This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1373
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Joseph Douglas Ankney, Appellant.
Filed June 20, 2016 Affirmed Toussaint, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69HI-CR-15-38
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Brian D. Simonson, Assistant County Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Sharon R. Markowitz, Liz Kramer, Special Assistant Public Defenders, Stinson Leonard Street LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TOUSSAINT, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. Because the
three criteria of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement were met, we affirm
the denial of the motion to suppress.
DECISION
When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate
court applies the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and a de
novo standard to its legal determinations. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn.
2012) (citation omitted).
When Hibbing police officers E. and H. responded to a complaint that rocks had
been thrown through the picture window of a residence, the officers saw distinctive
footprints in the snow 15 to 20 feet in front of the broken window. The complainant
identified appellant Joseph Ankney as the only potential suspect, and the officers knew
appellant had previously violated the restraining order prohibiting him from being at the
complainant’s residence.
The officers went to appellant’s apartment complex, where they noticed a footprint
matching those they had seen. They entered the complex, went to appellant’s apartment,
and knocked on the door. Appellant opened it, and one officer saw a pair of shoes, one of
which was turned to display a sole identical to those that had made the footprints. The
shoes were taken into evidence.
2 Appellant moved to suppress this evidence. His motion involved a legal
determination of whether the officer who saw the shoes met the three criteria of the plain-
view exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 671
(Minn. 2015) (listing the criteria of the plain-view exception: (1) the officer be lawfully in
the position from which the item is in plain view, (2) the officer has a lawful right of access
to the item, and (3) the incriminating nature of the item be immediately apparent to the
officer).
1. Was the officer lawfully in the position from which the shoes were in plain view?
The officers testified that, when they arrived at appellant’s apartment, they heard
music loud enough to violate the city ordinance. Officer E., standing in front of Officer
H., knocked. Officer H. testified that, when appellant opened the door, the music was too
loud “to have a common conversation,” that Officer E. told appellant they needed to talk
to him about the music, asked him to turn it down, and asked if they could come in, and
that appellant walked about 12 feet into the apartment turned the radio down, and turned
around to face the officers. Officer H. was asked where he was at this point; he answered,
“I was behind [Officer E.] standing in the doorway.” Asked what he could see from the
doorway, Officer H. answered that he “looked to the left around the door frame – the door
itself” and “there were the shoes on the floor; one of them was tipped on its side.” When
Officer H. was asked if he had stepped into the apartment at this point, he said he “had
taken one, maybe one step” and that “[his] shoulder was rubbing on the door or holding
the door open.” Officer H. testified that Officer E. continued speaking with appellant;
3 when asked if, during their conversation, he had moved farther into the apartment, he said,
“[A]t this point, no.” He was asked if he was “essentially at the doorway then?” and
answered, “Yup.”
On cross examination, Officer H. testified:
Q. So [appellant] opens the door and he’s asked to turn down the music?” A. Yes. Q. Okay. He turns away to do that and then you and [Officer E.] walk in the apartment. A. Yeah, [appellant] started to walk away from us. And we didn’t walk into the apartment, [Officer E.] took a step to the front edge of the door and I followed behind him.
Officer E. testified that he “stepped across the threshold” of appellant’s apartment and
walked “four [or] five feet” into it and that, when he did so, Officer H. “was still standing
at the threshold of the doorway.”1
Officer H. was lawfully in the doorway of appellant’s apartment when he saw the
shoes in plain view.
2. Did the officer have a lawful right of access to the shoes?
“A peace officer shall arrest without a warrant and take into custody a person whom
the peace officer has probable cause to believe has violated” a harassment restraining order.
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(g) (2014) (emphasis added); see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd.
16 (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”) (2014); see also State v. Patricelli, 324 N.W.2d 351, 353
(Minn. 1982) (“We believe that the United States Supreme Court will uphold nonexigent
1 Officer E. further testified that, when he was four or five feet into the apartment, “[the] shoes [were] behind me at the time,” which would be consistent with the shoes being in the plain view of someone standing in the doorway.
4 warrantless arrests initiated at the threshold of a suspect’s house where the suspect
voluntarily opens the door in response to knocking.”). Because the officers had probable
cause to believe that appellant violated the restraining order, they had a right and an
obligation to arrest him and take him into custody.
Officer E. testified that, while Officer H. was still in the doorway, appellant “started
stepping towards . . . [a] three foot bat or pole”; he “was [getting] within six feet of it”; and
“his eyes were quickly glancing in the direction of that bat.” Officer H. testified that, when
Officer E. told him there was “a bat of some sort” in the apartment, he “stepped forward
into the apartment” while Officer E. “was grabbing ahold of [appellant].” The officers then
arrested appellant for violation of the restraining order, as mandated by Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 6(g). Having entered the apartment to arrest appellant, Officer H. had
lawful access to the shoes.
3. Was the incriminating nature of the shoes immediately apparent to the officer?
Officer H. testified that, in front of the complainant’s house, he saw “two sets of
identical tracks. . . . [There] was [a] distinct tread pattern on the shoe print . . . [and] the
rear outer corner of the tread was worn perfectly smooth.” He also testified that, outside
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1373
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Joseph Douglas Ankney, Appellant.
Filed June 20, 2016 Affirmed Toussaint, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69HI-CR-15-38
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Brian D. Simonson, Assistant County Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Sharon R. Markowitz, Liz Kramer, Special Assistant Public Defenders, Stinson Leonard Street LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TOUSSAINT, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. Because the
three criteria of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement were met, we affirm
the denial of the motion to suppress.
DECISION
When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate
court applies the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and a de
novo standard to its legal determinations. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn.
2012) (citation omitted).
When Hibbing police officers E. and H. responded to a complaint that rocks had
been thrown through the picture window of a residence, the officers saw distinctive
footprints in the snow 15 to 20 feet in front of the broken window. The complainant
identified appellant Joseph Ankney as the only potential suspect, and the officers knew
appellant had previously violated the restraining order prohibiting him from being at the
complainant’s residence.
The officers went to appellant’s apartment complex, where they noticed a footprint
matching those they had seen. They entered the complex, went to appellant’s apartment,
and knocked on the door. Appellant opened it, and one officer saw a pair of shoes, one of
which was turned to display a sole identical to those that had made the footprints. The
shoes were taken into evidence.
2 Appellant moved to suppress this evidence. His motion involved a legal
determination of whether the officer who saw the shoes met the three criteria of the plain-
view exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 671
(Minn. 2015) (listing the criteria of the plain-view exception: (1) the officer be lawfully in
the position from which the item is in plain view, (2) the officer has a lawful right of access
to the item, and (3) the incriminating nature of the item be immediately apparent to the
officer).
1. Was the officer lawfully in the position from which the shoes were in plain view?
The officers testified that, when they arrived at appellant’s apartment, they heard
music loud enough to violate the city ordinance. Officer E., standing in front of Officer
H., knocked. Officer H. testified that, when appellant opened the door, the music was too
loud “to have a common conversation,” that Officer E. told appellant they needed to talk
to him about the music, asked him to turn it down, and asked if they could come in, and
that appellant walked about 12 feet into the apartment turned the radio down, and turned
around to face the officers. Officer H. was asked where he was at this point; he answered,
“I was behind [Officer E.] standing in the doorway.” Asked what he could see from the
doorway, Officer H. answered that he “looked to the left around the door frame – the door
itself” and “there were the shoes on the floor; one of them was tipped on its side.” When
Officer H. was asked if he had stepped into the apartment at this point, he said he “had
taken one, maybe one step” and that “[his] shoulder was rubbing on the door or holding
the door open.” Officer H. testified that Officer E. continued speaking with appellant;
3 when asked if, during their conversation, he had moved farther into the apartment, he said,
“[A]t this point, no.” He was asked if he was “essentially at the doorway then?” and
answered, “Yup.”
On cross examination, Officer H. testified:
Q. So [appellant] opens the door and he’s asked to turn down the music?” A. Yes. Q. Okay. He turns away to do that and then you and [Officer E.] walk in the apartment. A. Yeah, [appellant] started to walk away from us. And we didn’t walk into the apartment, [Officer E.] took a step to the front edge of the door and I followed behind him.
Officer E. testified that he “stepped across the threshold” of appellant’s apartment and
walked “four [or] five feet” into it and that, when he did so, Officer H. “was still standing
at the threshold of the doorway.”1
Officer H. was lawfully in the doorway of appellant’s apartment when he saw the
shoes in plain view.
2. Did the officer have a lawful right of access to the shoes?
“A peace officer shall arrest without a warrant and take into custody a person whom
the peace officer has probable cause to believe has violated” a harassment restraining order.
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(g) (2014) (emphasis added); see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd.
16 (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”) (2014); see also State v. Patricelli, 324 N.W.2d 351, 353
(Minn. 1982) (“We believe that the United States Supreme Court will uphold nonexigent
1 Officer E. further testified that, when he was four or five feet into the apartment, “[the] shoes [were] behind me at the time,” which would be consistent with the shoes being in the plain view of someone standing in the doorway.
4 warrantless arrests initiated at the threshold of a suspect’s house where the suspect
voluntarily opens the door in response to knocking.”). Because the officers had probable
cause to believe that appellant violated the restraining order, they had a right and an
obligation to arrest him and take him into custody.
Officer E. testified that, while Officer H. was still in the doorway, appellant “started
stepping towards . . . [a] three foot bat or pole”; he “was [getting] within six feet of it”; and
“his eyes were quickly glancing in the direction of that bat.” Officer H. testified that, when
Officer E. told him there was “a bat of some sort” in the apartment, he “stepped forward
into the apartment” while Officer E. “was grabbing ahold of [appellant].” The officers then
arrested appellant for violation of the restraining order, as mandated by Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 6(g). Having entered the apartment to arrest appellant, Officer H. had
lawful access to the shoes.
3. Was the incriminating nature of the shoes immediately apparent to the officer?
Officer H. testified that, in front of the complainant’s house, he saw “two sets of
identical tracks. . . . [There] was [a] distinct tread pattern on the shoe print . . . [and] the
rear outer corner of the tread was worn perfectly smooth.” He also testified that, outside
appellant’s apartment complex, he “did notice one footprint matching the footprint [he]
saw at [the complainant’s] residence identically, and it was . . . within about an inch of the
threshold of the doorway into the apartment complex.” Finally, he testified that, when he
looked to the left from the doorway of appellant’s apartment, “there were the shoes on the
floor; one of them was tipped on its side. You could see the bottom tread pattern . . . .”
When asked what he could see about the tread pattern, he answered, “It matched the tread
5 patterns at the scene, as well as the footprint outside of the apartment building.” Officer
H. knew that there was a harassment restraining order prohibiting appellant from being
near the complainant’s house and that someone wearing shoes with that tread pattern had
been in the complainant’s front yard and thrown rocks through her window. The
incriminating nature of the shoes he saw from appellant’s doorway was immediately
apparent to Officer H.
The shoes were in plain view from the doorway of appellant’s apartment: the officer
who saw them was lawfully in the position from which they were in plain view; the officer
had lawful access to the shoes when he entered the apartment to arrest appellant; and the
incriminating nature of the shoes was immediately apparent to the officer. The criteria of
the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement were satisfied, and there was no error
in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the shoes as evidence.
Affirmed.