STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1711
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Kenneth Jagger Crawford, Appellant.
Filed October 14, 2024 Reversed and remanded Larkin, Judge
Washington County District Court File No. 82-CR-21-4008
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for Crawford)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
SYLLABUS
The district court is without authority to disregard the mandatory-minimum
sentence in Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b) (2020), which applies to certain repeat
offenders who are convicted of a first-degree controlled-substance crime. OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea to first-degree
controlled-substance possession, arguing that his plea was invalid. Specifically, he argues
that his plea was unintelligent because he was not aware that imposition of a
mandatory-minimum term of imprisonment was a direct consequence of his plea or that
the district court was not authorized to disregard that mandatory-minimum sentence.
Instead, he was led to believe that the district court had authority to grant his request for a
downward-dispositional sentencing departure, based on the state’s assertion that, because
it had not invoked the mandatory-minimum sentencing provision in the charging
document, that provision did not restrict the district court’s sentencing discretion. Because
the district court was not authorized to disregard the relevant mandatory-minimum
sentence, appellant’s guilty plea was unintelligent and invalid. We therefore remand to
allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.
FACTS
Appellant Kenneth Jagger Crawford appeared before the district court on charges of
first-degree controlled-substance possession and fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle.
Crawford’s attorney informed the district court and respondent State of Minnesota that
Crawford intended to plead guilty as charged and to seek a downward-dispositional
sentencing departure. The guilty pleas would be proffered as a “straight plea,” that is, there
2 was no plea agreement or sentencing agreement with the state.1 Neither the district court
nor the state objected to Crawford’s intent to seek a downward-dispositional departure.
At previous hearings, the parties and the district court discussed that if Crawford
were convicted of the underlying charge of first-degree controlled-substance possession, a
mandatory-minimum sentence of 48 months would be required if the offense had been
charged with reference to a prior first-degree controlled-substance conviction. However,
the state asserted that even though Crawford had a prior controlled-substance conviction,
which triggered application of the mandatory-minimum sentence, the district court was not
required to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence if the state did not charge Crawford’s
first-degree controlled-substance offense as a subsequent controlled-substance offense, that
is, with reference to Crawford’s prior controlled-substance conviction. The district court
and defense counsel accepted that assertion.
Consistent with its position, the state made several statements in district court
indicating that the mandatory-minimum sentence could have applied if the state had
charged the underlying controlled-substance offense with reference to the prior
controlled-substance conviction. But at the plea hearing, no one mentioned the
mandatory-minimum sentence during discussions regarding Crawford’s intent to plead
guilty as charged and to request a downward sentencing departure. Moreover, the
mandatory-minimum sentence was not mentioned during Crawford’s waiver of trial rights
1 Crawford had other first-degree controlled-substance offenses pending in a separate file, with a different date of offense. The state voluntarily dismissed those charges after Crawford was sentenced on the underlying offenses in this case.
3 in support of his guilty plea. Finally, the district court told Crawford that it would consider
his lawyer’s request for “something less than the guidelines.”
Crawford tendered, and the district court accepted, his guilty pleas to first-degree
controlled-substance crime and fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle. The guilty pleas
were tendered remotely, and Crawford and his attorney were in different locations. Thus,
Crawford offered an oral waiver of his trial rights in support of his guilty pleas, and defense
counsel requested permission from Crawford to sign the petition on Crawford’s behalf.
The district court indicated that it would receive the petition, but the record does not contain
a petition to plead guilty.
As planned, Crawford requested a downward-dispositional or durational sentencing
departure. As to a dispositional departure, that is, probation instead of imprisonment,
Crawford’s motion papers identified his acceptance into the Minnesota Adult and Teen
Challenge Program as one supporting ground. The state argued against Crawford’s request
on the merits and did not mention the mandatory-minimum sentence. Defense counsel
argued in favor of a downward sentencing departure, and Crawford addressed the district
court, “beg[ging]” the court to put him on probation instead of sending him to prison.
The district court rejected Crawford’s request for a downward sentencing departure
on the merits after determining that substantial and compelling circumstances did not
justify a departure. The district court entered judgments of conviction on the admitted
offenses and imposed presumptive, concurrent prison sentences as follows: 125 months
for the first-degree controlled-substance offense and 19 months for the fleeing offense.
This appeal follows.
4 ISSUE
Was Crawford’s guilty plea unintelligent and therefore invalid because he was
misinformed that the district court could disregard the mandatory-minimum sentence
applicable to his first-degree controlled-substance conviction?
ANALYSIS
Crawford challenges the validity of his guilty plea to first-degree
controlled-substance possession.2 A defendant may challenge the constitutional validity of
a guilty plea for the first time on direct appeal. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn.
1989). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the
validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).
“The purpose of the requirement that the plea be intelligent is to [ensure] that the
defendant understands the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty,
and understands the consequences of his plea.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.
1983). The intelligence requirement concerns the direct consequences of a plea and
conviction. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. “[A] direct consequence is one that has a definite,
immediate and automatic effect on the range of a defendant’s punishment.” Kaiser v. State,
2 Crawford’s argument that his guilty plea was invalid focuses on his plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession and the district court’s authority to grant a downward- dispositional departure. We therefore limit our analysis to that issue. Although Crawford argues that his guilty plea was also involuntary, we do not address that issue because we ultimately conclude that his guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession was unintelligent and therefore invalid.
5 641 N.W.2d 900, 904 n.6 (Minn. 2002). Consistent with those principles, the district court
must ensure that defense counsel has told the defendant, and the defendant understands,
that “[i]f a minimum sentence is required by statute, the judge may impose a sentence of
imprisonment” not less than the amount specified in the statute. See Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.01, subd. 1(6)(j).
Crawford contends that he was misinformed regarding the direct consequences of
his guilty plea and that his plea was therefore unintelligent and invalid. Specifically, he
argues that a mandatory-minimum prison sentence of at least 48 months was a direct
consequence of his guilty plea, that the district court had no authority to disregard that
mandatory-minimum sentence, and that the district court therefore had no authority to grant
a downward-dispositional departure and place him on probation instead of imposing an
executed prison sentence.
Crawford pleaded guilty to first-degree controlled-substance possession under
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), which provides that “[a] person is guilty of a
controlled substance crime in the first degree if: (1) the person unlawfully possesses one
or more mixtures of a total weight of 50 grams or more containing cocaine or
methamphetamine.” The relevant penalty provisions for that offense provide:
(a) A person convicted under subdivisions 1 to 2a, paragraph (a), may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 30 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000,000, or both. (b) If the conviction is a subsequent controlled substance conviction, a person convicted under subdivisions 1 to 2a, paragraph (a), shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than four years nor more than 40 years
6 and, in addition, may be sentenced to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000,000.
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(a)-(b) (2020) (emphasis added).
A “subsequent controlled substance conviction” means that
before commission of the offense for which the person is convicted under this chapter, the person was convicted of a violation of section 152.021 or 152.022, including an attempt or conspiracy, or was convicted of a similar offense by the United States or another state, provided that ten years have not elapsed since discharge from sentence.
Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 16a (2020).
The parties do not dispute that the conviction resulting from Crawford’s guilty plea
to first-degree controlled-substance possession in this case constitutes a subsequent
controlled-substance conviction.3 Instead, the parties’ dispute centers on whether the
district court had authority to disregard the applicable mandatory-minimum sentence and
to grant a downward-dispositional departure.
Crawford’s Position
Crawford argues that the district court was without authority to disregard the
mandatory-minimum sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b). Caselaw supports
3 Crawford committed the underlying first-degree controlled-substance offense on November 23, 2021. In sentencing Crawford for that offense, the district court received and considered a pre-sentence investigation report. That report indicates that Crawford was convicted of a first-degree controlled-substance offense in 2006 and was not discharged from the sentence for that offense until November 2, 2021. Because Crawford was convicted of a violation of section 152.021 in 2006, before commission of the underlying offense, and ten years have not elapsed since his sentence was discharged for the 2006 offense, the underlying offense constitutes a “subsequent controlled substance conviction.” See Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 16a.
7 Crawford’s position that the district court lacked such authority.
Mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes “prohibit a stay of execution of sentence
and probation.” See State v. Adams, 791 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Minn. App. 2010) (discussing
Minn. Stat. §§ 152.022, subd. 3(b), .026 (2006)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). Thus,
mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions restrict judicial discretion in sentencing. See
State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982) (“[T]he legislature may restrict the exercise
of judicial discretion in sentencing, such as by providing for mandatory sentences . . . .”).
The supreme court has rejected “the argument that the legislature must append language
prohibiting waiver to every mandatory statute to ensure that the statute is given effect,”
reasoning that “[t]he canons of statutory construction provide that ‘shall’ is mandatory.”
State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998); see State v. Sheppard, 587 N.W.2d 53,
56 (Minn. App. 1998) (applying Humes to consideration of a mandatory-minimum
sentencing provision in Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd 8(b) (1996), and stating that “[t]he
legislature should not be expected to enumerate a prohibition against stayed executions in
every mandatory sentencing statute, particularly when the mandatory language and
removal of discretion is clear”), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 1999).
As to the application of mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions in the context
of controlled-substance crimes, in State v. Bluhm, the supreme court held that “Minnesota
Statutes [section] 152.025, subdivision 3(b) (2002), requires that a mandatory minimum
six-month jail term be imposed and served when an offender has a previous qualifying
controlled substance conviction.” 676 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 2004). That penalty
provision stated, “If the conviction is a subsequent controlled substance conviction, a
8 person convicted under subdivision 1 or 2 shall be committed to the commissioner of
corrections or to a local correctional authority for not less than six months nor more than
ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 3(b) (2002) (emphasis added). The supreme court
considered that statutory provision in conjunction with Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (2002), which
stated that “[a] defendant convicted and sentenced to a mandatory sentence under sections
152.021 to 152.025 is not eligible for probation, parole, discharge, or supervised release
until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by law.” Bluhm, 676
N.W.2d at 652 (quotation omitted).
The Bluhm court found that “[t]he language of sections 152.025 and 152.026 is clear
and unambiguous,” and it read that plain language “as mandating that an individual subject
to the penalty provision in section 152.025, subdivision 3(b), be committed to a local
correctional authority for a minimum of six months and that the sentence actually be
served.” Id. at 653. Thus, the supreme court rejected “Bluhm’s argument that the
sentencing court has the discretion to place a defendant being sentenced under section
152.025, subdivision 3(b), for a subsequent controlled substance crime on probation
instead of committing her to the minimum term called for in that section.” Id.
Like the supreme court, we have held that “In the absence of express authorization
by the legislature, a district court is without authority to disregard a statutory mandatory-
minimum sentence.” State v. Rausch, 799 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. App. 2011). In Rausch,
we reversed the district court’s grant of a downward departure, reasoning that the district
court erred by failing to impose an applicable mandatory-minimum sentence. Id. at 21.
The relevant statute in Rausch provided that “[a] person convicted of committing burglary
9 of an occupied dwelling, as defined in subdivision 1, clause (a), must be committed to the
commissioner of corrections or county workhouse for not less than six months.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1a (2010). We said that if “a statute is not ambiguous, it must be
given its plain meaning” and that there was no ambiguity in section 609.582, subdivision
1a. Rausch, 799 N.W.2d at 22. In reversing Rausch’s sentence because the district court
failed to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence, we recognized that our reversal might
“give rise to a motion to withdraw [the] plea as not voluntary or intelligent.” Id. at 23.
Although the mandatory-minimum sentence in Rausch applied to the offense of
burglary, we have also held that mandatory-minimum sentences applicable to
controlled-substance offenses must be imposed. For example, in State v. Turck, we held
that “[t]he mandatory-minimum sentencing provision for a repeat offender who commits a
third-degree controlled-substance crime under Minn. Stat. §§ 152.023, subd. 3(b) (2004),
and .026 (Supp. 2005), prohibits a district court from staying execution of the sentence.”
728 N.W.2d 544, 545 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. May 30, 2007).
The relevant statute in Turck provided that “[i]f the conviction is a subsequent
controlled substance conviction, a person convicted under subdivision 1 or 2 shall be
committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than two years nor more than 30
years.” Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 3(b) (2004) (emphasis added). Like the supreme court
in Bluhm, we considered the mandatory-minimum statutory provision in conjunction with
the relevant version of section 152.026, which provided that “[a] defendant convicted and
sentenced to a mandatory sentence under sections 152.021 to 152.025 and 152.0262 is not
eligible for probation, parole, discharge, or supervised release until that person has served
10 the full term of imprisonment as provided by law.” Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (Supp. 2005);
Turck, 728 N.W.2d at 545. We stated that “[s]ections 152.023 and 152.026 require repeat
offenders to serve a minimum prison sentence” and that “because respondent’s sentence
[was] for a subsequent controlled-substance offense, he must serve a term of
imprisonment” that is not less than the statutory minimum. Turck, 728 N.W.2d at 548.
And in Adams, we held that “[t]he mandatory minimum sentencing provision for a
repeat offender who commits a second-degree controlled-substance crime under Minn.
Stat. §§ 152.022, subd. 3(b), .026 (2006), prohibits a district court from staying execution
of the sentence.” 791 N.W.2d at 757. The relevant statute in Adams provided that “[i]f the
conviction is a subsequent controlled substance conviction, a person convicted under
subdivision 1 . . . shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than
three years.” Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 3(b) (2006) (emphasis added); Adams, 791
N.W.2d at 758. We once again considered the relevant sentencing statute in conjunction
with section 152.026, which provided that “[a] defendant convicted and sentenced to a
mandatory sentence under sections 152.021 to 152.025 . . . is not eligible for
probation . . . until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by
law.” Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (2006); Adams, 791 N.W.2d at 758-59. We determined that
“[t]he language of the statutes is clear and unambiguous” and “mandate[s] that a repeat
offender serve a minimum sentence of three years and is not eligible for probation until
that time is served.” Adams, 791 N.W.2d at 759.
We stated that “[b]ecause Adams’s conviction in this case is a subsequent controlled-
substance conviction, . . . sections 152.022, subdivision 3(b), and 152.026 mandate an
11 executed prison sentence of three years; they prohibit a stay of execution of sentence and
probation.” Id. We were quite clear: “The district court lacked discretion to place Adams
on probation instead of committing her to the minimum term called for in section 152.022,
subdivision 3(b).” Id.
Like the mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions in Bluhm, Turck, and Adams,
the relevant statute in this case uses the mandatory term “shall” to require imposition of
the mandatory-minimum sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b) (stating that “a
person convicted under subdivisions 1 to 2a, paragraph (a), shall be committed to the
commissioner of corrections for not less than four years” (emphasis added)). And like the
circumstances in those cases, Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (2020) provides that “[a] defendant
convicted and sentenced to a mandatory sentence under section 152.021 . . . is not eligible
for probation, parole, discharge, or supervised release until that person has served the full
term of imprisonment as provided by law.” We therefore do not discern a reason to treat
the mandatory-minimum sentencing provision in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b),
differently than the appellate courts of this state have treated similar mandatory-minimum
sentencing provisions in the controlled-substance context.
The State’s Position
The state argues that because it did not charge the underlying controlled-substance
offense with reference to the mandatory-minimum sentence in section 152.021, subdivision
3(b), that mandatory-minimum penalty does not apply. The state does not cite, and we are
not aware of, any authority supporting that proposition. In fact, it is inconsistent with the
12 caselaw set forth above. And as set forth below, there are several flaws in the state’s
argument.
First, the state conflates the elements of the first-degree controlled-substance offense
in this case with the factor necessary to trigger the mandatory-minimum sentence in section
152.021, subdivision 3(b). For example, the state argues that it “had ample opportunity to
amend the complaint in this case to charge [Crawford] with a more severe offense . . . based
on [his] prior first-degree possession conviction. The fact remains that the [s]tate chose
not to do so.” (Emphasis added.) The state notes that “a prosecutor has broad discretion
in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers
doctrine, a court should not interfere with the prosecutor’s exercise of that discretion.”
State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996).
The state’s reliance on charging discretion is unavailing because there is no attempt
to interfere with that discretion here. The state charged Crawford with first-degree
controlled-substance possession under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1). The elements
of that crime are as follows: (1) a person unlawfully possesses (2) one or more mixtures
of a total weight of 50 grams or more (3) containing cocaine or methamphetamine. See
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1). The plain language of section 152.021, subdivision
2(a)(1), shows that the existence of a prior controlled-substance conviction is not an
element of that offense. Instead, it is a sentencing factor that, if established, requires
imposition of the mandatory-minimum sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b).
Compare Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (defining the crime of first-degree possession
of a controlled substance without mention of a prior controlled-substance conviction) with
13 Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b) (stating the penalty for a person convicted under section
152.021, subdivision 2(a)(1), is a mandatory commitment “for not less than four years” if
the conviction is a “subsequent controlled substance conviction”).
Second, the state fails to recognize that, although the state must generally prove
aggravating sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, there is an exception
for prior convictions: “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2005) (emphasis
added) (quotation omitted).
For example, the state argues that it “did not allege in the charging document (much
less prove beyond a reasonable doubt) that a conviction on the charged offense would
constitute a ‘subsequent controlled substance conviction.’” But the state was not required
to prove that Crawford had a prior controlled-substance offense to trigger the mandatory-
minimum sentence under subdivision 3(b). The district court could make that finding based
on judicial records. See State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Minn. 2015) (noting that “[t]he
prior-conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial right . . . permits a court to
find the existence of a prior conviction when sentencing a defendant so long as the prior
conviction is not itself an element of the current offense” and that “[t]he exception is
justified in part by the certainty of procedural safeguards attached to any fact of prior
conviction” (quotations omitted)). Thus, we reject the state’s argument that because it did
not invoke the mandatory-minimum penalty provision in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b),
“there was no basis in law or fact for the sentencing court to impose [that] penalty” and
14 Crawford therefore “was not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence for the instant
offense.”
Third, the state’s assertion that it could usurp the district court’s obligation to impose
the mandatory-minimum sentence required under section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), is
further weakened by the fact that subdivision 3(b) does not contain language authorizing
the state to request sentencing without regard to the mandatory-minimum sentence. This
absence is notable because a mandatory-minimum sentencing provision in another
paragraph of section 152.021 allows the state to pursue sentencing without regard to that
mandatory-minimum sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(c) (2020) (requiring a
mandatory-minimum term of incarceration of 65 months and providing that “the prosecutor
may, prior to the time of sentencing, file a motion to have the person sentenced without
regard to the mandatory minimum sentence established by this paragraph”). The lack of a
similar provision in subdivision 3(b) indicates that the legislature did not intend the state
to avoid application of the mandatory-minimum sentence in subdivision 3(b).
Fourth, the legal authorities governing the content of a charging document do not
require the state to cite or describe any applicable mandatory-minimum sentencing
provisions. Although the criminal rules require the state to include the maximum penalty
in a complaint, the rules do not require inclusion of any potential mandatory-minimum
sentence. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01, subd. 1 (“The complaint must specify the offense
charged, the statute allegedly violated, and the maximum penalty. The complaint must also
conform to the requirements in Rule 17.02.”); 17.02 (requiring that “[a] complaint must be
substantially in the form required by Rule 2” and that “[f]or each count, the indictment or
15 complaint must cite the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law the defendant
allegedly violated”).
Similarly, Minn. Stat. §§ 628.01-.69 (2022), which govern the contents of
indictments and complaints, do not require the state to include information regarding any
applicable mandatory-minimum sentence in the charging document. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 628.10 (“The first pleading on the part of the state is the indictment, which shall contain:
(1) the title of the action, specifying the name of the court to which the indictment is
presented, and the names of the parties; (2) a statement of the acts constituting the offense,
in ordinary and concise language, without repetition.”); .12 (“The indictment shall be direct
and certain as it regards: (1) the party charged; (2) the offense charged; [and] (3) the
particular circumstances of the offense charged, when they are necessary to constitute a
complete offense.”).
Finally, as to the content requirements of a charging document, the due-process
“nature and cause requirement is satisfied if an indictment contains such descriptions of
the offense charged as will enable a defendant to make his defense and to plead the
judgment in bar of any further prosecution of the same crime.” State v. Dunson, 770
N.W.2d 546, 551 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20,
2009). The lack of any authority requiring the state to explicitly refer to a potential
mandatory-minimum sentence in a charging document undercuts the state’s assertion that
its failure to do so renders the mandatory-minimum sentence inapplicable.
Fifth—and most importantly—the state’s assertion that the state alone is entrusted
to determine whether or not to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence in section
16 152.021, subdivision 3(b), fails to recognize the relative powers of the legislature, the
judiciary, and a prosecutor in sentencing.
The power to define the conduct which constitutes a criminal offense and to fix the punishment for such conduct is vested in the legislature. However, the imposition of the sentence within the limits prescribed by the legislature is purely a judicial function. . . . But once the legislature has prescribed the punishment for a particular offense it cannot, within constitutional parameters, condition the imposition of the sentence by the court upon the prior approval of the prosecutor.
Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 17-18 (citations omitted).
The Olson court stated that “[t]he separation of powers doctrine mandates that
power given to [a] prosecutor . . . to initiate sentencing without regard to [a] statutory
mandatory minimum sentence must also be given to the courts.” Id. at 14. The supreme
court explained that the law “must be interpreted to give courts and prosecutors alike the
power to initiate sentencing without regard to statutory minimums. If the legislature gives
such power to the prosecutors, it must also give it to the courts. It cannot constitutionally
do otherwise.” Id. at 19. The state’s assertion that it can unilaterally prevent the district
court from imposing the mandatory-minimum sentence under section 152.021, subdivision
3(b), is untenable given that a prosecutor cannot unilaterally interfere with the prescribed
punishment for a particular offense. See id. at 18.
For these reasons, we reject the state’s argument that, because it did not “invoke”
section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), in its charging document, the mandatory-minimum
sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), does not apply in this case. Because the
17 first-degree controlled-substance conviction resulting from Crawford’s guilty plea was a
subsequent controlled-substance conviction, the district court was required to impose a
mandatory-minimum sentence of at least four years in prison under section 152.021,
subdivision 3(b). The district court had no authority to ignore that mandatory-minimum
sentence, to stay execution of a prison sentence and place Crawford on probation, or to
impose an executed sentence of less than 48 months. See Rausch, 799 N.W.2d at 21
(reversing downward-dispositional departure because the district court had no authority to
disregard the applicable mandatory-minimum sentence); Turck, 728 N.W.2d at 548
(reversing downward-dispositional departure because the applicable mandatory-minimum
sentence required imprisonment); Adams, 791 N.W.2d at 759 (reversing downward-
dispositional departure because the applicable mandatory-minimum sentence required
imprisonment).
Having concluded that the district court could not disregard the
mandatory-minimum sentence in Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b), we next consider
whether Crawford’s guilty plea was unintelligent and therefore invalid.
Validity of Crawford’s Guilty Plea
Several circumstances inform our decision regarding whether Crawford has shown
that his guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession was unintelligent and
therefore invalid.
First, although the lawyers and the district court discussed the mandatory-minimum
sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), at several hearings, those discussions
regarded the state’s assertion that it could have sought application of that sentence in the
18 underlying case. Indeed, Crawford may have acknowledged that possibility. But the state
never did so, and it asserted—incorrectly—that the district court was therefore not required
to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence under subdivision 3(b).
Second, as a result of the state’s incorrect assertion that the district court was not
required to impose the required sentence under subdivision 3(b), when Crawford tendered
his guilty plea, the district court misinformed him that the maximum statutory sentence for
his offense was 30 years. Because the district court had no authority to disregard the
mandatory-sentencing requirement, the statutory maximum sentence was 40 years. See
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b).
Third, as a result of the state’s incorrect assertion that the district court was not
required to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence under subdivision 3(b), when
Crawford tendered his guilty plea, he was not informed that he was subject to that
mandatory-minimum sentence, which required his commitment to prison for at least 48
months. Id. Nor was he informed that the district court could not disregard the mandatory
term of imprisonment, either by placing him on probation or by imposing a prison term
less than 48 months. Instead, the district court informed Crawford that it would consider
his request for “something less than the guidelines,” implying that the district court could
in fact grant a downward sentencing departure despite the mandatory-minimum sentence.
The district court had no authority to do so.
Fourth, the record does not contain a petition to plead guilty clarifying or correcting
the misinformation that Crawford received prior to tendering his guilty plea. See Perkins
v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 690 (Minn. 1997) (concluding, despite defendant’s contrary
19 assertions, that the record established that when defendant pleaded guilty, he understood
the maximum sentence that could be imposed, based in part on his signature on a petition
to plead guilty, which correctly stated the maximum penalty).
On this record, Crawford has established that he was not informed that the direct
consequences of his guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession included a
mandatory term of imprisonment of at least 48 months. Instead, he was incorrectly led to
believe that the district court could ignore that mandatory-minimum sentence, grant a
downward-dispositional departure, and place him on probation simply because the state
did not request application of the mandatory-minimum term of imprisonment. Again, the
district court could not do so. Thus, Crawford has shown that his guilty plea was
unintelligent and therefore invalid, and he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to first-
degree controlled-substance possession.
DECISION
Because Crawford’s guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession was
unintelligent and therefore invalid, we remand to allow Crawford to withdraw that guilty
plea if he chooses to do so. If Crawford withdraws his guilty plea to first-degree
controlled-substance possession on remand, the district court shall vacate his conviction
for that offense. Although Crawford does not specifically address the validity of his guilty
plea to felony fleeing, his brief suggests that he should be allowed to withdraw that guilty
plea on remand as well. Because it is not clear that the district court would have accepted
Crawford’s guilty plea to felony fleeing in the absence of his guilty plea to first-degree
controlled-substance possession, if the district court vacates Crawford’s judgment of
20 conviction of first-degree controlled-substance possession on remand, it may also vacate
his judgment of conviction of felony fleeing. See State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 762
(Minn. 1977) (“Neither the constitution nor our Rules of Criminal Procedure give to a
criminal defendant an absolute right to have his plea of guilty accepted.”).
Reversed and remanded.