This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0692
State of Minnesota, Appellant,
vs.
Richard Harold Stone, Respondent.
Filed January 5, 2026 Reversed and remanded Wheelock, Judge
Redwood County District Court File No. 64-CR-24-699
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Shannon M. Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and
Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s grant of a downward
dispositional departure, arguing that the district court erred in granting the departure because respondent failed to demonstrate that he was particularly amenable to probation.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In August 2024, a Redwood County police officer responded to a report from a
woman that her boyfriend, respondent Richard Harold Stone, refused to leave her house
after making threatening statements that left her fearing for her safety. She reported that
Stone had strangled her the night prior, showing the officer the resulting marks on her neck.
She also reported that she believed Stone recently had been using drugs. The state charged
Stone with one count of felony domestic assault by strangulation in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2247, subd. 2 (2024), and one count of gross-misdemeanor domestic assault in
violation of Minn. Stat § 609.2242, subd. 2 (2024). Stone pleaded guilty in a Norgaard
plea 1 in December 2024, and the district court ordered a presentence-investigation report
(PSI).
Stone’s PSI indicated that he had a significant criminal history with multiple felony
convictions, including for first-degree assault, terroristic threats, two violations of orders
for protection (OFP), and two domestic-assault offenses. The PSI further revealed that
Stone was on probation for a gross-misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction at the time
this incident occurred. Stone reported that he did not remember the incident because he
had been “using meth heavy” and further related that he had been using methamphetamine
1 In a Norgaard plea, a defendant may plead guilty despite claiming memory loss at the time of the offense due to intoxication or amnesia. See State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Minn. 1994); State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961).
2 for the past two years. The district court also received a victim-impact statement in which
Stone’s girlfriend stated that she believed most of Stone’s problems were attributable to
his drug use and that she did not want him to go to prison.
The PSI recommended that Stone receive a 24-month executed prison sentence, the
midpoint of a presumptive sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines of 21 to 28
months in prison. Stone moved for a downward dispositional departure on the basis that
he was particularly amenable to probation, asserting that he was a productive member of
society, had completed 16 hours of a domestic-violence class, and was remorseful about
his actions.
At the sentencing hearing, Stone recounted his struggles with methamphetamine
addiction and apologized to the victim. After Stone’s remarks at the hearing, the district
court granted the motion for a downward dispositional departure. The district court
addressed the factors identified in State v. Trog as relevant to its determination of whether
Stone was “particularly suitable for individualized treatment in the probation setting.”
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). These factors include the defendant’s age, prior record,
remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and the support of friends and family. Id.
(Trog factors). The district court found that, notwithstanding Stone’s multiple convictions,
the “prior record” factor weighed in favor of a dispositional departure because his last
felony conviction was over ten years ago. The district court also noted that the victim’s
letter supported a departure and requested help with Stone’s addiction. Further, the district
court mentioned Stone’s completion of part of a domestic-violence course and his
3 willingness to pursue treatment for his methamphetamine addiction. Finally, the district
court found that Stone showed remorse at the sentencing hearing.
The district court stayed execution of the felony sentence and placed Stone on
supervised probation for five years. On a form departure report, the district court indicated
the reasons for the downward departure by checking the boxes for “amenable to probation”;
“amenable to treatment [for chemical dependency]”; “ensure compliance w/ probation or
allow longer supervision”; and “shows remorse/accepts responsibility.”
The state appeals.
DECISION
A downward dispositional departure is permitted when there are “substantial and
compelling circumstances” that warrant departure. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 309
(Minn. 2014). “[A] defendant’s particular amenability to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a stay of execution of a
presumptively executed sentence.” Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31. In assessing whether a
defendant is particularly amenable to probation, courts consider various factors, including
the Trog factors noted above. Id. The state argues that mere amenability to probation is
insufficient to justify a downward dispositional departure; rather, a defendant must be
particularly amenable to probation. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309. Accordingly, the state
contends that the district court’s findings were insufficient for it to conclude that Stone was
particularly amenable to probation. For the reasons below, we agree.
4 I. The district court abused its discretion in granting the dispositional departure because the facts on which it relied did not support a finding of particular amenability to probation.
We review the district court’s grant of a downward dispositional departure for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). “[A]
departure is an abuse of discretion if the court’s reasons are improper or insufficient and
there is insufficient evidence of record to justify the departure.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308
(quotations omitted). In Soto, the supreme court articulated the standard for when a finding
of particular amenability is appropriate, noting the distinction between mere amenability
to probation and particular amenability to probation:
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0692
State of Minnesota, Appellant,
vs.
Richard Harold Stone, Respondent.
Filed January 5, 2026 Reversed and remanded Wheelock, Judge
Redwood County District Court File No. 64-CR-24-699
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Shannon M. Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and
Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s grant of a downward
dispositional departure, arguing that the district court erred in granting the departure because respondent failed to demonstrate that he was particularly amenable to probation.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In August 2024, a Redwood County police officer responded to a report from a
woman that her boyfriend, respondent Richard Harold Stone, refused to leave her house
after making threatening statements that left her fearing for her safety. She reported that
Stone had strangled her the night prior, showing the officer the resulting marks on her neck.
She also reported that she believed Stone recently had been using drugs. The state charged
Stone with one count of felony domestic assault by strangulation in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2247, subd. 2 (2024), and one count of gross-misdemeanor domestic assault in
violation of Minn. Stat § 609.2242, subd. 2 (2024). Stone pleaded guilty in a Norgaard
plea 1 in December 2024, and the district court ordered a presentence-investigation report
(PSI).
Stone’s PSI indicated that he had a significant criminal history with multiple felony
convictions, including for first-degree assault, terroristic threats, two violations of orders
for protection (OFP), and two domestic-assault offenses. The PSI further revealed that
Stone was on probation for a gross-misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction at the time
this incident occurred. Stone reported that he did not remember the incident because he
had been “using meth heavy” and further related that he had been using methamphetamine
1 In a Norgaard plea, a defendant may plead guilty despite claiming memory loss at the time of the offense due to intoxication or amnesia. See State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Minn. 1994); State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961).
2 for the past two years. The district court also received a victim-impact statement in which
Stone’s girlfriend stated that she believed most of Stone’s problems were attributable to
his drug use and that she did not want him to go to prison.
The PSI recommended that Stone receive a 24-month executed prison sentence, the
midpoint of a presumptive sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines of 21 to 28
months in prison. Stone moved for a downward dispositional departure on the basis that
he was particularly amenable to probation, asserting that he was a productive member of
society, had completed 16 hours of a domestic-violence class, and was remorseful about
his actions.
At the sentencing hearing, Stone recounted his struggles with methamphetamine
addiction and apologized to the victim. After Stone’s remarks at the hearing, the district
court granted the motion for a downward dispositional departure. The district court
addressed the factors identified in State v. Trog as relevant to its determination of whether
Stone was “particularly suitable for individualized treatment in the probation setting.”
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). These factors include the defendant’s age, prior record,
remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and the support of friends and family. Id.
(Trog factors). The district court found that, notwithstanding Stone’s multiple convictions,
the “prior record” factor weighed in favor of a dispositional departure because his last
felony conviction was over ten years ago. The district court also noted that the victim’s
letter supported a departure and requested help with Stone’s addiction. Further, the district
court mentioned Stone’s completion of part of a domestic-violence course and his
3 willingness to pursue treatment for his methamphetamine addiction. Finally, the district
court found that Stone showed remorse at the sentencing hearing.
The district court stayed execution of the felony sentence and placed Stone on
supervised probation for five years. On a form departure report, the district court indicated
the reasons for the downward departure by checking the boxes for “amenable to probation”;
“amenable to treatment [for chemical dependency]”; “ensure compliance w/ probation or
allow longer supervision”; and “shows remorse/accepts responsibility.”
The state appeals.
DECISION
A downward dispositional departure is permitted when there are “substantial and
compelling circumstances” that warrant departure. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 309
(Minn. 2014). “[A] defendant’s particular amenability to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a stay of execution of a
presumptively executed sentence.” Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31. In assessing whether a
defendant is particularly amenable to probation, courts consider various factors, including
the Trog factors noted above. Id. The state argues that mere amenability to probation is
insufficient to justify a downward dispositional departure; rather, a defendant must be
particularly amenable to probation. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309. Accordingly, the state
contends that the district court’s findings were insufficient for it to conclude that Stone was
particularly amenable to probation. For the reasons below, we agree.
4 I. The district court abused its discretion in granting the dispositional departure because the facts on which it relied did not support a finding of particular amenability to probation.
We review the district court’s grant of a downward dispositional departure for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). “[A]
departure is an abuse of discretion if the court’s reasons are improper or insufficient and
there is insufficient evidence of record to justify the departure.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308
(quotations omitted). In Soto, the supreme court articulated the standard for when a finding
of particular amenability is appropriate, noting the distinction between mere amenability
to probation and particular amenability to probation:
“Particular” means “exceptional” or “[d]istinctive among others of the same group,” and “particularly” means “especially” or “specifically.” By requiring a defendant to be particularly amenable to probation, therefore, we ensure that the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the “substantial[] and compelling circumstances” that are necessary to justify a departure.
Id. at 309 (citation omitted). Consequently, the supreme court in Soto concluded that the
district court abused its discretion there because its findings did not reflect this distinction
and it was required to find the defendant particularly amenable to probation, not just
amenable. Id. at 313.
We likewise conclude that the district court abused its discretion here. When
weighing the Trog factors, the district court noted that the prior-record factor weighs in
favor of granting a departure because Stone’s last felony conviction was over ten years
ago; that it considered the victim-impact statement, which contained “a plea in there for
5 help with Mr. Stone’s addiction and the role addiction played in this incident”; that Stone
had completed part of a domestic-violence course; and that Stone had displayed remorse
by pleading guilty and in his statements to the district court. 2 But the district court did not
at all explain why these facts distinguish Stone from most other defendants such that he is
particularly amenable to probation. And some of the facts upon which the district court
relied do not support any finding of amenability.
Most notably, we fail to see how the prior-record factor supports a finding of
particular amenability here. Stone’s criminal history is extensive, especially as to offenses
related to domestic violence. In fact, Stone was on probation for a gross-misdemeanor
domestic-violence conviction when he committed the underlying offense in this case, a
crucial detail that the district court failed to address altogether. That his last felony
conviction was ten years old is insufficient to support a finding of particular amenability.
Indeed, we have noted that a prior record that contains even 20-year-old felonies does not
weigh in favor of finding particular amenability. See State v. Haskins, No. A22-1804,
2023 WL 3806466, at *3 (Minn. App. June 5, 2023) (“[N]o precedential appellate decision
we are aware of stands for the proposition that having old felonies with ‘minimal’
subsequent offenses generally suggests particular amenability to probation.”), rev. denied
2 The district court did not state which Trog factors it was considering other than the prior-record and remorse factors.
6 (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023). 3 The prior-record factor does not weigh in favor of finding Stone
particularly amenable to probation.
The other facts the district court cites also do not support its finding. The district
court’s discussion of Stone’s remorse is limited to its observation that, “by pleading guilty
he has taken responsibility, and statements here do not negate his responsibility for the
offenses in which he’s taken responsibility.” But the supreme court in Soto stated that the
presence of a guilty plea alone does not signify particular amenability to probation.
855 N.W.2d at 312. Next, the district court’s recognition of “the role addiction played in
this incident” does not provide a basis for a departure as it does not mean Stone is
particularly amenable to treatment for addiction. The record does not indicate that Stone
underwent an updated chemical-dependency evaluation or engaged in treatment
programming to address his drug use after committing the underlying offense in this case.
And notwithstanding that the district court checked the box for “amenable to treatment” as
a reason for the downward departure, the record shows that the district court did not impose
requirements that Stone complete an updated chemical-dependency evaluation and comply
with any recommendations or that he complete chemical-use treatment when it granted the
departure here and ordered more probation. Finally, while it appears that the district court
credited Stone for completing part of a domestic-violence course, a mere “willingness to
work on . . . issues” does not “rise to the level of identifiable, substantial, and compelling
3 We may consider nonprecedential decisions of this court for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
7 circumstances different from those that would be present in a typical case.” State v.
Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
In short, the district court abused its discretion because the reasons it provided were
insufficient. It did not articulate any adequate basis to distinguish Stone from other
defendants when it found him particularly amenable to probation, and thus, it did not
explain how the “substantial and compelling circumstances” necessary to support a
departure from the sentencing guidelines existed. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 313 (quotation
omitted). We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of a downward dispositional
departure and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.