This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0334
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
George Edward Wilson, Appellant.
Filed December 21, 2015 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27CR1413387
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Heather Robertson, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Mary F. Moriarty, Chief Hennepin County Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal traffic stop. We affirm.
FACTS On May 9, 2014 at 11:54 p.m., Officer Jeffery Beck was on patrol in Minneapolis.
The officer was traveling northbound on Second Avenue and stopped at a red light at the
intersection of 35th Street and Second Avenue. As the light controlling northbound
traffic on Second Avenue and facing the officer turned green, he began to enter the
intersection and observed a vehicle driven by appellant George Edward Wilson traveling
westbound on 35th Street.
The officer observed appellant’s vehicle begin to slow for the intersection, fail to
stop at what he presumed was a red light because his light was green, and proceed to
make a right turn onto Second Avenue. The officer had to let off the gas to avoid
colliding with appellant’s vehicle. He acknowledged that he was not able to see the color
of the traffic light controlling westbound traffic on 35th Street and facing appellant.
Appellant’s alleged failure to stop at the red light at the intersection of 35th Street and
Second Avenue was the sole basis for the stop of appellant’s vehicle.
Appellant testified at a contested omnibus hearing that the light controlling
westbound traffic on 35th Street and facing him was green when he turned right from
35th Street to head north on Second Avenue. Appellant stated that the light turned
yellow as he was turning. Appellant also testified that he saw the officer’s squad car
stopped at the intersection. But the officer was on patrol that night in an unmarked squad
car. The unmarked car had no light bar on the top, push bumper on the front, grill light
on the outside, or police markings on the exterior of the vehicle.
When asked by the prosecutor whether he had been drinking the night of the
incident, appellant stated, “Earlier that evening I think I had a drink.” However,
2 appellant also stated that he did not believe the alcohol he consumed affected his ability
to drive. As a result of the traffic stop, appellant was asked to submit to a breath test.
The results of the test showed that appellant had an alcohol concentration of 0.12.
At the conclusion of the contested omnibus hearing, the district court found that
“the uncontroverted evidence in the case is that the defendant did not stop” at the
intersection. The court further stated that “the officer testified credibly that his light was
green.” Therefore, based on those two findings, the court found that appellant “ran a red
light,” which the court determined was a “clear traffic violation.” As a result, the court
denied appellant’s motion to suppress.
Appellant waived his right to a trial by jury, and the parties submitted the case for
a stipulated-facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. Based on the evidence
before it, the district court found defendant guilty of two counts of fourth-degree driving
while impaired. The district court sentenced appellant to 90 days at the Hennepin County
Correctional Facility but stayed execution of appellant’s sentence for two years and
ordered him to serve 30 days on electronic home monitoring. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I. The district court’s factual finding that appellant failed to stop at a red light was not clearly erroneous.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal traffic stop. Specifically, appellant asserts
that he had a yellow light when he entered the intersection of 35th Street and
Second Avenue. Appellant claims that the district court erroneously concluded that
3 because the officer “proceeded on a green light” appellant’s light was necessarily red
when he entered the intersection, and the officer had sufficient justification to stop
appellant. Because appellant asserts that his light was green, he contends that there was
no traffic violation justifying the stop of his vehicle. We disagree.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)). “A [district]
court’s finding is erroneous if this court, after reviewing the record, reaches the firm
conviction that a mistake was made.” State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983).
In addition, “determinations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to
the [district] court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous.” State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing State v.
Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. 1984)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989).
The standard of review in this case is controlling. Appellant’s contentions
regarding when he entered the intersection and whether he had a yellow light are factual
disputes. While appellant’s testimony supports his version of events, the officer’s
contradictory account as to what occurred on May 9, 2014, supports the district court’s
findings. “Because the weight and believability of witness testimony is an issue for the
district court, we defer to that court’s credibility determinations.” State v. Miller, 659
N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003). Therefore,
4 because there are facts in the record to support the district court’s findings, we cannot say
that “the district court unequivocally erred.” Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a similar factual situation in State v.
Smith, 276 Minn. 565, 565, 150 N.W.2d 868, 868 (1967). The defendant in Smith
testified that, when he was in the middle of an intersection executing a left turn, the
traffic light facing him changed from green to yellow. Id. The officer who issued the
traffic ticket testified that “‘after the light turned green for [him,] approximately three to
four seconds after the change,’ defendant entered the intersection and made a left turn.”
Id. (quoting the officer’s testimony).
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0334
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
George Edward Wilson, Appellant.
Filed December 21, 2015 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27CR1413387
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Heather Robertson, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Mary F. Moriarty, Chief Hennepin County Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal traffic stop. We affirm.
FACTS On May 9, 2014 at 11:54 p.m., Officer Jeffery Beck was on patrol in Minneapolis.
The officer was traveling northbound on Second Avenue and stopped at a red light at the
intersection of 35th Street and Second Avenue. As the light controlling northbound
traffic on Second Avenue and facing the officer turned green, he began to enter the
intersection and observed a vehicle driven by appellant George Edward Wilson traveling
westbound on 35th Street.
The officer observed appellant’s vehicle begin to slow for the intersection, fail to
stop at what he presumed was a red light because his light was green, and proceed to
make a right turn onto Second Avenue. The officer had to let off the gas to avoid
colliding with appellant’s vehicle. He acknowledged that he was not able to see the color
of the traffic light controlling westbound traffic on 35th Street and facing appellant.
Appellant’s alleged failure to stop at the red light at the intersection of 35th Street and
Second Avenue was the sole basis for the stop of appellant’s vehicle.
Appellant testified at a contested omnibus hearing that the light controlling
westbound traffic on 35th Street and facing him was green when he turned right from
35th Street to head north on Second Avenue. Appellant stated that the light turned
yellow as he was turning. Appellant also testified that he saw the officer’s squad car
stopped at the intersection. But the officer was on patrol that night in an unmarked squad
car. The unmarked car had no light bar on the top, push bumper on the front, grill light
on the outside, or police markings on the exterior of the vehicle.
When asked by the prosecutor whether he had been drinking the night of the
incident, appellant stated, “Earlier that evening I think I had a drink.” However,
2 appellant also stated that he did not believe the alcohol he consumed affected his ability
to drive. As a result of the traffic stop, appellant was asked to submit to a breath test.
The results of the test showed that appellant had an alcohol concentration of 0.12.
At the conclusion of the contested omnibus hearing, the district court found that
“the uncontroverted evidence in the case is that the defendant did not stop” at the
intersection. The court further stated that “the officer testified credibly that his light was
green.” Therefore, based on those two findings, the court found that appellant “ran a red
light,” which the court determined was a “clear traffic violation.” As a result, the court
denied appellant’s motion to suppress.
Appellant waived his right to a trial by jury, and the parties submitted the case for
a stipulated-facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. Based on the evidence
before it, the district court found defendant guilty of two counts of fourth-degree driving
while impaired. The district court sentenced appellant to 90 days at the Hennepin County
Correctional Facility but stayed execution of appellant’s sentence for two years and
ordered him to serve 30 days on electronic home monitoring. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I. The district court’s factual finding that appellant failed to stop at a red light was not clearly erroneous.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal traffic stop. Specifically, appellant asserts
that he had a yellow light when he entered the intersection of 35th Street and
Second Avenue. Appellant claims that the district court erroneously concluded that
3 because the officer “proceeded on a green light” appellant’s light was necessarily red
when he entered the intersection, and the officer had sufficient justification to stop
appellant. Because appellant asserts that his light was green, he contends that there was
no traffic violation justifying the stop of his vehicle. We disagree.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)). “A [district]
court’s finding is erroneous if this court, after reviewing the record, reaches the firm
conviction that a mistake was made.” State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983).
In addition, “determinations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to
the [district] court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous.” State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing State v.
Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. 1984)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989).
The standard of review in this case is controlling. Appellant’s contentions
regarding when he entered the intersection and whether he had a yellow light are factual
disputes. While appellant’s testimony supports his version of events, the officer’s
contradictory account as to what occurred on May 9, 2014, supports the district court’s
findings. “Because the weight and believability of witness testimony is an issue for the
district court, we defer to that court’s credibility determinations.” State v. Miller, 659
N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003). Therefore,
4 because there are facts in the record to support the district court’s findings, we cannot say
that “the district court unequivocally erred.” Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a similar factual situation in State v.
Smith, 276 Minn. 565, 565, 150 N.W.2d 868, 868 (1967). The defendant in Smith
testified that, when he was in the middle of an intersection executing a left turn, the
traffic light facing him changed from green to yellow. Id. The officer who issued the
traffic ticket testified that “‘after the light turned green for [him,] approximately three to
four seconds after the change,’ defendant entered the intersection and made a left turn.”
Id. (quoting the officer’s testimony). The district court found the defendant guilty,
concluding that the light changed to red before the defendant entered the intersection. Id.
at 565, 150 N.W.2d at 868-69. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, stating, “Upon the
record the court could have decided the fact question either way. . . . The rule governing
appellate review of fact issues compels affirmance.” Id. at 869-70; see also State v. Jobe,
361 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. App. 1985) (affirming conviction for going through a red traffic
signal even though the officer did not directly observe defendant’s traffic signal and
evidence supporting the conviction was therefore circumstantial). The only factual
distinction between this case and Smith is that, in the instant case, the officer did not
explicitly state for how many seconds the traffic light facing him had been green before
he observed appellant proceed through the intersection.
The cases appellant cites in support of his position are inapposite. State v.
Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 824 (Minn. 2004) (holding “that an officer’s mistaken
interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized and objective basis for
5 suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop”); State v. George, 557
N.W.2d 575 (Minn. 1997) (vacating conviction because the stop was premised on
officer’s undisputedly mistaken belief that a traffic law was violated); Sarber v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 819 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Minn. App. 2012) (discussing the absence of
support in record for one element of the underlying traffic violation); Pullen v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 412 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Minn. App. 1987) (reversing because the district
court’s conclusion was not supported by either party’s version of events). Because the
district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
Affirmed.