This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-2334
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Donald Ernest Beckman, Appellant.
Filed October 27, 2014 Affirmed Stauber, Judge Hooten, Judge, dissenting
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69HICR12809
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James Andrew Borland, Hibbing City Attorney, Sellman Law Office, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean M. McGuire, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAUBER, Judge
On appeal from his convictions of misdemeanor criminal damage to property and
disorderly conduct, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) the district court erred by sentencing him for two offenses that occurred
during a single behavioral incident. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 10, 2012, appellant Donald Beckman went to the Hibbing Public
Utilities (HPU) office to apply to have public utilities hooked up for his newly rented
home. When he arrived at the HPU office, appellant, who is disabled and walks with a
cane due to a lower-back injury, was informed that he needed to pay a $420 deposit to put
the utilities in his name. Appellant then left the office, annoyed because he did not have
sufficient funds on hand and because he was not informed beforehand of the deposit
requirement.
After appellant left, Joseph Borra, a HPU employee, noticed that the outside door
was not automatically closing. The doors are of heavy steel construction with double-
pane glass. They are “handicap accessible,” having a control arm that is connected to a
motor. When the handicap-access button is pressed, the control arm operates an opening
mechanism, and then a retraction mechanism when the door is closing. When the arm is
not attached, the door will not open when the access button is pressed, requiring the
person seeking entry to physically open the door. Once physically opened, the door will
not automatically close.
Borra mentioned to a co-worker that, when appellant left the office, he broke the
door. Borra then informed his supervisor of the situation. A police report was filed, and
appellant was charged with disorderly conduct and criminal damage to property.
2 At trial, Borra testified that after being told of the required deposit, appellant
“became upset with the amount” and began screaming and shouting obscenities. Borra
also testified that appellant then left the building, pushing “excessively hard” on the door,
causing the mechanism to break. Although Borra acknowledged that the doors “are
somewhat hard to open,” he testified that when appellant left, “there was a rapid rate of
acceleration with the door, much faster than the average person leaving.” Borra
explained that “[t]ypically, when you leave the office the door only opens about two feet
and most people skirt right around it. This time the door went beyond its opening point,
and then actually the first one came snapping back and then the second one . . . just
stayed open.” Borra further testified that he “could visibly see that the hinge mechanism
on the top [of the door] was separated.” Finally, Borra could not recall having any
problems with the door prior to appellant’s visit.
Appellant testified that when he went to the HPU office on September 10, he
pressed the handicap-access button that was supposed to open the external door.
According to appellant, however, the door did not open. Appellant testified that he then
pushed the button three or four more times, but it still would not open. Appellant further
testified that he then used the handle of the door and physically opened it, which, because
of his disability, was a difficult task.
Appellant testified that once inside the office, he talked with Borra, whom he
recognized as somebody he knew of from high school. Appellant stated that when he
was informed that he needed to pay a $420 deposit, he “was just annoyed that they didn’t
tell me I had to bring money or there was a deposit. Otherwise, I would have came
3 prepared.” Appellant claimed that he called the deposit demand “ridiculous,” and then
walked away from the counter. According to appellant, he then had to push the door
open and “prop it open with [his] cane, and then proceed to walk out.” Appellant denied
trying to break the door and did not “think” that he had damaged the door. And, although
he could not testify with any certainty that he did not use a swear word when expressing
his displeasure about the $420 deposit, he denied threatening anyone or attempting to
pick a fight with anyone.
The jury found appellant guilty of both charged offenses. The district court then
imposed concurrent 30-day sentences for both the disorderly conduct and the criminal
damage to property offenses and stayed execution of those sentences. The court also
imposed $500 fines for both offenses and ordered appellant to pay $269 in restitution for
the criminal-damage-to-property offense. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I.
Appellant challenges his convictions of disorderly conduct and criminal damage to
property, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. When
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we conduct “a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction,” is sufficient to allow jurors to reach a verdict of guilty.
State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that
“the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”
State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). This court
4 “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at
100.
A. Disorderly conduct
Minnesota law provides that whoever “engages in offensive, obscene, abusive,
boisterous, or noisy conduct or in offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending
reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others,” in a “public or private
place . . . knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know that it will, or will tend to,
alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or breach of the peace, is guilty of
disorderly conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2012).
Disorderly conduct charges “must be closely scrutinized.” State v. Klimek, 398
N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. App. 1986). “Whether particular conduct constitutes disorderly
conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. at 43. Disorderly
conduct must be conduct that will affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness
it and may be disturbed or driven to resentment by it. State v. Reynolds, 243 Minn. 196,
201, 66 N.W.2d 886, 890 (1954). When reviewing a conviction of disorderly conduct, a
reviewing court must consider the defendant’s words and conduct as a package. Klimek,
398 N.W.2d at 43.
Appellant argues that the record does “not support the conclusion that [he]
engaged in offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct, tending to
reasonably arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.” We disagree. Words that are
5 vulgar, offensive, or insulting may be criminal if they fall outside the protection afforded
to speech by the First Amendment. In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.
1978); see also In re Welfare of M.A.H., 572 N.W.2d 752, 759-60 (Minn. App. 1997)
(reversing disorderly conduct juvenile adjudication when juveniles swore loudly at police
officers). Although “the disorderly conduct statute prohibits only ‘fighting words’ as
applied to speech content, the disorderly shouting of otherwise protected speech or
engaging in other ‘boisterous or noisy conduct’ may still trigger punishment under the
statute without offending the First Amendment.” In re Welfare of T.L.S., 713 N.W.2d
877, 881 (Minn. App. 2006). Under those conditions, “it is not speech itself that triggers
punishment; the statute may be applied to punish the manner of delivery of speech when
the disorderly nature of the speech does not depend on its content.” Id. Therefore,
appellant’s conviction may be upheld if his conduct was “offensive, obscene, abusive,
boisterous, or noisy” and if he knew or had reason to know that his conduct would “tend
to alarm, anger or disturb others.” Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3).
Borra testified that, after being told of the required deposit, appellant “became
upset with the amount” and began screaming and shouting obscenities. He also testified
that when appellant left the building, he pushed “excessively hard” against the door.
And, according to Borra, “everyone” in the office was “concern[ed]” and “took aware of
what was going on” during appellant’s outburst. If believed, Borra’s testimony
establishes that appellant knowingly engaged in abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct that
disturbed the people in the office. See Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (stating that a
person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he “engages in . . . abusive, boisterous, or noisy
6 conduct” “knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know that it . . . will tend to, alarm,
anger or disturb others”). The jury heard the evidence presented at trial and believed
Borra’s testimony, and we defer to the jury’s determination of facts, assuming it believed
the state’s witnesses and rejected contrary evidence. See State v. McDonald, 394 N.W.2d
572, 576 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that it is “exclusively within the province of the
jury” to determine witness credibility and to give weight to their testimony), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 1986). Although we acknowledge that the evidence supporting
the verdict was not particularly strong, we conclude that it was sufficient to sustain
appellant’s conviction of disorderly conduct.
B. Criminal damage to property
Minnesota law also provides that “whoever intentionally causes damage to another
person’s physical property without the other person’s consent” is guilty of a misdemeanor
if the damage reduces the value of the property by no more than $500. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.595, subds. 2(a), 3 (2012).
“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence . . . warrants heightened scrutiny.”
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). “Circumstantial evidence must
form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the
guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference
other than guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). This court will not overturn a circumstantial-
evidence conviction based on “mere conjecture.” Id. Instead, a two-step analysis is
applied when examining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. State v. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013).
7 “The first step is to identify the circumstances proved. In identifying the
circumstances proved, we defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). The jury “is in
the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence.” Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d at 473. Therefore, the circumstances proved are identified “in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2012).
Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances
proved at trial are as follows: (1) appellant was upset when informed of the required
deposit, and when he left the HPU office, he pushed “excessively hard” on the door;
(2) after appellant left the office, Borra observed that the door was broken; (3) exhibits
were admitted depicting the broken door with the hinge mechanism separated from the
door; and (4) as Borra testified, although the door is typically “somewhat hard to open,”
there were no problems with the door prior to appellant coming into the office.
“The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted). In making this determination, this court does not
“review each circumstance proved in isolation,” but instead considers the circumstances
on the whole. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 332 (Minn. 2010). “The [s]tate does
not have the burden of removing all doubt, but of removing all reasonable doubt.” Al-
Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473. This court independently examines the reasonableness of
the possible inferences and gives “no deference to the fact finder’s choice between
8 reasonable inferences.” Id. at 473-74. To ensure that there is no reasonable doubt as to
the defendant’s guilt, there must be no reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt. Id. at
474.
Appellant argues that in light of his disability and his testimony that the door was
broken when he entered the HPU office, it was only reasonable to infer that he did not
break the door. But, the jury heard Borra’s testimony that the door was not broken prior
to appellant arriving at the office. And Borra testified that when appellant left, he pushed
the door “excessively hard” by leaning into it with his full body weight and that the door
was broken after appellant left the building. The jury was free to credit this testimony.
Moreover, although appellant testified that the door was already broken when he arrived
at the HPU office, the jurors clearly did not believe his testimony because the jury
convicted him of criminal damage to property. See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329 (stating
that in determining the circumstances proved, “we defer, consistent with our standard of
review, to the jury, acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of
evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the state”
(quotation omitted)).
Appellant further argues that the “circumstances proved do not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that [he] specifically intended to damage the door.” But “[i]ntent may be
proved by circumstantial evidence including the defendant’s conduct” and “may be
inferred from events occurring before and after the crime.” Davis v. State, 595 N.W.2d
520, 525-26 (Minn. 1999). The record here reflects that appellant was upset about the
required deposit and displayed his displeasure by shouting and yelling obscenities and
9 then pushing “excessively hard” on the door. From this evidence, the jury could infer
that appellant intended to break the door. Therefore, we conclude that the evidentiary
standard was met to prove by circumstantial evidence that appellant committed the crime
of criminal damage to property.
II.
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2012), provides that a person whose conduct
“constitutes more than one offense” may be punished for only one of them. The test is
whether the offenses are part of “a single behavioral incident.” Effinger v. State, 380
N.W.2d 483, 488 (Minn. 1986). “The state has the burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conduct underlying the offenses did not occur as
part of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (Minn.
2000).
“In order to determine whether two intentional crimes are part of a single
behavioral incident, [courts] consider factors of time and place and whether the segment
of conduct involved was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.”
State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “Whether
multiple offenses arose out of a single behavior[al] incident depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.” State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn.
1995). But once “the facts are established, the determination [whether offenses arose
from the same behavioral incident] is a question of law subject to de novo review.” State
v. Marchbanks, 632 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. App. 2001). Failure to raise the issue of
10 multiple sentences arising from a single behavioral incident at sentencing does not
preclude relief on appeal. Ture v. State, 353 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1984).
Appellant argues that the district court erred by sentencing him for disorderly
conduct and criminal damage to property because the offenses were committed during a
single behavioral incident. We disagree. Disorderly conduct and criminal damage to
property do not involve the same motivation. See Bauer, 792 N.W.2d at 828 (discussing
determination of whether two intentional crimes are part of same behavioral incident).
Criminal damage to property is a specific-intent crime requiring the offender to have
intent to cause damage to another person’s physical property without their consent.
Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 2(a). In contrast, disorderly conduct is a general intent
crime requiring that the offender to know or have reasonable grounds to know that the
behavior “will, or will tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others.” Minn. Stat. § 609.72,
subd. 1(3).
Appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct for engaging in abusive or
boisterous behavior that tended to alarm the employees at the HPU office and was
convicted of criminal damage to property for intentionally breaking the door. These acts
were motivated by separate criminal objectives. Accordingly, the offenses are not part of
a single behavioral incident.
Affirmed.
11 HOOTEN, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. Based on the evidence produced at trial, appellant is correct
in asserting that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either disorderly
conduct or criminal damage to property.
The majority acknowledges that “the evidence supporting the [disorderly conduct]
verdict was not particularly strong,” but is mistaken in then concluding that this evidence
was sufficient to convict appellant of disorderly conduct. The state was required at trial
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant: (1) “engage[d] in offensive, obscene,
abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct or in offensive, obscene, or abusive language
tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others”; (2) “kn[ew], or ha[d]
reasonable grounds to know that it will, or will tend to, alarm, anger, or disturb others or
provoke an assault or breach of the peace”; and (3) did so in a public or private place.
Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1 (2012).
As alluded to by the majority, appellant’s speech while at the Hibbing Public
Utilities (HPU) office, although unclear from the record, is protected by the First
Amendment. To preserve the disorderly conduct statute’s constitutionality, the supreme
court has narrowly construed the “offensive, obscene, or abusive language” portion of the
statute to only apply to “fighting words” when used to punish speech. In re Welfare of
S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 418–19 (Minn. 1978). “Fighting words” are “vulgar, offensive,
insulting words [that] would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” or words
that would “have an immediate tendency to provoke retaliatory violence or tumultuous
D-1 conduct by those to whom such words are addressed.” Id. at 419 (quotation omitted).
Whether certain language rises to the level of fighting words depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case. State v. Lynch, 392 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. App. 1986).
According to the service clerk at HPU, appellant’s reaction upon learning a
substantial deposit was required before he could set up new service was “screaming and
hollering” that included “a bunch of” unspecified obscenities. The clerk was unable to
recall exactly what words or obscenities were used, and only testified that appellant’s
statements were “curse words” and referred to “scams.” On cross-examination, the clerk
further testified that appellant did not threaten him personally, call him names, or try to
start a fight with him. Without more evidence in the record as to what appellant’s words
were, there is no showing that the speech could have provoked a breach of the peace or
retaliatory violence. In S.L.J., a 14-year-old defendant’s statement of “f*** you, pigs” to
police officers sitting in a squad car was not considered fighting words. 263 N.W.2d at
415. After providing its narrow construction of the disorderly conduct statute, the court
said:
While it is true that no ordered society would condone the vulgar language used by this 14-year-old child, and . . . her words were intended to, and did, arouse resentment in the officers, the constitution requires more before a person can be convicted for mere speech.
Id. at 419–20 (emphasis added). In Lynch, we held that similar language was fighting
words due to an additional circumstance: the defendant was using the speech to incite a
club-brandishing crowd. 392 N.W.2d at 704–05. Even if what appellant said was as
vulgar and offensive in nature as the speech in S.L.J. or Lynch, the circumstances do not
D-2 indicate that those words had the potential to cause violence or a breach of the peace that
was dispositive in Lynch.
The majority is correct that In re Welfare of T.L.S. held that the disorderly conduct
statute can punish the manner of speech and other accompanying conduct, even if the
speech itself is protected by the First Amendment, so long as the “disorderly nature of the
speech does not depend on its content.” 713 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn. App. 2006). In
T.L.S., the defendant was “shrieking” obscenities at a police officer, and the noise was so
loud that it was “disruptive to the running of the school and purposes of the school.” Id.
at 879. This court held that her speech itself was protected by the First Amendment, but
her “boisterous and noisy conduct” in making that speech was punishable under the
disorderly conduct statute. Id. at 880. Similarly, the defendant in State v. Klimek could
be punished under the statute due to the threatening conduct that accompanied his
words—following a guardian ad litem out to her car and shaking his fist at her. 398
N.W.2d 41, 43 (Minn. App. 1986).
But looking beyond appellant’s words, the conduct proved at trial simply does not
constitute “offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct” that “tend[ed]
reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.” Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd.
1(3). The evidence provides two instances of conduct during the ten-minute period
appellant was at the HPU office for which he might be punished: his “screaming and
D-3 hollering” at the clerk and his “excessively hard” pushing of the office doors.1 But the
evidence does not show that this conduct aroused alarm, anger, or resentment in those
present at the HPU. The following exchange at trial illustrates the effect appellant’s
conduct had on the four utility workers who were present:
PROSECUTOR: Is this typical for the service employees of the [u]tility to be addressed like this?
CLERK: It happens more often than I would like.
PROSECUTOR: But it’s not a typical everyday occurrence, like, oh, it’s just another happy customer or unhappy customer?
CLERK: No, it’s not typical.
PROSECUTOR: Cause some concern with regard to the individuals and yourself there?
CLERK: Yes, everyone took [sic] aware of what was going on.
(emphasis added). This evidence, provided by the state’s chief witness on direct
examination, showed the employees were merely “aware” of appellant’s outburst, and it
was customer conduct that, while atypical, was not so disturbing as to alarm utility
employees who had seen this type of conduct before. Similarly, the clerk’s reaction after
seeing appellant push open the door “excessively hard” and noticing that the door
remained open was to comment to a fellow employee, “I think he just broke our door,”
and then later call the police after speaking with a supervisor. This is a far cry from the
1 At closing arguments, the state also alleged that appellant had snatched his belongings off the HPU counter. As pointed out in appellant’s brief, this fact was not in evidence at trial. D-4 classroom disruption caused by the “shrieking” in T.L.S. or the fear resulting from
threatening actions in Klimek. The evidence here fails to show a similar disturbance of
the peace.
“Not every annoyance is born of culpable conduct.” State v. Korich, 219 Minn.
268, 271, 17 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Minn. 1945). We have warned before that the disorderly-
conduct statute “should not be used to combat rudeness or [as] social engineering.”
Klimek, 398 N.W.2d at 43. Even assuming the jury believed the state’s witnesses, and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, see State v. Ortega,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012), the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable juror to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s conduct “tend[ed] reasonably to
arouse alarm, anger, or resentment” as required for a guilty verdict. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.72, subd. 1(3).
To convict appellant of criminal damage to property, the state had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt, inter alia: (1) that appellant broke the door; and (2) that appellant
intended to break the door. See Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 2(a) (2012) (providing that
“whoever intentionally causes damage to another person’s physical property without the
other person’s consent” is guilty of an offense (emphasis added)). I agree with the
majority that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that when appellant went
through the door, it broke. But I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the state
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to break the door because, as to
the circumstantial evidence of appellant’s state of mind, “the circumstances proved in this
D-5 case are consistent with a reasonable inference of innocence.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 480 (Minn. 2010).
Due to the use of the term “intentionally” in the criminal damage to property
statute, criminal intent is a required element of the offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 9(1) (2012). Under Minnesota’s criminal code, a criminal offense that is defined
using the word “intentionally” requires that the defendant either: (1) “has a purpose to do
the thing or cause the result specified”; or (2) “believes that the act . . . , if successful, will
cause that result.” Id. subd. 9(3). A criminal damage to property charge under Minn.
Stat. § 609.595 therefore requires proof that the defendant purposely caused damage to
another’s property without consent, or proof that the defendant believed his or her act
would cause such damage. In addition, “the actor must have knowledge of those facts
which are necessary to make the actor’s conduct criminal and which are set forth after the
word ‘intentionally.’” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3).
As a state of mind, intent “generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from
words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident. A jury is permitted to infer
that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of [his or her] actions.” State
v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000) (citation omitted). “A conviction based
on circumstantial evidence . . . warrants heightened scrutiny.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at
473. This heightened scrutiny comes in the form of a two-step process when reviewing
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges based on circumstantial evidence. “The first step
is to identify the circumstances proved,” and “[t]he second step is to determine whether
the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
D-6 hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598–99 (Minn.
2013) (quotations omitted).
“[I]n determining the circumstances proved, we consider only those circumstances
that are consistent with the verdict.” Id. at 599. “As with direct evidence, we construe
conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury
believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Here, the relevant circumstances proved are as follows. Appellant’s
undisputed testimony was that he suffers from a chronic lower-back injury and used a
cane while visiting the HPU on September 10, 2012. Due to his condition, appellant
typically has to balance doors with his cane or elbow in order to fully open them, and he
did brace the door with his elbow when entering HPU. While at the HPU, appellant
became upset when informed of the required deposit and expressed his displeasure by
“scream[ing] and holler[ing].” When he left the office, the clerk observed that appellant
pushed “excessively hard” on both doors by “lean[ing] into [the doors] and just with body
weight push[ing] [them] forward.” The HPU office had inner and outer handicap-
accessible doors made of heavy steel and double-paned glass. According to the clerk, the
state’s chief witness at trial, these doors were “difficult to open at times” such that
“[m]ost people have to lean on them to push them open,” and the doors would “only
open[] about two feet and most people [would] skirt right around [them].” Upon leaving
the HPU office, appellant went through the first, inner door by pushing “excessively
hard,” and when he similarly pushed open the second, outer door, it “just stayed open”
because the return mechanism arm on the door frame was disconnected from the outer
D-7 door itself. The return mechanism was originally attached to the outer door with two
screws, but only one screw was found at the scene by the investigating police officer. A
citation for disorderly conduct and criminal damage to property against appellant was
published in the local newspaper, and after seeing the publication, appellant called the
police because he thought his identity had been stolen.
After establishing the circumstances proved, “[t]he second step is to determine
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotations omitted). “Circumstantial
evidence must form a complete chain that, as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the
defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than
guilt.” State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011) (citing Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d at 473). The state need not remove all doubt, but it has the burden of removing
all reasonable doubt. Id. We give no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable
inferences. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 474.
The majority is correct that the circumstances proved are arguably consistent with
an inference of guilt: that appellant intended to damage the door. However, the
heightened review of circumstantial evidence entails more than “simply” examining
“whether the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at
599. The circumstances must also be “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). The majority utterly fails to
show how the evidence produced at trial sufficiently excludes alternate hypotheses
consistent with appellant’s innocence. The inference that appellant intended to damage
D-8 the outer door at the HPU office is not the only reasonable inference that can be drawn
from the circumstances proved, and therefore appellant’s conviction for criminal damage
to property cannot be upheld.
In the context of criminal damage to property charges, intent can be inferred from
conduct. See State v. Anderson, 494 N.W.2d 876, 876 (Minn. 1993) (order opinion);
Barnslater v. State, 805 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. App. 2011). In Anderson and
Barnslater, the defendants damaged property by throwing it either into a lake, Anderson,
494 N.W.2d at 876, or around a house, Barnslater, 805 N.W.2d at 915. An inference of a
defendant’s intent to damage property based on evidence that the defendant threw an
object is supported by the fact that throwing is an action that a reasonable person knows
will likely result in damage to the property; in other words, damage is the “natural and
probable consequenc[e]” of such an action. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 726; see also
Anderson, 494 N.W.2d at 876.
Appellant did appear to push “excessively hard” on the door, and the door was
broken after he left the HPU office. But appellant’s conduct here was not intrinsically
damaging. A radio is not thrown into a lake in the normal course of using that property,
see Anderson, 494 N.W.2d at 876, but doors are pushed and pulled in the normal course
of their operation. The degree of force applied by appellant may have looked “excessive”
to the clerk, but the clerk also testified that appellant appeared to apply the same level of
force to the inner door that did not break. Beyond the simple cause-and-effect logic that
the door was not broken until appellant pushed it open, and the clerk’s testimony that the
pushing appeared “excessive,” there is no evidence in the record supporting the
D-9 conclusion that the “natural and probable” consequence of appellant’s actions was a
broken door. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 726.
Other reasonable inferences can be drawn from appellant’s opening of the HPU
office door. One reasonable inference is that appellant’s conduct in opening the door
“excessively hard” was due to his disability and the nature of the door. The evidence
establishes appellant’s disability, including his use of a cane and the fact that the outer
door was difficult to open and possibly already in a compromised condition due to a
missing screw. While appellant may have been upset at the utility clerk before opening
the door, it is reasonable to infer that his outburst had no bearing on his later “excessively
hard” pushing on the door. Instead, appellant may have pushed “excessively hard” due to
his disability and the fact that the door was inherently difficult to open. But, even
assuming that appellant was still upset when he left the HPU office, it could also
reasonably be inferred that he pushed excessively hard on the outer door not with the
intent to break it, but instead to further express frustration at having to pay the HPU $420
before he could receive electrical service. It is reasonable to infer that he then opened the
doors “excessively hard” not with the intent to damage the doors, but because he was still
upset about having to pay an unforeseen utility bill. In either of these scenarios, appellant
nonetheless lacks the necessary criminal intent to damage the door.
An additional circumstance supports both of these alternative hypotheses:
appellant’s actions after he left the HPU office. As noted by the majority, a defendant’s
actions after the alleged offense can serve as evidence of intent. Davis v. State, 595
N.W.2d 520, 526 (Minn. 1999) (“[I]ntent may be inferred from events occurring before
D-10 and after the crime.”); see also State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 562 (Minn. 2009)
(holding that defendant’s fleeing the scene and failing to render aid to the victim were
evidence of intent to kill). Here, when he read the publication noticing the citations,
appellant thought his identity had been stolen and contacted the police with a complaint
that someone using his name had been cited for disorderly conduct and criminal damage
to property. Appellant’s conduct after the incident at the HPU fails to show that he was
even aware he had broken the door, much less that he intended to do so. This
circumstance is wholly consistent with the alternate hypotheses that appellant lacked
intent to damage the door, and it is difficult to see how one could infer intent in light of
appellant’s actions after the incident.
When viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are consistent with other
reasonable hypotheses that show a lack of criminal intent. “[I]f any one or more
circumstances found proved are inconsistent with guilt, or consistent with innocence,
then a reasonable doubt as to guilt arises.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 474 (quotations
omitted). The circumstances proved at trial do not form the “complete chain” needed to
show intent beyond a reasonable doubt because they fail to exclude other reasonable
inferences showing a lack of intent. Therefore, the evidence in the record is insufficient
to establish appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support appellant’s
convictions for criminal damage to property and disorderly conduct, I would reverse.
D-11