STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A23-1134
Court of Appeals Thissen, J. Took no part, Gaïtas, J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: May 27, 2026 Patrick Jay Sullivan, Office of Appellate Courts
Appellant.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
James Ratz, Aitkin County Attorney, Aitkin, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. The district court’s reinstatement of the appellant’s conviction did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution and United States
Constitution because the reinstatement was not double prosecution or double punishment.
2. When a defendant prevents the State from submitting substantive evidence
to satisfy a prior-convictions element for a charged offense, the invited-error doctrine
1 applies, and a court cannot grant relief unless failure to do so would seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Affirmed.
OPINION
THISSEN, Justice.
Appellant Patrick Jay Sullivan was charged with felony domestic assault in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. Domestic assault under this statute is a
felony-level offense if the defendant also has two or more previous domestic violence-
related convictions within the past ten years. Although Sullivan did not personally waive
his right to a jury trial on the prior-convictions element, his trial counsel stipulated to
Sullivan’s prior convictions. As a result, the jury was not asked to determine whether the
State had proven the prior-convictions element. The jury found Sullivan guilty of
domestic assault. Sullivan petitioned for postconviction relief on the ground that the State
failed to prove the prior-convictions element. The postconviction court vacated Sullivan’s
conviction on that ground. The State moved for reconsideration, claiming trial error, and
the postconviction court, after reconsidering the matter, reinstated Sullivan’s conviction.
The court of appeals affirmed.
Before us Sullivan makes two arguments. First, he asserts that the postconviction
court’s reinstatement of his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
Minnesota Constitution and United States Constitution. We hold that the postconviction
court’s reinstatement of Sullivan’s conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution and United States Constitution.
2 Sullivan also argues that his conviction must be reversed because the State
provided insufficient evidence to prove the prior-convictions element of felony domestic
assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. The State does not dispute that the
stipulation to the prior-convictions element was incorrectly received, but it argues that the
resulting exclusion of the evidence the State otherwise would have offered was an error
Sullivan invited that forecloses appellate relief. We hold that when a defendant prevents
the State from introducing substantive evidence to satisfy a prior-convictions element for
a charged offense, the invited-error doctrine applies. This is not a case where failure to
grant the relief Sullivan seeks would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Instead, to grant Sullivan relief based on the argument
that the State did not introduce evidence—evidence that Sullivan invited the district court
to erroneously exclude for his own benefit—would seriously affect the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings here. Accordingly, we affirm the court of
appeals as to the reinstatement of Sullivan’s conviction, although on other grounds.
FACTS
On January 19, 2023, the State charged Sullivan with felony domestic assault
under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. To convict a defendant of felony domestic assault,
the State must prove that the defendant committed misdemeanor domestic assault “within
ten years of the first of any combination of two or more previous qualified domestic
violence-related offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency.” Minn. Stat.
3 § 609.2242, subd. 4.1 Sullivan had previously been convicted of felony fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct on January 9, 2017, and felony third-degree assault on
August 24, 2015. Both crimes are qualified domestic violence-related offenses. Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 16 (defining “qualified domestic violence-related offense”).
During a pretrial conference the day before jury trial, Sullivan’s trial counsel
stated that “we are going to be stipulating or do stipulate” to the previous qualified
domestic violence-related offenses. At the same hearing, defense counsel, the State, and
the district court discussed the State’s motion seeking to impeach Sullivan with his prior
felony convictions for fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and third-degree assault if
Sullivan opted to testify at trial.
The next morning, in a hearing before the start of trial, the district court granted
the State’s motion to impeach Sullivan with the specified prior felony convictions. The
State then raised the defense’s stated intention to stipulate to the prior-convictions and
requested the stipulation be “put on the record.” Defense counsel confirmed Sullivan’s
willingness to stipulate to the prior-convictions and indicated that the purpose of
stipulating was to avoid the “highly prejudicial” prior convictions from being introduced
or proven at trial. The State requested a written stipulation, explaining that the prosecutor
was “accustomed to having stipulations in written form signed by both parties and then
1 Misdemeanor domestic assault is defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1. There is no dispute that the State proved each element of misdemeanor domestic assault beyond a reasonable doubt. To enhance a misdemeanor domestic assault to a felony domestic assault, the State must also prove the defendant had two or more previous qualified domestic assault-related convictions within the previous ten years (the prior-convictions element). Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. 4 read to the jury as part of the instructions at the close of the State’s case” because
“stipulations are evidence.” Defense counsel disagreed, stating that “I believe we just
stipulated it into the record” and “I have never had a written stipulation. We’ve always
just done it orally.” Defense counsel also stated he did not want Sullivan’s prior
convictions “to be contained as elements” and presented to the jury. The district court
agreed with defense counsel that stipulations were made on the record. Ultimately, no
separate written stipulation was prepared. At no point did Sullivan personally waive his
right to demand that the State prove to the jury that he had two prior qualified domestic
violence-related convictions.
Sullivan testified at trial. On cross-examination, the State questioned him about his
prior convictions. Sullivan acknowledged the convictions. The district court instructed
the jury to consider Sullivan’s prior convictions only for credibility purposes. When
instructing the jury before deliberations, the district court omitted the prior-convictions
element from the jury instructions on the felony domestic assault charge. At the end of
the trial, the jury found Sullivan guilty of domestic assault, and the district court entered a
conviction and sentence.
A different attorney represented Sullivan on appeal and in postconviction
proceedings. Sullivan filed a notice of appeal to the court of appeals, then asked the court
to stay his appeal to allow him to pursue postconviction relief. Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02,
subd. 4(4) (authorizing a defendant to file a motion to stay an appeal for postconviction
proceedings). In his petition for postconviction relief, Sullivan argued the State failed to
establish the prior-convictions element of felony domestic assault because Sullivan did
5 not personally stipulate to the prior-convictions and the jury was not asked to, and so did
not, find that the State had proven the prior-convictions element of the offense. He
requested that the district court vacate his conviction. The State did not file a written
response to the petition. At the postconviction hearing, Sullivan argued that the State had
not introduced sufficient evidence at trial to convict Sullivan, while the State argued that
Sullivan invited any error.
The postconviction court vacated Sullivan’s conviction, concluding that “the prior
convictions element must either be found by a jury or stipulated to by the Defendant” and
neither occurred. The postconviction court reinstated the previous terms and conditions of
Sullivan’s release, ordered that Sullivan be transported from prison to the county jail, and
set a plea hearing date in advance of a new trial.
Sullivan subsequently moved to dismiss further proceedings on the ground that
double jeopardy barred further prosecution. The State, in turn, filed a motion for the
district court to reconsider its vacatur of Sullivan’s conviction, arguing the postconviction
court should have reviewed for error, not sufficiency of the evidence, when considering
whether to vacate Sullivan’s conviction. After a hearing and further briefing, the
postconviction court reinstated Sullivan’s conviction. The postconviction court reasoned
that invalid waiver of the right to a jury trial on each element of an offense is error, but
that the error in Sullivan’s case was not prejudicial, and the jury’s verdict was not
attributable to the error.
The case returned to the court of appeals. Before that court, Sullivan briefed only
whether double jeopardy prevented the postconviction court from reinstating his
6 conviction. The State briefed both the double jeopardy issue and whether the district
court had otherwise erred in reinstating Sullivan’s conviction. At oral argument, the court
of appeals sua sponte raised whether sufficiency of the evidence was at issue on appeal.
In response, the State argued that the prior-convictions stipulation should be reviewed for
plain error under our holding in State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 852–53 (Minn.
2011).
In a nonprecedential decision, the court of appeals affirmed Sullivan’s conviction.
State v. Sullivan, No. A23-1134, 2025 WL 302586, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 27, 2025). The
court of appeals concluded that double jeopardy did not preclude the postconviction court
from reinstating Sullivan’s conviction. Id. at *4. And, assuming without deciding that
sufficiency of the evidence was the appropriate review framework, the court concluded
that Sullivan’s acknowledgment of his previous qualified domestic violence-related
convictions on the record at trial when impeached was “sufficient for a jury to reasonably
conclude that Sullivan was guilty of felony domestic abuse.” Id. at *5–6.
We granted Sullivan’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
This case presents us with two questions. The first is whether the postconviction
court’s reinstatement of Sullivan’s conviction constituted repeat prosecution or
punishment for the same offense, thereby violating double jeopardy principles. The
second question is whether Sullivan’s conviction must be reversed because the State
failed to meet its burden to prove a critical element of the charged offense when Sullivan
prevented the State from introducing that evidence.
7 I.
The first question before us is whether the postconviction court’s reinstatement of
Sullivan’s conviction violated double jeopardy principles. We conclude it did not.
The United States Constitution and Minnesota Constitution each protect a criminal
defendant from being tried twice for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 7.2 We review the application of double jeopardy de novo. State v. Leroy,
604 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. 1999).
A person is twice put in jeopardy when that person is prosecuted or punished more
than once for a single offense. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975). “It
is a fundamental rule in double jeopardy jurisprudence that a verdict of acquittal on the
merits cannot be reviewed on error or otherwise without putting the defendant twice in
jeopardy, thereby violating the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.” State v.
Large, 607 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. 2000) (first citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 671 (1896); and then citing Leroy, 604 N.W.2d at 77).
The general rule that the State cannot seek review following an acquittal, however,
does not apply “when a judge rules in favor of the defendant after a verdict of guilty has
2 We have repeatedly declined to decide whether the Minnesota Constitution provides greater double jeopardy protection than the United States Constitution, and we decline to do so here because it is unnecessary to our decision and because the parties did not make this argument. State v. Large, 607 N.W.2d 774, 778 n.2 (Minn. 2000) (“Because it is not necessary in order to resolve this case, we decline to decide whether the Minnesota Constitution affords greater double jeopardy protection than the United States Constitution.”); State v. Lerma, 25 N.W.3d 40, 46 n.5 (Minn. 2025) (“We have not resolved [whether the double jeopardy standard under the Minnesota Constitution differs from the federal Constitution] and decline to do so here.”). 8 been entered by the trier of fact.” Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352. In that circumstance, “the
Government may appeal from that ruling without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.” Id. at 352–53. In other words, “[w]hen a jury returns a verdict of guilty and a
trial judge … sets aside that verdict and enters a judgment of acquittal, the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a prosecution appeal to reinstate the jury verdict of
guilty.” Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005).3 For similar reasons, “it is
well settled that an appellate court’s order reversing a conviction is subject to further
review even when the appellate court has ordered the indictment dismissed and the
defendant discharged.” Wilson, 420 U.S. at 345.
The reason for the exception to the general rule is that “where there is no threat of
either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
offended.” Id. at 344. When a jury has found a defendant guilty and a district court judge
subsequently enters a judgment of acquittal,4 reversal of the judgment of acquittal does
not create the risk of multiple punishments or successive prosecutions because the
remedy following reversal is not a retrial, but entry of conviction based on the jury’s
3 If the fact-finder has not yet returned a guilty verdict when the district court or appellate court enters an acquittal, double jeopardy bars the government from appealing. See Smith, 543 U.S. at 467. That is not the situation here. 4 Sullivan’s postconviction petition to vacate his conviction under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1, and the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 334, are procedurally distinct. For purposes of double jeopardy, however, the practical implications are the same: the State has the right to appeal because the fact-finder entered a guilty verdict, and the remedy for reversal is reinstatement of the jury verdict rather than a new trial. For clarity, we note that Sullivan’s petition to vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence is also distinct from a post-verdict motion to vacate judgment under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 3. 9 guilty verdict and (if one has been entered) imposing the sentence previously
pronounced. See id. at 344–45.
Sullivan argues that the general rule does not apply in this case because the State
asked the district court to review the vacatur of Sullivan’s conviction through a motion
for reconsideration rather than appealing the vacatur to the court of appeals. We perceive
no analytical distinction for double jeopardy purposes.
First, in either case, there is no risk of a successive prosecution. The district court’s
decision to reverse its post-guilty-verdict vacatur of conviction in response to the State’s
motion for reconsideration does not run the risk of subjecting Sullivan to a new trial. The
district court reinstated Sullivan’s conviction pursuant to the same guilty verdict.
Second, the district court did not impose a second punishment on Sullivan; it
reinstated the sentence it had imposed after the jury found Sullivan guilty. Sullivan argues
that reinstating his conviction constituted repunishment because his conviction was
vacated in postconviction proceedings and he was released from prison (until the district
court issued its order reinstating his conviction). This argument is unpersuasive. Under
the reinstated sentence, Sullivan was required to serve the remainder of the initially
imposed sentence. Therefore, reinstating Sullivan’s conviction did not constitute
repunishment.
Sullivan’s reliance on State v. Jeffries to support his second-punishment argument
is misplaced. 806 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011). In Jeffries, the defendant pled guilty to felony
domestic assault, and the district court unconditionally accepted the plea and adjudicated
the defendant guilty on the record at the same hearing. Id. at 59, 63. On the date set for
10 sentencing, the district court informed the defendant it was no longer willing to accept the
plea agreement for several reasons—primarily because the court believed that a
probationary sentence would be too lenient given the defendant’s criminal history. Id. at
59–60. Later, the defendant and the State reached a second plea agreement, and the
defendant pled guilty to felony domestic assault a second time—with a harsher sentence.
Id. at 60. The district court accepted the second plea. Id.
The central issue in Jeffries was whether the district court unequivocally convicted
the defendant after the first guilty plea. Id. at 61. We held the district court did convict the
defendant at the plea hearing and, accordingly, held that the court could not take back the
conviction and impose a second conviction following a new plea deal. Id. at 64. As
Justice Stras put it in his concurrence:
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause barred the district court’s acceptance of Jeffries’ second guilty plea because the court had already convicted Jeffries once. Here, the district court unambiguously convicted Jeffries of the crime of felony domestic assault, then unambiguously un convicted Jeffries by giving him his “pleas back” and telling him that he was “not guilty” at a subsequent hearing, and then unambiguously convicted him again of felony domestic assault at yet another hearing after accepting a second plea agreement with a more severe punishment. At the risk of oversimplifying the issue in this case, the question is not whether jeopardy attaches when a guilty plea is accepted, but rather whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits two convictions for the exact same crime. I have been unable to locate a single case from any jurisdiction permitting a trial court to convict a defendant, then unconvict the defendant because the court was surprised by the defendant’s criminal history, and subsequently reconvict the defendant of the exact same offense. The absence of authority on this question is no doubt due to the Supreme Court’s repeated recognition that the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects an individual against being twice convicted for the same crime.”
11 Id. at 66 (Stras, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977)). Our remedy was to vacate the second conviction and reinstate
the first conviction based on the initial plea deal. Id. at 65 (majority opinion).
This case is distinguishable. In Jeffries, the defendant did not ask the district court
to “un convict[]” him—the court did so sua sponte after a plea hearing. Id. at 66 (Stras, J.,
concurring); see id. at 60 (majority opinion). In contrast, Sullivan filed a postconviction
petition requesting that the district court vacate his conviction following the jury’s guilty
verdict and the court entering conviction, according to a procedure prescribed by statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. The district court initially granted the motion and
vacated Sullivan’s conviction, then, on reconsideration, reinstated it. Rather than being a
second prosecution, this reinstatement of Sullivan’s conviction is the same remedy we
ordered in Jeffries. Further, Sullivan’s sentence remained unchanged from that imposed
following his only conviction. Sullivan’s case involves neither multiple prosecutions nor
multiple punishments.
In summary, we hold that the postconviction court reinstating Sullivan’s
conviction under the circumstances of this case did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution and United States Constitution.
II.
We now turn to Sullivan’s argument that his conviction must be reversed because
the State did not prove a critical element of felony domestic assault—that Sullivan had
two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 4. The parties agree that the stipulation by Sullivan’s trial counsel that
12 Sullivan had two previous qualified domestic violence-related convictions is invalid
because Sullivan did not personally waive his right to have a jury decide whether he had
the requisite qualified convictions. We conclude, however, that Sullivan is not entitled to
relief because Sullivan invited the district court error that resulted in the State’s failure to
introduce evidence of the two previous qualified convictions. Further, declining to correct
this invited error will not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings; rather, granting relief in this case would seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
A.
Under the invited-error doctrine, a party is estopped from “assert[ing] on appeal an
error that [the party] invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.” State
v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); State v. Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d 79, 94 (Minn.
2024) (“We have recognized that the doctrine of invited error prevents a party from
challenging on appeal a district court decision to which the party consented or
affirmatively requested.”); see also Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 360 n.10 (Minn.
2022) (stating that the invited-error doctrine is a “species of estoppel”).
Sullivan did not want his previous qualified domestic violence-related convictions
presented to the jury. Sullivan’s trial counsel verbally stipulated that Sullivan had two
qualifying convictions. The State asserted that the stipulation should be committed to a
writing signed by both parties. Sullivan’s trial counsel objected, arguing that it was
sufficient to stipulate “on the record.” The district court agreed with Sullivan’s trial
counsel and accepted the verbal stipulation. As a result, the State did not affirmatively
13 introduce substantive evidence of Sullivan’s two prior convictions to satisfy the prior-
convictions element. Sullivan never personally waived his right to have the jury
determine whether he had two previous qualified convictions. The jury never received
any stipulation as to Sullivan’s previous qualified domestic violence-related convictions.5
Put simply, the State did not introduce affirmative substantive evidence—which it
indisputably possessed—of Sullivan’s two previous qualified convictions because of
errors Sullivan invited through his attorney refusing the State’s request for a written
stipulation signed by both parties. Because Sullivan invited the erroneous rulings that
prevented the State from introducing evidence of his two previous qualified domestic
violence-related convictions, Sullivan is estopped from challenging his felony domestic
assault conviction based on the absence of that evidence.6
5 While the State ultimately agreed that the court would not read the stipulation to the jury, the State initially requested a written stipulation to the prior-convictions element, signed by both parties, that would be read to the jury. Only after Sullivan’s trial counsel asserted that the defense had already stipulated to the prior-convictions element did the State agree to forgo a written stipulation. Under our reasoning in State v. Trifiletti, the State, by initially requesting a written stipulation to read to the jury, preserved the position it argues here: Sullivan, and not the State, invited the error of failing to obtain a valid waiver of Sullivan’s right to a jury trial on the prior-convictions element. Cf. Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d at 94–95 (reasoning that the defendant did not invite an error when he objected, lost the objection, and then agreed to proceed in the manner to which he had earlier objected). 6 The court of appeals concluded that the State introduced evidence of two previous qualified domestic violence-related convictions sufficient to support Sullivan’s felony domestic assault conviction. Sullivan, 2025 WL 302586, at *6. The court of appeals relied on the fact that Sullivan acknowledged the convictions when the State introduced them for impeachment purposes. Id. Before us, the State concedes that we may not properly consider evidence of the two convictions—introduced for the purpose of impeachment and to attack Sullivan’s credibility, not for substantive purposes—in a sufficiency of the evidence analysis. We are not bound by the State’s concession because 14 B.
This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. “[W]e have the discretionary
authority to remedy errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity[,] or public
reputation of judicial proceedings, even when the defendant invited the error.” Benton,
858 N.W.2d at 540. We can exercise our authority to grant relief based on an invited error
if “failing to correct the error would have an impact beyond the current case by causing
the public to seriously question whether our court system has integrity and generally
offers accused persons a fair trial.” Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356.7
Because Sullivan has not established that allowing the error he invited to stand
would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,
we may not correct the error. Declining to reverse Sullivan’s conviction will not cause the
public to seriously question whether our court system has integrity and offers accused
persons fair trials. Indeed, this is “one of those very rare cases where the fairness and
integrity of judicial proceedings would be adversely affected” if we granted the relief
Sullivan requests. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1998). The problem
“it is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel’s oversights.” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But because we resolve whether the State proved the prior-convictions element on other grounds, we do not address, and express no opinion on, the question of whether the court of appeals properly considered impeachment evidence in its sufficiency of the evidence analysis. 7 Our authority to grant appellate relief based on a forfeited assertion of error is limited to situations in which the error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 359 and 360 n.10. 15 Sullivan asks us to remedy—the State’s failure to prove the prior-convictions element
required for a felony domestic assault conviction—is a problem Sullivan created. He did
so because it served his interest to keep substantive evidence that he had been convicted
of other crimes from the jury. There is no question that the State had evidence that
Sullivan had two previous qualified domestic violence-related convictions; Sullivan
conceded as much during his own testimony. Accordingly, we cannot exercise our
authority to review and reverse Sullivan’s conviction on the ground the State failed to
prove his prior qualified domestic violence-related convictions—evidence which the
State had but did not introduce based on error Sullivan himself invited.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, though in
part on other grounds.
GAÏTAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.