State of Minnesota v. John Tyrus Anderson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: a230613r
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0613

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

John Tyrus Anderson, Appellant.

Filed March 2, 2026 Affirmed Schmidt, Judge

Chisago County District Court File No. 13-CR-20-456

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kristi Nielsen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Kirk,

Judge. *

SYLLABUS

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 144

(Minn. 2025), holding that the statutory venue requirement in Minn. Stat. § 627.01 (2024)

is not an element of an offense, is not limited to cases involving guilty pleas.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

This case is before us on remand from the supreme court for reconsideration in light

of State v. Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 144 (Minn. 2025). In that case, the supreme court held that

the statutory venue requirement is not an element of an offense and upheld a guilty plea

even though the factual basis for the plea did not establish the venue requirement. Applying

Paulson’s rule, we reject appellant’s argument that his conviction following a trial must be

reversed for insufficient evidence of venue and we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant John Tyrus Anderson with three

counts of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult in Chisago County. The state

aggregated numerous offenses into three counts covering different time periods. Count

one involved over 300 offenses totaling $37,595.29 and included one victim who resided

in Chisago County. Count two involved over 150 offenses totaling $17,905.41, and

included one victim who resided in Chisago County. Count three involved five offenses

totaling $309.37 and included three victims. For count 3, the record is silent about where

the offense occurred or whether any victim resided in Chisago County.

After waiving his jury-trial rights, the district court held a trial on stipulated

evidence and found Anderson guilty of all three counts. The district court found that

Anderson “intentionally used, managed, or took either temporarily or permanently the

money of the vulnerable adults for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult

for [whom] the money was intended.” The court also determined that venue was proper in

2 Chisago County for all counts. The district court entered judgments of conviction on all

counts, stayed imposition of sentence on counts one and two, and imposed a misdemeanor

sentence on count three.

Anderson appealed and challenged only his conviction on count three, arguing that

venue is an essential element and that the state failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable

doubt. 1 We agreed and reversed Anderson’s conviction for this count. State v. Anderson,

No. A23-0613, 2024 WL 1613914, at *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 15, 2024), rev’d mem., (Minn.

Oct. 15, 2025). The supreme court granted the state’s petition for further review and stayed

the case pending the final disposition in Paulson.

The supreme court then issued its Paulson decision, holding “that the statutory

venue requirement set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 627.01 is not an element of an

offense.” Paulson, 22 N.W.3d at 151. After deciding Paulson, the supreme court lifted

the stay in Anderson’s case, reversed our decision, and remanded for reconsideration in

light of Paulson. See State v. Anderson, No. A23-0613 (Minn. Oct. 15, 2025) (mem.).

The parties have submitted supplemental briefs addressing the impact of Paulson

on this appeal. We now reconsider our decision based on the supreme court’s directive.

ISSUE

Does the holding in Paulson—that the statutory venue requirement in Minnesota

Statute section 627.01 is not an element of a criminal offense—apply to cases that

proceeded to trial?

1 As relevant here, the venue statute provides that “every criminal cause shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed.” Minn. Stat. § 627.01, subd. 1.

3 ANALYSIS

The state must “prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt”

before a defendant may be convicted of a charged crime. State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134,

142 (Minn. 2020). In evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence stemming from either a

jury trial or a bench trial, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the verdict

to determine whether the facts permitted the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the

defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense for which he was convicted.

State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).

Following a court trial, a district court convicted Anderson of financial exploitation

of a vulnerable adult. The elements of this crime are: whoever, “in breach of a fiduciary

obligation,” intentionally “uses, manages, or takes either temporarily or permanently the

real or personal property or other financial resources of the vulnerable adult . . . for the

benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult” commits the crime of financial

exploitation. Minn. Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1)(ii) (2016). A charge of financial

exploitation of a vulnerable adult may be prosecuted in the county where any part of the

offense occurred or in the county of residence of a victim. Id. at subd. 5 (2016). The

general venue statute provides that “every criminal cause shall be tried in the county where

the offense was committed.” Minn. Stat. § 627.01.

In his direct appeal, Anderson only argued that the state failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the venue element for count three. We agreed and concluded that

Anderson’s conviction must be reversed. After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme

Court reversed our decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Paulson.

4 We begin by detailing the circumstances that gave rise to the supreme court’s

decision in Paulson. The state charged Paulson by amended complaint in Anoka County

District Court with criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping to facilitate a felony—

specifically, a second-degree controlled-substance crime. Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 147. The

complaint alleged that Paulson removed the child victim from Wisconsin to Minnesota,

where he sexually assaulted her. Id. Police encountered the victim in Anoka County. Id.

The district court denied Paulson’s motion challenging venue in Anoka County for

the criminal sexual conduct charges because venue is proper where the victim is found

under Minn. Stat. § 627.15 (2024). Id. Paulson did not argue that Anoka County was an

improper venue for the kidnapping charge. Id. at 148. Instead, Paulson pleaded guilty to

kidnapping, appealed, and argued that the kidnapping plea was inaccurate because the

factual basis did not establish the statutory venue requirement under section 627.01. Id.

We rejected this argument, concluding that venue is not an element of the offense. Id.

The supreme court granted Paulson’s petition for review and considered whether

“the statutory right under section 627.01 to insist that a criminal trial be held in the county

where the crime was committed [is] an element of the offense?” Id. at 150. The supreme

court answered “no” to that question, holding that the statutory venue requirement in

section 627.01 is not an element of an offense “because a violation of the statutory venue

requirement does not negate a defendant’s criminal culpability.” Id. at 151. Accordingly,

the supreme court concluded that the state’s failure to establish venue as part of the factual

basis of a plea did not make the plea inaccurate. Id.

5 We now turn to the parties’ arguments on remand. Anderson raises three arguments.

First, he contends that Paulson, which involved an Alford plea, does not apply because

Anderson was convicted after a trial. Second, Anderson argues that if Paulson applies to

cases that proceeded to trial, applying Paulson to his case would violate the Ex Post Facto

Clause because it changed the evidence required to convict him. Finally, Anderson argues

that applying Paulson to his case is fundamentally unfair.

The state responds that the supreme court’s holding in Paulson is not limited to

cases involving guilty pleas. The state asserts that applying Paulson would not violate the

Ex Post Facto Clause because the supreme court clarified the elements of the offense rather

than change the elements of the offense. Finally, the state contends that Paulson controls

and compels the conviction to be affirmed. The state’s arguments are more persuasive.

First, Anderson’s argument that Paulson is limited to guilty-plea cases is belied by

the supreme court’s opinion. Although the court indicated that the “narrow question” was

whether the factual basis for the plea was accurate, the court framed the issue broadly: “Is

the statutory right under section 627.01 to insist that a criminal trial be held in the county

where the crime was committed an element of the offense?” Id. at 150. The court did not

limit this rationale to guilty plea cases.

Second, applying Paulson to Anderson’s case does not violate the Ex Post Facto

Clause. Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the enactment of

ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 11; see also

Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 790 (Minn. 2014) (“Both provisions prohibit laws that

render an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was

6 committed.” (quotation omitted)). The Minnesota Supreme Court did not substantively

change the elements of any criminal offense in deciding Paulson. Paulson, 22 N.W.3d at

150. Instead, the supreme court clarified that the section 627.01 venue requirement is not

an element of criminal offenses. Id. The elements for a defendant’s culpability for

violating a criminal statute remained the same. Id.

In addition, we are not persuaded by Anderson’s arguments regarding the Ex Post

Facto Clause that are premised upon Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000). In Carmell,

the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether an amended Texas

statute—which eliminated the corroboration requirement for certain sexual offenses—

could apply to acts alleged to have occurred before the statute was amended. 529 U.S. at

522, 530. The Supreme Court reasoned that the amendment altered the quantum of

evidence necessary to convict and, therefore, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 530.

Unlike Carmell, the Minnesota Legislature did not change the statutory elements of

the offense or the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction. Rather, the

Minnesota Supreme Court construed existing statutes and clarified that the statutory venue

requirement is not an element of a criminal offense. Paulson, 22 N.W.3d at 150. The

supreme court had not previously addressed this question. To the extent that our court’s

prior decisions had concluded otherwise, the supreme court held that those opinions—

applying the same, unchanged venue statutes—were wrong. Because the substantive

elements of the crime of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult have not changed, we

are not persuaded that applying Paulson to our review of Anderson’s conviction violates

the Ex Post Facto Clause.

7 Finally, applying Paulson to Anderson’s conviction is not fundamentally unfair.

The cases that Anderson cites for his fairness argument are inapposite. For example,

Anderson does not argue that his trial was fundamentally unfair due to restrictions on his

ability to present a defense. See State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. 1992).

Nor does Anderson’s case involve an insufficiently detailed restitution affidavit for which

he had no notice. See State v. Seeman, 25 N.W.3d 858, 866 (Minn. 2025). Instead,

Anderson argues in his principal brief on appeal that his “conviction on Count 3 [must] be

reversed because the [s]tate failed to meet its burden of proof that the offense charged in

Count 3 occurred in Chisago County.” The supreme court has now held that the venue

requirement set forth in section 627.01 is not an element of this, or any other criminal

offense. Paulson, 22 N.W.2d at 151.

Applying Paulson, we conclude that Anderson’s conviction for financial

exploitation of a vulnerable adult in count three must be affirmed.

DECISION

The holding in Paulson that the statutory venue requirement in Minnesota Statute

section 627.01 is not an element of an offense that applied to cases that proceeded to trial.

Applying Paulson to Anderson’s case is neither a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause,

nor fundamentally unfair. Because the venue requirement in section 627.01 is not an

element of an offense, the state was not required to prove that any of the five offenses

covered by count three occurred in Chisago County—or that any of the three victims reside

in Chisago County—in order to sustain a conviction for that count.

Affirmed.