This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-1716
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Evalyn Lia Bheaanu, Appellant.
Filed July 14, 2014 Affirmed Bjorkman, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-12-7217
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Stephanie A. Karri, Plymouth, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree sale of a
controlled substance, arguing that her guilty plea is not accurate. We affirm. FACTS
After an FBI investigation into a large methamphetamine-distribution operation in
the Twin Cities, respondent State of Minnesota charged 13 individuals with various
controlled-substance crimes. In a 30-page complaint that detailed the FBI’s
investigation, appellant Evalyn Lia Bheaanu was charged with conspiracy to commit
first-degree sale of a controlled substance.
Bheaanu agreed to enter a “straight [guilty] plea” to the charged offense, with the
option to move for a sentencing departure. In support of her plea, Bheaanu admitted that
in January and February 2012 she purchased methamphetamine from co-defendant Koua
“Jimmy” Yang, who had “admitted . . . that he was very involved in the sale of
methamphetamine in the Twin Cities area.” Accord State v. Ayala-Leyva, ___ N.W.2d
___, ___, 2014 WL 2013325, at *3 (Minn. App. May 19, 2014) (discussing Yang’s
testimony about the methamphetamine operation at another co-defendant’s trial), pet. for
review filed (Minn. June 18, 2014). Bheaanu stated that she did not sell or intend to sell
the methamphetamine she purchased but acknowledged that Yang and her other co-
defendants would testify that she sold or purchased with intent to sell at least four “balls”
of methamphetamine and that police had recordings of telephone conversations between
her and Yang consistent with that anticipated testimony. Bheaanu also acknowledged
there was a substantial likelihood a jury would find her guilty based on the available
evidence. Characterizing Bheaanu’s testimony as part Alford plea and part straight guilty
plea, the district court considered it along with the complaint and the recorded telephone
conversations and found that there was an “extreme likelihood that the jury would find
2 guilt under the circumstances regarding the conspiracy to actually sell.” The district
court accepted Bheaanu’s plea.
Bheaanu moved for downward dispositional and durational sentencing departures.
The district court denied the motion and imposed a presumptive sentence of 146 months’
imprisonment. This appeal follows.
DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Minn. 2007). After sentencing, a defendant may
withdraw a guilty plea only if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is invalid.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A valid guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). The
validity of a guilty plea is a question of law, which we review de novo. Lussier v. State,
821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that
the plea was invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Accuracy
Bheaanu principally challenges the accuracy of her guilty plea, arguing that it is
not supported by a sufficient factual basis. The accuracy requirement is satisfied if the
record as a whole contains sufficient facts to support a conclusion that defendant’s
conduct falls within the charge to which she desires to plead guilty. State v. Iverson, 664
N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003); see also Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589 (“[T]he plea
3 petition and colloquy may be supplemented by other evidence to establish the factual
basis for a plea.”).
Bheaanu contends the factual basis for her plea is inadequate because she did not
admit that she “unlawfully sold 10 grams or more of methamphetamine” during a 90-day
period. We disagree. First, Bheaanu’s argument is premised on a misstatement of the
applicable law. The conduct Bheaanu describes is first-degree sale of methamphetamine.
But she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit first-degree sale of methamphetamine.
Conspiracy entails an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime and an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556
(Minn. 2001) (discussing essential elements of controlled-substance conspiracy crime).
“The elements of the underlying crime need not be proven to establish conspiracy since
the crime itself need not be proven to prove conspiracy.” State v. Tracy, 667 N.W.2d
141, 146 (Minn. App. 2003). Bheaanu’s failure to admit an element of the completed
offense does not invalidate her plea of guilty to conspiring to commit that offense.
Second, the record contains sufficient facts establishing the quantity of
methamphetamine that Bheaanu conspired to sell. Bheaanu testified that she told Yang
(in a recorded telephone conversation) that she sold methamphetamine to a man, received
$500 from him in return, and that the man still owed her another $900. She also testified
that Yang gave her “four balls” of methamphetamine. When asked if “four balls is 14
grams,” Bheaanu replied, “I don’t know, it looks like whole bunch of stuff. I don’t weigh
them.” But she agreed that “[i]f experts would say that a ball is 3.5 grams, then four of
those would be 14 grams.” And the complaint provides additional factual support. The
4 complainant FBI special agent indicated that, based on his training and 21 years’
experience, “‘4 balls’ refers to four ‘eightballs,’ or one half-ounce of methamphetamine.”
Bheaanu judicially admitted this and similar statements in the complaint by pleading
guilty. See State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983) (relying on the complaint
in examining the plea because the defendant, by pleading guilty, “in effect judicially
admitted the allegations contained in the complaint”).
Viewed as a whole, the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that
Bheaanu agreed to receive at least ten ounces of methamphetamine from Yang and sell it
to others, and that she committed overt acts in furtherance of that agreement.
Accordingly, we conclude Bheaanu’s plea is accurate.
Voluntariness
In a pro se supplemental brief, Bheaanu also challenges the voluntariness of her
guilty plea. “The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-1716
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Evalyn Lia Bheaanu, Appellant.
Filed July 14, 2014 Affirmed Bjorkman, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-12-7217
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Stephanie A. Karri, Plymouth, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree sale of a
controlled substance, arguing that her guilty plea is not accurate. We affirm. FACTS
After an FBI investigation into a large methamphetamine-distribution operation in
the Twin Cities, respondent State of Minnesota charged 13 individuals with various
controlled-substance crimes. In a 30-page complaint that detailed the FBI’s
investigation, appellant Evalyn Lia Bheaanu was charged with conspiracy to commit
first-degree sale of a controlled substance.
Bheaanu agreed to enter a “straight [guilty] plea” to the charged offense, with the
option to move for a sentencing departure. In support of her plea, Bheaanu admitted that
in January and February 2012 she purchased methamphetamine from co-defendant Koua
“Jimmy” Yang, who had “admitted . . . that he was very involved in the sale of
methamphetamine in the Twin Cities area.” Accord State v. Ayala-Leyva, ___ N.W.2d
___, ___, 2014 WL 2013325, at *3 (Minn. App. May 19, 2014) (discussing Yang’s
testimony about the methamphetamine operation at another co-defendant’s trial), pet. for
review filed (Minn. June 18, 2014). Bheaanu stated that she did not sell or intend to sell
the methamphetamine she purchased but acknowledged that Yang and her other co-
defendants would testify that she sold or purchased with intent to sell at least four “balls”
of methamphetamine and that police had recordings of telephone conversations between
her and Yang consistent with that anticipated testimony. Bheaanu also acknowledged
there was a substantial likelihood a jury would find her guilty based on the available
evidence. Characterizing Bheaanu’s testimony as part Alford plea and part straight guilty
plea, the district court considered it along with the complaint and the recorded telephone
conversations and found that there was an “extreme likelihood that the jury would find
2 guilt under the circumstances regarding the conspiracy to actually sell.” The district
court accepted Bheaanu’s plea.
Bheaanu moved for downward dispositional and durational sentencing departures.
The district court denied the motion and imposed a presumptive sentence of 146 months’
imprisonment. This appeal follows.
DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Minn. 2007). After sentencing, a defendant may
withdraw a guilty plea only if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is invalid.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A valid guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). The
validity of a guilty plea is a question of law, which we review de novo. Lussier v. State,
821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that
the plea was invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Accuracy
Bheaanu principally challenges the accuracy of her guilty plea, arguing that it is
not supported by a sufficient factual basis. The accuracy requirement is satisfied if the
record as a whole contains sufficient facts to support a conclusion that defendant’s
conduct falls within the charge to which she desires to plead guilty. State v. Iverson, 664
N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003); see also Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589 (“[T]he plea
3 petition and colloquy may be supplemented by other evidence to establish the factual
basis for a plea.”).
Bheaanu contends the factual basis for her plea is inadequate because she did not
admit that she “unlawfully sold 10 grams or more of methamphetamine” during a 90-day
period. We disagree. First, Bheaanu’s argument is premised on a misstatement of the
applicable law. The conduct Bheaanu describes is first-degree sale of methamphetamine.
But she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit first-degree sale of methamphetamine.
Conspiracy entails an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime and an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556
(Minn. 2001) (discussing essential elements of controlled-substance conspiracy crime).
“The elements of the underlying crime need not be proven to establish conspiracy since
the crime itself need not be proven to prove conspiracy.” State v. Tracy, 667 N.W.2d
141, 146 (Minn. App. 2003). Bheaanu’s failure to admit an element of the completed
offense does not invalidate her plea of guilty to conspiring to commit that offense.
Second, the record contains sufficient facts establishing the quantity of
methamphetamine that Bheaanu conspired to sell. Bheaanu testified that she told Yang
(in a recorded telephone conversation) that she sold methamphetamine to a man, received
$500 from him in return, and that the man still owed her another $900. She also testified
that Yang gave her “four balls” of methamphetamine. When asked if “four balls is 14
grams,” Bheaanu replied, “I don’t know, it looks like whole bunch of stuff. I don’t weigh
them.” But she agreed that “[i]f experts would say that a ball is 3.5 grams, then four of
those would be 14 grams.” And the complaint provides additional factual support. The
4 complainant FBI special agent indicated that, based on his training and 21 years’
experience, “‘4 balls’ refers to four ‘eightballs,’ or one half-ounce of methamphetamine.”
Bheaanu judicially admitted this and similar statements in the complaint by pleading
guilty. See State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983) (relying on the complaint
in examining the plea because the defendant, by pleading guilty, “in effect judicially
admitted the allegations contained in the complaint”).
Viewed as a whole, the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that
Bheaanu agreed to receive at least ten ounces of methamphetamine from Yang and sell it
to others, and that she committed overt acts in furtherance of that agreement.
Accordingly, we conclude Bheaanu’s plea is accurate.
Voluntariness
In a pro se supplemental brief, Bheaanu also challenges the voluntariness of her
guilty plea. “The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered
because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670,
674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted). To analyze the voluntariness requirement, we
examine “what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. In doing so, we consider the defendant’s indications of
voluntariness on the record. See id. (rejecting claims of “extreme stress,” irrational
thinking, and fear of federal prosecution when defendant’s statements indicated
voluntariness).
Bheaanu contends that she was pressured to plead guilty, taken advantage of
because of her mental illness and drug addiction, and misled by promises of a
5 probationary sentence. The record indicates otherwise. Bheaanu expressly stated that
she was voluntarily entering a guilty plea. She discussed her history of mental-health
issues but indicated that she was not currently receiving treatment or medication and was
competent to proceed. And the sentencing issue was thoroughly addressed. Bheaanu
indicated her understanding that the presumptive sentence was 146 months, and that the
term would be spent in prison, rather than on probation. Bheaanu agreed that she was
seeking a sentencing departure but acknowledged that she had not been promised any
particular outcome. On this record, we conclude that Bheaanu voluntarily pleaded guilty.
Affirmed.