This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0067
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Jeremy Bruce Cournoyer, Appellant.
Filed January 11, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Beltrami County District Court File No. 04CR131377
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Annie P. Claesson-Huseby, Beltrami County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant
argues that the district court committed reversible error by playing the complainant’s
video-recorded statement to a forensic interviewer at trial because the statement was
inadmissible hearsay. He also raises several arguments in his pro se supplemental brief.
We affirm.
FACTS
In 2005, appellant Jeremy Bruce Cournoyer was convicted of attempted second-
degree sexual assault of an 11-year-old girl. In 2013, appellant was convicted of failure
to register his new address as a predatory offender. On April 18, 2013, appellant posted
bail and returned to his mother’s home where the complainant A.D. was currently living.
A.D. was 11 years old at that time.
On April 30, 2013, A.D.’s aunt, C.D., took A.D. to the emergency room because
she complained of pain in her rectal area due to an alleged sexual assault by appellant. At
the emergency room, Dr. William Shuler completed a cursory examination but did not
complete a sexual-assault examination. He referred A.D. to the Family Advocacy Center,
where she recounted what occurred and provided a video-recorded statement. Appellant
was subsequently charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2012). Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and the
Blakely notice regarding the aggravating factors and a court trial followed.
2 A.D. alleged the following in both her live trial testimony and in her video-
recorded testimony. She stated that, on April 19, 2013, everyone left the house, and she
was left home alone with appellant. Appellant slammed her finger in the door. Appellant
then grabbed her arm and pulled her into the bathroom. A.D.’s statements after this point
diverge in her live and video-recorded testimony.
During trial, A.D. consistently testified that appellant touched her vagina with his
hand. She also stated that he licked her vagina and “butt.” She stated she did not tell
anyone that appellant raped her because he threatened to rape her again and kill her if she
told anyone. A.D. responded in the affirmative to questions regarding statements she
previously made in her video-recorded statement that her “butt” hurt afterwards, and it was
gross.
In her video-recorded statement, A.D. stated that appellant touched her vagina
with his hands.1 She also said that appellant raped her vaginally and anally. She
complained of pain in her “butt.” A.D. also alleged that appellant stopped raping her
when he heard a car pull up to the house. However, inconsistent with her video-recorded
statement, at trial, A.D. did not state that appellant vaginally or anally raped her, only that
appellant’s “privacy” (penis) “just touched the outside” of her “butt.”
In addition to A.D.’s trial testimony, the state relied on the testimony of Dr. Shuler
as well as Aria Trudeau and Jennifer Fraik from the Family Advocacy Center. Dr. Shuler
testified that A.D. came to the emergency room because of an alleged sexual assault and,
1 A.D. initially told a teacher at school that her mother was abusive and that appellant “touched her.”
3 more specifically, complained of pain in her anal region. He stated that A.D. reported
that appellant took her into the bathroom, penetrated her vaginally and rectally, put his
finger and penis inside her, and threatened to rape her again and kill her if she told
anyone about the assault. Trudeau conducted A.D.’s forensic interview and testified
regarding the forensic interview process. Trudeau also testified that A.D. described to
her how appellant injured her finger in the metal part of the door and touched and rubbed
her breast. A.D. told Trudeau that her “buttocks” hurt during the assault and still hurt.
After A.D. provided a video-recorded statement, Fraik testified that she conducted a
complete physical examination of A.D., during which A.D. complained of pain in her
anal area. Fraik stated that A.D.’s injuries could be caused by penetrating trauma, blunt
trauma or contusions, or some congenital birth defects. She also noted the absence of
injuries to the perianal area or the perineum, an area where injuries are often seen after
anal penetration.
Conversely, appellant testified that, on April 19, 2013, he was busy running
errands all day while the children were at school. He then took A.D.’s mother, S.D., to
Wal-Mart, attempted to pick up his brother at school, and then ran more errands with
S.D. When appellant and S.D. arrived at home around 4:20 or 4:30 p.m., 13 of the 15
people who occupy the home were there, including A.D. Later, he picked up his mom
from work around 5:00 p.m., picked up his brother’s friend, and returned to the house
around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. Appellant denied that he sexually assaulted A.D. and maintains
that at no point in the day was he alone with her.
4 After hearing live testimony and reviewing the parties’ memoranda of law
regarding the admissibility of the video-recorded statement, the district court admitted
A.D.’s video-recorded testimony over appellant’s objection under the hearsay residual
exception. The district court found appellant guilty of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Admission of statements made during A.D.’s video-recorded statement
Appellant argues that the district court erred by allowing the admission of A.D.’s
video-recorded statement under both Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) and the hearsay
residual exception, Minn. R. Evid. 807. We address each issue in turn.
A. The district court erred by admitting inconsistent statements made during A.D.’s video-recorded statement under Minn. R. 801(d)(1)(B), but appellant is unable to establish prejudice.
Respondent argues in the alternative that the statement is admissible under rule
801(d)(1)(B). A prior statement made by a witness is not hearsay when, “the declarant
testifies at the trial . . . and the statement is. . . consistent with the declarant's testimony.”
Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). While the district court did not explicitly reference this
rule, it stated that “if there are inconsistencies [between the video-recorded statement and
the live testimony] the [c]ourt will disregard those.”
Inconsistent with her video-recorded statement, A.D. testified at trial that
appellant’s “privacy area” and hands “touched her butt.” Despite attempts to rehabilitate
A.D. and refresh A.D.’s memory, at no point did she state that appellant penetrated her
butt or anal area. Instead, A.D. testified that his “privacy” (penis) “just touched the
5 outside.” The prosecutor then asked A.D. “do you remember saying at the Family
Advocacy Center that he put his privacy in your butt?” A.D. answered, “I think so.” She
also responded in the affirmative when the prosecuting attorney reminded her that she
said it was gross and that it hurt afterwards. Because these statements were inconsistent
with her video-recorded statement, the statements constitute hearsay.
But even if the district erred by admitting the videotape as substantive evidence,
we must consider whether the admission prejudiced appellant. State v. Amos, 658
N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). In order to convict appellant of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.341.12 (2012), the state must prove sexual
penetration “committed without the complainant’s consent” involving “(1) sexual
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse; or (2) any intrusion however slight
into the genital or anal openings: (i) of the complainant’s body by any part of the actor’s
body or . . . by inducement if the child is under 13 years of age.”
At trial, A.D. responded “uh-huh” and “yes” when asked whether appellant licked
her vagina and “butt.” Moreover, Dr. Shuler testified that A.D. had been penetrated
vaginally and anally with both appellant’s finger and penis and that A.D. complained of
pain in her anal region. C.D. also testified that A.D. was penetrated both vaginally and
anally and that A.D. complained about pain in her “butt.” Fraik testified that A.D.’s
physical examination was consistent with the report A.D. made. While there were no
injuries to the perianal area or the perineum, which are both common areas to see injuries
from anal penetration, Fraik noted that the body is naturally able to stretch and
6 accommodate, so injuries oftentimes do not occur. Fraik further testified that, given the
amount of time since the event, if there were injuries they could have healed already.
Based on A.D.’s in-court testimony alone, the district court could conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that appellant committed criminal sexual conduct in the first degree
by performing cunnilingus on A.D. without her consent. And the testimony of other
witnesses supports the conclusion that appellant engaged in several types of penetration
with A.D. The district court stated that it determined appellant’s guilt without
considering the videotaped statements. Thus, even if the district court erred by admitting
inconsistent statements in A.D.’s video-recorded statement, it was harmless as appellant
cannot demonstrate prejudice because evidence independent of the video-recorded
statement supports the guilty verdict.
B. The district court did not err by admitting statements made during A.D.’s video-recorded statement under the residual exception.
The residual exception allows admission of statements not falling under one of the
accepted hearsay exceptions that (1) have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness;” (2) are evidence of a material fact, (3) are more probative on that point
than any other evidence that is attainable by reasonable methods, and (4) serve the
interests of justice and the general purpose of the rules of evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 807.
However, “[t]he court should make findings explicitly on the record unless there is a
waiver, . . . or the basis of the ruling is obvious.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 105
(Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). “Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion
of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. On
7 appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court abused its
discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203.
For the residual exception, we follow the totality of the circumstances approach to
determine whether the out-of-court statement has circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to other hearsay exceptions. State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d
400, 408 (Minn. 2006). In child-abuse cases, the circumstances include whether the
statement was spontaneous, whether the questioner had a preconceived idea of what the
child should say, whether the statement was in response to leading questions, whether the
child had a motive to fabricate, whether the statement remained consistent over time, and
the mental state of the child at the time of the statement. Id. at 410. “The focus of rule
807 is the statement, not the testifying witness who heard the statement.” State v. Ahmed,
782 N.W.2d 253, 261 (Minn. App. 2010).
Here, the district court analyzed and admitted the video-recorded statement under
rule 803(24) as interpreted by the Ortlepp test. State v. Ortlepp, 363 N.W. 2d 39 (Minn.
1985). However, rule 803(24) has been updated, to rule 807. And the Ortlepp test is
inapposite. In Ortlepp, the prosecution’s witness recanted his prior statement at trial that
incriminated both himself and the defendant. 363 N.W. 2d at 44. But here, the victim
did not recant her earlier video-recorded statement.
In a rule 807 analysis, the district court must make findings on the four factors
previously referenced. Similar to the findings made in DeRosier, “the [district] court
made no specific findings regarding the requisite elements of the rule,” other than the
specific findings on the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. DeRosier, 695
8 N.W.2d at 106. The district court found A.D.’s testimony to be credible. Although
A.D.’s testimony was given 11 days after the alleged abuse occurred, the district court
found that her testimony remained consistent with that of Dr. Shuler, Trudeau, and Fraik
on what A.D. told them about the abuse. And her testimony was consistent with both the
injury and examination. The district court also found that A.D.’s statement was made
against her own interest because she stated that appellant would “kill her and rape her
again” if she told anyone about the abuse. Such statements have a high degree of
reliability. See Oliver v. State, 502 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Minn. 1993). Based on the totality
of the circumstances, the district court did not err by admitting consistent statements
made during A.D.’s video-recorded statement.
II. Appellant’s pro se supplemental brief arguments
A. Claim of violation of rights under the Confrontation Clause
Appellant first argues that the district court erred by allowing the admission of
A.D.’s video-recorded statement because the statement was inadmissible hearsay and
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.
At trial, appellant objected to the admission of A.D.’s video-recorded statement on
hearsay grounds, but did not object based on the Confrontation Clause. An error raised
initially on appeal is reviewed under a plain-error analysis “and warrants reversal if:
(1) an error occurred in the district court, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affects
the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010). If
appellant meets his burden on all three prongs, we then determine “whether the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding
9 before granting relief.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[W]hether the admission of evidence
violates a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law that we
review de novo.” State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Minn. 2007).
In analyzing appellant’s state and federal protections under the Confrontation
Clauses, we use the same analysis. State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 564 (Minn.
2008). The Confrontation Clause of the United States constitution states that, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause excludes
testimonial statements neither made by a witness not subject to cross-examination nor
available to testify at trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
1365 (2004). However, statements are admissible where a witness is available to testify
at trial and is cross-examined regarding prior statements, even when “the reliability of
some out-of-court statements cannot be replicated.” Id. at 59 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9
(quotation and citation omitted).
Appellant argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated
because A.D.’s non-testimonial statement must be admitted under a hearsay exception to
avoid violating the Confrontation Clause. We disagree. A.D. testified in court and was
cross-examined by appellant’s counsel. Appellant was not denied his constitutional right
of confrontation.
Appellant raises several additional arguments in his supplemental brief without
argument or legal authority. In general, a claim will be considered unless it is waived for
lack of briefing. State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002) (deeming
10 arguments set out in pro se supplemental brief waived because the “brief contain[ed] no
argument or citation to legal authority in support of the allegations”). Additionally, this
court generally cannot consider issues not raised to the court below. Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Nevertheless, these claims are without merit.
B. Claim of violation of due process from court trial
Appellant generally cites to various cases, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the Minnesota Statutes to argue that his due-process rights were violated
by the court trial, without any analysis or arguments, thus waiving these arguments. See
Krosch, 642 N.W.2d at 719. But even if we consider this argument, it is without merit.
Against the advice of both of his attorneys, appellant knowingly waived his right to a jury
trial. Appellant understood that he was waiving the right to have a jury decide the issue
of the aggravating factors as well. Appellant’s court trial was not a violation of his due-
process rights.
C. Admissibility of Spreigl evidence
Under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” However, this evidence may be admitted to show motive, intent, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan. Id. (quotations
omitted). The district court’s decision to admit this evidence, often referred to as Spreigl
evidence, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685
(Minn. 2006).
11 Here, appellant argues that the prior conviction of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct occurred nine years ago, was too remote in time, and overly prejudicial.
Conversely, the state argues that all five Spreigl factors2 were met to create a link
between the bad act and the charged offense, including the fact that both victims were 11-
year-old girls and, therefore, the use of the prior act was more probative rather than
prejudicial. After carefully evaluating its probative value against its prejudice, the district
court allowed in the prior Spreigl evidence. The district court did not err by admitting the
Spreigl evidence.
D. Constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 609.347 (2012)
Appellant argues that Minn. Stat. § 609.347 is facially unconstitutionally vague
because it applies no guidelines for “victim” testimony under the rules of evidence and
authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. This issue is waived as it was not
raised in the district court. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Moreover, appellant’s claim is
misguided.
Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1, states that the testimony of a victim need not be
corroborated. And the supreme court has stated that “a conviction can rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d
536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Appellant argues that the “‘victims’
2 The five factors are: (1) The state must give notice; (2) clearly indicate what the evidence is being offered to prove; (3) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in a prior act; (4) the evidence is relevant and material to the state’s case; and (5) the probative value outweighs the potential prejudice. Angus v. State, 695 N.W.2d 109, 119 (Minn. 2005).
12 testimony by relinquishing the need or requirement for corroboration of said testimony
under the rules of evidence. . . creates vagueness grounds.” This argument is inapplicable
here. The testimony of the additional witnesses corroborated A.D.’s testimony that
appellant engaged in multiple forms of penetration with A.D. Appellant’s claim that
Minn. Stat. § 609.347 is unconstitutional fails.
E. Dilution of the reasonable-doubt standard
Appellant argues that the use of “Minn. Stat. § 609.347 in the [district] court’s jury
instructions impermissibly diluted the reasonable doubt standard and rendered the entire
requirement to satisfy reasonable doubt erroneous.” But this statute does not apply here
as no jury instructions were read because appellant had a court trial. We therefore need
not consider this issue on appeal. See Koudsi v. Hennepin Cnty. Med. Ctr., 317 N.W.2d
705, 708 n.3 (Minn. 1982) (holding that where a statute is inapplicable, no further
discussion is necessary).
F. The district court’s adoption of the state’s proposed findings
A district “court’s verbatim adoption of the state’s proposed findings, standing
alone, does not constitute grounds for reversal.” Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 259
(Minn. 2001). But the practice of the verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed findings
and conclusions is hardly commendable. Our preference is “for a court to independently
develop its own findings.” Id. at 258.
Here, the district court adopted 86 of the state’s 94 proposed findings. The court
also adopted the state’s language that the prongs of the Ortlepp test had been met in its
conclusions-of-law section. While the preference is for a court to independently develop
13 its own findings, this does not constitute grounds for reversal. Id. at 259. Therefore, the
district court did not err in adopting the state’s proposed findings.
G. Prosecutorial misconduct
Appellant argues that the prosecutor (1) improperly participated in a case
involving a friend; (2) improperly used evidence by admitting inadmissible and irrelevant
evidence, overlooked evidence, withheld evidence, and violated Minn. R. Evid. 609
procedures; and (3) injected personal opinion into the closing argument. Appellant
acknowledges that he did not object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial.
Unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed using a modified plain-error test.
State v. Carradine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012).
Under the modified plain-error test there must be “(1) [an] error; (2) that is plain;
and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 298
(Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). An error is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or
a standard of conduct.” Id. at 302. In cases of prosecutorial misconduct, appellant has
the burden of proving the error and that it was plain. Id. If appellant meets his burden, it
shifts to the state to show that the error does not affect appellant’s substantial rights such
that “there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question
would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotations omitted).
If the first three prongs are met, we may correct the error if necessary to “ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id at 298 (quotation omitted).
We first examine each claim individually to determine whether it constitutes
misconduct. State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 506 (Minn. 2006). If we determine
14 there was prosecutorial misconduct, we must examine the misconduct individually and
cumulatively to determine whether the misconduct denied appellant a fair trial. Id.
1. Improper participation in a case involving a friend
Appellant alleges that it was improper for the prosecutor to involve herself in a
case involving a friend because she did not recuse herself, and cites to Minn. R. Prof.
[Conduct] 5(a) to support his claim. As an initial matter, there is no Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 5(a). And to the extent appellant is referring to Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.1 (a),
that rule is inapplicable here because it relates to the responsibilities of managing partners
to ensure that “all lawyers in the firm confirm to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”
Appellant contends that a Pioneer Press article contains evidence showing that the
prosecutor was S.D.’s personal friend. However, the newspaper article was not a part of
the record at the district court. The record on appeal consists of “[t]he documents filed in
the [district] court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any.” Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 110.01. Appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record.
Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. App. 1995). “It is well settled
that an appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal,
and that matters not produced and received in evidence below may not be considered.”
Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co., 261 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1977). Therefore, the
newspaper article cannot be considered on appeal.
15 2. Improper use of evidence
Appellant alleges that the prosecutor violated rule 609 by not requesting a hearing
outside the jury’s presence.3 But appellant had a court trial, not a trial before a jury.
Appellant also alleges that the prosecutor failed to disclose the picture of A.D.’s
finger in violation of Minn. R. Civ. P. 9, thus prejudicing him. This argument is
misguided. Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.1 discusses the capacity to plead special matters. Here,
pictures of A.D.’s injured finger, exhibits four and five, were admitted into evidence
without objection. These exhibits were disclosed, offered, and properly received at trial.
Appellant further alleges that the prosecutor admitted irrelevant, false, and
inadmissible evidence from A.D.’s physical exam, citing to State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d
777 (Minn. 2007). But, that case is inapposite as it involved admitting evidence of prior
bad acts and whether the prosecutor’s line of questioning constituted prosecutorial
misconduct. See Id. at 781-86. The district court did not err in determining this evidence
was admissible.
3. Improper use of personal opinion in the closing argument
Appellant argues that the prosecutor “endors[ed] the credibility of the [s]tate’s
witnesses and inject[ed] personal opinion as to defense witnesses and defendant’s
credibility.” “A prosecutor commits misconduct by intentionally misstating evidence,”
3 We note that, while appellant argues that the prosecutor admitted the evidence, it is the district court that decides whether or not to admit evidence. We therefore construe appellant’s argument as a challenge to the district court’s decision to admit this evidence.
16 State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 788 (Minn. 2006), and by basing a closing argument
on facts not in evidence. State v. Stofflet, 281 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. 1979).
After a careful review of the record, we find nothing to indicate that the prosecutor
misstated evidence or based the written closing argument on facts not in evidence. We
are not persuaded that the prosecutor committed misconduct.
H. Sentencing errors
Appellant argues that Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines violate his Sixth-
Amendment right to trial by a jury because he was denied his right to have the jury prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that his sentence should be enhanced and relies on Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) to support his claim. He also argues
that the admission of A.D.’s prior inconsistent statement was used to determine his
enhanced sentence. Appellant did not raise these issues with the district court and waives
them on appeal. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Even if we were to consider them, they are
without merit. Again, appellant waived his right to a jury trial, including the right to have
a jury decide the issue of the aggravating factors. As discussed above, admitting A.D.’s
video-recorded statement was not plain error, and there was sufficient evidence to prove
multiple forms of penetration without the video evidence.
I. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
Appellant argues he was deprived of a fair trial due to ineffective counsel. “The
defendant must affirmatively prove that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness’ and ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
17 different.’” Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). “We will
generally not review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial
strategy.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). Because a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel involves a mixed question of law and fact, review is de
novo. Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Minn. 2013).
Appellant argues that he was forced to waive his omnibus hearing, but the record
does not reflect that the hearing was waived. He also argues that his attorneys did not
present his alibi defense or have proper communication with him. But the record reflects
that appellant’s counsel presented an alibi defense on October 25, 2013. His counsel also
requested a continuance due to lack of communication on December 10, 2013.
Moreover, appellant stated on the record that he felt he had adequate time to speak with
his attorneys. Finally, appellant makes various trial strategy arguments that are generally
not reviewable. The record does not reflect that, but for counsel’s errors, the results of
the proceedings would have been different. Therefore, appellant was not deprived of a
fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.