This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0797
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Matthew Starnes, Appellant.
Filed May 6, 2024 Affirmed Connolly, Judge
Washington County District Court File No. 82-CR-21-2691
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition and fleeing a peace officer by means other than a motor vehicle,
appellant argues that the district court erred by (1) determining that neither appellant nor
his vehicle were improperly seized, (2) determining that law enforcement had probable
cause to search his vehicle, (3) determining that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm, and (4) directing a verdict on one
element of the crime of fleeing a peace officer by means other than a motor vehicle. We
affirm.
FACTS
The facts below are taken from testimony and exhibits presented during the
underlying suppression hearings as well as from other documents in the record.
Just after midnight on August 8, 2021, Oakdale law enforcement responded to a call
of a suspicious vehicle “driving circles around [a private church] parking lot.” Upon
arrival, Officer 1 observed that the vehicle described by the caller was parked in the church
parking lot. Without activating his police siren or emergency lights, Officer 1 pulled in
behind the vehicle. After running the license plate, Officer 1 approached the vehicle to
identify any occupants. Appellant Matthew Starnes was found sleeping in the backseat of
the vehicle. Officer 1 asked appellant whether he needed resources or a place to stay. After
appellant declined those services, Officer 1 asked appellant whether he had identification;
appellant stated that he did and immediately retrieved it.
2 Meanwhile, Officer 2 arrived at the scene and walked toward the vehicle and shined
a light into the vehicle to ensure that no other occupants were inside. Officer 2 observed a
glass pipe on the passenger seat. Based on his experience and training, Officer 2 concluded
that the glass pipe was likely used to smoke controlled substances. Officer 2
communicated to Officer 1 and appellant that he planned to search appellant’s vehicle for
contraband and other drug paraphernalia. The squad-camera footage shows appellant, who
had exited the vehicle, verbally protested the search while shutting and locking his
vehicle’s doors. The officers then directed appellant toward the squad car. The officers
told appellant twice to stand near the squad car before appellant fled on foot. While the
officers apprehended appellant, Officer 3 arrived at the scene. Officer 3 shined his
flashlight in appellant’s vehicle and observed a gun sticking halfway out from under the
driver’s seat. Approximately 15 minutes later, officers had secured appellant. At that time,
officers searched appellant’s vehicle.
During the search of appellant’s vehicle, officers recovered a 9mm handgun under
the driver’s seat and a multicolored glass pipe from the passenger seat. Appellant was
arrested and his vehicle impounded. The complaint alleged that appellant’s previous
convictions made him ineligible to possess a firearm. Respondent State of Minnesota
charged appellant with possession of a firearm or ammunition by an ineligible person and
fleeing a peace officer by means other than a motor vehicle.
In April 2022, appellant moved to suppress the evidence found in the search of his
vehicle, arguing that the warrantless search violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. The district court denied appellant’s motion, concluding that there was
3 probable cause for the officers to search appellant’s vehicle under the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement.
The next month, the district court granted appellant’s motion to discharge his court-
appointed counsel and proceed pro se. The district court also appointed advisory counsel
for appellant. Appellant then moved the district court to suppress the evidence found in
the search of his vehicle, arguing that he was subject to an unreasonable seizure before
Officer 2 observed the glass pipe. The district court denied the motion.
A two-day jury trial was held in December 2022. The jury heard from five
witnesses, including appellant. Officers 1 and 2 testified consistent with their testimony at
the contested omnibus hearing and the squad-camera footage. Officer 3 testified to
observing a gun sticking halfway out from under the driver’s seat. And a forensic expert
testified that, after examining the firearm found in appellant’s vehicle, she found
“insufficient genetic information” to determine who handled the weapon.
Appellant testified that he co-owns his vehicle with his girlfriend. He explained that
they both own a set of keys to the vehicle but his girlfriend never drives the vehicle and
keeps her keys at her mother’s house. Appellant noted that his girlfriend’s adult children
often have access to the vehicle while he is at work. Appellant also testified that he lives
in the vehicle on the weekends to avoid his girlfriend’s children. On the night of appellant’s
arrest, he testified that his girlfriend’s daughter drove him and the vehicle to the church
parking lot before leaving to see her boyfriend.
The jury found appellant guilty as charged. The district court entered judgments of
conviction on both counts. Appellant was sentenced to 60 months in prison for unlawful
4 possession of a firearm and 90 days in jail for fleeing a peace officer by means other than
a motor vehicle with credit for time served.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence because appellant was not unlawfully seized.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
the district court’s factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. But
legal determinations, such as whether there was a seizure and, if so, whether that seizure
was unreasonable, are reviewed de novo.” State v. Eichers, 853 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Minn.
2014) (citation omitted). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence,
we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. Generally,
a warrantless seizure is per se unreasonable. State v. Dotson, 900 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Minn.
App. 2017). But not all interactions between law enforcement and citizens constitute
seizures. In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993). “A seizure occurs
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995)
(quotations omitted). In determining whether a seizure has occurred, we assess whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would have believed that he
5 or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the
encounter.” Id.
Appellant argues in his principal brief and pro se supplemental brief that the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm evidence found during the search
of his vehicle because he was unlawfully seized both when Officer 1 (A) parked behind his
vehicle, blocking him in; and (B) approached his vehicle on foot, suggested he exit the
vehicle, and asked him whether he had identification. The parties do not dispute that
appellant was seized after Officer 2 stated that he would search the vehicle.
A. Appellant was not seized when Officer 1 parked his squad car behind appellant’s vehicle.
Generally, a person is not seized “merely because a police officer approaches him
in a public place or in a parked car and begins to ask questions.” State v. Harris,
590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999); see State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn.
1980) (explaining that generally a person is not seized when “an officer . . . simply walk[s]
up and talk[s] to a person standing in a public place or to a driver sitting in an already
stopped car”). Rather, officers must “convey a message that compliance with their requests
is required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991). A seizure will occur when an
officer orders a person out of their vehicle and summons them to “the officer’s squad car
to provide identification and to respond to questioning.” State v. Day, 461 N.W.2d 404,
407 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1990).
The district court determined that appellant was not seized when Officer 1 pulled in
behind him because appellant’s “vehicle was in no way impeded from movement toward
6 the passenger side of the vehicle” and he had “sufficient distance between his vehicle and
[Officer 1’s squad car] to back up slightly and then drive away while still on [the]
pavement” or through “the grassy area in front of his vehicle.” Appellant argues that under
these circumstances a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter by
driving off the pavement or through the grass.
Appellant relies on State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. App. 2005), to support
his argument that, because Officer 1 parked his squad car behind appellant’s vehicle,
blocking him in, he was seized. But Lopez is distinguishable. In Lopez, this court
concluded that Lopez was seized when an officer unnecessarily activated his squad-car
lights when pulling into a parking lot to question Lopez, partially blocked Lopez’s forward
movement, pounded on the driver-side window, and opened the driver’s door. 698 N.W.2d
at 22. In that case, the officer’s actions created a show of authority sufficient to cause a
reasonable person to believe they were not free to leave and constituted a seizure. Id.
Here, Officer 1 woke appellant by shining his flashlight into the vehicle; he did not
pound on the window, open the vehicle’s door, block appellant’s forward movement, or
activate his squad-car lights. While the squad-camera footage suggests that driving away
might have been difficult for appellant, we are not persuaded that the totality of the
circumstances amounts to a seizure.1 Instead, we conclude that this case is more akin to
Vohnoutka.
1 Appellant also relies on State v. Miller, No. A20-0558, 2021 WL 1522665, *7 (Minn. App. Apr. 19, 2021). But Miller is neither binding nor persuasive. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating that nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority). In Miller, this court recognized “the dynamic that exist[ed]” when police officers interacted
7 In Vohnoutka, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a defendant was not
temporarily seized when officers drove behind the defendant’s car—which had entered a
closed service station—and “asked [the] defendant if there was anything wrong.” 292
N.W.2d at 757. In that case, a second “officer routinely walked up to [the] defendant’s car
and shined his flashlight through the window into the passenger compartment to see if there
was anyone in the car.” Id. While looking in the window, the officer discovered marijuana.
Id. The supreme court held that the officer’s discovery of marijuana gave him probable
cause to search the car for more marijuana. Id.
The circumstances here are not fundamentally different from those in Vohnoutka.
Officer 1 parked behind appellant’s stopped vehicle after receiving a call that the car was
“driving circles” in a church parking lot without permission. Officer 1 did not activate his
sirens or emergency lights when contacting appellant. After shining his flashlight to
identify any other occupants in appellant’s vehicle, Officer 2 observed the glass pipe in
plain view. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, appellant was not seized
when Officer 1 parked behind appellant’s vehicle.
with Miller, a “young Black man,” when it determined that “a reasonable person in Miller’s position would not have felt free to ignore the police instructions and end the encounter.” 2021 WL 1522665, at *7. The court reasoned that, although officers were generally polite to Miller while offering him services, officers had positioned their squad car in front of Miller’s vehicle and directed Miller into the back of their squad car. Id. Here, although appellant is also a young African American man, officers did not park in front of appellant’s vehicle nor did they direct appellant into the back of their squad car before discovering the glass pipe.
8 B. Appellant was not seized when Officer 1 made initial contact with him.
Appellant also argues that he was seized when Officer 1 suggested he exit his
vehicle and inquired into whether he had identification. We disagree. This court has held
that an officer’s approach to a car “to check on the welfare of its occupants was not a
seizure.” State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 693 (Minn. App. 2012). In Klamar, this court
concluded that Klamar was not seized until the officer ordered Klamar to exit her vehicle
and approach the officer’s squad car because, at that point, Klamar had admitted consuming
alcohol and “reasonably would have concluded that she was not free to disobey the order.”
Id. Similarly, in Day, this court held that an officer seized Day when they ordered him out
of his vehicle, summoned him to the officer’s squad car, asked for identification, and
questioned him. 461 N.W.2d at 407.
The facts here are distinguishable from those in Klamar and Day. Appellant was
sleeping when Officer 1 approached his vehicle to conduct a welfare check. Appellant then
woke up, opened his car door himself, and asked Officer 1 if he should exit his vehicle.
Officer 1 responded, “Yeah . . . I can try and find some resources [if] there is somewhere
you’re trying to stay or something like that.” Officer 1 then asked appellant if he had
identification, which appellant procured without contest. At that point, appellant had not
made any incriminating statements. Rather, Officer 1 offered appellant resources after
learning that appellant did not have a place to stay “at the moment,” expressing to appellant
that he wanted to “make sure [appellant was] alright.” Officer 1 also told appellant that he
was not in trouble and explained that they were investigating a suspicious-person report.
Officer 1 did not order appellant to approach the squad car until after the glass pipe was
9 observed in plain view. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer 1’s initial contact
with appellant was not a seizure.
Moreover, Officer 1 was justified in conducting a welfare check on appellant. When
an officer responds to a call that a person is unconscious or asleep in a vehicle, the officer
is justified in investigating that person’s welfare. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23. To carry out
the investigation, “the officer must be permitted to make contact with the individual and
ensure that the individual does not require additional medical assistance.” Id.; see Kozak
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 359 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. App. 1984) (emphasizing that
officers have a duty “to offer such assistance as might be needed and to inquire into the
physical condition of persons in vehicles”). In Lopez, this court held that reports from
concerned store employees that someone was asleep in a vehicle in the store parking lot
justified the officer’s welfare check on the vehicle’s occupant. 698 N.W.2d at 23-24.
Here, Officer 1 responded to a call from a church employee who reported that a
suspicious vehicle was driving in circles in the church parking lot just after midnight.
Officer 1 drove to the scene to investigate and found a vehicle that matched the caller’s
description parked in the church’s parking lot without permission. The record reflects,
and appellant agrees, that officers also received information that a person in the same
vehicle was sleeping inside the vehicle. When Officer 1 looked inside the vehicle, he
observed appellant sleeping. Once appellant opened the vehicle’s door, Officer 1 asked
appellant whether he needed any resources or a place to stay, and whether he was “alright.”
Under the circumstances here, we conclude that Officer 1’s actions constitute a welfare
check and not a seizure.
10 In sum, the district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the
evidence based on unlawful seizure.
II. Law enforcement had probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle.
“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions applies.” State v. Licari, 659
N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). It is the state’s burden to prove that
an exception applies. Id. One exception to the warrant requirement is the “automobile
exception,” under which a police officer may search a vehicle without a warrant, including
closed containers in that vehicle, if there is “probable cause to believe the search will result
in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn.
2016) (quotations omitted).
“Probable cause is an objective inquiry that depends on the totality of the
circumstances in each case.” Id. The totality of the circumstances is a “common-sense,
nontechnical concept that involves the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (quotations
omitted). When determining whether probable cause exists, “appellate court[s] must give
due weight to reasonable inferences drawn by police officers and to a district court’s
finding that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.” Id. (quotations
omitted); Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at 391 (explaining that law enforcement “may draw
inferences and deductions that might elude an untrained person”).
Appellant asserts in his pro se supplemental brief that the district court erred in
determining that officers had probable cause to search his vehicle based on the presence of
11 the glass pipe and the officers’ inferences that the glass pipe was used for illegal activity.
We disagree.
Based on the totality of the circumstances present at the time officers searched
appellant’s vehicle, we conclude that there was a fair probability that a search of appellant’s
vehicle would produce contraband or evidence of a crime. First, officers responded to a
report of a suspicious person in a private church parking lot after midnight as well as
information that the person was sleeping in their vehicle. And Officer 1 testified that the
officers who later searched appellant’s vehicle had “see[n] the original stop.” See State v.
Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1997) (“When more than one officer is involved in an
investigation, Minnesota uses the ‘collective knowledge’ approach to determine whether
probable cause existed.”). Second, Officer 2 testified that he observed a glass pipe in plain
view2 on the front seat of appellant’s vehicle. Third, the officers had experience as patrol
officers and testified that, based on their experience and training, the glass pipe could be
used to ingest controlled substances. See State v. Lembke, 509 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Minn.
App. 1993) (holding that an officer’s seizure of a marijuana bag was valid under the plain-
view exception to the warrant requirement because, although “[a] bag has many legitimate
uses,” it is not improper for an officer to rely on their “trained intuition and observations
drawn from [their] experience” to determine it likely contains contraband). Fourth, when
2 Appellant does not dispute that Officer 2 properly observed the glass pipe under the plain- view exception to the warrant requirement. See Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d at 757 (concluding that an officer’s use of a flashlight to look inside a parked vehicle was not unconstitutional because the car’s occupant was not seized and the officer had a right to look into the passenger compartment to check for other occupants).
12 asked by Officer 2 whether appellant had “anything” (marijuana) in his vehicle, appellant
said, “Yes,” but maintained that he had done nothing illegal and did not want the officers
to search his vehicle. See State v. Willis, 320 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Minn. 1982) (recognizing
that when a defendant acts suspiciously, as if trying to conceal something, the defendant’s
failure to provide an explanation may increase an officer’s grounds for suspicion). Fifth,
appellant protested the search by locking his car doors and fleeing on foot. See State v.
Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (considering defendant’s evasive conduct).
Sixth, before officers apprehended appellant and searched the vehicle, Officer 3 observed
a firearm sticking out from under the front seat of the vehicle in plain view.
Appellant does not argue that he was improperly seized at the point that Officer 2
observed the glass pipe. And appellant points to no authority to support his contention that
law enforcement are prohibited from considering information that occurred before
commencing a search simply because an officer stated their intention to conduct a search
when the preceding seizure was not unlawful. Accordingly, we discern no error in the
district court’s determination that the officers’ search was supported by probable cause.
Appellant also points to State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 365 (Minn. 2011), to
support his argument that evidence of the glass pipe, without evidence showing the glass
pipe was used for illegal purposes, was insufficient to establish probable cause. Koppi is
inapposite, as that case involved the jury instruction related to the element of probable
cause to suspect a person of driving while impaired not possession of drug contraband. Id.
at 362. Further, even “[o]bservation of apparently innocent acts can be significant to a
trained officer and . . . the officer is entitled to assess probable cause in light of his
13 experience.” State v. Anderson, 439 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. App. 1989) (quotations
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 1989); State v. Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d 576, 581
(Minn. App. 2001) (citing Anderson).
Appellant further argues that Officer 2 was required to show that appellant
“intentionally or knowingly” used the glass pipe for illegal activity to establish probable
cause. See Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 18(b) (2020) (defining “drug paraphernalia” as
equipment or products that a person “knowingly or intentionally” uses to make or ingest
controlled substances). We are not persuaded. Appellant’s argument would require
officers to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed “drug paraphernalia,”
as defined by statute, before conducting a search. Probable cause to search does not require
such a high standard of certainty. See State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 790 (Minn. 1999)
(“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than
that required to support a conviction.”).
In sum, law enforcement had probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle and the
district court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress on that basis.
III. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the firearm.
Appellant asserts in his principal brief that there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction of possessing a firearm while ineligible. At trial, respondent presented
circumstantial evidence that appellant possessed the firearm discovered in his vehicle by
showing that appellant knew or should have known that the firearm was in his vehicle.
14 Appellant asserts that the evidence presented to the jury supports a rational hypothesis that
someone else owned and placed the firearm in his vehicle.
When considering a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we carefully review the
record to determine “whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State
v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). But “[a] conviction based
on circumstantial evidence . . . warrants heightened scrutiny,” requiring us “to consider
whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved
support a rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473
(Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
To convict appellant of possessing a firearm while ineligible, the state had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that “in relevant part[,] [appellant] knowingly possessed the
firearm.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). “Possession may be proved
through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” Id. Actual possession is proved
by showing an individual physically possessed an item. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609,
610 (Minn. 1975). Constructive possession is proved by showing that either the object was
found “in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not
normally have access” or that it was found “in a place to which others had access” and
“there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that [the] defendant was at
the time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. at 611. The latter
requires a strong inference “that the defendant at one time physically possessed the [object]
and did not abandon his possessory interest in the [object] but rather continued to exercise
15 dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.” Id. at 610. We look to the totality
of the circumstances when assessing whether constructive possession has been proved.
State v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. App. 1986). And we will uphold a conviction
if the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the charged offense.
Davis v. State, 595 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Minn. 1999).
Because the firearm here was not found on appellant’s person, he was not in actual
possession of the firearm and the constructive possession doctrine applies. Assuming that
appellant did not have exclusive control over the vehicle where the firearm was found
because he co-owned the vehicle with his girlfriend, and others regularly had access to the
vehicle, respondent was required to prove that there was a strong probability that, at the
time of the arrest, appellant was consciously exercising dominion and control over the
firearm found in his vehicle.
Respondent relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that appellant possessed the
firearm and ammunition. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder
can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599
(quotation omitted). We apply a two-step analysis to assess the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). First, we
identify the circumstances proved. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013).
Second, we review the identified circumstances as a whole, to determine whether
they are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of
guilt, not simply whether the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable. Id. at 599. We
give no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. The
16 circumstances proved “must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole,
leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any
reasonable inference other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted).
These circumstances were proved by respondent at trial: (1) after midnight on
August 8, 2021, Officer 1 found appellant alone, sleeping in the backseat of his vehicle
while parked in a private parking lot without permission; (2) when law enforcement told
appellant they would search his vehicle, appellant objected, locked his vehicle, and fled on
foot; (3) law enforcement found a firearm and ammunition under the driver’s seat in
appellant’s vehicle; (4) appellant co-owned the vehicle with his girlfriend and both had
their own keys to the car; (5) appellant’s girlfriend “never drove” the vehicle;
(6) appellant’s girlfriend kept her keys at her mother’s house where others had access to
the keys; (7) appellant lived with his girlfriend except on weekends when he lived in his
car; (8) appellant was living in his vehicle on the night of his arrest; (9) DNA evidence
from the firearm was inconclusive; and (10) appellant has felony convictions that make
him ineligible to possess a firearm.
The circumstances here support the reasonable inference that appellant
constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition found in his vehicle by exercising
dominion and control over the firearm. First, officers observed the handgun sticking out
from under the front seat of appellant’s vehicle. Second, the forensic expert testified that
inconclusive genetic testing from a firearm “is a fairly common result.” Third, there was
no one else in appellant’s vehicle at the time officers contacted appellant, and appellant
called no witnesses to testify to owning the gun. Nor did appellant’s girlfriend’s daughter
17 testify to driving appellant to the church parking lot. Fourth, the record reflects that
appellant resisted officers’ efforts to search his vehicle by shutting the vehicle’s door,
locking the vehicle, and fleeing with the keys, suggesting that he knew that evidence of a
crime was present in the vehicle. And while appellant’s testimony established that others
had access to the vehicle, appellant admitted that he had been living in his vehicle on the
weekend of his arrest to avoid his girlfriend’s children.
Because appellant cannot point to any evidence that supports his alternative
hypothesis “that unbeknownst to [him] there was a firearm or ammunition in the vehicle,”
he has not shown that a rational theory other than guilt exists. See State v. Stein, 776
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that “[t]o successfully challenge a conviction
based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that
is consistent with a rational theory other than . . . guilt” as appellate courts will not reverse
a jury verdict based on mere “possibilities of innocence”) (quotation omitted)).
Accordingly, the circumstances proved, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from those circumstances, are consistent with appellant’s guilt of possession of a firearm
and ammunition by an ineligible person.
IV. The district court did not err by directing a verdict as to the second element of fleeing a peace officer.
This court reviews de novo whether a jury instruction correctly states the law. State
v. Lory, 559 N.W.2d 425, 427-28 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997).
In criminal cases, district courts may not direct a verdict for the prosecution nor may it
“instruct the jury that any of the elements of the offense have been proven beyond a
18 reasonable doubt, absent a judicial admission by the defendant of any of the elements.”
State v. Perkins, 353 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. 1984). Appellate courts will conclude that
a district court directed a verdict if the district court’s ruling “represents a resolution,
correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). But a district court does not commit
reversible error when instructing a jury on an issue of law, rather than a question of fact or
application of law to facts. State v. Bowen, 910 N.W.2d 39, 49-50 (Minn. App. 2018)
(holding district court did not err by instructing the jury to determine whether Bowen “took
a bottle of liquor” to convict him of simple robbery for taking “personal property” because
whether the bottle was personal property was a question of law), aff’d, 921 N.W.2d 763
(Minn. 2019) (analyzing only sufficiency of the evidence).
In Minnesota, to be convicted of fleeing a peace officer by means other than a motor
vehicle, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ran, hid, or fled
from a peace officer, who was “acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty,” to avoid
arrest or investigation. Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2020). Appellant argues that the
district court erred by instructing the jury that, as to the second element, “The court has
ruled, and therefore you must accept, that the peace officers were acting in the lawful
discharge of their duties.”
The district court’s instruction deprived appellant of the right to a jury determination
as to the second element of the offense of fleeing a peace officer. But the district court
gave this instruction because it ruled before trial that the search of appellant’s vehicle was
not unconstitutional. No questions of fact were left for the jury to resolve as to the second
19 element of fleeing a peace officer. Instead, the district court instructed the jury on a purely
legal question. See Bowen, 910 N.W.2d at 49.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by instructing the jury as to the second
element of the crime of fleeing a peace officer by means other than a motor vehicle.
Affirmed.