State of Minnesota v. Jaquelyn Marie Olcott

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: September 30, 2024
• Docket: a240282
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-0282

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs.

Jaquelyn Marie Olcott, Appellant.

Filed September 30, 2024 Affirmed Johnson, Judge

Becker County District Court File No. 03-CR-22-763

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,

Judge. ∗

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant ∗

to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

Jaquelyn Marie Olcott pleaded guilty to a felony-level charge of driving while

impaired. The district court imposed a prison sentence but stayed execution of the sentence

and placed Olcott on probation, with conditions. One year later, the district court revoked

Olcott’s probation after finding that she violated multiple conditions of her probation. We

conclude that the district court made the necessary findings before revoking Olcott’s

probation, and we further conclude that the record supports the district court’s findings.

Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

In April 2022, a Becker County deputy sheriff stopped Olcott’s vehicle based on a

report that she was driving while impaired. Olcott was arrested after she appeared to the

deputy to be impaired. At the county jail, Olcott provided a breath sample, which revealed

an alcohol concentration of 0.24.

The state charged Olcott with driving while impaired (DWI), in violation of Minn.

Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2020), and driving after cancellation as inimical to public

safety, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2020). The state alleged a felony-level

DWI offense because Olcott had three prior DWI convictions within the previous 10 years.

See Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2020).

In September 2022, Olcott pleaded guilty to the DWI charge, and the state dismissed

the charge of driving after cancellation. In October 2022, the district court imposed a 36-

month prison sentence but stayed execution of the sentence and placed Olcott on probation

2 for five years, with conditions. Among the probation conditions are the requirements that

Olcott abstain from alcohol and controlled substances, follow all recommendations of a

comprehensive chemical-dependency assessment, and complete a DWI Court program.

Olcott’s probation officer filed a probation-violation report in July 2023 and three

addenda in August and September of 2023. The probation officer alleged that Olcott

violated probation conditions by not abstaining from alcohol and controlled substances,

not following the recommendations of a comprehensive chemical-dependency assessment,

and not successfully completing the DWI Court program.

The district court conducted a probation-revocation hearing in November 2023.

Olcott denied all of the alleged violations. Olcott’s probation officer testified that Olcott

tested positive for methamphetamine on two dates (and admitted to using

methamphetamine) and tested positive for alcohol on four dates. The probation officer

also testified that Olcott was discharged from a treatment program, which was

recommended by her chemical-dependency assessment, because of the positive test results

and her ongoing use of alcohol and methamphetamine. The probation officer further

testified that Olcott was discharged from the DWI Court program because of her lack of

honesty while in the program and her continued use of alcohol and methamphetamine.

Olcott also testified at the probation-revocation hearing. On direct examination, she

testified that one or more of her positive alcohol test results were caused by her

consumption of kombucha, a slightly fermented, sweetened tea. She also testified that she

had “a lot going on” because she was dealing with anxiety and depression, she had become

a student again, and her mother was experiencing health problems. Olcott testified that she

3 could successfully complete probation if she were reinstated. On cross-examination, she

denied using methamphetamine and denied admitting it to her probation officer, and she

testified that she takes prescribed medications that can lead to a positive test result.

One week after the hearing, the district court filed an order with thorough findings

of fact and conclusions of law. The district court found that Olcott had committed the

alleged violations, revoked Olcott’s probation, and executed her 36-month prison sentence.

Olcott appeals.

DECISION

Olcott argues that the district court erred by revoking her probation and executing

her prison sentence. The state did not file a responsive brief. Nonetheless, this court must

determine the appeal on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

If a probationer violates one or more conditions of probation, a district court may

continue an existing stay of execution or may revoke probation and execute the underlying

sentence. Minn. Stat. § 609.14 (2020); Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(2)(b)(iv)-(v). The

supreme court has prescribed a three-step analysis to guide district courts in determining

whether to revoke probation. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). A

district court may revoke probation if the court (1) designates the specific conditions of

probation that have been violated, (2) finds that the violations were “intentional or

inexcusable,” and (3) finds “that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring

probation.” Id. In making these findings, district courts “must seek to convey their

substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” State v. Modtland, 695

N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of

4 review to a district court’s decision to revoke probation because a district court “has ‘broad

discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be

reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.’” Id. at 605 (quoting Austin, 295

N.W.2d at 249-50).

Olcott makes two arguments for reversal, which we consider in turn.

A.

Olcott first argues that the evidence in the record of the probation-violation hearing

does not establish that she intentionally and inexcusably violated conditions of her

probation.

The second Austin factor is concerned with whether a probationer’s violation was

“intentional or inexcusable.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250 (emphasis added). Because the

two requirements are stated in the disjunctive, a district court is not required to find that a

probationer’s violation is both intentional and inexcusable. See State v. Davis, No. A20-

0448, 2021 WL 416410, at *5 (Minn. App. Feb. 8, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 28,

2021); State v. Jackson, No. A20-0782, 2021 WL 21437, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 4, 2021),

rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2021); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)

(providing that nonprecedential opinions are “not binding authority” but “may be cited as

persuasive authority”).

With respect to the district court’s finding that Olcott did not abstain from alcohol

and controlled substances, Olcott contends that one or more positive results for alcohol

were caused by her consumption of kombucha and that there is no evidence that she

continued to drink kombucha after learning that it was prohibited by a condition of her

5 probation. But the district court specifically stated that it “does not believe that testimony.”

The district court’s credibility determination is supported by the testimony of Olcott’s

probation officer, who testified about Olcott’s dishonesty in DWI Court and also testified

(without objection) that a lab technician had told her that kombucha likely did not cause

Olcott’s positive test result. Olcott also asserts that she does not use methamphetamine

and did not admit to using it. But Olcott does not dispute that she tested positive for

methamphetamine, and Olcott’s probation officer testified that Olcott admitted to using

methamphetamine.

With respect to the district court’s finding that Olcott did not follow the

recommendations of a comprehensive chemical-dependency assessment, Olcott contends

that she wanted to engage in treatment but had issues with transportation and insurance

coverage and that she achieved minimal compliance by attending a few appointments. The

district court found that Olcott was discharged from her treatment program because she

relapsed, did not take the steps necessary to enter another treatment program, and

“demonstrated a pattern of lack of follow through.” The district court’s findings are

supported by the testimony of Olcott’s probation officer, who testified that Olcott attended

only five of 13 appointments, continued to use alcohol and controlled substances while in

treatment, did not take the treatment program seriously, and did not follow through on a

recommendation that she engage in a more-intensive treatment program.

With respect to the district court’s finding that Olcott did not successfully complete

the DWI Court program, Olcott contends that she “was committed to the program and

motivated to continue in it.” The district court made findings to the contrary. The district

6 court found that Olcott “struggled with honesty and keeping in communication with” her

probation officer and “continued to abuse chemicals.” The district court also found that

the DWI Court “put in more work . . . than [Olcott] did.” Again, the district court’s findings

are supported by the testimony of Olcott’s probation officer, a member of the DWI Court

team, who testified that Olcott was not honest with the DWI Court and did not meet

expectations for maintaining communications. The probation officer explained that, when

Olcott first struggled with chemical dependency while in DWI Court, the program team

initially refrained from terminating her participation, instead taking a “wait and see”

approach. But, after Olcott tested positive for alcohol and methamphetamine multiple

times, the DWI Court decided in September 2023 to discharge her from the program despite

her expressed desire to remain in the program.

Thus, the record is sufficient to establish that Olcott intentionally or inexcusably

violated three conditions of her probation.

B.

Olcott also argues that the district court erred by finding that the need for

confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.

A district court may find that the third Austin factor is satisfied if it finds that any of

the following three sub-factors are present: (1) “‘confinement is necessary to protect the

public from further criminal activity by the offender,’” (2) “‘the offender is in need of

correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if [s]he is confined,’” or

(3) a further stay of the sentence “‘would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the

7 violation.’” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quoting A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice,

Probation § 5.1(a) (Approved Draft 1970)).

With respect to the district court’s finding concerning the second sub-factor, that

Olcott is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively in prison,

Olcott contends that she was willing to participate in treatment while on probation and had

made efforts to do so. The district court, which was aware that Olcott committed the

offense in this case while on probation for a prior DWI conviction, specifically stated that

Olcott “is unamenable to community-based treatment.” The district court’s decision is

supported by the testimony of Olcott’s probation officer, who testified that Olcott would

be even less likely to succeed in a traditional probation setting than in the more-intensive

and more-structured setting of DWI Court. The district court did not abuse its discretion

by finding that Olcott is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most

effectively in prison.

With respect to the district court’s finding concerning the third sub-factor, that

staying Olcott’s prison sentence further would unduly depreciate the seriousness of her

violations, Olcott reiterates that she is motivated to complete her term of probation and

asserts that her probation officer was willing to continue working with her. The district

court believed that Olcott’s multiple violations of probation conditions, as well as her

failure to successfully complete probation after her previous DWI conviction, justify the

execution of her stayed prison sentence. In light of the record as a whole, the district court

did not abuse its discretion by finding that not revoking Olcott’s probation would unduly

depreciate the seriousness of her violations.

8 In sum, the district court did not err by revoking Olcott’s probation and executing

her prison sentence.

Affirmed.