STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A23-0927
Court of Appeals McKeig, J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: October 22, 2025 Office of Appellate Courts Jennifer Lynn Nagle,
Appellant.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter D. Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Danielle H. Olson, Swift County Attorney, Benson, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam S. Lozeau, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
Alicia L. Granse, Teresa J. Nelson, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Shauna F. Kieffer, Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota and Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Mahesha P. Subbaraman, Subbaraman PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Restore the Fourth, Inc. and Restore the Fourth Minnesota.
1 SYLLABUS
1. When determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause,
the district court must consider corroboration of a confidential reliable informant’s tip in
considering the totality of the circumstances, but corroboration is not an independent
requirement.
2. The search warrant in this case was not supported by probable cause because
the limited, uncorroborated information in the warrant application did not establish a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in appellant’s house.
Reversed and remanded.
OPINION
McKEIG, J.
In this case, we granted review to clarify whether there is an independent
requirement that a tip from a confidential reliable informant be corroborated to establish
probable cause for a search warrant. In a controlled substance crime case, appellant
Jennifer Nagle moved to suppress the evidence found in a search of her house pursuant to
a warrant. The warrant application stated that a confidential reliable informant had
personally observed people smoking methamphetamine in Nagle’s house sometime in the
72 hours prior to the warrant application. Concluding that the warrant application
established probable cause, the district court denied the suppression motion, and Nagle was
found guilty after a jury trial. On appeal, Nagle challenged the district court’s denial of her
suppression motion. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the district court,
concluding that the totality of the circumstances established probable cause that drugs
2 would be found in Nagle’s house at the time of the search. The court of appeals rejected
Nagle’s argument that a tip must always be corroborated to establish probable cause. The
dissent, on the other hand, concluded that our case law always requires some corroboration
of a tip to establish probable cause and would have reversed based on the lack of
corroboration.
Although we disagree with the dissent’s reasoning that corroboration is an
independent requirement, we nonetheless reverse. We conclude that the district court erred
by denying Nagle’s suppression motion because the limited observations of the confidential
reliable informant in the warrant application did not establish a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in Nagle’s house at the time of the
search. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
On March 10, 2022, a Willmar police officer sought a search warrant for a house in
Benson lived in by Nagle based on information from a confidential reliable informant
(CRI). The CRI had personally observed people smoking methamphetamine in Nagle’s
house in the last 72 hours prior to the search warrant application. In the search warrant
application, the officer described the information that he had received from the CRI:
On March 10th, 2022, your Affiant was contacted by a Confidential Reliable Informant or C.R.I. who stated that within the last 72 hours, they had been over to [a specified address] in Benson, MN and had observed meth pipes inside the house and people smoking meth. The C.R.I. was not directed by law enforcement to go to this residence and did so on their own. This particular C.R.I. has been working for the [Drug and Gang] Task Force since February 2022 and is working for monetary consideration. The C.R.I. has an
3 intimate knowledge of the controlled substances community and has been arrested for controlled substance violations in the past. The C.R.I. has provided [the Task Force] reliable information and performed multiple controlled buys for the task force for controlled substances.
A district court judge signed the warrant. That same day, officers executed the search
warrant at Nagle’s house and found drug paraphernalia and items that tested positive for
methamphetamine.
The State charged Nagle with two counts of possession of a controlled substance. 1
Before trial, Nagle moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, arguing that there
was not probable cause to believe that her house would contain contraband or evidence of
a crime at the time of the search. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the
warrant was supported by probable cause. A jury found Nagle guilty on both counts.
Nagle appealed, arguing that the district court committed reversible error when it
denied her suppression motion. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals affirmed. State
v. Nagle, No. A23-0927, 2024 WL 2890830 (Minn. App. June 10, 2024). The majority
concluded that the search warrant was supported by probable cause based on the totality of
the circumstances, including the CRI’s reliability and basis of knowledge. Id. at *4–5. The
majority rejected Nagle’s argument that corroboration of a confidential reliable informant’s
tip is an independent requirement to establish probable cause. Id. at *3–5.
1 Nagle was charged with one count of third-degree possession of methamphetamine in a school zone, Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(6), and one count of storing methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child, Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(4). Nagle’s minor grandchild was found in one of the bedrooms of the house, and Nagle’s house is located within a one-block radius of a high school.
4 The dissent would have reversed based on the lack of corroboration of the CRI’s tip.
Id. at *9. The dissent concluded that “Minnesota authorities suggest that probable cause
based on an informant tip requires corroboration, and the warrant application does not set
forth any information to corroborate the CRI’s tip.” Id. at *6. The dissent determined that,
although corroboration of significant details may not be necessary, “such tips [need] to be
supported by some corroboration.” Id. at *8. The dissent concluded the search warrant
was not supported by probable cause due to the lack of any corroboration of the tip. Id. at
*9.
We granted Nagle’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
Both the federal and Minnesota constitutions protect “against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. To be constitutional, a
search must be supported by probable cause, which means a “fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Wiley, 366
N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Both warrantless searches and searches pursuant to a
warrant are subject to the same totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determine whether
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
5 place. 2 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (warranted search); State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883,
889 (Minn. 2023) (warrantless search).
In cases where a search warrant was issued, the scope of our “review is limited to
the information presented in the application, and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from that information.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 596 (Minn. 2024).
We “consider the totality of the circumstances alleged in the supporting affidavit” and do
not “review each component of the affidavit in isolation.” State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d
380, 385 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Our inquiry is “whether the issuing judge had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding
that probable cause existed.” Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 596 (quoting State v.
Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014)). We review probable cause decisions de
novo. Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 384 (2025); State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d 124, 132
(Minn. 2024) (stating that “[a]lthough we assess the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, we review legal determinations, including probable cause, de novo”). But we
have explained that, in doubtful or marginal cases, we give deference to the issuing judge’s
decision to issue the warrant. State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 791 (Minn. 1999) (stating
that “the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be ‘largely determined by the
preference to be accorded warrants’ ” (quoting Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268)).
2 We take this opportunity to reiterate that the totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause (i.e., whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place) applies equally to warranted and warrantless searches. To the extent that the analysis of the court of appeals suggests this substantive test differs between the two—that the deference afforded search warrants alters the substantive test—such a distinction is erroneous.
6 Nagle argues the warrant was not supported by probable cause because it did not
contain enough detailed information and lacked corroboration. The State contends that,
under the totality of the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude
there was a fair probability drugs would be found in Nagle’s house at the time of the search.
To resolve this case, we first address whether there is an independent requirement
that a confidential reliable informant’s tip be corroborated by police officers to establish
probable cause. Then, we determine whether the search warrant in this case was supported
by probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances presented in the warrant
application.
I. This case first asks us to decide whether there is an independent requirement that a
confidential reliable informant’s tip be corroborated in order to establish probable cause
for a search warrant. Whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause is
determined by the totality-of-the-circumstances test adopted by the Supreme Court in
Gates:
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common- sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
7 462 U.S. at 238. In adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the Supreme Court
rejected “[r]igid legal rules,” which are “ill-suited” for this type of analysis. 3 Id. at 232.
Instead, reviewing courts make “a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the
various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip.” Id. at 234.
When a search warrant is based on a tip, relevant considerations include the informant’s
veracity and basis of knowledge. Id. at 230. “[A] deficiency in one may be compensated
for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by
some other indicia of reliability.” Id. at 233. Under this flexible approach, we have
likewise held that a deficiency in one aspect of a warrant application “may be compensated
for by other indicia of reliability.” State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138, 150 (Minn. 2024) (per
curiam). One such indicia of reliability is corroboration.
We have long held that corroboration of a tip by police officers is a relevant factor
in the totality of the circumstances; even “minimal corroboration” can be relevant in the
3 In Gates, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[i]nformants’ tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons.” 462 U.S. at 232. We have reached a similar conclusion. Our case law illustrates that tips can come from a variety of sources—some of which are more reliable, some less—including anonymous callers, citizens making a first-time report, informants, and confidential reliable informants. E.g., State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138, 149 (Minn. 2024) (per curiam) (anonymous); State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1978) (describing a first-time citizen informer); McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 704 (informant); State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (confidential reliable informant). And the type of information provided can be based on sources that may be more reliable or less reliable—first-hand knowledge, hearsay, contemporaneous observations, or can involve predictive information about future criminal activity. E.g., Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269 (first-hand knowledge); In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690–91 (Minn. 1997) (hearsay); Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 886, 892 (contemporaneous observations); Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 132, 136 (predictive information). As such, the totality-of-the-circumstances provides the flexibility needed for courts to conduct this necessarily fact-specific inquiry.
8 totality of the circumstances. State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1990). We
recently affirmed the role of corroboration in a probable cause determination in State v.
Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 892. In Mosley, officers conducted a warrantless search of the
defendant’s car based on a confidential reliable informant’s tip. Id. at 885. Before the
search, officers corroborated some details from the confidential reliable informant’s tip,
including the car description, its location, and the license plate number. Id. at 887. In
concluding that the officers lacked probable cause to search the defendant’s car, the district
court discounted the relevance of the corroborated details on the grounds that they were
easily obtained. Id. at 892. We disagreed with the analysis of the district court, explaining
that “when an informant gives police information based on the informant’s personal
knowledge, police do not need to corroborate significant details in the tip for the tip to be
sufficient to support probable cause.” Id. As part of our analysis, we observed that even
when the corroborated details are “easily obtained,” they still “lend credence to the
informant’s tip.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To be clear, we did not hold that
police need to corroborate easily obtained details for the tip to be sufficient to support
probable cause. Instead, we again acknowledged that corroboration is a relevant factor that
should be “considered together” with the other indicia of reliability. Id. at 893.
In sum, our case law establishes that corroboration of a tip is always a relevant
consideration in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Like other relevant factors in the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, a lack of corroboration may be compensated for by
a strong showing of other indicia of reliability, depending on the facts of the case. On the
other hand, in some cases, the totality of the circumstances may fall short of the probable
9 cause standard without corroboration. A court must consider corroboration of a
confidential reliable informant’s tip in considering the totality of the circumstances, but we
decline to adopt a brightline rule that corroboration is an independent requirement outside
the totality of circumstances analysis to establish probable cause based on a confidential
reliable informant’s tip. 4 Instead, we affirm our longstanding totality-of-the-circumstances
test, which considers any and all facts that bear upon probable cause as relevant in the
analysis.
II. We next consider whether the search warrant here was supported by probable cause:
whether the facts alleged in the warrant application established a fair probability that
4 Legal commentators likewise agree that the United States Supreme Court has not held that “some form of corroboration is essential to a finding of probable cause based primarily upon information received from an informant.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.3(f) (6th ed. 2024). Instead, LaFave describes the role corroboration plays in the Supreme Court’s informant cases as compensating for other deficiencies in the informant’s tip:
From this survey, it is apparent that the Supreme Court has either used corroboration or assumed that it might be used in a variety of ways. Sometimes it appears the Court was seeking evidence of corroboration because of no showing of the informant’s basis of knowledge (Draper, Ker), sometimes because the informant’s veracity was not otherwise established sufficiently (Jones, Harris), and sometimes for both reasons (Aguilar, Spinelli, Gates). Moreover, the type of information considered as tending to corroborate has ranged from the innocent conduct in Draper to that which itself created “strong suspicion” in Ker.
Id. (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, (1969); and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
10 evidence of a crime would be found in Nagle’s house at the time of the search. Gates, 462
U.S. at 238. Nagle argues that the warrant application did not include enough facts to
satisfy this standard, and, on these particular facts, we agree.
When we analyze whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, the
scope of our “review is limited to the information presented in the application, and the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that information.” Sardina-Padilla,
7 N.W.3d at 596. As such, our analysis focuses on the facts that were presented in the
search warrant application.
11 Here, the lower courts appropriately concluded the warrant application adequately
established the reliability of the CRI 5 and the CRI’s first-hand basis of knowledge, 6 two
relevant considerations. But these are not the only considerations in the analysis. When
considering the totality of the circumstances, the observations of the confidential reliable
informant—that is to say, the content of the tip itself—is key. Here, the limited observations
of the CRI presented in the warrant application fall short of the probable cause standard of
a fair probability that contraband evidence of a crime would be found in the house at the
time of the search.
5 A confidential reliable informant is an individual with a track record of providing reliable information to law enforcement, Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 885, and must be explicitly designated as a confidential reliable informant in the search warrant application, Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d at 149. Even if the warrant application “does not contain specific details of the CRI’s record, further elaboration concerning the specifics of the CRI’s veracity is not typically required.” Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136. In this case, the warrant stated:
This particular C.R.I. has been working for the [Drug and Gang] Task Force since February 2022 and is working for monetary consideration. The C.R.I. has an intimate knowledge of the controlled substances community and has been arrested for controlled substance violations in the past. The C.R.I. has provided [the Task Force] reliable information and performed multiple controlled buys for the task force for controlled substances.
Nagle’s argument that more details about the confidential reliable informant’s track record should be required to conclude the CRI here was reliable is contrary to our case law. Here, although the showing could be stronger, we conclude the information presented in the warrant application and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that information established the reliability of the CRI. 6 Recent personal observation—the type in the warrant application here—is “the preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269. Accordingly, the warrant application sufficiently demonstrated the CRI’s first-hand basis of knowledge.
12 The entirety of the information presented in the warrant application that related to
whether contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in Nagle’s house at the time of
the search was that “within the last 72 hours, [the CRI] had been over to [Nagle’s house]
and had observed meth pipes inside the house and people smoking meth.” On its face, the
limited observations of the CRI constituted a single occurrence of drug use by an unknown
number of people. This limited observation, by itself, did not establish a fair probability
that drugs would still be found in Nagle’s house at the time of the search. The tip did not
include, for instance, observations of more drugs in the house beyond what was being used
at the time or other indications of ongoing criminal activity. Having considered the totality
of the circumstances—the limited, uncorroborated observations of the CRI presented in the
warrant application and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
information—we conclude the warrant application failed to establish a fair probability that
drugs would still be found in the house 72 hours after this one-time occurrence of observed
drug use.
Our conclusion that the search warrant here is not supported by probable cause is
consistent with our case law, which suggests that more information is required to establish
a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place at the time of the
search. For instance, in State v. Wiley, the confidential reliable informant whose tip formed
the basis for the search warrant application had observed evidence of crime in the house
on numerous occasions, suggesting ongoing criminal activity. 366 N.W.2d at 268. The
confidential reliable informant’s tip included observations of “15–20 handguns and rifles
in a cardboard box,” specific types of narcotics, as well as stolen stereos and televisions.
13 Id. at 268. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we concluded that the search warrant
in Wiley was supported by probable cause. Id. at 269.
In contrast to Wiley, the scant information presented in the warrant application here
did not establish probable cause. Unlike Wiley, the CRI described being in the house on
only one occasion, and the CRI’s limited observations did not suggest any ongoing criminal
activity at the house. Considering the totality of the circumstances here, the warrant
application described one observation of drug use with little information and no indication
of ongoing criminal activity. The limited, uncorroborated observations of the CRI
presented in the warrant application are a far cry from cases in which we have upheld a
search warrant, like Wiley.
Although our preference for warrants requires us to defer to the issuance of the
warrant in close cases, this is not such a close case. On these facts, we conclude that the
totality of the circumstances did not establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime would be found in Nagle’s house. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred when
it affirmed the district court’s denial of Nagle’s suppression motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court of appeals’ decision and remand to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.