This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0406
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Raymond Allen Torgerson, Appellant.
Filed January 8, 2024 Affirmed Florey, Judge *
Aitkin County District Court File No. 01-CR-22-565
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James P. Ratz, Aitkin County Attorney, Sebastian Mesa, Assistant County Attorney, Aitkin, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his conviction for introducing a dangerous
weapon into jail. He argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and the
district court erred in its jury instructions. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 8, 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Raymond Allen
Torgerson in Aitkin County with four offenses—including felony introduction of a
dangerous weapon into a jail in violation of Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b) (2020)—
relating to an encounter with law enforcement. 1 The following version of events, relevant
to the issues on appeal, is taken from the testimony and evidence presented at trial.
On July 7, 2022, Officer Aaron Cook of the Aitkin County Sheriff’s Office was
dispatched to a report that a man, later identified as Torgerson, had acted inappropriately
at the Aitkin County fairgrounds. Cook looked for Torgerson and eventually spotted
Torgerson riding a bicycle. Cook pulled his squad car behind Torgerson, activated his
lights and siren, and told Torgerson to stop. Torgerson turned around and approached
Cook. Cook told Torgerson about the report. Cook testified that Torgerson seemed
intoxicated during their encounter, became increasingly upset, and tried to leave. Officer
1 Torgerson was also charged with misdemeanor fourth-degree assault of a peace officer in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1(b) (2020); misdemeanor disorderly conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2020); and misdemeanor obstruction of legal process in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2020).
2 Riedel and Officer Koonce eventually arrived at the scene, and Torgerson was placed under
arrest.
Koonce, who had prior experience with Torgerson, advised Cook that Torgerson
may have a knife on him. Koonce advised Cook that he had discovered a knife in
Torgerson’s boot during a previous interaction. At the time Cook learned this information,
Torgerson was talking to Riedel, and so Cook did not know if Torgerson heard Koonce tell
him about the earlier encounter. Cook searched Torgerson by patting around his ankles
and feeling down into the sides of his shoes but did not find a knife.
Torgerson was put into the back seat of Cook’s squad car and transported to the jail.
Torgerson was not asked whether he had anything on him, such as a knife or other
contraband, that should not go into the jail. Cook walked Torgerson into the jail through
the booking room. As part of the booking process, Torgerson was required to change out
of his clothing. While doing so, a ceramic steak knife fell out of his shoe. Torgerson
stated, “if you would have asked me about it, I would have told you.”
The district court instructed the jury as to the elements of introducing a dangerous
weapon into a jail:
First, that the Defendant brought, sent or in any manner caused to introduce into the Aitkin County Jail a dangerous weapon.
“Dangerous weapon” is any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm, or other device or instrumentality that in the manner in which it’s used or intended to be used is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
Second, that the Defendant’s act was done without the consent of the person in charge.
3 Third, that the Defendant’s act occurred on or about July 7th, 2022, in Aitkin County.
The jury found Torgerson guilty of felony introduction of a dangerous weapon into
a jail and misdemeanor obstruction of legal process. 2 Torgerson appeals his conviction for
introducing a dangerous weapon into a jail in violation of Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b).
DECISION
Torgerson asserts that his conviction for introduction of a dangerous weapon into a
jail, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), must be reversed because the evidence
is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Torgerson also argues the
district court erred in its jury instructions.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court conducts a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict. State v. Webb,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We must assume that “the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101,
108 (Minn. 1989). Ordinarily, this court will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with
due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged
offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
2 Torgerson was acquitted of the fourth-degree assault-of-a-peace-officer and disorderly- conduct charges.
4 Convictions based upon circumstantial evidence merit “heightened scrutiny” on
appeal. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). In these cases, the
“[c]ircumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, as a whole, leads so directly
to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable
inference other than guilt.” State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011). A
defendant’s intent is a state of mind, which is generally proven circumstantially “by
drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997).
Torgerson argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish the “mens rea” and
“dangerous weapon” elements of section 641.165, subdivision 2(b). We address each
argument in turn.
A. Mens Rea
First, Torgerson argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he had the requisite mens rea to be convicted of violating Minn. Stat.
§ 641.165, subd. 2(b).
The meaning of a criminal statute is intertwined with the issue of whether the state
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the statute. State v. Vasko,
889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017); see also State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 360 (Minn.
2020). “A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim that turns on the meaning of the statute under
which a defendant has been convicted presents a question of statutory interpretation that
we review de novo.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019). Therefore,
we must first interpret Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), to determine the scope of the
5 mens rea—if any—required by the statute before considering whether the evidence is
sufficient to support Torgerson’s conviction. Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), states that
“[w]hoever introduces or in any manner causes the introduction of a dangerous weapon, as
defined in section 609.02, subdivision 6, into any jail . . . without the consent of the person
in charge . . . is guilty of a felony.” As written, the statute contains no express mens rea
requirement. But neither party argues that Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), is a strict
liability offense, and the state concedes there is a mens rea requirement to Minn. Stat.
§ 641.165, subd. 2(b). We therefore assume, without deciding, that the offense does not
impose strict liability.
Torgerson argues the mens rea requirement of Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), is
“willfully” and “intentionally.” We are not persuaded. First, supreme court precedent
supports that when a statute lacks an explicit mens rea requirement and is not a strict
liability offense, the required mens rea is knowledge. See, e.g., State v. Ndikum, 815
N.W.2d 816, 822 (Minn. 2012) (reading a knowledge requirement into possession-of -a-
pistol-in-public statute); In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 2000)
(reading a knowledge requirement into possession-of-a-knife-while-on-school-property
statute); State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975) (reading a knowledge requirement
into possession-of-a-controlled-substance statute). Torgerson does not present any
argument that this court should, and we find no reason to, depart from this established
precedent.
Second, Torgerson relies on State v. Strong, 294 N.W.2d 319, 319-20 (Minn. 1980),
to argue that the mens rea requirement for the offense of introduction of contraband into a
6 correctional facility is “intentional” and “willful.” We are not persuaded based on the
context of the supreme court’s reasoning. “The interpretation of case law is a legal question
that is reviewed de novo.” State v. Robideau, 796 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2011). In
Strong, the state’s complaint charged the defendant with “willfully and intentionally taking
contraband with him into the state prison” in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.55 (Supp.
1979). 294 N.W.2d at 320. The state moved to strike from the complaint, as surplusage
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.04, the words “willfully” and “intentionally.” Id. at 319.
The district court denied the state’s motion and the state appealed. Id. The supreme court
affirmed the district court’s decision noting, “[w]e see no reason why the element of
scienter should be dispensed within this situation and we are not convinced that the
legislature intended to do so.” Id. at 320. Torgerson asserts that the supreme court’s
decision in Strong incorporated a “willfully and intentionally” mens rea requirement into
Minn. Stat. § 243.55. And because Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), mirrors the language
of Minn. Stat. § 243.55, Torgerson argues that Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), should
also be read to require the state to prove that the defendant acted both willfully and
intentionally.
The court’s analysis in Strong focused on whether Minn. Stat. § 243.55 was a strict
liability offense—an offense that does not have a mens rea requirement. N.W.2d at 319-
20. The court in Strong ultimately concluded that Minn. Stat. § 243.55 was not a strict
liability offense and that the statute required the state to prove scienter as an element. Id.
at 320. The court likened Minn. Stat. § 243.55 to a statute criminalizing the possession of
a controlled substance “requiring conscious possession with actual knowledge of the nature
7 of the substance.” Id. Consistent with this language, the supreme court has since referred
to Strong as an example of where the court will read a knowledge requirement into a statute
that lacks an explicit mens rea requirement. See, e.g., Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 819 (stating
Strong “required the state to show that the defendant knew he possessed the item”); State
v. Arkell, 672 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Minn. 2003) (stating Strong “required the state to show
that the defendant had knowledge of possession of the offensive item”); C.R.M., 611
N.W.2d at 808 (stating Strong “required the state to show that the defendant had knowledge
of possession of the offensive item”).
Because there is no argument before us that Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b), is a
strict liability offense, we assume without deciding, that the mens rea required would be
knowledge. Therefore, for purposes of our sufficiency of the evidence analysis, we assume
the state was required to establish Torgerson’s knowledge of the knife. “The [s]tate
ordinarily proves a criminal defendant’s mental state by circumstantial evidence.” State v.
Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn. 2013). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from
which the fact[-]finder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State
v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). This court reviews the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence by conducting a two-step analysis. State v. German,
929 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. App. 2019) (citing Hanson, 800 N.W.2d at 622).
First, this court must identify the circumstances proved. State v. Silvernail, 831
N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). Appellate courts “assume that the jury resolved any factual
disputes in a manner that is consistent” with the verdict. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83,
88 (Minn. 2014). Second, we determine “whether the circumstances proved are consistent
8 with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving v. State,
891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). We do not defer to the fact-
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. We will
reverse the conviction if a reasonable inference other than guilt exists. Loving, 891 N.W.2d
at 643. But we will uphold the verdict if the circumstantial evidence forms “a complete
chain” that leads “directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Peterson, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn.
2018) (quotation omitted).
Here, the circumstances proved are that:
- On a prior occasion, Koonce arrested Torgerson and had asked Torgerson if he had any weapons. At that time, Torgerson replied that he had a knife in his sock, which was turned over to Koonce prior to Torgerson entering the jail;
- After Torgerson was arrested for the instant offense, Koonce told Cook to search Torgerson’s person for a knife and informed Cook of the knife that Torgerson possessed during his prior arrest;
- Torgerson was near Cook when Koonce was relaying this information to Cook but was talking to another officer and the officers did not know if Torgerson heard them discuss the prior occasion of Torgerson carrying a knife on his person;
- Cook searched Torgerson for weapons by patting his ankles and inserting his fingers into Torgerson’s shoes, but he found none;
- Torgerson was placed in the squad car and transported to the jail;
- The officers did not ask Torgerson if he had a weapon, or other contraband, on him before bringing him to the jail;
9 - During the booking process at the jail, when Torgerson took off his shoes and socks, a small, ceramic kitchen knife fell onto the booking-room floor;
- Torgerson stated at that time, “if you would have asked me about it, I would have told you.”
Torgerson asserts that even if the mens rea required by Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd.
2(b), is knowledge, the state failed to prove that he knowingly caused the knife to be
introduced into the jail. Torgerson argues there is a rational hypothesis inconsistent with
his guilt—that he had the knife on him before police stopped him and he did nothing to
cause it to be introduced into the jail after he knew they were taking him there. We are not
persuaded.
The hypothesis Torgerson presents is not inconsistent with a finding that Torgerson
knowingly possessed the knife at the jail. The hypothesis does not assert that Torgerson
did not know he possessed the knife or did not know he was going to the jail. In light of
the circumstances proved, Torgerson has failed to meet his burden to present a reasonable
inference other than guilt. It is not reasonable to conclude Torgerson unknowingly
possessed the knife in light of the circumstances proved, which include that the knife was
a ceramic kitchen knife and that the knife was in Torgerson’s shoe. It is also not reasonable
to conclude that Torgerson unknowingly introduced the knife into the jail in light of the
circumstances proved that Torgerson had been searched for weapons by Cook—which
included patting Torgerson’s ankles and shoes; and that after the knife became visible at
the jail, he said, “if you would have asked me about it, I would have told you.” Considered
10 as a whole, the circumstances proved only lead to one rational inference—Torgerson knew
he possessed the knife and knew he possessed the knife at the jail.
Torgerson also argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he
voluntarily engaged in a prohibited act. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn.
2012) (“[R]egardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent
crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act.”
(quotation omitted)); State v. Pederson, 840 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn. App. 2013) (“The
defendant must have engaged in a volitional act and not merely acted accidentally.”).
Torgerson does not offer any rational inference from any evidence showing that he
accidentally or involuntarily possessed the knife. The evidence sufficiently supports the
jury’s finding that Torgerson knowingly introduced the knife into the jail. See State v.
Lampkin, 978 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d on other grounds, 994 N.W.2d
280 (Minn. 2023).
B. Dangerous Weapon
Torgerson also argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the knife he possessed was a dangerous weapon. A dangerous weapon is “any device
designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm” or any other
“device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated
or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2020); see
Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b) (stating that “dangerous weapon” has the meaning given
in section 609.02, subdivision 6).
11 Torgerson argues that the state “presented absolutely no evidence that [he] intended
to use the ceramic knife in the jail in a way that was calculated or likely to produce death
or serious bodily harm.” Here, the circumstances proved regarding the nature of the knife
include that the knife was a steak knife or a small kitchen knife and that the knife was
hidden in Torgerson’s shoe. Torgerson asserts that there is no evidence to demonstrate that
he intended to use the knife to cause great bodily harm. However, Torgerson has failed to
present any reasonable inference as to the knife’s intended use, in light of the circumstances
proved, that would be inconsistent with his guilt.
It is not reasonable to conclude, absent any assertion to the contrary, that the knife
hidden in Torgerson’s shoe was not intended to be used in self-defense or a manner that
would be likely to cause death or great bodily harm. See, e.g., State v. Coauette, 601
N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. App. 1999) (observing that ordinary objects can be transformed
into dangerous weapons and citing examples), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1999); State v.
Patton, 414 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that defendant brandished a
kitchen knife in such a manner that jury could have found it was used as a dangerous
weapon). We conclude that the circumstances proved lead to one rational inference—the
knife in Torgerson’s shoe, in the manner which it was intended to be used, was likely to
produce death or great bodily harm.
II. Jury Instructions.
Finally, Torgerson argues that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on the mens rea element of Minn. Stat. § 641.165 (2020). Torgerson did not object to the
proposed jury instruction on Minn. Stat. § 641.165 at trial. See State v. Cross, 577 N.W.2d
12 721, 726 (Minn. 1998) (stating that a party’s failure to object to a jury instruction at trial
generally waives consideration of the issue on appeal). However, even when there is no
objection to jury instructions at trial, this court has “discretion to consider [the] issue on
appeal if it is plain error affecting substantial rights.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736,
740 (Minn. 1998); Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02. The three-prong test for plain error establishes
that before an appellate court reviews an unobjected-to error, there must be: an (1) error;
(2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. If these three prongs are
met, the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740 (citations
omitted).
An error is plain if it is “clear” or “obvious,” meaning that it “contravenes case law,
a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)
(quotations omitted). Only if we conclude that the court committed a plain error do we
consider whether that error affected the defendant’s substantial rights and whether we must
“address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Griller,
583 N.W.2d at 740. “[F]ailure to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense
charged is plain error.” State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Minn. 2007).
Appellate courts “review the [jury] instructions in their entirety to determine
whether they fairly and adequately explained the law of the case.” State v. Kuhnau, 622
N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (Minn. 2001). Here, the district court’s jury instructions mirrored the
language of Minn. Stat. § 641.165, which the parties do not dispute. Because the supreme
court has not yet clearly required district courts to include a specific explanation of the
13 mens rea required under Minn. Stat. § 641.165, we conclude that the court’s instructions,
which mirrored the language of the statute, did not constitute “clear” or “obvious” error,
and thus the court’s error is not plain. Vance, 734 N.W.2d at 658.
Even assuming the district court committed plain error, the third prong of the plain-
error test requires the error to affect defendant’s substantial rights. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at
741. “[A]n error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error
had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Vance, 734 N.W.2d at 656. The district
court’s omission of an element of a crime from the jury instructions has a significant effect
on the verdict when the defendant submits evidence that tends to negate that element and
“there is a reasonable likelihood that a properly instructed jury could have accepted the
defendant’s version of events.” Id. at 661. Given the evidence presented in this case,
including Torgerson’s statement that, “if you would have asked me about [the knife], I
would have told you,” we are satisfied that there is no likelihood the verdict would have
been different had the jury been given a mens rea instruction. For these reasons, we
conclude Torgerson has failed to meet his burden of establishing plain error that affected
his substantial rights.
Affirmed.