This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1562
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Ernest Alvin Ranzy, Appellant.
Filed August 15, 2016 Affirmed Jesson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-15-2879
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Ernest Ranzy challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
terroristic-threats convictions. Ranzy argues that there is no evidence that he communicated a threat to commit a future crime of violence. Ranzy also raises several
issues in a pro se supplemental brief. Because the evidence is sufficient to support
Ranzy’s convictions and we find no merit in the issues raised in his pro se brief, we
affirm.
FACTS
On January 25, 2015, appellant Ernest Ranzy and his wife T.R. had an argument in
their pick-up truck. During the argument, Ranzy hit T.R. in the eye.1 When T.R. got out
of the truck and refused to get back in, Ranzy drove away. T.R. flagged down a Metro
Transit mobility vehicle for a ride. Ranzy started following the Metro Transit vehicle,
and the driver called the police. Police drove T.R. to a shelter where she spent the night.
On the morning of January 26, T.R. went to work at the Medica building in
Minnetonka. Ranzy called multiple times that morning, telling her to come home and
saying that they could work things out. He also said that he was not going to live without
her. Their last conversation was around noon. T.R. told Ranzy that the relationship was
over. T.R. thought Ranzy seemed very angry during the call.
T.R. asked her co-worker T.B. to give her a ride back to the shelter after work.
T.B. agreed, and they left work together that afternoon. As they walked through the
Medica parking lot toward T.B.’s car, T.R. noticed Ranzy in the pick-up truck. Ranzy
was in the driver’s seat and was yelling out the window at T.R. to come with him. He
was also saying that he was going to leave and not come back. When T.R. noticed
1 T.R. testified that she was not sure if Ranzy punched her in the eye or if he threw a cellphone at her eye.
2 Ranzy, she and T.B. were almost to T.B.’s car. They hurried through the parking lot and
got into the car.
Ranzy’s truck was behind T.B.’s car so she could not reverse out of the parking
spot. There was no car in the spot in front of her, however, so she pulled forward and to
the right. T.B. then took another right toward one of the parking lot’s exits. Ranzy drove
the pick-up truck down the aisle of parking spots and blocked T.B. from completing her
right turn and heading to the exit. A bystander heard the pick-up truck’s “wheels
screeching” as Ranzy sped through the parking lot to block T.B.’s exit. T.B.’s car was
now wedged between the pick-up and a median, preventing her from going forward or in
reverse. T.B. and T.R. were both very scared. T.R. was saying they had to go because
Ranzy would kill them. T.B. was holding her hands up to try and show Ranzy she
wanted no part of this conflict.
Ranzy got partially out of the pick-up. Ranzy continued to yell at T.R. to come
with him. As Ranzy got out, the pick-up pulled forward slightly. T.B. believed that she
could now get around the pick-up and started to drive forward. When T.B. pulled
forward, Ranzy quickly got back in the pick-up truck, reversed, and then drove forward at
a relatively high rate of speed into T.B.’s car. The bystander again described hearing
“wheels screeching” as Ranzy drove towards and rammed into T.B.’s car. When the
vehicles collided, T.B.’s car spun so that it was now facing the opposite direction.
After ramming T.B.’s car, Ranzy reversed a second time. T.B. thought that Ranzy
was going to ram into her car again. She was also worried that if she got out of the car,
Ranzy might run her over. But then Ranzy pulled the pick-up alongside the car to talk to
3 T.R. Although the driver-side door was jammed from the collision, T.B. was able to kick
it open. She got out of the car and ran back into the Medica building.
Ranzy got out of the pick-up and began banging on the passenger-side window
and yelling at T.R. about reconciling. T.R. believed that Ranzy was trying to break the
window. She climbed over the driver’s seat, exited, and also ran back into the Medica
building. Ranzy then got back into the pick-up truck and drove away.
Initially, Ranzy was charged with two counts of second-degree assault. On the
first day of trial, the state amended the complaint to add two counts of terroristic threats,
one count for each victim. After the state presented its case, Ranzy moved for a
judgment of acquittal on all charges. Ranzy’s attorney argued that Ranzy did not threaten
to commit a crime of violence and therefore could not be convicted of terroristic threats.
The district court denied the motion.
The jury found Ranzy guilty of both terroristic-threats counts. The jury acquitted
Ranzy of the two second-degree assault counts. The district court sentenced Ranzy to 32
months in prison on one terroristic-threats count and 36 months in prison on the other.
The district court ordered the sentences served concurrently. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Ranzy threatened T.R. and T.B. with a future crime of violence and that he communicated the threat with the purpose of terrorizing the victims or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.
Ranzy first claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his terroristic-threats
convictions. He argues that the state failed to prove that he threatened to commit a future
4 crime of violence. Ranzy maintains that the act of driving a pick-up at another vehicle
may be an assault but cannot be construed as a threat to commit a future assault.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we conduct a painstaking analysis
of the record to determine if the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to reach the
verdict that it did. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the
state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206,
223 (Minn. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 509 (2015). The verdict will not be disturbed if
the jury, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the charged offense[s].” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
Any person who threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit a crime of violence
with the purpose of terrorizing another or in reckless disregard of terrorizing another, is
guilty of making a terroristic threat. Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2014). A threat is
defined as the communication of an intent to harm another or his property through an
unlawful act. State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 399, 237 N.W.2d 609, 613 (1975). The
communication, when viewed in context, must have a “reasonable tendency to create
apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” Id. (quotations omitted).
The threat need not be verbal or written. State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn.
1996). Physical acts may communicate a threat. Id.
The threat, however, must be to commit a crime of violence in the future. Id. The
statute is designed to deter and punish both the future act threatened and the threat itself.
5 Id. But there is no specific amount of time that must pass before a threat of immediate
violence turns into a threat to commit future violence. State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131,
136 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013).
The jury was instructed that to find Ranzy guilty of both terroristic-threats counts
they had to determine that he threatened T.R. and T.B. with second-degree assault.
Second-degree assault requires the use of a dangerous weapon to commit an act “with
intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death” or “intentional[ly]
inflicting” or “attempt[ing] to inflict bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02,
subd. 10, .222, subd. 1 (2014).
The state does not argue that Ranzy verbally threatened T.R. or T.B. Instead,
when his actions are considered in context, the state argues that Ranzy’s driving conduct
conveyed a threat to use the pick-up to commit the crime of assault with a dangerous
weapon. We agree.
The evidence shows that Ranzy assaulted T.R. on January 25. Then, on January
26, Ranzy called T.R. and told her that he would not live without her. He was angry
because T.R. wanted to end the relationship. When T.R. and T.B. left work at the end of
the day, Ranzy was waiting in the parking lot and began yelling at T.R. to come with him
and to reconcile their relationship. When T.B. drove toward the exit, Ranzy raced
through the parking lot and used his pick-up to physically prevent T.R. and T.B. from
leaving.
When Ranzy’s pick-up pulled forward slightly, T.B. thought she could drive
around it and to the exit. As soon as she began pulling forward, Ranzy got back into his
6 truck and reversed. Ranzy appeared willing to do anything to prevent T.R. and T.B. from
leaving. Given this context, a reasonable jury could find that, when Ranzy re-entered his
pick-up and reversed, he communicated a threat to ram T.B.’s car if T.B. did not stop
driving forward. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to believe that Ranzy
would follow through with this threat.
While the length of time between Ranzy reversing and Ranzy ramming T.B.’s car
was very short, there is no specific amount of time that must pass before a threat of
immediate violence turns into a threat of future violence. Smith, 825 N.W.2d at 136. In
Smith, the defendant waved a knife in front of the victim and demanded money. Id. at
135. We held that, although this took place during an ongoing confrontation, the act of
waving the knife in front of the victim communicated a threat to stab the victim in the
future if the money was not delivered. Id. at 135-36. Smith’s terroristic-threats
conviction therefore punished and deterred both the threat to stab the victim and the act
threatened. Id. at 136.
Similarly, when T.B. began to drive her car forward, Ranzy reversed. This
communicated a threat that if T.B. did not stop her car, Ranzy would commit the future
crime of second-degree assault by ramming T.B.’s car. Ranzy’s terroristic-threats
convictions therefore punish and deter the threat Ranzy communicated by reversing, as
well as the threatened act of ramming T.B.’s car.
The state also argues that Ranzy threatened to commit a future second-degree
assault when, after ramming T.B.’s car, he reversed again. We agree. T.B. testified that
she was concerned that Ranzy was going to ram her car a second time. She also testified
7 that she considered getting out of the car but was initially worried that Ranzy would run
her over if she exited. A reasonable jury could find that Ranzy’s act of reversing, after
running into T.B.’s car, communicated a threat to hit T.B.’s car a second time. Given the
context, the jury could also find that it was reasonable to believe Ranzy would carry out
this threat.
Furthermore, Ranzy banging on the passenger window with his hands could also
be viewed by the jury as a threat to commit second-degree assault. T.R. testified that
Ranzy was banging so hard on the window she believed he was trying to break it. Given
what had previously occurred, Ranzy pounding on the window with that amount of force
could be viewed as a threat to assault T.R. should Ranzy successfully break the window.
A threat to use hands as a dangerous weapon may be the basis of a terroristic-
threats conviction, where the threatened crime of violence is second-degree assault. State
v. Jorgenson, 758 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Minn. App. 2008). The defendant, however, must
threaten to use his hands in a way that is calculated to or likely to produce great bodily
harm or death. Id. By banging hard on the window after just ramming into T.B.’s car,
Ranzy may have threatened to use his hands to commit an assault calculated to produce
great bodily harm or death.
In addition to proving a threat to commit a future crime of violence, the state also
had to prove that Ranzy communicated the threat with the purpose of terrorizing T.R. and
T.B. or acted “in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1. Under the terroristic-threats statute, “purpose means aim, objective,
or intention,” and “terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.”
8 Smith, 825 N.W.2d at 136 (quotation omitted). Intent is a state of mind that must
generally be proven by using circumstantial evidence. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175,
179 (Minn. 1997). A victim’s reaction to a threat is circumstantial evidence of intent.
Schweppe, 306 Minn. at 401, 237 N.W.2d at 614.
We apply heightened scrutiny to convictions that are based on circumstantial
evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). In circumstantial
evidence cases, the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any other rational hypothesis. State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011).
The first step in analyzing whether the evidence is sufficient is to identify the
circumstances proved. Id. The second step, is to “examine independently the
reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved,
including inferences consistent with rational hypotheses other than guilt.” Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d at 473-74 (quotation omitted).
The circumstances proved, as outlined above, show that T.R. and T.B. were
terrified by Ranzy coming to their workplace, physically blocking them from leaving the
parking lot, running into T.B.’s vehicle, reversing, and then banging on the vehicle’s
passenger-side window. We conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.2
2 Ranzy also argues that we must remand and order the district court to hold a restitution hearing. At Ranzy’s sentencing, the district court ordered restitution and Ranzy objected. The district court then agreed with a statement by the prosecutor that because written notice of the restitution amount had not yet been given, Ranzy should wait and request a hearing after the written restitution order had been filed. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2014) (“An offender may challenge restitution, but must do so by requesting a
9 II. The issues raised in Ranzy’s pro se supplemental brief are without merit.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Ranzy claims that his trial attorney was
ineffective, that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that there was error in the
jury instructions. We briefly address each claim below.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Ranzy must demonstrate
“(1) that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke
v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). An attorney provides reasonable
assistance when the attorney exercises the customary skills and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State,
621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001). The defendant must overcome the “strong
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable
assistance.” Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007). Matters of trial strategy
hearing within 30 days of receiving written notification of the amount of restitution requested, or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever is later.”). The prosecutor and the district court both indicated that they would consider any subsequent request for a restitution hearing timely. Ranzy conceded at oral argument that he has not requested a restitution hearing since the written restitution order was filed. Appellate courts typically do not consider matters that were not argued to and considered by the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Because Ranzy has not requested a restitution hearing since sentencing, the district court has not considered the issue, and there is nothing for us to review. We do not address the matter.
10 are left to the discretion of trial counsel and are not second-guessed on appeal. Leake v.
State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 2007).
Ranzy first claims that his attorney was unprepared on the original trial date, and,
as a result, the state had additional time to amend the complaint to add the terroristic-
threats charges. On the date trial was scheduled to begin, Ranzy insisted that his public
defender was not prepared and demanded a new attorney. The attorney, however,
indicated that he was prepared to proceed with trial. The district court explained to
Ranzy that he would not be granted a different public defender, but Ranzy persisted in his
demands. Ultimately the district court continued the matter to allow Ranzy additional
time to consult with his attorney. The trial was therefore continued at Ranzy’s request.
Furthermore, even if the continuance was granted because the attorney needed additional
time to prepare for trial, it is unclear how successfully obtaining a continuance to further
prepare a defense could amount to a failure to provide reasonable assistance. Moreover,
Ranzy has failed to show prejudice. Although the new charges were added on the
continued trial date, Ranzy provides no evidence that the additional charges would not
have been filed had the trial commenced as originally scheduled.
Second, Ranzy argues that his attorney failed to file “standard motions in
preparation for trial.” But Ranzy does not identify the motions that he believes his
attorney should have filed or state how he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to file
these motions.
Ranzy further argues that his attorney failed to communicate with him about trial
strategy. Trial strategy, however, is left to the discretion of trial counsel and is generally
11 not reviewed by this court. Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 536. Ranzy also does not indicate how
this failure to communicate prejudiced him. He fails to state anything that would have
been done differently had his attorney been in better communication.
Ranzy also maintains that his attorney failed to provide him with discovery, jury
instructions, or clothes for trial. These claims are all plainly contradicted by the record.
Lastly, Ranzy claims that his attorney failed to object to the addition of the new
terroristic-threats charges. It is unclear if this refers to a failure to object to the state
amending the complaint, a failure to challenge probable cause, or both. Regardless,
Ranzy cannot prevail because his attorney’s performance was not deficient, and, even if it
had been deficient, Ranzy suffered no prejudice. Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2,
prior to the jury being sworn, the prosecuting attorney may freely amend the complaint
by motion. State v. Bluhm, 460 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. 1990). The state moved to amend
the complaint before the jury was sworn. Accordingly, there was likely no basis to
challenge the district court’s decision to grant the amendment. There was also no basis
for a probable-cause challenge. This is clear from the district court’s denial of Ranzy’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal and our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence
to support Ranzy’s convictions on these charges. See, e.g., Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d
719, 731 (Minn. 2010) (noting that burden of overturning grand jury indictment is
heavier after a fair trial and a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
Ranzy’s attorney competently argued pre-trial and jury-instruction issues,
thoroughly cross-examined witnesses, competently presented Ranzy’s testimony, and
presented a thorough closing argument. The attorney’s representation led to an acquittal
12 on the more serious second-degree assault charges. Ranzy has not shown that his
attorney’s assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was
prejudiced by his attorney’s alleged errors. See Nissalke, 861 N.W.2d at 94.
B. Speedy Trial
Ranzy next argues that the district court violated his right to a speedy trial by
allowing the state to amend the complaint to add the two terroristic-threats charges. He
claims that the amendment violated his right to a speedy trial because it was made one
day after his 60-day speedy-trial date.
Ranzy’s trial began on May 5, 2015. Ranzy made a speedy trial demand on
March 5, 2015. Ranzy’s trial therefore began on the 61st day after his speedy-trial
demand. A delay of more than 60 days from the date of the speedy-trial demand raises a
presumption that a violation has occurred. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn.
2015); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09 (stating that “the trial must start within 60 days”
of a speedy-trial demand “unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date”).
However, “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the
defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d
97, 109 (Minn. 2005). The delay was the result of Ranzy’s actions and can in no way be
attributed to the state. Ranzy’s trial was originally scheduled for April 27, 2015, well
within the 60 days. Although the state appeared to have been ready for trial and Ranzy’s
attorney said he was also ready for trial, Ranzy insisted that his attorney was not prepared
and demanded a new attorney. Ranzy’s actions forced the district court to continue the
13 matter. The state’s subsequent motion to amend the complaint caused no further delay.
Ranzy’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
C. Jury Instructions
Finally, Ranzy raises a general challenge to the jury instructions. He does not
point to any specific instruction, but alleges generally that the instructions confused the
jury and were not in line with the law. A claim of error in a brief based only on assertion
and not supported by argument or authority is forfeited unless prejudicial error is clear on
inspection. State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006), aff’d, 728
N.W.2d 2443 (Minn. 2007). We observe no obvious prejudicial error in the jury
instructions.3
Affirmed.
3 Ranzy’s pro se brief also raises what he labels a “[v]iolation of due process.” This section, however, only addresses a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim that appears identical to that argued in Ranzy’s principal brief.