This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-2044
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Renard Rucker, Appellant.
Filed February 27, 2017 Affirmed Reilly, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-14-24675
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Max A. Keller, Lexie D. Stein, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Renard Rucker challenges his first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct
conviction, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the evidence underlying his conviction is insufficient, and that the cumulative effect of the errors
deprived him of the right to a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant by complaint with three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct occurring between June 1, 2013 and August 18, 2014.
The complaint alleged that appellant, the boyfriend of H.B.’s mother, engaged in sexual
penetration with the victim, H.B., when appellant was over the age of 16; H.B. was under
the age of 16 at the time of the sexual penetration; appellant resided with the victim; and
appellant used force or coercion to accomplish the penetration.
The state presented the following evidence at a jury trial. On August 18, 2014,
Crystal police officers responded to a report of ongoing sexual assaults committed by
appellant against H.B. Appellant lived with H.B. and her family. H.B. reported that
appellant sexually and physically abused her over the course of two years by forcing his
penis into her vagina on multiple occasions, causing her pain. CornerHouse conducted a
forensic interview of H.B., and she underwent a medical examination. The jury heard
testimony from a number of witnesses, including H.B.’s mother, a Crystal police officer, a
CornerHouse forensic interviewer, a medical examiner, and appellant’s sister and nephew,
with whom the family briefly lived. Appellant also testified in his own defense and denied
the allegations. The jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of each of the three
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court imposed a 201-month
prison term for the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, multiple acts of
penetration of a victim under the age of 16 by a person with a significant relationship, but
2 did not adjudicate the remaining two offenses, which merged with the sentenced offense.
Appellant filed a direct appeal.
Four months later, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief in district court,
seeking to vacate the conviction on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. Appellant moved to stay his appeal before the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
pending resolution of postconviction proceedings in district court. We granted appellant’s
motion to stay and remanded the matter to the district court for consideration of appellant’s
postconviction petition. The district court subsequently denied appellant’s motion for
postconviction relief, concluding that appellant failed to satisfy the two-part Strickland test
governing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. We thereafter dissolved the stay and
reinstated the instant appeal.
DECISION
I. Appellant received effective assistance of counsel.
a. We apply the two-part Strickland test to an ineffective-assistance-of- counsel challenge.
“We review the denial of postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo because such a claim involves a mixed question of law and
fact.” Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Minn. 2013). A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Fort v. State, 861 N.W.2d 674,
677 (Minn. 2015). We analyze an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under the two-
prong test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.
Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (Minn. 2015) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
3 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). To prevail on his claim,
appellant must demonstrate that “(1) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 94 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068). A reviewing court need not
address both parts of the Strickland test if one is determinative. Hawes, 826 N.W.2d at
783.
“Under the deficiency prong, [appellant] must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that his counsel’s performance . . . fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999). In Minnesota, we
assume an attorney’s performance meets this standard “when he provides his client with
the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” Id. (quotations
omitted). The first prong is thus “necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the
legal community.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010)
(noting that the “proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms”). Under the second Strickland prong, appellant must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that but for his counsel’s errors, the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id.
4 b. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel declined to contact an aggrieved juror after trial.
Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness because the attorney failed to investigate an aggrieved juror’s
claim of harassment. Following trial, a juror sent letters to the court and to counsel,
alleging that he felt intimidated, abused, and harassed by his fellow jurors. Appellant
moved for a Schwartz hearing to impeach the jury’s verdict under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 20(6), and Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus
Co., 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960), which the district court denied on the ground
that appellant failed to make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief.
A defendant may request a motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct. Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(6). The purpose of the hearing, commonly known as a
Schwartz hearing, “is to determine whether a jury verdict is the product of misconduct.”
State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. 2001). However, before a motion for a Schwartz
hearing will be granted, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of juror
misconduct. State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. 2000); State v. Larson, 281
N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. 1979) (noting that the rule “implicitly requires [a] defendant to
establish a prima facie case of jury misconduct before a Schwartz hearing is mandated”).
To make a prima facie showing, “a defendant must submit sufficient evidence which,
standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.”
Larson, 281 N.W.2d at 484.
5 The district court denied appellant’s request for a Schwartz hearing, reasoning that
appellant failed to make a prima facie showing of juror misconduct. In its order denying
petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief, the district court determined that:
[Appellant] has not provided any additional information to the Court indicating [the juror] may have been threatened, and thus the Court views this claim as an argumentative assertion without factual support. . . . The Court believes, in assessing the situation for reasonableness under the circumstances, [appellant’s] counsel had no compelling basis to investigate further. It seems likely that if [the juror] were actually threatened, he would have conveyed this i[n] one of his voluminous and broad letters to the Court or Counsel. . . . In short, this claim has no merit.
We agree with the district court that appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie showing
of juror misconduct, and, therefore, his counsel’s performance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness when he declined to further investigate the juror’s
harassment complaint.
With respect to the second Strickland element, appellant speculates that the outcome
of the trial would have been different if his counsel had investigated the juror’s claims.
However, appellant has not presented any evidence establishing a prima facie case of juror
misconduct, or of any objectively unreasonable conduct on the part of his attorney. See
Larson, 281 N.W.2d at 484 (placing burden on defendant); see also Chambers v. State, 769
N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn. 2009) (“We have generally required that the petitioner factually
support his claims with admissible evidence.”); see also State v. Usee, 800 N.W.2d 192,
201 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[A] Schwartz hearing is inappropriate where the claim of
misconduct is wholly speculative and not based on any evidence reasonably suggesting
6 that misconduct had occurred.” (quotation omitted)). Therefore, we determine that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for relief on the
ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
c. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel failed to review a transcript before publication to the jury.
Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he failed
to review the CornerHouse transcript and the videotape before the evidence was published
to the jury, to ensure that the agreed-upon redactions were properly removed. During trial,
the state presented a video of H.B.’s CornerHouse interview, along with a typewritten
transcript. The videotape was redacted, but the transcript inadvertently included a
statement from H.B. that appellant abused her mother, and that he had lost parental rights
to his other children. The video also contains a section of the interview where H.B.
references appellant’s abusive history with her mother. Appellant’s trial counsel did not
ask that this section be redacted.
After the disclosure, the parties approached for a bench conference, at which time
the state argued that the remarks and comments made in the video were admissible as
relationship evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2016). The district court
agreed with the state, determining that H.B.’s statements regarding appellant’s past
domestic abuse were admissible as relationship evidence because they gave “context to his
sexual abuse of H.B., and the probative value of each act was not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.” On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence
constitutes inadmissible Spreigl evidence. See State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139
7 N.W.2d 167 (1965); Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Appellant argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the statements on Spreigl grounds and for not reviewing
the videotape and transcripts prior to the jury viewing them to ensure that they were
properly redacted and did not mention prior conduct.
In cases involving domestic abuse, Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 governs the
admissibility of evidence related to a defendant’s prior incidents of domestic abuse. State
v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004). This evidence is commonly referred to as
“relationship evidence.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010).
Relationship evidence is distinct from Spreigl evidence because it evinces “prior conduct
between the accused and the alleged victim and may be offered to illuminate the history of
the relationship, that is, to put the crime charged in the context of the relationship between
the two.” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159. A defendant is presumed to be aware that his prior
relationship with the victim, “particularly in so far as it involves ill will or quarrels,” may
be offered against him at trial. Id. at 159-60 (quotation omitted). Consequently, “the
stringent procedural requirements” associated with Spreigl evidence “do not apply to
section 634.20 [relationship] evidence.” State v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. App.
2008).
Here, the district court determined that:
[E]vidence of [appellant’s] previous acts of domestic conduct gives context to his sexual abuse of H.B., and the probative value of each act was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . . Here, admitting the relationship evidence helped the jury understand the relationship [appellant] had with H.B. and perhaps helped explain why she delayed reporting the crime and her credibility in explaining
8 the course of events. The probative value of the relationship evidence was not outweighed by any potential prejudice to [appellant].
We agree. Appellant’s prior acts of domestic violence against H.B.’s family members
carried probative value and provided context to the relationship between appellant and H.B.
Therefore, appellant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the first Strickland
prong by failing to object to the evidence on Spreigl grounds.
Moreover, the district court concluded that even if some of the jurors read the
statements in the transcript or heard H.B. discuss the abuse on the video, “the second prong
of the Strickland test would not be met” because there was “ample corroborative evidence
to convict” appellant. Again, we agree. Appellant has not demonstrated beyond a
reasonable doubt that the outcome of the trial would have been different, but for his trial
counsel’s error. Ample evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Furthermore, the district court
gave a limiting instruction to the jury, advising the jurors that:
Mr. Rucker is not being tried for and may not be convicted of any offense other than the charged offenses. You are not to convict him on the basis of anything other than the charged offenses. To do so would be unjust.
We presume that jurors follow limiting instructions with respect to the proper use of
evidence. See State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249-50 (Minn. 2014) (holding that reviewing
courts assume that jurors follow a court’s instruction). The district court judge’s curative
instruction rendered harmless any prejudice that may have occurred.
9 In sum, appellant is not entitled to relief on the ground that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ensure that the statements were not published
to the jury.
d. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel failed to preserve the voir dire record.
Appellant argues that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to preserve the
record regarding the racial composition of the jury. The jury pool assigned to appellant’s
case included a racially diverse group of people. However, the jurors randomly assigned
to answer questions during the voir dire portion of the trial were all from the same race.
Appellant argues that his attorney “failed to note which jurors the State peremptorily
struck,” precluding him from raising a Batson challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) (forbidding the striking of prospective jurors based solely
on their race).
Appellant’s argument fails. Minnesota courts are committed “to insuring that the
systems used are increasingly inclusive in the hope that the faces of the people in the jury
room will soon mirror the faces of the people in the community at large.” State v.
Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 304 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted); Hennepin County v.
Perry, 561 N.W.2d 889, 897 (Minn. 1997)). But “while defendants are entitled to a fair
and impartial jury, they are not entitled to one of a particular racial composition or one that
precisely mirrors the racial makeup of the community.” Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 304
(citing Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 542).
10 The district court and counsel extensively questioned the potential jurors during the
voir dire process. The fact that all of the members of the voir dire panel were of the same
race does not support a determination that any particular racial group was peremptorily
excluded from the jury on the basis of race. See State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 101
(Minn. 2009) (stating framework for Batson challenge). Thus, even if the defense counsel
had preserved the record from voir dire, appellant would not be able to demonstrate that
the state used a peremptory challenge to strike a person of color. Accordingly, appellant
cannot satisfy either of the Strickland prongs.
II. Sufficient evidence supports appellant’s conviction.
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is “limited to a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 108 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). A
reviewing court must assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved
any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). “This is especially true whe[n] resolution of the case depends on
conflicting testimony, because weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive
function of the jury.” State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). The verdict
will not be disturbed “if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100
(Minn. 2012).
11 Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his criminal-sexual-
conduct conviction, a violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(h)(iii)
(2016). To support a conviction of this charge, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
(h) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual penetration, and:
(i) the actor or an accomplice used force or coercion to accomplish the penetration;
(ii) the complainant suffered personal injury; or
(iii) the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time.
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h).
The record establishes that H.B. was between 14 and 15 years old during the relevant
timeframe. She had a significant relationship with appellant, who lived with the family for
nearly 13 years as her mother’s boyfriend. Appellant sexually and physically abused H.B.
on multiple occasions between June 2013 and August 2014 by forcing his penis into her
vagina, causing her pain. On several occasions, appellant physically hit H.B. when she
tried to resist. The evidence sufficiently supports appellant’s conviction because the jury
could reasonably conclude that he was guilty of the charged crime.
Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient because the state’s case rested upon
the testimony of a single witness. However, Minnesota law recognizes that a conviction
can rest upon the testimony of a single, credible witness. Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1
(2016) (stating that in a prosecution for a first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct crime, “the
12 testimony of a victim need not be corroborated”); see State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426,
435 (Minn. 1997) (“It is a well-established rule that a conviction can rest upon the
testimony of a single credible witness.”). And here, testimony from other fact witnesses
supported H.B.’s testimony. H.B.’s mother testified that she found appellant in H.B.’s
bedroom dressed only in his boxer shorts and believed he may have been drunk. The
CornerHouse forensic interviewer testified that it is common for an abuse victim to delay
reporting. The CornerHouse interviewer referred H.B. for a medical examination, and the
medical examiner testified that H.B.’s statements were consistent with the CornerHouse
interview. While H.B. was the primary witness, other witnesses corroborated her
testimony.
The jury heard evidence from several witnesses, including appellant, who denied
the charges. The jury credited H.B.’s testimony. It is not the role of this court on appeal
to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness credibility. See State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d
68, 73 (Minn. 2009) (“Our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence.”).
Deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and assuming that “the jury
believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,” State v. Porte,
832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013), we determine that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain appellant’s first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Given the heavy
burden appellant must carry to overturn a conviction, State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 690
(Minn. 2001), we conclude that appellant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.
13 III. Appellant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of cumulative error.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the cumulative effect of
the errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. “In rare cases, . . . the cumulative effect
of trial errors can deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial” and warrant
reversal. State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 538 (Minn. 2012). “The test is whether the
effect of the errors considered together denied appellant a fair trial.” State v. Valentine,
787 N.W.2d 630, 642 (Minn. App. 2010). Because we conclude that no error occurred, we
do not reach this argument.
Affirmed.