This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1921
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Jimmy Clyde Griffin, Appellant.
Filed August 22, 2016 Affirmed Toussaint, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-15-10001
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TOUSSAINT, Judge
On appeal from his convictions of prohibited person in possession of a firearm and
fifth-degree controlled substance crime, appellant argues (1) the seized pellet gun and
marijuana should have been suppressed when the district court judge advised and authorized
appellant’s probation officer to conduct a warrantless search of appellant’s residence based
on tips that appellant had a .38 caliber gun and drugs; (2) the district court improperly directed
a verdict when it instructed the jury that pellet guns are firearms under Minnesota law; (3) the
court materially misstated the law when it instructed the jury that the word “knowingly” only
refers to possession of the firearm and that the state was not required to prove appellant knew
the gun was a firearm under state law; and (4) the state’s evidence failed to establish that
appellant possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt because he possessed a pellet gun,
and a pellet gun is not a firearm within the meaning of the statute. Because (1) the search of
Griffin’s home was supported by reasonable suspicion, (2) the district court did not abuse its
discretion in its jury instructions, and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support Griffin’s
firearm conviction, we affirm.
DECISION
I.
Appellant Jimmy Griffin argues that a pellet gun and marijuana seized during an April
2015 search of his home must be suppressed because the search was not supported by
reasonable suspicion. The search was conducted by Griffin’s probation agent after she
received a tip that Griffin had drugs in a black backpack and a second tip that Griffin had
2 drugs and kept a gun in his desk drawer. After the district court denied Griffin’s motion to
suppress, a jury convicted him of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2014), and fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(b)(1) (2014). We review de novo a
district court’s order on constitutional questions involving searches and seizures. State v.
Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 2007). The district court’s factual findings will not
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee individuals the right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
warrantless search of a person’s residence is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d at 136. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has concluded that a state’s interest in ensuring that probationers comply with the conditions
of their probation “presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable cause-requirements.” Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873-75, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168-69 (1987). A warrantless search of a
probationer’s home is valid if it is reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Anderson, 733 N.W.2d at 138. In this context, “the reasonableness of a search is determined
by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591
(2001) (quotation omitted); see also Anderson, 732 N.W.2d at 137 (adopting Knights’s
approach).
3 We apply the Knights test to determine the level of suspicion necessary to make the
probation search of Griffin’s home reasonable. We first consider the degree to which the
search infringed on Griffin’s right to privacy. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S. Ct. at 591. As
the Minnesota Supreme Court explained in Anderson, Griffin’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy was diminished merely by virtue of his status as a probationer.” 733 N.W.2d at 139.
Griffin was also subject to a probation condition requiring him to submit to “cursory searches
of [his] person and residence.” Griffin does not challenge the validity of this condition. A
valid search condition further reduces a probationer’s expectation of privacy. Knights, 534
U.S. at 119-20, 122 S. Ct. at 592.
Second, we consider “the degree to which [the search] is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.” Id. at 119, 122 S. Ct. at 591. We must recognize “the
state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that [Griffin] abides by the terms of his probation.”
Anderson, 733 N.W.2d at 140. Griffin was on probation for a fifth-degree controlled-
substance offense, and his probation agreement specifically forbade him from possessing any
“non-prescribed mood-altering substances.” As conditions of probation, Griffin was also
prohibited from possessing any firearms or ammunition and required to remain law abiding.
The institution of probation assumes “that the probationer is more likely than the ordinary
citizen to violate the law.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 120, 122 S. Ct. at 592 (quotation omitted).
At the same time, the state also has the “hope that [a probationer] will successfully complete
probation and be integrated back into the community.” Id. at 120-21, 122 S. Ct. at 592. The
state was therefore justified in focusing on Griffin to ensure that he followed the terms of his
probation. See id. at 121, 122 S. Ct. at 592 (stating that the state “may . . . justifiably focus
4 on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen”); Anderson, 733 N.W.2d at
137 (explaining that the state has a “special need” to ensure that probationers comply with
conditions).
In weighing similar competing interests, the United States Supreme Court in Knights
and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Anderson concluded that, where a valid search condition
exists, a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence may be based on reasonable
suspicion. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S. Ct. at 592; Anderson, 733 N.W.2d at 140.
Likewise, because Griffin was on probation and subject to a valid search condition, we
determine that the search of his home was reasonable under the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions as long as it was based on reasonable suspicion.1
The district court determined that reasonable suspicion existed to support the search of
Griffin’s residence.2 The court found reasonable suspicion based on the information provided
to Griffin’s probation officer, Noni Karkoska, by two informants.
The first informant contacted Karkoska on February 6, 2015. She told Karkoska that
Griffin had been selling marijuana, which he kept in a black backpack. From prior contacts,
1 In the district court, Griffin argued that the search of his residence went beyond the “cursory search[]” authorized by his probation condition and therefore could not be based on reasonable suspicion. On appeal, Griffin does not make this claim. Accordingly, we do not address whether the search exceeded the scope of the probation condition or what effect this would have on the level of suspicion required for the search. See Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 24 n.1 (Minn. 1992) (stating that a claim not addressed in appellant’s brief is forfeited). We note, however, the district court’s finding that Griffin gave the probation officer consent to search the drawer where the pellet gun was located and that prior to that point “the cursory search provision had not been violated.” 2 The district court actually went further and determined that the search was justified under the higher probable-cause standard.
5 Karkoska knew that this informant had a long-standing relationship with Griffin. The second
informant called Karkoska on March 31, 2015. Although Karkoska did not personally know
this informant and the informant did not leave her name, the informant left a phone number
at which Karkoska subsequently contacted her. The second informant told Karkoska that
there were drugs in Griffin’s home and that Griffin had a “.38-caliber” gun in his desk drawer.
The district court found that both informants came forward voluntarily and without
solicitation. The district court further found that both informants appeared to be first-time
citizen informants and were presumed to be reliable. The court also noted that neither person
was anonymous. Both informants left a phone number, and the first informant also gave her
name.
Reasonable suspicion requires “‘a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct
is occurring to make the intrusion on the probationer’s privacy interest reasonable.’”
Anderson, 733 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S. Ct. at 592). An
“unarticulated hunch” is not enough. Id. (quotation omitted). There must be “a particularized
and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity. Id. (quotation omitted). Whether
reasonable suspicion exists is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. State v.
Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007).
Griffin argues that the search was not supported by reasonable suspicion because
“neither informant had a track record of providing reliable information in the past so there
was no inference to be made that the informants were currently reliable.” But “[w]e presume
that tips from private citizen informants are reliable.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390,
394 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). This is especially true “when informants give
6 information about their identity so that police can locate them if necessary.” Id. (quotation
omitted). As the district court found, the informants were identifiable private citizens. The
first informant provided her name and phone number and was known to Karkoska. While the
second informant did not give her name, she provided a phone number through which
Karkoska successfully contacted her. In addition, both informants came forward voluntarily.
This also supports their reliability. See State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004)
(stating that “the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant voluntarily comes
forward”).
Furthermore, the information provided by the informants was based on first-hand
knowledge. “Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the
preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn.
1985). Both informants said that Griffin was in possession of narcotics, and the second
informant said that she had personally seen a gun in Griffin’s home.
Griffin also argues that there was no reasonable suspicion for the search because the
information provided by the informants was not independently corroborated by probation or
police. But given the presumed reliability of the citizen-informant tips, corroboration was not
necessary to create reasonable suspicion. State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Minn.
App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006). Also, even if some corroboration were
required, the two similar, independent tips provided within a two-month period corroborated
each other. See State v. Hochstein, 623 N.W.2d 617, 623 (Minn. App. 2001) (upholding
issuance of search warrant when the statement of one informant was corroborated by the
similar statements of two other informants).
7 The information provided by the two informants created a “particularized and objective
basis” for suspecting criminal activity in Griffin’s home. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d at 138
(quotation omitted). The search was based on more than an “unarticulated hunch.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Therefore, the search was supported by reasonable suspicion, and the
district court did not err by denying Griffin’s motion to suppress.
Griffin also argues that the search violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because
Karkoska was “advised and authorized” to conduct the search by a district court judge. Griffin
concedes that he did not raise this argument before the district court. Appellate courts
generally do not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court. Roby v.
State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). We may, however, review a matter that was not
properly raised “when the interests of justice require consideration of such issues and doing
so would not unfairly surprise a party to the appeal.” Id. In the interests of justice, we will
briefly address Griffin’s claim.
Probation officers serve at “the pleasure of the [district] court” and “act under the
orders of the [district] court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.19, subds. 1, 3 (2014). Therefore, Karkoska’s
consultation with a district court judge prior to conducting the search was not inappropriate.
Griffin has not alleged that the district court did more than tell Karkoska that she believed a
search would be proper given the information provided by the two informants and the search
condition that Griffin agreed to as part of his probation. This is similar to a judge authorizing
a search by signing a warrant. Moreover, while Griffin had the right to have his case heard
before a judge who had “no actual bias against [him] or interest in the outcome of his
particular case,” McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted),
8 Griffin cannot claim bias because the judge who Karkoska consulted with had no part in the
subsequent hearing on Griffin’s motion to suppress or in his trial.
II.
Griffin next argues that by instructing the jury that “[p]ellet guns and bb guns are
firearms under Minnesota law,” the district court removed the issue from the jury’s
consideration and “effectively directed a verdict on the ‘firearm’ element of this offense.” We
disagree.
District courts have considerable latitude in selecting the language of jury instructions.
State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 147 (Minn. 2011). We review the district court’s jury
instructions under the abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 361
(Minn. 2011). The instructions must be viewed as a whole to determine if they fairly and
adequately explain the law. State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (Minn. 2001). A
district court errs if the instructions materially misstate the law. Id. at 556.
In addressing Griffin’s argument, we first discuss whether a pellet gun is a firearm
under Minn. Stat. § 624.713 and then determine whether the district court’s instruction
violated Griffin’s constitutional rights by directing a verdict on the firearm element.
Minn. Stat. § 624.713 does not define “firearm.” Although the statute prohibits
possession of a “firearm” by a person convicted of a crime of violence, Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2), the district court in State v. Fleming determined that it did not prohibit the
possession of a BB gun and dismissed the charge against the defendant. 724 N.W.2d 537,
538 (Minn. App. 2006). We reversed, holding that the definition of “firearm” includes a BB
gun for purposes of the statute. Id. at 540-41. In doing so, we applied the definition of
9 “firearm” used by the supreme court in State v. Seifert, 256 N.W.2d 87, 88 (Minn. 1977). Id.
at 540. The supreme court in Seifert held that a BB gun was a “firearm” within the meaning
of a “dangerous weapon” under Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (1974). 256 N.W.2d at 88.
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6, states that a “firearm” is a “dangerous weapon” but, like Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, does not define “firearm.” The Seifert court used the definition of firearm in
Minn. Stat. § 97.40, subd. 34 (1974), the game-and-fish law (now codified at Minn. Stat.
§ 97A.015, subd. 19 (2014)). Id. Under this definition, a firearm is “any gun from which shot
or a projectile is discharged by means of an explosive, gas, or compressed air.” Id. (quoting
Minn. Stat. § 97.40, subd. 34). In Fleming, we concluded that by declining to define “firearm”
differently for the purposes of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, the legislature presumptively adopted
the definition used by the supreme court in Seifert. Fleming, 724 N.W.2d at 540.
Recently, in State v. Haywood, we determined that a BB gun is a “firearm” within the
meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) (2012), which, like the statute at issue in
Fleming and this case, prohibits a person convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a
firearm. Haywood, 869 N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. App. 2015), review granted (Minn. Dec.
15, 2015). In Haywood, we relied on Fleming and the definition of “firearm” applied by the
supreme court in Seifert. Id. at 905-08.
Although Griffin’s case involves a pellet gun, rather than a BB gun, the precedent cited
above remains applicable. Griffin concedes that “there is no factual or legal basis to
distinguish pellet guns from the line of cases dealing with BB guns.” The gun found in
Griffin’s possession was powered by CO2. The guns at issue in both Seifert and Fleming
were also powered by CO2. Seifert, 256 N.W.2d at 88; Fleming, 724 N.W.2d at 540. The
10 only difference between those guns and the gun at issue here appears to be the type of shot
fired. “Pellet” has been defined as “[a] bullet or piece of small shot.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1301 (5th ed. 2011). Similarly, “BB” is defined as “[a]
pellet or ball, usually of steel coated with copper or nickel, that measures 7/40 of an inch (0.44
centimeter) in diameter, used in air rifles.” Id. at 154. Accordingly, a pellet gun, like a BB
gun, fits the Seifert definition of a firearm as “any gun from which shot or a projectile is
discharged by means of an explosive, gas, or compressed air.” 256 N.W.2d at 88 (quotation
omitted).
Griffin argues that Fleming and Haywood were wrongly decided and that the law is
now in question because the supreme court granted review of Haywood. But we see no reason
to reexamine the issue so soon after Haywood and in light of the precedent set by Fleming
and Seifert. Moreover, unless and until they are overruled, we are bound to follow Fleming
and Haywood as they are published opinions of this court. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763,
767 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
In light of our conclusion that a pellet gun is a firearm for purposes of Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, we now address whether the district court’s instruction was erroneous because it
effectively directed a verdict on an element of the charged offense. Griffin cites the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Moore to support his argument. 699 N.W.2d 733 (Minn.
2005). Moore was charged with first-degree assault for an incident that resulted in the loss of
the victim’s tooth. Id. at 736. The district court instructed the jury that loss of a tooth met
the definition of great bodily harm. Id. The supreme court reversed, concluding that whether
an injury constitutes great bodily harm is a question for the jury. Id. at 737-38. The supreme
11 court noted that this court had held in State v. Bridgeforth, 357 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn. App.
1984), review denied (Minn. Feb. 6, 1985), that there was a sufficient factual basis for a plea
to first-degree assault where the defendant admitted that the victim lost a tooth during the
assault. Id. at 737. The supreme court stated, however, that “there is a distinction between
determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a plea or conviction, as
Bridgeforth concluded, and instructing the jury as a matter of law that an element of the
offense has been established.” Id. The supreme court then stated that because the jury
instruction removed from the jury’s consideration the question of whether the loss of a tooth
constituted great bodily harm, the district court’s instruction “violat[ed] the requirement that
criminal convictions must rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation
While the loss of a tooth does not constitute great bodily harm as a matter of law, this
court has held that “the operative definition of ‘firearm’ includes a BB gun” under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1. Fleming, 724 N.W.2d at 541. Unlike our holding in Bridgeforth, our
holding in Fleming was not merely that evidence of a defendant’s possession of a BB gun was
sufficient to satisfy the “firearm” element of the offense. Rather, we determined that a BB
gun is a firearm as a matter of law under Minn. Stat. § 624.713. As previously stated and
conceded by Griffin, this holding applies equally to pellet guns. The district court “must
instruct the jury on all matters of law necessary to render a verdict.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03,
subd. 19(6). Here, the district court instructed the jury that “[p]ellet guns and bb guns are
12 firearms under Minnesota law.” This instruction was an accurate statement of the law and
was not an abuse of discretion.
III.
Griffin also claims that the district court abused its discretion when it instructed the
jury as follows: “In the first element of Count 1, the word ‘knowingly’ refers only to the
possession. The state is not required to prove the defendant knew the object received was a
firearm under Minnesota law.” The instruction was given in response to two jury questions
during deliberations about the meaning of the word “knowingly” in the court’s previous
instruction requiring the state to prove that Griffin “knowingly possessed a firearm.” Griffin
claims this instruction misstated the law. He argues that the state was required to prove that
he knew that Minnesota law defined a pellet gun as a firearm. We disagree.
In response to a jury’s question on a point of law, the district court may, after notice to
the parties, give additional instructions to the jury in open court. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03,
subd. 20(3)(a); State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 1986). “[I]f a jury is confused,
additional instructions clarifying those previously given may be appropriate since the interests
of justice require that the jury have a full understanding of the case and the rules of law
applicable to the facts under deliberation.” Murphy, 380 N.W.2d at 772 (quotation omitted).
As stated above, jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and to ensure they
do not misstate the law. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d at 555-56.
The statute Griffin was convicted of violating provides that a person convicted of a
crime of violence “shall not be entitled to possess a pistol or semiautomatic military-style
assault weapon or . . . any other firearm.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). The statute
13 contains no express knowledge or mens rea requirement. Mens rea is the element of a crime
that requires “the defendant [to] know the facts that make his conduct illegal.” Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994). Because a mens rea
requirement is strongly favored by the law, courts often interpret a statute that is silent as to
mens rea to include a knowledge or other mental-state element. State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d
816, 818-19 (Minn. 2012). Griffin maintains that this principle requires the state to prove that
he knew the pellet gun was a firearm. He is mistaken.
Minnesota firearm possession statutes have been interpreted to require the state to
prove the defendant’s “knowledge of the prohibited item.” State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156,
161 (Minn. 2015). In other words, in this case the state was required to prove that Griffin
knew he possessed the pellet gun. The state, however, was not required to prove that Griffin
knew a pellet gun was defined under Minnesota law as a firearm.
Griffin cites to Ndikum to support his argument. In that case, the supreme court dealt
with a statute criminalizing the possession of a pistol in public without a permit. 815 N.W.2d
at 818. The statute contained no express mens rea requirement. Id. The supreme court
imputed a mens rea element into the statute, requiring the state to prove that the defendant
“knew he possessed the pistol.” Id. at 822. Ndikum is consistent with the district court’s
instruction in this case. It holds only that the state must prove the defendant knew he
possessed the prohibited item. Id. It does not require the state to prove that the defendant
knew that Minnesota law defined the item as a pistol.
Griffin also argues that in controlled-substance crimes, “the state must prove that
defendant consciously possessed, either physically or constructively, the substance and that
14 defendant had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance.” State v. Florine, 303 Minn.
103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975) (emphasis added). While the reasoning of Florine has
been applied to cases involving section 624.713, these cases have used Florine to imply a
mental state as to a defendant’s knowing possession of a firearm, not a defendant’s knowledge
of the fact that the possessed object was a firearm under Minnesota law. See, e.g., State v.
Olson, 326 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Minn. 1982) (citing Florine and noting that Olson “consciously
exercised” control over a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713); State v. Willis, 320
N.W.2d 726, 729 (Minn. 1982) (same).
Moreover, Griffin’s knowledge that a pellet gun is a firearm under Minnesota law is
distinguishable from knowledge of the nature of a controlled substance because Griffin is not
arguing that he did not know that the pellet gun was a pellet gun. Instead, he claims that he
was unaware that a pellet gun constituted a firearm under Minnesota law. This is analogous
to a person convicted of a controlled substance crime admitting that he knew cocaine was in
his possession but claiming that his conviction cannot stand because he did not know that
cocaine was a controlled substance. “[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse.” State v. King, 257
N.W.2d 693, 697 (Minn. 1977). Also, by statute, “[c]riminal intent does not require proof of
knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under which the actor is
prosecuted or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that statute.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 9(5) (2014). The district court’s instruction was an accurate statement of the law and
15 IV.
Finally, Griffin argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. Griffin does not claim that he did not possess
the pellet gun or that he was not prohibited from possessing a firearm. He claims only that
the evidence is insufficient because a pellet gun is not a firearm under Minnesota law.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we conduct a painstaking analysis of
the record to determine if the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to reach the verdict
that it did. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 509 (2015). The verdict will not be disturbed “if the jury, acting with due
regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.”
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
As discussed above, a pellet gun is a firearm under Minnesota law. The gun was found
in a desk drawer in Griffin’s apartment, Griffin told his probation officer where he stored the
gun, and Griffin admitted possessing the gun at trial. Finally, Griffin stipulated at trial that
he was ineligible to possess a firearm on the date of the offense. The evidence is sufficient to
support Griffin’s conviction.
Affirmed.