State of Minnesota v. Keevin Lashawn Hinton

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: November 13, 2023
• Docket: a221772
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A22-1772

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Keevin Lashawn Hinton, Appellant.

Filed November 13, 2023 Affirmed Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-20-18183

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith,

Tracy M., Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

In this direct appeal from the district court’s judgments of conviction for unlawful

possession of a firearm or ammunition and fifth-degree drug possession, appellant raises

three issues: (1) the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence from a search of his apartment; (2) the state’s circumstantial evidence failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he possessed the firearm, ammunition, and drugs found in his

apartment; and (3) the district court erred by denying his motion to compel disclosure of

information about a confidential informant. We first conclude that the district court did not

err by denying the motion to suppress because probable cause supported the issuing judge’s

decision to issue the search warrant and law enforcement had reasonable suspicion for a

no-knock entry. Second, we conclude that the record evidence was sufficient to sustain

appellant’s convictions. Third, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying

appellant’s motion to compel. Thus, we affirm.

FACTS

On August 21, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Keevin

Lashawn Hinton with one count of possessing a firearm or ammunition as an ineligible

person under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020) (count one), and one count of

fifth-degree controlled-substance crime (possession) under Minn. Stat. § 152.025,

subd. 2(1) (2020) (count two). These charges were based on evidence that law enforcement

obtained during a search of Hinton’s apartment.

Six days after obtaining a warrant, on August 20, 2020, at approximately 5:30 a.m.,

law enforcement executed a no-knock search of Hinton’s apartment. Hinton was inside the

apartment. Law enforcement found “a black box in a cabinet above the refrigerator” that

contained “razor blades, a small bindle of brown powder, and several plastic cards,” one

of which was a credit-union card with Hinton’s name. The contents of the bindle

field-tested positive for cocaine. Law enforcement also found “a Glock 40 pistol in a black

2 pouch near a bookshelf next to the bed.” The gun “was loaded when it was found.” In a

closet, law enforcement located a box of ammunition inside a shoebox that also held men’s

shoes, a box of ammunition at the bottom of a black tote, and a bag of ammunition in the

pocket of a multicolored jacket.

After the state charged Hinton, he moved to compel disclosure of information about

the confidential reliable informant (CRI) who is mentioned in the warrant application.

Hinton sought the CRI’s name, date of birth, criminal history, and any payments or other

consideration relating to the CRI’s cooperation with law enforcement. In the alternative,

Hinton moved for an order requiring the state to “provide all information that goes to the

veracity of the CRI that does not identify the CRI.” As an additional alternative, Hinton

moved for “in camera review of all discovery regarding the identity, veracity, consistency,

and accuracy of the CRI.” The state opposed disclosure. The district court denied Hinton’s

motion to compel in a written decision, determining that Hinton “has not met his burden to

show that the informant is a material witness or that the informant will provide testimony

relevant to the material issue of guilt” or that the informant is “a hearsay declarant whose

statements will be offered for the truth.”

Hinton also moved to suppress “all evidence derived from the August 20, 2020

search” of his apartment. Hinton argued that (1) “the CRI’s reliability and veracity of

knowledge were not sufficiently corroborated,” (2) the search-warrant affidavit does not

“establish a nexus between [his] alleged illegal activity” and his apartment, and (3) the

affidavit contains “boilerplate language . . . insufficient to support the no-knock entry.” At

a June 1, 2022 hearing, the district court ruled that the search warrant was “valid” and

3 denied Hinton’s motion to suppress. The district court determined that law enforcement

corroborated more than just “innocent details” from the CRI’s tip, “the use of the canine”

provided “the appropriate nexus for the search warrant,” and the peace officer’s affidavit

contained “specifics for nighttime and no-knock” entry.

The district court conducted a bench trial in June 2022. The state called as witnesses

four law-enforcement officers who testified about searching Hinton’s apartment and

finding contraband as described above. Hinton testified in his defense and called two other

witnesses: his girlfriend and the peace officer who applied for the warrant to search

Hinton’s apartment.

We summarize Hinton’s girlfriend’s testimony while noting that the district court

found her not credible, as is discussed in more detail below. Girlfriend testified as follows:

• She has dated Hinton “on and off for the past nine years.” • She has a conceal-and-carry permit and purchased a Glock 40 caliber handgun from a private seller in 2019. • she usually carried the gun in “a small, black garment bag” inside of her purse. • She “never told [Hinton] that [she] had a gun.” • In June 2020, Hinton “broke up with” her. • Before the break-up, they lived with her parents and “kept all of [their] clothing in totes.” • She stored the boxes of ammunition for her gun in the bottom of a black tote and “stacked clothes on top” of the ammunition so Hinton “wouldn’t know it was in there.” • After the breakup, she “took [her] clothes out” of the black tote and “put more of [Hinton’s] clothes in there”; she was “hurt” and “angry” when going through the black tote and did not have the ammunition on her mind. • The black tote also contained a multicolored jacket; Hinton had bought the jacket for her, and she would wear the jacket to the gun range and bring her own ammunition. • The ammunition in the multicolored jacket was “left behind from the last time” she wore the jacket to the gun range.

4 • She would be “surprise[d]” to find out that one of the boxes of ammunition was later found outside the black tote in a shoebox. • At some point, she “reconcile[d]” with Hinton, and they began dating again. • There was “a really bad thunderstorm” the “weekend before” the August 20 search of Hinton’s apartment; her house “lost power,” so she “stayed over” at Hinton’s apartment. • When she slept at Hinton’s apartment, she would “place [the gun] underneath the [book]shelf” near her side of the bed. • On a night before August 20, she “left [Hinton’s] in a rush because [she] had a feminine issue” and did not have the products she needed; as a result, she “[u]nintentionally” left her gun at Hinton’s apartment.

We summarize Hinton’s testimony while noting that the district court found him not

credible, as is discussed in more detail below. Hinton testified as follows:

• He lived in a “very little” studio apartment. • He was not sure how the black tote ended up in his apartment, but he “never looked in” it. • He did not know how the multicolored jacket was moved from inside the tote to hanging in his closet. • He did not go into the pocket of the jacket because he is “not a snooper” and does not “go through [girlfriend’s] belongings.” • He would not know if someone put a gun near the bookshelf in his apartment because he does not go into that area. • The bookshelf belonged to girlfriend because she is “an avid reader,” and he “play[s] video games” and does not read so he has “no reason to be over” by the bookshelf. • He had no knowledge of the gun and drugs in his apartment. • At least three other people had keys to his apartment: his nephew, girlfriend, and a friend. • The shoebox in his closet held his “funeral” shoes, but he did not know how the ammunition got in the shoebox.

On June 24, 2022, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law,

verdict, and order. The district court found Hinton guilty of both counts—unlawful

possession of a firearm or ammunition and fifth-degree drug possession. The district court

determined that Hinton “knowingly constructively possessed a firearm and ammunition”

5 and “knowingly constructively possessed one or more mixtures containing a . . . controlled

substance.” The district court sentenced Hinton to 60 months in prison on count one, to be

served concurrently with a stayed sentence of 19 months in prison on count two.

Hinton appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not err by denying Hinton’s motion to suppress evidence from the search of his apartment.

Hinton challenges the search warrant on three grounds related to probable cause. He

first argues that (1) “[t]he informant’s information was not reliable or specific enough,”

(2) the affidavit “fail[ed] to establish a nexus between the contraband and Hinton’s

apartment,” and (3) “the information was stale by the time the search warrant was

executed.” Hinton also argues that the warrant affidavit “failed to provide sufficient facts

that would justify a no-knock entry.”

We first summarize the record before the district court for the motion to suppress.

Second, we consider Hinton’s three probable-cause arguments. Third, we address Hinton’s

challenge to the no-knock entry by law enforcement.

On August 14, 2020, law enforcement applied for a “Daytime/Nighttime

Unannounced Search Warrant” to search Hinton’s Minneapolis apartment, which the

district court granted that same day.

The search-warrant application included a peace officer’s affidavit that described

information received from a CRI. The CRI stated that Hinton was “in possession of a black

handgun and selling crack cocaine. The CRI advised that [Hinton] was a member of the

6 street gang Vice Lords and lived near 26th and Fremont Ave. N. in the City of Minneapolis”

and that Hinton “uses multiple vehicles to assist in the sale of narcotics.” When law

enforcement showed the CRI a “Hennepin County booking photo” of Hinton without his

name attached, the CRI “confirmed” the photo was of “the individual the CRI knows as

Keevin Hinton who is in possession of a black handgun and selling crack cocaine.”

The affidavit also averred the following facts: Hennepin County jail records stated

that Hinton was a member of the Vice Lords, which is a “violent gang . . . known to commit

numerous violent crimes [including] weapon possession, narcotic sale, robbery, . . .

shootings and murder.” The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) website

listed Hinton’s address as a specific apartment building and unit on Fremont Avenue near

26th Street in Minneapolis. Law enforcement contacted apartment management for

Hinton’s building and learned Hinton was the “listed renter” for his specified apartment.

Hinton’s criminal history included convictions for drug and weapon offenses dating from

1989 to 2010. And on August 13, 2020, law enforcement conducted a canine sniff in the

hallway outside Hinton’s apartment. The canine “positively alerted [law enforcement] to

the presence of narcotics coming from the door seams” of Hinton’s apartment.

A. The warrant was supported by probable cause.

Warrants may not be issued except upon probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV;

Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Generally, a search is lawful only if it is executed pursuant to a

valid search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate after a finding of probable

cause.” State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. App. 2008).

7 We apply “a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a search

warrant is supported by probable cause.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn.

1995) (quotation omitted). Under this test, “courts must be careful not to review each

component of the affidavit in isolation.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985).

“When reviewing a judge’s decision to issue a search warrant,” the appellate court’s “only

consideration is whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that

probable cause existed.” State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn. 2016) (quotation

omitted). The “resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by

the preference to be accorded to warrants.” State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 704

(Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted).

An appellate court’s review of a district court’s probable-cause determination gives

“great deference” to the issuing court. State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).

The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and the determination of

probable cause is reviewed de novo. State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 794 (Minn. 2000).

Hinton makes three challenges to the district court’s probable-cause determination

that we consider in turn.

1. The CRI’s Reliability

First, Hinton contends that the CRI was “not reliable because the information he or

she provided was innocuous and easily corroborated.” At the June 1 hearing on Hinton’s

motion to suppress, the district court determined that the CRI’s tip satisfied “the totality of

the circumstances review.”

8 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “an informant’s tip must have

sufficient indicia of reliability for police to rely on the tip to sustain probable cause.” State

v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). When determining

whether a CRI’s tip has sufficient indicia of reliability, the informant’s “reliability and basis

of knowledge . . . are relevant considerations.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also State v.

Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (stating that a court may consider “the

credibility and veracity of the informant” in determining whether a CRI’s tip can establish

probable cause to search). But the supreme court has cautioned that reliability and basis of

knowledge “are not a rigid two-pronged test” and that “a deficiency in one may be

compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to

the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.” Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 890 (quotation

omitted); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (noting that an informant’s

veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are “closely intertwined issues that may

usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is probable cause to

believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place”).

Hinton’s brief to this court relies on “six factors for determining the reliability” of

a CRI, as discussed by this court in State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004). 1

1 The six factors are (1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an informant who has given reliable information in the past is likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can be established if the police can corroborate the information; (4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an

9 Hinton argues that “at least three of the Ross factors weigh against reliability, two others

are neutral given their lack of information and only one weighs in favor of reliability.” The

state argues that “some of the [Ross] factors are mutually exclusive” such that a CRI need

not satisfy all six to be reliable, and here, “reliability was established by the CRI’s track

record in providing reliable information to police in the past and by police corroboration of

the CRI’s tip.”

While both Hinton and the state analyze the CRI’s reliability by referring to each of

the six factors discussed in Ross, we are not persuaded to follow this approach. The

supreme court has never cited the Ross factors. Also, we agree with the state that a CRI’s

reliability does not depend on satisfying all six Ross factors. Indeed, in Ross, this court

stated that only “the second and third factors are at issue” and reversed the district court’s

suppression of evidence based on those factors alone. 676 N.W.2d at 304-05. Thus, we

follow the supreme court’s direction and consider “the overall reliability of [the CRI’s]

tip.” Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 890. In doing so, we examine the CRI’s track record, the CRI’s

basis of knowledge, and corroboration of the CRI’s tip.

a. Track Record

The supreme court has determined that “[h]aving a proven track record is one of the

primary indicia of an informant’s veracity.” Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136. Hinton argues

that “[t]he affidavit lacked any information as to how many times the informant had been

informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a statement against the informant’s interests. Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 304.

10 used by law enforcement in the past” and “how many successful arrests or convictions were

obtained based on the informant’s cooperation with law enforcement.”

“[S]pecific details” regarding a CRI’s track record are “not typically required.” Id.

For example, the supreme court in Wiley determined that a CRI was reliable based on the

search-warrant affidavit’s statement that the informant “has been used over several years

successfully.” 366 N.W.2d at 269. Similarly, in Munson, the supreme court determined that

an officer’s testimony that the CRI “had given the police reliable information in the past”

was enough to show reliability. 594 N.W.2d at 136. In Mosley, the supreme court

determined the CRI was “reliable” and noted that law enforcement provided “more detail”

about the CRI’s reliability than the supreme court required. 994 N.W.2d at 891. Law

enforcement in Mosley testified that they “worked with the Informant multiple times

before, . . . that the Informant’s information was always accurate, always timely, and

reliable,” and that “the Informant’s prior information resulted in arrests, charges, and

convictions.” Id.

Here, the search-warrant affidavit stated that the “CRI has worked with Law

Enforcement in the past and has provided names and addresses . . . of suspects involved in

distribution of narcotics and prohibited persons in possession of firearms in the Twin Cities

metro area.” The affidavit further stated that the “CRI has also provided accurate and

reliable information that produced seizures of large quantities of narcotics and multiple

firearms.” The district court stated that the search-warrant affidavit contained “a fairly

length[y] paragraph detailing the confidential informant’s prior work with the police

11 officers,” including a “specific[] mention[] that there’s been seizures of quantities of

narcotics and firearms based on this confidential informant’s information.”

We conclude that the search-warrant affidavit provided more details about the CRI’s

track record than is required by supreme court caselaw. See Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136;

Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269. Accordingly, we determine that the CRI’s track record with law

enforcement shows the CRI’s reliability.

b. Basis of Knowledge

The supreme court has also stated that a CRI’s “basis of knowledge” is a “relevant

consideration[]” in determining whether a CRI’s tip can sustain probable cause. Mosley,

994 N.W.2d at 890. “Assessment of the CRI’s basis of knowledge involves consideration

of the quantity and quality of detail in the CRI’s report and whether police independently

verified important details of the informant’s report.” State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 668

(Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. July 25, 2000).

Hinton argues that “the informant provided only generic information.” The district

court determined that the CRI provided “specific” information “not necessarily found on

Google” about the color of the gun, the type of drug, and Hinton’s gang affiliation. We

agree with the district court. This court in Holiday concluded that a search warrant was

supported by probable cause when “some of the details [supplied by the informant] were

easily obtained (e.g., defendant’s address),” but others were “not necessarily easily

obtained,” such as “gang affiliation.” 749 N.W.2d at 841-42. Likewise, here, we conclude

that the CRI supplied specific information, not all of which was easily obtainable, and this

information was corroborated as further detailed below.

12 c. Corroboration

“[T]he fact that police can corroborate part of the informer’s tip as truthful may

suggest that the entire tip is reliable.” State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn.

1978). Further, “[t]he independent corroboration of even innocent details of an informant’s

tip may support a finding of probable cause.” Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136; see also Mosley,

994 N.W.2d at 892 (explaining that “when an informant gives police information based on

the informant’s personal knowledge, police do not need to corroborate significant details

in the tip for the tip to be sufficient to support probable cause”).

On appeal, Hinton argues that law enforcement independently corroborated only

“easily verifiable pieces of information,” such as Hinton’s “identity and residence.” The

district court stated that while “a lot” of the corroborating information regarding the CRI’s

tip “could be found on Google,” law enforcement was “able to corroborate not only

innocent details,” like Hinton’s address, but details such as Hinton’s “specific gang

affiliation.”

We conclude that law enforcement corroborated many details of the CRI’s tip. Jail

records listed Hinton as a member of the Vice Lords street gang; the BCA website listed

Hinton’s address at a particular apartment on Fremont Avenue, and apartment management

confirmed Hinton was a renter of the unit listed by the BCA; the CRI confirmed Hinton’s

identity when shown an unlabeled booking photo; Hinton’s criminal history showed prior

convictions involving drugs and weapons; and a canine sniff of Hinton’s apartment door

13 was “positive[]” for “the presence of narcotics.” 2 Law enforcement’s corroboration of

many details of the CRI’s tip indicates the CRI’s sufficient basis of knowledge and supports

the district court’s determination that the CRI’s tip “satisf[ied] the adequate standard.”

In sum, after considering the CRI’s track record, the CRI’s basis of knowledge, and

the corroboration of the CRI’s tip, we conclude that the tip had “sufficient indicia of

reliability.” Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 890. Thus, the district court did not err by determining

that law enforcement could rely on the CRI’s tip to show probable cause for the warrant.

2. Nexus Between the Facts in the Search-Warrant Affidavit and the Contraband Sought at Hinton’s Apartment

Hinton argues that the CRI’s information “did not provide a nexus to contraband at

[Hinton’s] apartment,” relying on State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. App. 1998). The

state argues that “it was reasonable for the issuing magistrate to infer that [Hinton] would

keep narcotics in a location convenient for him, such as his residence, and then transfer the

narcotics to one of the vehicles” allegedly used for sales.

Probable cause requires “that there is a fair probability that the evidence will be

found at the specific site to be searched.” State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn.

2014). In other words, there must be “a sufficient nexus . . . between the evidence sought

2 Hinton cites State v. Gabbert, in which this court determined that “[b]ecause the anonymous tipster’s information was insufficiently corroborated, the issuing judge did not have probable cause to issue the search warrant.” 411 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Minn. App. 1987). Hinton argues that “like Gabbert, the informant should not be deemed reliable as police only verified innocent details that were not sufficient to provide probable cause.” But in Gabbert, “the brunt of the information provided by the [anonymous tipster] was actually disproved by the officers’ subsequent investigation.” Id. at 212. Further, the tipster in Gabbert was anonymous and not a CRI, as here. Id. Thus, Gabbert is distinguishable.

14 and the place to be searched.” Id. “[T]he nexus may be inferred from the totality of the

circumstances, including the type of crime involved, the nature of the items sought, the

extent of an opportunity for concealment, and reasonable assumptions about where a

suspect would likely keep that evidence.” State v. Ruoho, 685 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn.

App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004).

The district court determined that, on its own, “what the confidential informant said

doesn’t really provide [a nexus] to [Hinton’s] apartment. However, that is what the canine

dog does.” The district court stated that the CRI’s “information that then got corroborated

with respect to where the apartment is, provided enough reasonable articulable suspicion

to deploy the use of the canine,” and the canine’s positive alert on Hinton’s door “was then

the appropriate nexus for the search warrant.”

We conclude that the search-warrant affidavit provides a sufficient nexus for two

reasons. First, Hinton’s comparison to Ward is unpersuasive. In Ward, this court concluded

that a warrant to search a hotel room lacked probable cause because the only link between

the defendant and the drugs found in the hotel room was the defendant’s occupancy of the

room 72 hours before the warrant application. 580 N.W.2d at 73-75. Hinton argues that

“[i]f the warrant was insufficient in Ward, where the informant obtained marijuana within

72 hours of the warrant’s execution, then the same must be true of this warrant, which was

executed at least a week after” the CRI’s tip. But this court in Ward noted that “it is far less

likely that a suspect will continue to occupy a hotel room, as compared with a permanent

residence, after a period of days.” Id. at 73-74. Because the warrant here rested on

15 information that Hinton sold crack cocaine and involved a search of Hinton’s apartment,

Ward is distinguishable.

Second, it was reasonable for the issuing judge to infer that Hinton kept drugs at his

apartment. “[A]n issuing magistrate is entitled to draw common-sense and reasonable

inferences from the facts and circumstances given” in the search-warrant affidavit.

Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 843 (quotation omitted). The affidavit attested that the CRI stated

Hinton “uses multiple vehicles to assist in the sale of narcotics.”

This court has determined that it was “reasonable” for an issuing magistrate to infer

that a defendant “who sold drugs from his automobile, kept a supply of drugs and proceeds

from drug sales at his residence” when “[n]o evidence suggested” the defendant “stored

drugs in a separate place.” State v. Bynum, 579 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. App. 1998), rev.

denied (Minn. Aug. 18, 1998). Because the search-warrant affidavit indicated that Hinton

sold drugs via multiple vehicles, the issuing judge could reasonably infer that Hinton kept

drugs and related evidence in his apartment. Cf. Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 748-49 (determining

that the affidavit “failed to establish a sufficient nexus” to defendant’s home where the

affidavit “did not indicate that [defendant] ever arranged drug deals, sold, or distributed

drugs, much less that she performed such acts from her home”); State v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d

15, 18 (Minn. App. 1996) (declining to find “a reasonable nexus” between defendant’s

“possession of one ounce of cocaine in Minneapolis” and “possible evidence or contraband

at his residence 75 to 85 miles away” (emphasis added)).

For the first time on appeal, Hinton challenges the canine sniff, arguing that law

enforcement lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion because the CRI provided

16 information that Hinton was selling drugs on the streets “but had no information regarding

Hinton’s residence.” We “generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the

district court.” Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). We may, however,

address an issue for the first time on appeal if “the issue will not work an unfair surprise

on a party” and the record “permits us to address such an issue.” State v. Gauster,

752 N.W.2d 496, 508 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). Here, the district court determined

there was reasonable, articulable suspicion for the canine search and the parties’ briefs to

this court address the issue of reasonable, articulable suspicion. Accordingly, we consider

whether law enforcement had reasonable, articulable suspicion for the canine sniff of the

door seams of Hinton’s apartment.

“[P]olice need only reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity in order to

conduct a dog sniff, provided they are lawfully present in the place where the sniff is

conducted.” State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 523 (Minn. 2018). “Reasonable suspicion

must be based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d

173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). “The requisite showing is not high.” Id.

(quotation omitted). “The reasonable suspicion standard can also be met based on

information provided by a reliable informant.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393

(Minn. 2008).

The state contends that the CRI’s information “provided reasonable

suspicion . . . and thus supported the deployment of a narcotics-sniffing dog.” We agree.

As detailed above, the CRI’s tip had sufficient indicia of reliability. Thus, the CRI’s

17 information that Hinton was selling crack cocaine from multiple vehicles gave law

enforcement “more than an unarticulated hunch” to support a canine sniff in the hallway

outside Hinton’s apartment. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182. The canine’s positive alert to the

presence of narcotics at Hinton’s apartment-door seam established “a fair probability that

the evidence [of drugs would] be found” in Hinton’s apartment. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d

at 622. Indeed, Hinton does not challenge the district court’s determination that the

information from the canine sniff of his apartment-door seam provided the “appropriate

nexus for the search warrant.”

We therefore conclude that the totality of the circumstances provides a nexus

between the contraband sought and Hinton’s apartment, and accordingly, the district court

did not err in determining there was a sufficient nexus.

3. Staleness of the Search Warrant

Hinton contends that “[t]he warrant application was also deficient because the

information was stale by the time the warrant was executed” six days after it was issued.

Hinton raises this argument for the first time on appeal, and as noted above, we generally

decline to decide issues not raised in district court. Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357. But because

the facts are undisputed and this issue is addressed in the parties’ briefs, we consider

Hinton’s staleness argument. See Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 508; see also McKenzie v. State,

872 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Minn. 2015) (stating that a party is not disadvantaged by a court’s

18 consideration of an issue for the first time on appeal “when the previously unaddressed

issue involved a legal question and the parties had an opportunity to brief the question”).

Under Minnesota law, a search warrant must be executed “within ten days after its

date” or it “is void.” Minn. Stat. § 626.15(a) (2020). A search-warrant affidavit must

contain proof “of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify

a finding of probable cause at that time.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750 (quotation omitted).

“Factors relating to staleness include whether there is any indication of ongoing criminal

activity, whether the articles sought are innocuous or incriminating, whether the property

sought is easily disposable or transferable, and whether the items sought are of enduring

utility.” Id. Staleness “must be determined by the circumstances of each case,” and the

court’s “approach should be one of flexibility and common sense.” State v. King,

690 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29,

2005).

Hinton argues that because the CRI “did not say that Hinton was selling drugs or

had possessed the firearm on a continuing basis,” the warrant was stale. (Emphasis added.)

The state argues that the warrant provided a “clear indication of ongoing criminal activity”

based on the CRI’s information that Hinton was “selling crack cocaine” using “multiple

vehicles” and the canine’s “positive alert for narcotics at [Hinton’s] apartment door several

days after the CRI’s report of narcotics sales.” The state contends that Hinton appears to

argue that the search-warrant affidavit “did not use the term ‘ongoing criminal activity’ or

‘continuing criminal activity,’” but there is “no case law holding that this term of art must

be used.”

19 Caselaw supports the state’s arguments. In State v. Yaritz, the supreme court

determined that a warrant executed six days after it was issued was not stale because the

affidavit “indicate[d] that defendant was in the business of selling drugs and that he had

been doing it on a continuing basis.” 287 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 1979). The affidavit in

Yaritz stated that an informant told law enforcement the defendant was selling drugs, the

informant made two controlled buys of the drugs, and surveillance indicated the defendant

used two different vehicles to meet people for possible drug sales. Id. at 14 n.1. In State v.

Cavegn, the supreme court held that the information in a search-warrant affidavit was not

stale and indicated ongoing criminal activity where a CRI stated that the defendant was

selling drugs and law enforcement observed a controlled buy of the drugs. 356 N.W.2d

671, 672-74 (Minn. 1984).

Here, the search-warrant affidavit contained information from a CRI that is similar

to the information in Yaritz and Cavegn that suggested ongoing drug sales and was

determined to support probable cause. Because the affidavit indicated that Hinton was

engaged in ongoing criminal activity, we reject Hinton’s arguments that the warrant was

stale because the CRI did not use the exact phrase “ongoing criminal activity.” Thus, we

conclude that the warrant was not stale when executed six days after issued.

To summarize our analysis of probable cause, we determine that the CRI’s tip had

sufficient indicia of reliability, the search-warrant affidavit provided a sufficient nexus

between the contraband sought and Hinton’s apartment, and the warrant was not stale. The

district court therefore did not err by determining the issuing judge had a substantial basis

for concluding that probable cause to search existed.

20 B. The no-knock entry was supported by reasonable suspicion.

Hinton argues that “[t]he warrant application failed to provide sufficient facts that

would justify a no-knock entry.” 3 To justify a no-knock entry, “police must have a

reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular

circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective

investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” State v.

Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted). “In other contexts

[appellate courts] ha[ve] defined reasonable suspicion as something more than an

unarticulated hunch.” Id. “Boilerplate language that an announced entry would be

dangerous is insufficient.” Id. “When the material facts are undisputed, [appellate courts]

independently determine whether evidence obtained during a search conducted with a no-

knock warrant should be suppressed.” State v. Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App.

2004), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004).

The district court determined that reasonable suspicion supported the issuing

judge’s decision allowing a no-knock entry. The district court stated that the affidavit “did

not only use . . . boilerplate” language but gave “specifics for nighttime and no-knock

3 After Hinton’s offenses, the legislature amended the no-knock-warrant statute. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 9, §§ 5-7, at 145-46. The amendment provides that “[a] court may not issue or approve a no-knock search warrant unless the judge determines that the applicant has articulated specific, objective facts that establish probable cause for belief that: (1) the search cannot be executed while the premises is unoccupied;” and (2) the individual occupying the premises “present[s] an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to the officers executing the warrant or other persons.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 9, § 6, at 146. Because the amendment occurred after Hinton’s 2020 offenses, we do not analyze the no-knock entry under this amended standard.

21 [entry], which was the confidential informant’s information that [Hinton] was in possession

of a firearm, . . . that he has prior convictions that were specifically for murder, fleeing,

and weapons possession,” and “that he is known to have gang, Vice Lord, affiliations,” and

that “[w]hat the officer specifically knows of that particular gang is listed.”

In his brief to this court, Hinton argues that the affidavit relied on “boilerplate

language that courts have rejected as insufficient” and “lacked the particularized facts to

give police reasonable suspicion to believe an unannounced entry was necessary.” The

state contends that the affidavit contained “specific facts” establishing reasonable suspicion

for a no-knock entry.

The state’s argument is persuasive. The affidavit contained some boilerplate

language that a no-knock entry was “necessary to prevent the loss, destruction, or removal

of the objects of the search, or to protect the safety of the searchers or the public.” But the

affidavit also provided specifics about why announcing entry or entering during daytime

hours would be dangerous. The affidavit referenced “the CRI information that Hinton is in

possession of a firearm” and that Hinton “has prior convictions for murder, fleeing and

weapons possession, and that [Hinton’s apartment] is [in] an apartment complex

surrounded by multiple residences and near a transit stop where numerous members of the

public reside.” The affidavit further noted that “Hinton is affiliated with the gang Vice

Lords who [law enforcement] knows is a very violent gang who are known to commit

numerous violent crimes.”

The specifics regarding Hinton’s violent gang affiliation, his past convictions, his

possession of a gun, and the location of his apartment in a populous area provided

22 reasonable suspicion that a no-knock entry was necessary for the safety of law enforcement

and the public. See Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 320-21 (determining that the

reasonable-suspicion standard was satisfied where the affidavit contained some

“admittedly boilerplate language” but “also pointed to a specific objective piece of

information”). Thus, the district court did not err by concluding that reasonable suspicion

supported the issuing judge’s decision to allow no-knock entry into Hinton’s apartment.

II. The evidence was sufficient to sustain Hinton’s convictions for possession of the firearm, ammunition, and drugs found in his apartment.

Hinton argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for

possession of a firearm or ammunition by an ineligible person and fifth-degree

controlled-substance crime (possession). Due process requires that the state prove beyond

a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. State v. Hage,

595 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. 1999).

Here, the state was required to prove that Hinton knowingly possessed a firearm or

ammunition for count one and that he knowingly possessed one or more mixtures

containing a Schedule I controlled substance for count two. See Minn. Stat §§ 624.713,

subd. 1(2), 152.025, subd. 2(1); 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 20.36, 32.21 (2022).

In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, verdict, and order, the district court concluded

that as to count one, Hinton “knowingly constructively possessed a firearm and

ammunition” and that as to count two, Hinton “knowingly constructively possessed . . . a

controlled substance.” (Emphasis added.) Hinton challenges the state’s evidence that he

23 constructively possessed the firearm, ammunition, and drugs. Hinton does not challenge

the other elements of his convictions.

When the state does not prove that a defendant had actual possession, or “direct

physical control,” over an item, such as drugs or firearms, the state may satisfy its burden

of proof by showing constructive possession. State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn.

App. 2016). To prove constructive possession, the state must show either (a) that law

enforcement found the item in a location “under defendant’s exclusive control to which

other people did not normally have access,” or (b) if law enforcement found the item in a

location others could access, that “there is a strong probability (inferable from other

evidence) that defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over

it.” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). 4 “A defendant may possess an

item jointly with another person.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017).

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, appellate courts

“review criminal bench trials the same as jury trials.” State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556,

4 Hinton’s brief to this court argues that “the application of the constructive-possession doctrine [is] problematic.” Hinton relies on the following language from Florine: the constructive-possession doctrine applies where the state cannot prove actual possession but “where the inference is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the substance and did not abandon his possessory interest in the substance but rather continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.” 226 N.W.2d at 610 (emphasis added). Hinton contends that “because there was no evidence that Hinton had ever physically possessed the firearm and ammunition, he had no possessory interest in it to abandon.” Hinton appears to argue that prior physical possession is an element of constructive possession. We are not persuaded. Neither Florine nor other controlling caselaw makes prior physical possession an element of constructive possession. See id. at 611. Further, the record evidence suggests that Hinton at one time physically possessed the contraband found in his studio apartment.

24 562 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same

weight as direct evidence; however, if a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, a

higher level of scrutiny is warranted.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 (Minn.

2004). Hinton and the state analyze the “possession” element of counts one and two based

on circumstantial evidence.

When analyzing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-step

process. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the

circumstances proved, deferring “to the [fact-finder]’s acceptance of the proof of these

circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances

proved by the State.” Id. at 598-99. In other words, we “consider only those circumstances

that are consistent with the verdict.” Id. at 599. Second, we determine whether the

circumstances proved are (a) “consistent with guilt” and (b) “inconsistent with any rational

hypothesis except that of guilt,” giving “no deference to the fact finder’s choice between

reasonable inferences.” Id. (quotations omitted).

The district court’s order concluded that Hinton knowingly possessed a firearm,

ammunition, and a controlled substance. The order included detailed credibility

determinations, and we defer to those determinations. See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d

469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that “the trier of fact is in the best position to determine

credibility and weigh the evidence”). The district court did “not find [Hinton’s] testimony,

with respect to the firearms, ammunition and drugs, to be credible.” The district court found

“not plausible” Hinton’s assertion that “he had no idea there was a gun, ammunition, and

a box with a controlled substance located in various places throughout his small

25 apartment.” The district court also did “not find [girlfriend’s] testimony credible,” noting

that “oftentimes her testimony seemed too rehearsed and lacked the nuance typically seen

when a witness is testifying truthfully from direct knowledge.”

A. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that Hinton possessed a firearm or ammunition.

We first consider the sufficiency of the evidence for the possession element in count

one. The circumstances proved are the following. Law enforcement found a loaded gun

and two boxes and a bag of ammunition in Hinton’s small studio apartment, where he lived

by himself. Three others had a key to the apartment and occasionally accessed it. The

loaded gun was found in a black pouch next to a bookshelf containing video games, which

Hinton plays, and the gun was within arm’s reach of Hinton’s bed. Law enforcement found

ammunition in Hinton’s closet in the pocket of a multicolored jacket that was hanging next

to his clothes, in a black tote that also held Hinton’s clothes, and in a box with Hinton’s

funeral shoes.

Hinton argues that the circumstances proved for count one are not consistent with

guilt for two reasons that we consider in turn. First, he argues girlfriend “exercised sole

possession of the firearm and ammunition in the tote and jacket pocket” and “one of the

other persons who had access to the apartment left the ammunition in the shoe box.” We

disagree because Hinton’s argument rests on evidence that is not part of the circumstances

proved. The circumstances proved “do not include every circumstance as to which there

may be some testimony in the case, but only such circumstances as the [fact-finder] finds

proved by the evidence.” State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. 2010) (quotation

26 omitted). Identifying the circumstances proved “requires an appellate court to winnow

down the evidence presented at trial” to that which “preserve[s] the [fact-finder’s]

credibility findings” and weighing of the evidence. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600.

The district court did not find girlfriend’s testimony credible and found it “illogical”

that she “left a loaded firearm simply lying . . . on the floor of [Hinton’s] apartment right

next to where [Hinton] sleeps” and that she “would forget about three different containers

of ammunition and allow the ammunition to make its way into [Hinton’s] apartment.”

Because girlfriend’s testimony was deemed not credible by the district court, Hinton cannot

rely on it to argue that the circumstances proved show girlfriend exercised sole possession

of the firearm and ammunition. We therefore disregard girlfriend’s testimony and conclude

that the circumstances proved show that Hinton knowingly possessed the firearm and

ammunition in his apartment and are consistent with guilt. 5

Second, Hinton argues that the district court erred by concluding that Hinton

constructively possessed the firearm because he “had dominion and control over the area

where the firearm was found.” Hinton contends that caselaw requires the state to prove that

“Hinton had dominion and control over the firearm itself.” (Emphasis added.)

We have held that “a defendant must exercise dominion and control over the [item]

itself in order to constructively possess it.” State v. Hunter, 857 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Minn.

App. 2014). Here, the district court stated that “[a] person is in constructive possession of

5 Also, Hinton’s argument fails to recognize that a person may jointly possess contraband. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. So, the district court may have found that the loaded gun belonged to girlfriend and that Hinton exercised dominion and control over it at the time police found the gun in his apartment.

27 a firearm if . . . the person knowingly exercised dominion and control over the firearm.”

(Emphasis added.) And the district court’s analysis of the evidence was specific to Hinton’s

control over the firearm itself. The district court noted that Hinton “was sleeping alone on

an inflatable bed” and that “[t]he gun was right next to the bed and within arm’s reach of

[Hinton’s] position on the bed.” Thus, the district court properly applied the law in finding

that Hinton knowingly constructively possessed the firearm, despite its statement that

Hinton exercised dominion and control over the “area where the firearm was found.”

We next consider whether the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any

rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. Hinton argues that

the circumstances proved support a reasonable alternative hypothesis that he “lacked

knowledge” of the firearm and ammunition in his apartment.

Under count one, the state was required to prove that Hinton knowingly possessed

a firearm or ammunition. See Minn. Stat § 624.713, subd. 1(2); 10A Minnesota Practice,

CRIMJIG 20.36, 32.21 (2022). We therefore need only consider Hinton’s alternative

hypothesis regarding the firearm or ammunition. As to the firearm, Hinton asserts that even

if he saw the black bag that the loaded gun was in, “it is entirely reasonable that he did not

reach down . . . to retrieve it.” We disagree.

The circumstances proved establish that Hinton lived in a small studio apartment in

which the loaded gun was in arm’s reach of his bed and next to the video games he plays.

And as noted above, the district court did not find credible Hinton’s testimony that he had

no idea there was a gun in his “very little” studio apartment. Thus, we conclude that

28 Hinton’s theory that he lacked knowledge of the loaded gun is not a reasonable alternative

hypothesis supported by the circumstances proved.

Because count one only required the state to prove that Hinton knowingly possessed

a firearm or ammunition and we have concluded that the evidence was sufficient to show

that Hinton knowingly possessed a loaded gun, we need not consider whether Hinton

knowingly possessed the ammunition in the tote, multicolored jacket, and shoebox. The

district court concluded that under count one, Hinton knowingly possessed a gun and

ammunition. This finding may be due to the record evidence showing that the gun was

loaded when found. For the sake of completeness, we consider whether the circumstances

proved support Hinton’s alternative hypothesis that he was unaware of the ammunition in

his shoebox.

Hinton argues that “it is a reasonable possibility that Hinton’s nephew or someone

else” accessed the shoebox “to hide their own contraband” and that Hinton only saw “the

exterior of the box[].” We are not persuaded. Hinton acknowledged at trial that the shoes

in the shoebox were his, and the district court found it “not plausible [that Hinton] was

unaware of a box of ammunition resting on top of his own shoes.” Caselaw indicates that

it is reasonable to infer possession of a disputed item when a defendant’s other possessions

are found in the same location. See, e.g., State v. Colsch, 284 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn.

1979) (concluding there was sufficient evidence male defendant constructively possessed

drugs when they were found in a bedroom containing male clothing and papers and a

checkbook bearing defendant’s name).

29 The circumstances proved fail to show someone else with access to Hinton’s

apartment solely possessed the ammunition found in Hinton’s shoebox. Hinton testified

that his nephew, girlfriend, and his friend “had a key to [his] apartment.” But this evidence

alone does not reasonably support an inference that one of these other people solely

possessed the ammunition in Hinton’s shoebox. First, we need not consider Hinton’s

testimony because the district court found it not credible and that it was “not plausible

[Hinton] was unaware of a box of ammunition resting on top of his own shoes.” Second,

we “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere

conjecture.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473. 6 Accordingly, we conclude that the

circumstances proved do not support Hinton’s theory that he lacked knowledge of the

ammunition in his shoebox.

In sum, the evidence was sufficient to support Hinton’s conviction for possession

of a firearm or ammunition by an ineligible person.

B. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that Hinton possessed a controlled substance.

Next, we consider the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of Hinton’s

possession of drugs for count two. The circumstances proved are the following. As noted

above, Hinton lived in a small studio apartment by himself, which others occasionally

accessed. Law enforcement found a box on top of Hinton’s refrigerator containing both a

controlled substance and a credit-union card with Hinton’s name.

6 As discussed supra note 5, Hinton’s argument fails to consider that evidence of joint possession is sufficient to support a conviction under the charged statute.

30 On appeal, Hinton contends that the circumstances proved are not consistent with

guilt because “one of the other persons who had access to the apartment” left a controlled

substance in the box above Hinton’s refrigerator. But Hinton’s brief to this court ignores

the evidence that his credit-union card was found in the box alongside the controlled

substance. The circumstances proved are therefore consistent with guilt and Hinton’s

knowing possession of a controlled substance.

We also determine that Hinton’s alterative hypothesis is not reasonable. Like with

the ammunition in the shoebox, Hinton contends that “it is a reasonable possibility that

Hinton’s nephew or someone else” accessed the top of the refrigerator to “hide their own

contraband” and that Hinton had “no knowledge” because he could only see the exterior of

the box. As detailed above, the evidence that other people had access to Hinton’s apartment

rests on Hinton’s credibility, which the district court discredited. Also, Hinton’s own

testimony does not reasonably support the alternative hypothesis that “someone else”

possessed the controlled substance found in a box with his credit-union card. See State v.

Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 861 (Minn. 2008) (refusing to reverse a conviction based on

“mere conjecture or the possibility of innocence when the evidence shows such possibility

is unreasonable”). We conclude that the circumstances proved for count two are

inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of Hinton’s constructive possession

of the drugs, and thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Hinton’s conviction for

fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance.

31 III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hinton’s motion to compel disclosure of information about the confidential informant.

Hinton challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to compel disclosure of

information about the CRI, arguing that his “right to prepare his defense outweighed the

state’s privilege to withhold information regarding the informant.” Appellate courts

“review a district court order regarding disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity for

an abuse of discretion.” State v. Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Minn. 2008). “The state

has a legitimate interest in protecting the identity of persons who provide information to

law enforcement.” State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn. 2002). The state’s privilege

to withhold a CRI’s identity “is not unlimited, however, and it gives way when the

disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant

and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”

Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d at 90 (quotation omitted).

The supreme court has outlined four factors that district courts should consider in

determining whether to order disclosure of information about a CRI: “(1) [w]hether the

informant was a material witness; (2) [w]hether [the] informer’s testimony will be material

to the issue of guilt; (3) [w]hether testimony of officers is suspect; and (4) [w]hether the

informant’s testimony might disclose entrapment.” Id. (quotation omitted) (citing

Syrovatka v. State, 278 N.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Minn. 1979)). The four Syrovatka factors are

not exclusive, and ultimately, the district court must perform “a balancing test between the

defendant’s right to prepare a defense and the public’s interest in effective law

enforcement.” Id. “In rare cases a criminal defendant’s interest in learning the identity of a

32 police informant outweighs the state’s privilege not to disclose the identity.” State v.

Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Minn. 1989). “The defendant bears the burden of making a

showing sufficient to require disclosure.” State v. Solheim, 477 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Minn.

App. 1991).

Hinton moved to compel disclosure of identifying information about the CRI. In the

alternative, Hinton moved for disclosure of nonidentifying information “that goes to the

veracity of the CRI” or an in-camera review of all information related to the CRI. The

district court denied Hinton’s requests. 7

We first consider the district court’s denial of Hinton’s request for the CRI’s

identifying information. The district court determined that under the first two Syrovatka

factors, “disclosure of the informant’s identity is unwarranted because [Hinton] has not

shown that the informant is a material witness or that the informant’s testimony will be

material to the issue of guilt.” The district court noted that the charges “are not based on

any [incident the CRI] previously observed . . . but on the firearm and narcotics that police

discovered firsthand in [Hinton’s] residence.” Under the third Syrovatka factor, the district

court determined that Hinton did not provide “sufficient indication that the testimony of

the officers is suspect.” The district court emphasized that the CRI provided accurate and

reliable information in the past and that law enforcement “corroborated the informant’s key

information.” The district court did not consider the last Syrovatka factor because Hinton

did not “contend[] that the informant’s testimony might disclose entrapment.”

7 On appeal, Hinton does not challenge the district court’s denial of in-camera review.

33 In his brief to this court, Hinton argues that “[d]isclosure of the informant’s identity”

was “essential to Hinton’s defense.” Under the Syrovatka factors, Hinton first contends that

“the informant was a material witness” because “the informant was the only potential

witness to [Hinton’s] actual possession of the firearm and drugs.” The state argues that “the

CRI was not present at the time the search warrant was executed and thus was not a witness

to the crimes with which [Hinton] was charged.”

The state’s argument is persuasive. “[W]hen a trustworthy informant is a mere

transmitter of information and not a competent witness to the crime itself . . . the

informant’s name need not be disclosed when the information was used as a basis for

probable cause to search or arrest.” State v. Purdy, 153 N.W.2d 254, 262 (Minn. 1967). For

example, we determined that a defendant “did not make a sufficient showing of need for

the disclosure of the informants’ identity” where the charges “were based primarily [on the

defendant’s] possession” of contraband and “[t]he information supplied by the informants

was only used to obtain the search warrants.” State v. Marshall, 411 N.W.2d 276, 280

(Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 1987); see also State v. Ford, 322 N.W.2d

611, 614 (Minn. 1982) (concluding that the defendant failed to show the need for disclosure

of the CRI’s identity when “the informant was not a witness to any of the events . . . on

which the state relied in establishing defendant’s guilt”).

Hinton’s charges were based on possession of a firearm, ammunition, and drugs

found during a search of his apartment. The CRI was not a witness to the charged crimes.

Rather, like the CRI in Marshall, the CRI here only supplied information used to obtain a

34 search warrant. Thus, the district court did not err by determining that the CRI was “not a

material witness to the charged offenses” and was not “material to the issue of guilt.”

Next, Hinton argues that under the third Syrovatka factor, “various statements in the

warrant application were suspect” because the affidavit “provided no basis as to why the

informant was reliable” and corroborated only “generic” information from the CRI. The

state argues that Hinton is “reiterating the argument . . . that the warrant affidavit did not

establish probable cause for the search of his residence, not showing that the statements

made in the affidavit were suspect.” Indeed, Hinton challenged the district court’s

probable-cause determination on the same grounds he raises here. Because, as detailed

above, the search-warrant affidavit established the CRI’s reliability and corroborated

specific details from the CRI’s tip, Hinton fails to show that the affidavit contained

“suspect” statements. We conclude that Hinton has not met his burden to show that

disclosure of the CRI’s identity was required. Thus, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Hinton’s motion to compel disclosure of identifying information

about the CRI.

Second, we consider the district court’s denial of Hinton’s request for

nonidentifying information related to the CRI’s veracity. The district court based its denial

on “the same reasons that [Hinton] is not entitled to the informant’s identity” while also

noting that defendants are “generally not entitled to impeachment information about

individuals who will not testify at trial” and that “the informant is not a hearsay declarant

whose credibility is at issue.”

35 Hinton asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to

compel disclosure of nonidentifying information because “no privilege attaches to the

informant’s non-identifying information.” Hinton relies on United States Supreme Court

caselaw that states, “[W]here the disclosure of the contents of a communication will not

reveal the identity of [a CRI], the contents are not privileged.” Roviaro v. United States,

353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957). Still, Hinton must prove that the disclosure of information about a

CRI “is relevant and helpful to the defense . . . or is essential to a fair determination of a

cause.” Id. at 60-61; accord Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d at 90. As described above, Hinton fails

to do so. Because Hinton does not make separate arguments as to why the CRI’s

nonidentifying information was essential to his defense, he likewise fails to show that the

district court abused its discretion by denying disclosure of the CRI’s nonidentifying

information.

Affirmed.