This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0111
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Mark John Jenni, Appellant.
Filed January 5, 2026 Affirmed Halbrooks, Judge *
Hubbard County District Court File No. 29-CR-23-1267
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John A. Olson, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of insurance fraud, arguing that the prosecutor
committed misconduct that constituted reversible plain error by (1) soliciting evidence
regarding the prevalence and cost of insurance fraud and (2) arguing in closing and rebuttal
that the costs of insurance fraud are passed on to the county’s insurance customers. We
affirm.
FACTS
In July 2023, appellant Mark John Jenni applied for a homeowner’s insurance policy
with Liberty Mutual Insurance for a residence located in Park Rapids, Hubbard County.
Jenni’s application represented that (1) the property was his primary residence; (2) he
purchased the residence in 2023; (3) it was not under construction or undergoing significant
renovations; (4) it had not been subject to an insurance claim or loss within the previous
five years; and (5) no other insurance coverage on the property had been canceled or denied
in the past year.
Approximately one month after obtaining the policy, Jenni filed a claim with Liberty
Mutual, reporting a burglary loss valued at more than $80,000 in stolen tools and property
damage. Jenni did not report the burglary to the Hubbard County Sheriff’s Office, although
he called the sheriff’s office to report trespassers. A responding sheriff did not observe
any signs of burglary.
Liberty Mutual denied coverage, citing exclusions for theft from dwellings under
construction and noting Jenni’s acknowledgment to an adjuster that he was living
2 elsewhere while the home was being renovated. Shortly after denying Jenni’s claim,
Liberty Mutual notified the Minnesota Commerce Fraud Bureau about its suspicions
regarding Jenni’s insurance application. At the time, a special agent with the bureau was
already investigating Jenni regarding a 2022 claim he made to a different insurance
company for water and fire damage to the property. That claim had been denied, and the
policy was canceled.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Jenni with one count of insurance fraud
under Minn. Stat. § 609.611, subd. 1(a)(1) (2022), and he was convicted following a jury
trial. The district court sentenced Jenni to 12 months in prison, stayed for five years of
probation, and ordered him to serve 75 days in the county jail.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Jenni contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct that requires reversal by
(1) eliciting irrelevant testimony about the prevalence and cost of insurance fraud and
(2) stating during closing and rebuttal arguments that those costs are passed on to insurance
customers. Jenni did not object during trial to this testimony or argument.
We review unobjected-to claims of prosecutorial misconduct under a modified
plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this
standard, the burden is on the appellant to prove that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted
(1) error and (2) that the error was plain. Id. If the appellant makes that showing, the
burden then shifts to the state to show that the plain error did not affect the appellant’s
substantial rights. Id. A prosecutor’s conduct constitutes error when it “was, in fact,
3 erroneous.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 2023). That error is plain if it
“contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. A
prosecutor’s “statement must be read in context,” and we look at “the closing argument as
a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.” Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 19-20
(Minn. 2004).
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked a fraud investigator for Liberty
Mutual a series of questions about his role in investigating insurance fraud. In one instance,
the prosecutor asked the investigator about the general costs of insurance fraud. The
investigator replied, “[A]pproximately ten percent [of] . . . claim payments are . . . not
meritorious . . . . [A]s far as dollar figures, . . . it’s in the billions.” The prosecutor then
asked the investigator, “[D]o you know how the insurance companies deal with that loss?”
The investigator replied, “Well, in the simplest terms, it . . . get[s] passed on [to] the
consumer.” Jenni contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting this
testimony because it was irrelevant, and thus inadmissible, and did not bear directly on an
element of the crime of insurance fraud. As previously noted, appellant did not object to
this testimony.
I. The prosecutor did not err in eliciting testimony regarding insurance fraud or by stating during his closing argument and rebuttal that the costs of insurance fraud are passed to customers.
A. The investigator’s testimony.
A prosecutor errs by eliciting inadmissible testimony. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 300.
But “brief” and “unsolicited” inadmissible statements do not constitute prosecutorial
misconduct. State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 807 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation
4 omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). Relevant evidence is admissible, unless
another rule or law prohibits it. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Minn. R. Evid. 401. Rule 401 “adopts a minimal relevancy approach.” State v. Provost,
490 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Minn. 1992). “A fact is relevant if, when taken alone or in connection
of other facts, [it] warrants a jury in drawing a logical inference assisting, even though
remotely, the determination of the issue in question.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474,
478 (Minn. 2005).
We disagree with Jenni that the admission of the investigator’s testimony that
insurance fraud costs the insurance industry billions of dollars was an error. The
prosecutor’s question does not appear to be an attempt to elicit inadmissible or prejudicial
evidence, but rather a logical question following the investigator’s testimony about how an
applicant’s claim history can affect the assessment of the applicant’s risk. Further, the
testimony appears only once in the investigator’s testimony. In the context of the
prosecutor’s questioning, the insurance investigator’s brief response about the cost of
insurance fraud to the industry was relevant to establish the investigator’s background
knowledge and to provide context for his subsequent testimony.
The testimony may also be understood as an explanation of the insurance industry’s
interest in asking applicants specific questions designed to minimize its risk. With billions
of dollars at stake, the industry has an interest in investigating fraud. Additionally, the
investigator answered the questions with a variety of information, noting that he has
5 worked in the industry for decades; that a recent industry survey indicated that ten percent
of insurance claims are non-meritorious, but the industry investigates only three percent of
those non-meritorious claims; and finally, that the cost of fraud on the industry is “in the
billions.”
Even though we do not find these statements to be error, we address the second
prong of the modified-plain-error standard. For an error to be plain, it must be “clear or
obvious.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotation omitted). “Usually this is shown if the
error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. “An error is plain if it
contravenes a principle that is conclusively resolved at the time of appeal.” Portillo, 998
N.W.2d at 250 (quotation omitted). “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, the State Constitution, statute, by
these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.” Minn. R. Evid. 402. Stated another way, if evidence is even
minimally relevant, it may be admissible. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 299 (Minn.
2019). But relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Jenni does not dispute this principle and does not cite an instance in which this court
or the supreme court has called into doubt the basic definition of relevancy. We are also
unable to locate a case from this court or the supreme court supporting Jenni’s argument.
And evidence need not go only to an ultimate fact to be relevant. See Schulz, 691 N.W.2d
at 478 (“Evidence is relevant and has probative value when it, in some degree, advances
the inquiry.”). For example, evidence may be used to challenge witness credibility,
6 State v. McArthur, 730 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Minn. 2007), or establish a witness’s bias or
prejudice, Minn. R. Evid. 616. Ultimately, we conclude that it was not plain error for the
prosecutor to elicit the investigator’s testimony about the cost of insurance fraud to the
industry and that the costs are passed to customers.
B. The prosecutor’s closing argument.
Jenni next argues that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument—that
the costs of insurance fraud are passed on to Hubbard County customers—constituted
misconduct. The prosecutor made the following two statements during his closing
argument:
Insurance fraud affects all of its . . . customers, . . . as the cost of insurance fraud is pas[s]ed on to the consumer. That’s why making a material misstatement on an insurance application and receiving a lower premium rate . . . is a crime.
....
If Liberty Mutual would have paid out, and frankly, the fact that Liberty Mutual had a policy that was much lower than it should have been, if they did a policy at all, . . . that loss is to Hubbard County consumers.
And the prosecutor made the following statement during his rebuttal argument:
“The defendant purposely did what he did in this case to try to fraudulently receive over
80,000 dollars from an insurance company that would be passed on to consumers.”
As previously discussed, to satisfy the first prong of the modified-plain-error test,
Jenni must show that the prosecutor’s statement was, in fact, erroneous. “Prosecutors have
‘considerable latitude’ during closing arguments and are ‘not required to make a colorless
argument.’” Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 808 (quoting State v. Williams, 586 N.W.2d 123, 127
7 (Minn. 1998)). But a prosecutor’s argument must adhere to the evidence presented during
trial and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. DeWald,
463 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. 1990). The prosecutor must avoid statements that are
“calculated to inflame the passions of the jury or prejudice the jury against the [appellant].”
Id. at 744-45. When misconduct is alleged, the appellant cannot rely on a few isolated
statements; the misconduct must be considered in the context of the parties’ arguments and
the entire trial. State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 679 (Minn. 2003).
Here, the prosecutor’s statement adhered to the evidence presented at trial. And that
statement was not “calculated to inflame the passions of the jury or prejudice the jury
against the [appellant].” DeWald, 463 N.W.2d at 744-45. In our review, we consider the
context of the statements and the overall theme of the prosecutor’s closing argument and
rebuttal. In the first statement, the prosecutor did not argue that the jury should convict
Jenni because the cost of insurance fraud is passed on to customers. Instead, his argument
was that lying on an insurance application is criminalized as fraud because it drives up
insurance costs for everyone. That is a reasonable inference from the evidence, as the
insurance investigator stated as much during direct examination.
In his second statement, the prosecutor referred to the location of the insurance
fraud—Hubbard County. The district court instructed the jury to determine whether the
insurance fraud had occurred in Hubbard County. And Jenni’s jail text messages that were
in evidence suggested that he was not in Hubbard County when he completed the insurance
application. But, as the prosecutor argued with respect to the jurisdictional issue, whether
Jenni was physically in Hubbard County did not change the fact that he made
8 misstatements on his insurance application concerning a Hubbard County property. In
order to distinguish and contextualize that the property’s location mattered, the prosecutor
stated:
[T]he fact that the residence is in Hubbard County means that it happened in Hubbard County. The loss is in Hubbard County. If Liberty Mutual would have paid out, . . . that loss is to Hubbard County consumers . . . . [I]t is a Hubbard County case because the property is in Hubbard County.
Reviewing the closing and rebuttal arguments in their entirety, we conclude that, while
close, the prosecutor did not urge the jurors to convict Jenni because they were members
of Hubbard County and would bear the cost of his fraudulent conduct. Further, the
statement does not urge the jury to convict Jenni to protect society, State v. Duncan, 608
N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000), nor does it urge
the jury to hold Jenni accountable for his alleged conduct, State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d
815, 819 (Minn. 1993). The theme of the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal argument is
also relevant to this analysis. Upon our review of the trial transcripts, the prosecutor
seemed focused on reiterating the evidence presented at trial that supports a finding that
Jenni intentionally made multiple material misstatements on his insurance application.
II. The prosecutor’s alleged misconduct did not affect Jenni’s substantial rights.
Having concluded that Jenni has not established plain error with respect to the
alleged misconduct, we need not address the third prong of the plain-error test regarding
whether the error affected his substantial rights. We nevertheless address this prong for
the sake of completeness. To show that the alleged misconduct did not affect the
appellant’s substantial rights, “the state must prove ‘that there is no reasonable likelihood
9 that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the
verdict.’” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 640 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Ramey,
721 N.W.2d at 302), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). To assess the impact of the
misconduct on the jury’s verdict, we “consider the strength of the evidence against the
[appellant], the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the [appellant] had
an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 735
N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007).
Jenni contends that he lacked an opportunity to rebut the testimony, that the
prosecutor’s conduct was pervasive, and that the evidence against him was weak. We are
not persuaded. Jenni had at least three opportunities to rebut the alleged improper
testimony and argument. First, the investigator’s testimony occurred about halfway
through direct examination; Jenni’s attorney did not object. Second, Jenni’s attorney did
not address the testimony on cross-examination or on recross-examination. Third, Jenni’s
attorney did not object to the statements during the prosecutor’s closing or in his own
closing argument. The fact that Jenni’s attorney had several opportunities to “rebut the
improper suggestions,” but failed to utilize them negates Jenni’s argument. Id.
Further, the prosecutor’s statements were not pervasive. The prosecutor’s statement
that insurance fraud costs companies billions of dollars and that the costs are passed on to
the customers occupied only a few lines during the insurance investigator’s testimony,
which covered 50 pages in the trial transcript. The statement that insurance fraud costs are
passed on to consumers was not mentioned again until the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal
argument. In those arguments, which totaled approximately ten pages, the prosecutor’s
10 statement occupied approximately four sentences. See State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 424
(Minn. 2021) (stating that four sentences in 28 pages of closing argument was “brief and
not repeated”); Davis, 735 N.W.2d at 682 (noting that the prosecutor’s improper
suggestions were not pervasive because they covered “less than one of the 64 pages of the
transcript containing [the witness’s] testimony”).
Finally, the evidence against Jenni was strong. The Liberty Mutual application,
which Jenni electronically signed, represented that the property was: his primary
residence; purchased in 2023; not under construction or significant renovation, and in good
repair; and that he had not had a claim denied or a policy canceled and had not filed other
claims within the previous five years.
The state introduced evidence that several of these representations were false when
made and that Jenni knew or had reason to know they were false. Evidence presented to
the jury during trial showed that in 2022, Jenni had filed an insurance claim with another
insurance provider for more than $10,000 in alleged fire and water damage on the same
property and that the claim was denied and Jenni’s insurance policy was canceled. That
evidence flatly contradicts Jenni’s “no prior claim/no cancellation” response on the Liberty
Mutual application. As to ownership and occupancy, both the special agent and an
investigator with the Hubbard County Sheriff’s Office (the county investigator) testified
that Jenni’s business partner, not Jenni, owned the residence in July 2023 and that Jenni
did not live there. 1 A neighbor also testified that no one lived in the house during the
1 Jenni disputes a witness’s credibility and argues that, based on an order in a civil case, he owned the residence in July 2023 when he completed the insurance application. But we
11 relevant period and that Jenni appeared only during the day on some weekends. Jenni’s
own jail text messages acknowledged that the house was not yet in his name, that he held
only a constructive-trust interest, and that he was trying to obtain legal title in his name,
reinforcing the jury’s ability to conclude that he understood he was not the owner when he
represented on the application that he had purchased the residence in 2023 and that it was
his primary home.
The record also contains evidence that the property’s condition and use did not
match Jenni’s representations and that he was aware of that inaccuracy. Jenni’s business
partner’s mother described the condition of the house as “unlivable” in mid-2023: the
bathrooms were “tor[n] to pieces,” there was evidence of fire damage around the furnace
and extensive water and mold damage, no running water, and no working kitchen. The
county investigator testified that, based on his investigation and interviews with neighbors,
the property had been in serious disrepair since at least late 2022. And yet, on the
application, Jenni denied any major repairs, denied that the dwelling was under
construction or renovation, and he presented that the property was an ordinary, occupied
principal residence. From this evidence of long-standing damage and Jenni’s 2022 claim
for similar damage, the jury could reasonably infer that he knew the actual condition of the
do not question witness credibility. State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d 900, 909 (Minn. 2009). And the civil order was not introduced at trial and is not part of the record on appeal, so we may not consider it. State v. Marth, 25 N.W.3d 911, 916 n.1 (Minn. App. 2025) (“The general rule is that this court will not consider evidence outside the record.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2025).
12 house and nonetheless chose to describe it otherwise for purposes of obtaining insurance
coverage.
Finally, Jenni’s post-application conduct provided a basis for the jury to infer an
intent to defraud. Within approximately a month of the policy’s effective date, Jenni
submitted two claims, seeking over $80,000 for alleged burglary losses and property
damage at the residence. But despite the size of the loss, Jenni never reported any burglary
or theft to the Hubbard County Sheriff’s Office, even when he called law enforcement to
complain about people on the property and request that they be charged with trespass.
In response to Liberty Mutual’s denial letter and explanatory email citing policy
exclusions related to dwellings under construction and his own statement that he was living
with his uncle during renovations, Jenni wrote, “If I don’t get a check[,] . . . my lawyer will
be calling”—language the jury could view as reflecting an insistence on payment despite
his awareness of the property’s condition and policy terms. His jail texts about obtaining
insurance so that he would be “ok” if something happened to the house, coupled with his
efforts to later secure title and sell the home, further support an inference that the
misstatements on the application were part of a broader plan to extract insurance proceeds
as opposed to innocent mistakes.
In sum, the record contains multiple evidentiary avenues for the jury to convict
Jenni: documentary evidence of false statements in the application, independent testimony
and records contradicting those statements, Jenni’s admissions in emails and text messages,
and circumstantial evidence of motive in the form of the timing related to the quickly filed
claim and lack of a police report following the alleged burglary. The district court later
13 characterized the evidence as “overwhelming,” and the jury deliberated for approximately
40 minutes before reaching a verdict. Apart from any challenged testimony or arguments
by the prosecutor, the full record amply supports the jury’s decision to convict Jenni of
insurance fraud. Given the strength of the evidence, the investigator’s brief testimony and
the prosecutor’s isolated reference to that testimony during closing do not constitute
reversible misconduct.
Affirmed.