State of Minnesota v. Paul Bradley Lanphear

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: November 13, 2023
• Docket: a221675
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A22-1675

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Paul Bradley Lanphear, Appellant.

Filed November 13, 2023 Affirmed Cochran, Judge

Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-21-1036

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Andrew C. Wilson, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and

Hooten, Judge. ∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

In this direct appeal from two convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct

involving a child, appellant challenges the exclusion of certain evidence relating to the

child and the denial of his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct.

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence or by

denying appellant’s motion for a new trial, we affirm.

FACTS

In February 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Paul Bradley

Lanphear with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on allegations that

he sexually abused his then-girlfriend’s child. The complaint alleged, based on a forensic

interview with the child, that Lanphear sexually assaulted her almost daily between

April 2016 and August 2018 and that the last assault occurred when the child was eight

years old.

Before trial, the state filed a motion to preclude Lanphear from introducing evidence

about a 2015 allegation by the child against her biological father. The disputed evidence

showed that Hennepin County Child Protection Intake received a report that, in

November 2015 when the child was five years old, she told her maternal grandmother that

her father had rubbed her “front private” (vaginal area) over her clothes. Following an

investigation, the county found that the child’s father maltreated her by sexual abuse. Her

father administratively appealed the county’s determination to the Minnesota Department

of Human Services, and the department reversed following an evidentiary hearing before

2 a human-services judge. The human-services judge determined, based on the child’s

statements, that the county proved that the child’s father “touched or made contact with

[the child’s] underpants covering her vaginal area” and noted that the child described that

the conduct happened after she hit her thigh on a dresser in her father’s apartment. The

human-services judge found the child to be credible and gave her statements great weight

based on the consistency of the child’s disclosures to several individuals. But the

human-services judge determined that the county failed to prove that the child’s father

touched her with sexual or aggressive intent, as required to prove maltreatment by sexual

abuse. For that reason, the human-services judge recommended that the department

reverse the county’s maltreatment determination, and the department agreed.

The state argued that evidence relating to the 2015 allegation should be excluded

under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412(1)(A) and Minnesota Statutes section 609.347,

subdivision 3 (2022), which govern the admissibility of evidence of an alleged victim’s

sexual history. Lanphear opposed the state’s motion, arguing that the evidence was

admissible under rule 412 as evidence of a past false allegation of criminal sexual conduct.

The district court initially granted the state’s motion to preclude Lanphear from introducing

the evidence. Lanphear then filed a motion for reconsideration, which included the

human-services judge’s report and an affidavit from the child’s father filed in another

matter. Based on the motion, the district court decided to reconsider the matter and

scheduled an evidentiary hearing to receive Lanphear’s offer of proof.

At the hearing, Lanphear submitted his offer of proof, which included testimony

from the child’s mother as well as father’s affidavit and the human-services judge’s report.

3 In a subsequent order, the district court affirmed its earlier order excluding the evidence

under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412. The district court concluded that Lanphear “ha[d]

not shown that [the child’s] allegations were false, that the probative value of her past

conduct outweighs its prejudicial value, or that his constitutional rights will be infringed

by his inability to introduce this evidence.”

The state’s case against Lanphear proceeded to a jury trial in May 2022. At trial,

the child testified that Lanphear rubbed her chest and “private part,” kissed her and had her

touch his “private part” “in an up-and-down motion” with her hand, put his “private part”

in her mouth and “outside” her “private part.” She testified that “white stuff” came out of

his private part “more than one time.” The child said this happened “every day” when they

were living at the “blue” house while her mother was at work and Lanphear was watching

her and her younger siblings. She explained that the sexual abuse by Lanphear would

happen when her siblings were napping. The child testified that the touches continued after

the family moved to a different house and happened less often, but the touches stopped

only when Lanphear moved out to an apartment. In the forensic interview played for the

jury, the child provided consistent descriptions of the sexual abuse.

The child’s mother testified that Lanphear lived with their family from April 2016

through August 2018, that Lanphear would watch the children while she was at work, and

that Lanphear was “more . . . touchy” with the child than her other children. In addition,

the child’s grandmother testified that, once when she showed up unannounced at the child’s

house, Lanphear “came down the stairs with his pants unbuckled.” The next day, the

child’s mother informed grandmother that Lanphear “said [grandmother] was no longer

4 welcome there without an invitation.” Although the house had generally been unlocked,

after that, the house door was always locked.

Lanphear called one witness, a victim-assistance coordinator from the county

attorney’s office. The coordinator testified that, before trial, the child said she found a

hidden camera with naked pictures of her, that Lanphear gave her a secret cellphone and

contacted her on it, and that the child’s mother had walked in on Lanphear and the child

naked under the covers. On cross-examination, the defense elicited testimony from the

child that she did not find a hidden camera. Defense also elicited testimony from the child’s

mother that the cellphone Lanphear gave the child did not work and that the mother did not

walk in on the two naked but did find them sleeping together one day. In closing, the

defense argued that the child was not credible because of these inconsistencies. The jury

found Lanphear guilty of both counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Following the verdict, Lanphear moved for a new trial based on alleged

prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments, which the state opposed. The

district court denied Lanphear’s motion for a new trial. The district court entered

convictions for both counts and imposed an executed sentence of 172 months for count 1.

Lanphear appeals.

DECISION

On appeal, Lanphear argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district

court (1) improperly excluded evidence related to the child’s 2015 allegation against her

father and (2) abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. We address each

argument in turn.

5 I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the child’s 2015 allegation.

Lanphear first challenges the district court’s exclusion of evidence relating to the

child’s 2015 allegation that her father touched her vaginal area. He argues that the

exclusion violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense.

“Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, even when a

constitutional violation is alleged.” State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Minn. 2015).

“A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of

the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281,

291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

In prosecutions for acts of criminal sexual conduct, a victim’s sexual history is

generally excluded by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412 and Minnesota Statutes

section 609.347, subdivision 3, also known as the “rape-shield law.” See Wenthe,

865 N.W.2d at 305-06. Under the rape-shield law, “evidence of the victim’s previous

sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in

the presence of the jury, except by court order.” Minn. R. Evid. 412(1); see also Minn.

Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3. Previous “sexual conduct” includes prior allegations of sexual

abuse. State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn.

Apr. 18, 1991).

The defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense creates an

exception to the rape-shield law. See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982)

(holding that a victim’s past sexual conduct is admissible when constitutionally required);

6 Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 306 (explaining that sexual-history evidence is admissible when

“constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his

accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense” (quotation omitted)). Thus,

evidence of a prior false accusation of sexual abuse by a child complainant “is admissible

to challenge the credibility of the children and as substantive evidence tending to prove the

current offense did not occur,” and excluding such evidence “violates a defendant’s

constitutional right to present a defense.” State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 335

(Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993). But for such evidence to be

admissible, the district court must first make a “threshold determination” that “a reasonable

probability of falsity exists.” Id. at 340. And such evidence may still be excluded if the

probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or

prejudicial nature. Minn. R. Evid. 412(1); Kobow, 466 N.W.2d at 750-51 (explaining that,

even when evidence is constitutionally required, the district court must “weigh the

probative value against the prejudicial effect of testimony regarding her sexual conduct

under [rule 412 1]”).

The district court excluded evidence of the 2015 allegation after determining that

Lanphear’s “offer of proof [did] not show that there is reasonable probability that [the

child’s] allegation” was false. The district court also determined that, because there was

not a reasonable probability of falsity, the evidence’s “limited probative value” was

outweighed by the highly prejudicial effect of introducing a child victim’s sexual history.

1 Kobow cited Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(c), which was renumbered as rule 412. The balancing test did not change.

7 Lanphear challenges both the district court’s threshold determination of falsity and its

evaluation of the evidence’s probative value, arguing that the district court should have

concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the child’s sexual abuse allegation was

false because the county’s maltreatment finding was reversed. We are not persuaded.

As the district court explained in its thorough and well-reasoned order, Lanphear

conflates the truth or falsity of the child’s allegation about her father’s conduct with the

county’s burden to prove that her father maltreated her by sexual abuse. The

human-services judge recommended reversing the maltreatment finding because the

county failed to prove that the child’s father acted with sexual or aggressive intent when

he touched her, as required to prove sexual abuse under the relevant

criminal-sexual-conduct statutes. 2 But the human-services judge did not find that the

child’s allegation about her father’s conduct was not credible. To the contrary, the

human-services judge determined that the county proved “it is more likely than not [her

father] touched or made contact with [the child’s] underpants covering her vaginal area”

based on the child’s credible and consistent disclosures. The human-services judge noted

that the child consistently described the incident to several people and indicated that the

touch occurred after she hit her thigh on a dresser in father’s apartment. Also, in her

disclosures, the child did not describe her father’s intent or describe his actions as sexual.

As a result, the reversal of the maltreatment finding is not evidence that the child’s

2 The applicable statutes criminalize nonconsensual touching of clothing covering the primary genital area and groin when committed with sexual or aggressive intent. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.343, subd. 1(a), .341, subds. 5, 11 (2014).

8 allegation about her father was false. We therefore conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by determining that Lanphear failed to show a reasonable probability

of falsity.

The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it determined that “the

limited probative value of the evidence does not outweigh the substantial prejudicial value

of introducing [the child’s] sexual history.” “Evidence is relevant and has probative value

when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 269

(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). And the rape-shield law “serves to remind the bench

that the victim’s sexual history is normally irrelevant in a sexual assault prosecution.”

State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996).

Thus, while a prior false allegation would have been relevant to the child’s credibility and

to show that the sexual assaults did not occur, see Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d at 335, the

district court properly determined that the child’s prior credible allegation involving her

father did not make it more or less probable that the child fabricated the allegations about

Lanphear. Moreover, Lanphear does not appear to challenge the district court’s

determination that introduction of the evidence would have been highly prejudicial.

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the

evidence’s potential prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The district court

acted well within its discretion by excluding evidence of the 2015 allegation.

9 II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lanphear’s motion for a new trial.

Lanphear next challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.

Appellate courts “review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.”

State v. Green, 747 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. 2008).

Following the guilty verdict, Lanphear moved for a new trial based on alleged

prosecutorial misconduct during the prosecutor’s closing argument. In the motion,

Lanphear identified at least three separate grounds. On appeal, Lanphear challenges only

one of those grounds, which involves a specific portion of the prosecutor’s closing

argument. Lanphear did not object to this portion of the closing argument at trial. The

plain-error standard applies to alleged error that is not objected to at trial whether raised in

a motion for a new trial or on appeal. Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 732

(Minn. 2011); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02. Lanphear therefore must show plain error to

establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial.

Because Lanphear alleges prosecutorial misconduct, we apply the modified

plain-error standard. State v. Parker, 901 N.W.2d 917, 925-26 (Minn. 2017). Under this

standard, a defendant has the burden of proving that the alleged misconduct constitutes an

error that is plain. Id. at 926 (citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)).

An error is plain “if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.”

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. If a defendant establishes this burden, the burden then shifts

to the state to prove that the unobjected-to misconduct did not affect the defendant’s

substantial rights. Id. If the defendant establishes an error that is plain and the state does

10 not meet its burden, “the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error

to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Davis,

735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also Pulczinski v. State,

972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022) (“[A]n appellate court may correct the error only when

it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”).

But if the defendant does not prove an error that is plain, an appellate court need not reach

the next steps in the plain-error analysis. See State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785

(Minn. 2017).

The prosecution “may present ‘all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all

proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence’ in its closing argument.”

State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 587 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Pearson,

775 N.W.2d 155, 163 (Minn. 2009)). “We view the closing argument ‘as a whole, rather

than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue

prominence to determine whether reversible error has occurred.’” Id. (quoting

State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 751 (Minn. 2010)).

During closing, the state argued that the child was credible for several reasons. One

of the reasons argued by the prosecutor was that:

[S]he had knowledge of things no 12-year-old should know. Moving her hand up and down his penis. How did she know that? She told you: He told me to do it. Then putting a penis in her mouth. She told you: He did that. Licking her vagina: That was him. White stuff coming out of a penis. That is not something possibly an 11-year-old can know unless they saw it happen. Putting his penis on her vagina and moving his body up and down. Putting his penis between the lips of her vagina and moving his body up and down. Rub her vagina.

11 Again, this goes back to her describing these things she doesn’t have the vocabulary for. We know what stuff coming out of a penis is, semen, ejaculate. She doesn’t know that. We know that someone putting a penis between the lips of a vagina and moving up and down is sex. She doesn’t know that. We know moving your hands up and down on a penis is referred to as a hand job. She doesn’t know that because she shouldn’t. She shouldn’t know that because she should have had, she shouldn’t have had to do it.

Lanphear contends that, in making this argument, the prosecution improperly

suggested that Lanphear was the sole source of the child’s knowledge of sexual activity

when, according to Lanphear, the prosecution knew that the excluded 2015 allegation could

be the source of the child’s knowledge. We disagree.

The prosecution’s closing argument regarding the child’s source of knowledge,

viewed as a whole, does not constitute plain error. As the district court correctly stated in

its order, the sole sexual act listed in the prosecutor’s closing argument that is consistent

with the 2015 allegation is the phrase, “Rub her vagina.” The other detailed and graphic

descriptions of sexual activity identified during the prosecution’s closing argument are

consistent only with the child’s testimony about Lanphear, not with the prior allegation.

Thus, taken as a whole, the prosecution’s argument is a legitimate inference from the trial

testimony and evidence and does not implicate the excluded evidence. See Munt,

831 N.W.2d at 587. We therefore conclude that Lanphear has failed to demonstrate the

prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by

denying Lanphear’s motion for a new trial.

12 In sum, Lanphear has not identified any basis for reversing his convictions of

first-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Affirmed.