closing arguments, the defense moved for a jury instruction on self-defense
and defense of others, which the State opposed. Although the district court had allowed
the defense to introduce those defenses during opening arguments, it ruled, at the close of
7 evidence, that it would not be instructing the jury on self-defense and defense of others.
Explaining the decision, the district court found that the robbery was over and the defendant
“re-engaged” by exiting the car with a gun. The court stated that the defense failed to
establish that Baker was not the initial aggressor because he re-engaged in contact with the
victim, and that Baker did not have a reasonable means to retreat. The jury found Baker
guilty of second-degree intentional murder, and the district court sentenced him to
438 months in prison. 6
The court of appeals affirmed, but it determined that the elements of self-defense
relied on by the district court—aggression and retreat—were “complex and somewhat
muddled under the facts of this case.” Baker, 2023 WL 8013919, at *3. Ultimately, the
court of appeals did not decide the issues of aggression or retreat but instead affirmed
because it concluded that Baker did not, as a matter of law, use a reasonable amount of
force. Id. at *4. Because “no reasonable jury could find that Baker ‘used only the level of
force reasonably necessary to prevent the harm feared,’ ” the court of appeals held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by not instructing the jury on the law of
self-defense. Id. (quoting State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. 2001)).
Judge Johnson filed a special concurrence, concluding that “the district court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to give the requested instruction for the reasons stated
by the district court.” Id. at *4 (Johnson, J., concurring). “Baker could have safely driven
6 The district court sentenced Baker to 60 months on the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction, to be served concurrently with his second-degree murder sentence.
8 away from the scene and avoided further conflict.” Id. But “[i]nstead Baker chased
Anderson, whom Baker knew was armed, thereby creating a new confrontation.” Id.
This court granted Baker’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
Determining whether to give a jury instruction “lies within the discretion of the
district court and will not be reversed but for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Hannon,
703 N.W.2d 498, 509 (Minn. 2005). “It is an abuse of the district court’s discretion to
refuse to give an instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case ‘if there is evidence to
support it.’ ” State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (quoting State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d
552, 557 (Minn. 2001)). But “[i]f the defense was not prejudiced by a refusal to issue an
instruction, there is no reversible error.” Hannon, 703 N.W.2d at 509.
A.
To be entitled to jury instructions on self-defense or defense of others, the defendant
has the burden of going forward with evidence to support the claim. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d
at 629. If a defendant meets this burden, the defendant is entitled to the self-defense
instruction, and the burden then shifts to the State to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. State v. Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d 79, 96 (Minn.
2024). Baker asserts that the court of appeals used an incorrect standard when analyzing
whether he met his burden to come forward with evidence to support his defenses of
self-defense and defense of others. The court of appeals stated that “[t]he claim of
self-defense is sufficiently raised when a defendant creates a reasonable doubt as to
9 whether the level of force was justified.” Baker, 2023 WL 8013919, at *3 (citing State v.
Soukup, 656 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Minn. App. 2003)). We agree with Baker. 7
We take this opportunity to reiterate the standard for determining whether a
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense or defense of others. The inquiry
is “whether [the defendant] produced reasonable evidence to support [their] claim, and, if
so, whether such evidence was sufficient to shift the burden to the state to disprove the
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629. A defendant’s burden
is satisfied if they have presented “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could
have found [the] defendant acted in self-defense.” State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 257–58
(Minn. 1990); see also Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 630–32 (holding that the defendant “met
[their] burden of coming forward with evidence to support each element of [their] claim of
self-defense” after concluding there was evidence to support the reasonable conclusion that
each element of self-defense was met). A court must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the defendant when making this determination. Id. (explaining that “it is the
jury’s duty to determine what evidence is credible” and that “ ‘[i]n keeping with the
presumption of innocence, trial courts should resolve all doubts as to the legitimacy of a
7 The court of appeals has used this “reasonable doubt” standard when articulating a defendant’s burden of going forward with evidence to support a claim of self-defense in at least four precedential decisions. See Soukup, 656 N.W.2d at 429; State v. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Minn. App. 1986); State v. Stephani, 369 N.W.2d 540, 546 (Minn. App. 1985); State v. Liggons, 348 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Minn. App. 1984). Although we have long applied a different standard, the court of appeals continues to use the standard articulated in Soukup and other court of appeals cases. To ensure the correct standard is used, we overrule the portions of these court of appeals cases addressing when a defendant has satisfied their burden of going forward with evidence to support a claim of self-defense.
10 self-defense claim in favor of the defendant’ ” (quoting State v. Boitnott, 443 N.W.2d 527,
533 n.2 (Minn. 1989))).
The elements of self-defense include:
(1) The absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger.
State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997).
There is an additional requirement for claims of self-defense and defense of others:
“The degree of force used in self-defense must not exceed that which appears to be
necessary to a reasonable person under similar circumstances.” Id. at 286 (emphasis
added); see also Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 403 (explaining that “[a] defendant claiming
self-defense may use a level of force that is reasonable . . .” (emphasis added)). Although
we do not label the “degree of force” requirement as an element of a self-defense claim,
we have treated the requirement as part of the defense. For example, when the burden
shifts to the State to disprove a claim of self-defense, the State may disprove the claim by
disproving any of the four elements or by disproving that the degree of force used was
reasonable. Compare State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 325 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that
the defendant’s self-defense claim failed because the State disproved that the defendant
was not the initial aggressor), with Basting, 572 N.W.2d at 286 (concluding that the district
court did not err when it found that the defendant did not act in self-defense in part because
it “could have determined that [the defendant] used more force than was necessary”).
Consequently, as part of the burden to come forward with evidence to support the
11 self-defense claim, the defendant must present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
juror could find that the degree of force used was reasonable.
The defenses of self-defense and defense of others are born out of the same statutory
language. See Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2022) (authorizing reasonable force “when
used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person”
(emphasis added)). We have said these two defenses parallel each other, State v.
Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 278 (Minn. 2003), but have recently articulated that as to
the fourth element—the duty to retreat—for a claim of defense of others “a defendant must
subjectively believe that the person in peril has no reasonable possibility of safe retreat,
and that belief must be objectively reasonable based on the information available to the
defendant at the time that they use force to defend the person in peril.” State v. Valdez,
___ N.W.3d. ___, No. A22-1424, 2024 WL 4447067, at *7 (Minn. Oct. 9, 2024).
B.
We next consider whether, under the proper standard just described, Baker
presented sufficient evidence to support his claims of self-defense and defense of others
such that he was entitled to jury instructions on these defenses. In doing so, we “must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 545–46
(Minn. 2006); see also Boitnott, 443 N.W.2d at 533 n.2 (stating that “[i]n keeping with the
presumption of innocence, trial courts should resolve all doubts as to the legitimacy of a
self-defense claim in favor of the defendant”).
12 Neither party disputes that Baker presented sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable juror could find that he had an actual and honest belief that he was in imminent
danger of bodily harm or death or that he had reasonable grounds for that belief. Instead,
the parties dispute whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could
find that Baker was not the initial aggressor, that Baker lacked a reasonable means to
retreat, and that the degree of force he used was reasonable.
We begin by addressing the first disputed element: absence of aggression or
provocation on the part of the defendant. Baker argues that he presented sufficient
evidence that he was not the initial aggressor. He presented the following evidence about
the altercation. Two assailants entered Baker’s car and took his personal property at
gunpoint. Then, when the assailants were only approximately 30 feet away from the car,
Baker got out of the car and demanded that they return his property. Baker was in
possession of a firearm when he exited the car.
There is no dispute that Baker re-engaged with the victim when he exited the car.
But we also acknowledge that if the robbery was ongoing, then Baker was entitled to
reasonably resist the robbery. See Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(4) (2022) (providing that
a person may use reasonable force to resist the trespass upon their personal property).
When viewed in a light most favorable to Baker, it is reasonable to infer that the robbery
was ongoing when Baker exited the car and demanded his belongings back. See
United States v. Pate, 932 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the escape phase is
part of the robbery). Based on the specific evidence presented in this case, we conclude
13 that Baker satisfied his burden by presenting sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find that he was not the initial aggressor.
Next, we address the duty to retreat. For Baker’s claim of self-defense, we must
determine whether he presented sufficient evidence that he lacked a reasonable opportunity
to retreat. For his claim of defense of others, we must determine whether he presented
sufficient evidence that he subjectively believed that the two women did not have a
reasonable opportunity to retreat safely and that this belief was objectively reasonable
based on the information available to him at the time. Valdez, ___ N.W.3d. ___,
2024 WL 4447067, at *7.
The evidence about Baker’s and the women’s ability to retreat, viewed in the light
most favorable to Baker, is as follows. Baker, standing about seven feet away from the
car, demanded that the assailants return his property. In response, both assailants, who
were approximately 30 feet away from the car, raised their guns at Baker. The two women
who were inside the car were in the line of fire, and Baker had previously heard one of the
assailants demand the car’s keys from one of the women. We conclude that Baker
presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Baker, with
guns pointed at him, did not have a reasonable opportunity to retreat and that it was
objectively reasonable to believe that the two women, who were also in the assailants’ line
of fire, had no reasonable means to retreat.
Having concluded that Baker presented sufficient evidence to satisfy his burden
regarding the elements of aggression and retreat, we next turn to whether Baker presented
sufficient evidence that he used a reasonable degree of force. The evidence favorable to
14 Baker includes that Baker had just been robbed at gunpoint, he was faced with two
assailants, including Anderson, who raised their guns at him, and two women were in a
nearby car within the line of fire of the assailants. Although Baker characterized his
movements toward Anderson as a “chase,” the evidence favorable to Baker paints a chaotic
scene, one where Anderson might have appeared like he was going to run toward Baker
but then “bolted off,” and “started going in through a car.”
There was evidence presented at trial that the shooting could have occurred in
approximately five seconds. During this relatively short period of time, Baker fired 16
shots, 11 of which hit Anderson, and 7 of which traveled through Anderson’s body from
back to front. Baker also said he stopped shooting as soon as Anderson dropped to the
ground and later expressed surprise that so many of his shots had hit Anderson.
Based on the foregoing evidence, whether Baker used a reasonable degree of force
is a close call. We acknowledge that a reasonable jury could conclude that the degree of
force used was not reasonable. But we cannot go so far as to say that “no reasonable juror
could conclude that his use of force to defend himself was reasonable.” Glowacki,
630 N.W.2d at 403 (concluding that defendant’s use of force was unreasonable as a matter
of law) (emphasis added). In fact, the very acknowledgment that this issue is a close call
supports our conclusion that Baker presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the degree of force used was reasonable. The reasonableness of
the degree of force used in a particular situation is a quintessential question for a jury. Id.
(stating that “[g]enerally, a reasonableness determination is properly made by the finder of
15 fact—in this case, the jury”). Accordingly, the jury should determine the reasonableness
of Baker’s force.
Because Baker met his burden of coming forward with evidence to support his
claims of self-defense and defense of others, we hold that the district court abused its
discretion by denying Baker’s request for an instruction on these claims.
C.
Having concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to instruct
the jury on self-defense and defense of others, we consider whether such error requires
reversal and a new trial. Failure to instruct the jury on a defendant’s defense when the
evidence warrants it requires a new trial unless it can be said, “beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error had no significant impact on the verdict.” State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d
265, 270 (Minn. 1997). Here, the district court’s abuse of discretion in refusing to instruct
the jury on self-defense and defense of others was reversible error. In Johnson, we
concluded that the district court’s refusal to provide self-defense instructions was reversible
error because “[w]ithout the requested instructions, a jury following the law would have
been required to return a guilty verdict even if it believed that Johnson was acting in . . .
self-defense.” 719 N.W.2d at 632. Likewise, without instructions on self-defense and
defense of others, the jurors had to convict Baker of second-degree intentional murder even
if they believed he was acting to defend himself or others when he shot and killed
Anderson. Therefore, we conclude that the error was prejudicial, and Baker is entitled to
a new trial.
16 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and
remand for a new trial.
GAÏTAS, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.