State of Minnesota v. Deshon Israel Bonnell
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Opinion
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-1463
Saint Louis County Hudson, C.J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: February 25, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts Deshon Israel Bonnell,
Appellant.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Kimberly J. Maki, Saint Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
1. A sender of an electronic message does not retain a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s
separate and independent account or device.
2. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were not
triggered when the law enforcement officers searched his accomplices’ Facebook accounts
because appellant claims no ownership interest in those accounts and he did not retain a
1 legitimate expectation of privacy in the electronic messages he sent to his accomplices after
the messages were received and stored in his accomplices’ Facebook accounts.
3. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were
violated by law enforcement’s searches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant
authorizing the searches of his two Facebook accounts lacked any temporal or subject-
matter limitations.
4. Although the district court erred when it failed to suppress the evidence
collected exclusively during the search of appellant’s two Facebook accounts and when it
later admitted that evidence at trial, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the errors.
5. Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the contents of constitutionally obtained social media messages pursuant to the
immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), the
errors were harmless because they did not significantly affect the verdict.
6. When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the corroborative
evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s
eyewitness testimony that appellant fatally shot the decedent, and the State presented
sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
2 O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Chief Justice.
Appellant Deshon Israel Bonnell directly appeals his conviction of first-degree
premeditated murder for the shooting death of Joshua LaValley. On appeal, Bonnell makes
six arguments. First, he argues a sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the
recipient’s separate and independent account or device. Second, he argues officers violated
his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections when they searched the separate
and independent Facebook accounts of his accomplices, which contained digital copies of
electronic messages he sent to his accomplices that were received and stored in their
accounts. Third, Bonnell argues officers violated his Fourth Amendment and state
constitutional protections when they searched his two Facebook accounts. Fourth, he
argues the district court committed harmful error when it admitted the evidence collected
from the accomplice’s Facebook accounts and his two Facebook accounts at trial. Fifth,
he argues the district court committed harmful error when it admitted evidence of prior bad
acts at his trial in violation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). Sixth, Bonnell argues
the direct eyewitness testimony of his accomplice, who testified that she saw Bonnell shoot
the victim, was not adequately corroborated and that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction.
We conclude, as a matter of first impression, that a sender of an electronic message
does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received
message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. We
3 further conclude that Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections
were not triggered when an officer searched his accomplices’ Facebook accounts because
Bonnell claims no ownership interest in those accounts and because he did not retain a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the electronic messages he sent to his accomplices after
the messages were received and stored in his accomplices’ Facebook accounts. We also
conclude, however, that Bonnell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital
copies of the sent messages that were stored in his two Facebook accounts, and therefore
the searches of his two Facebook accounts triggered his federal and state constitutional
protections. And Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were
violated by the officer’s searches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant
authorizing the searches of his Facebook accounts lacked any temporal or subject-matter
limitations.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court’s failure to suppress the evidence
collected exclusively from the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts and its
erroneous admission of that evidence at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the errors. In addition, although we
assume without deciding that the district court erred when it admitted the contents of social
media messages—which were constitutionally obtained from accomplices’ Facebook
accounts—pursuant to the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(b)(1), we conclude that the errors were harmless because they did not
significantly affect the verdict.
4 Finally, we conclude that when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the
corroborative evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the
accomplice’s eyewitness testimony that Bonnell fatally shot the decedent, and therefore the
State presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’s conviction. Based on our
conclusions, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 6, 2019, a man snowmobiling on the Mesabi Trail in Saint Louis County
found a dead body lying in the snow. The snowmobiler immediately called 911, and the
law enforcement officers who arrived on the scene identified the decedent as Joshua
LaValley. When crime-scene analysts and officers from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) arrived at the scene, they found a shoe print in the snow with a
distinctive circular tread on the sole. 1 They also found one spent .22-caliber bullet casing
near the body. A medical examiner determined that LaValley died from two bullet wounds
to the face, one to his right jaw and one to the right side of his nose.
The next day, officers found LaValley’s car parked outside Bailey French’s house.
After staking out the vehicle, officers observed a man enter the vehicle and drive it a short
distance, at which point they approached the man and identified him as Anthony Howson.
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STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-1463
Saint Louis County Hudson, C.J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: February 25, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts Deshon Israel Bonnell,
Appellant.
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Kimberly J. Maki, Saint Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
1. A sender of an electronic message does not retain a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s
separate and independent account or device.
2. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were not
triggered when the law enforcement officers searched his accomplices’ Facebook accounts
because appellant claims no ownership interest in those accounts and he did not retain a
1 legitimate expectation of privacy in the electronic messages he sent to his accomplices after
the messages were received and stored in his accomplices’ Facebook accounts.
3. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were
violated by law enforcement’s searches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant
authorizing the searches of his two Facebook accounts lacked any temporal or subject-
matter limitations.
4. Although the district court erred when it failed to suppress the evidence
collected exclusively during the search of appellant’s two Facebook accounts and when it
later admitted that evidence at trial, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the errors.
5. Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the contents of constitutionally obtained social media messages pursuant to the
immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), the
errors were harmless because they did not significantly affect the verdict.
6. When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the corroborative
evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s
eyewitness testimony that appellant fatally shot the decedent, and the State presented
sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
2 O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Chief Justice.
Appellant Deshon Israel Bonnell directly appeals his conviction of first-degree
premeditated murder for the shooting death of Joshua LaValley. On appeal, Bonnell makes
six arguments. First, he argues a sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the
recipient’s separate and independent account or device. Second, he argues officers violated
his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections when they searched the separate
and independent Facebook accounts of his accomplices, which contained digital copies of
electronic messages he sent to his accomplices that were received and stored in their
accounts. Third, Bonnell argues officers violated his Fourth Amendment and state
constitutional protections when they searched his two Facebook accounts. Fourth, he
argues the district court committed harmful error when it admitted the evidence collected
from the accomplice’s Facebook accounts and his two Facebook accounts at trial. Fifth,
he argues the district court committed harmful error when it admitted evidence of prior bad
acts at his trial in violation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). Sixth, Bonnell argues
the direct eyewitness testimony of his accomplice, who testified that she saw Bonnell shoot
the victim, was not adequately corroborated and that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction.
We conclude, as a matter of first impression, that a sender of an electronic message
does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received
message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. We
3 further conclude that Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections
were not triggered when an officer searched his accomplices’ Facebook accounts because
Bonnell claims no ownership interest in those accounts and because he did not retain a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the electronic messages he sent to his accomplices after
the messages were received and stored in his accomplices’ Facebook accounts. We also
conclude, however, that Bonnell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital
copies of the sent messages that were stored in his two Facebook accounts, and therefore
the searches of his two Facebook accounts triggered his federal and state constitutional
protections. And Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were
violated by the officer’s searches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant
authorizing the searches of his Facebook accounts lacked any temporal or subject-matter
limitations.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court’s failure to suppress the evidence
collected exclusively from the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts and its
erroneous admission of that evidence at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the errors. In addition, although we
assume without deciding that the district court erred when it admitted the contents of social
media messages—which were constitutionally obtained from accomplices’ Facebook
accounts—pursuant to the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(b)(1), we conclude that the errors were harmless because they did not
significantly affect the verdict.
4 Finally, we conclude that when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the
corroborative evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the
accomplice’s eyewitness testimony that Bonnell fatally shot the decedent, and therefore the
State presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’s conviction. Based on our
conclusions, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 6, 2019, a man snowmobiling on the Mesabi Trail in Saint Louis County
found a dead body lying in the snow. The snowmobiler immediately called 911, and the
law enforcement officers who arrived on the scene identified the decedent as Joshua
LaValley. When crime-scene analysts and officers from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) arrived at the scene, they found a shoe print in the snow with a
distinctive circular tread on the sole. 1 They also found one spent .22-caliber bullet casing
near the body. A medical examiner determined that LaValley died from two bullet wounds
to the face, one to his right jaw and one to the right side of his nose.
The next day, officers found LaValley’s car parked outside Bailey French’s house.
After staking out the vehicle, officers observed a man enter the vehicle and drive it a short
distance, at which point they approached the man and identified him as Anthony Howson.
1 The distinctive circular tread is significant because accomplice Bailey French testified at trial that before going out onto the Mesabi trail where she personally witnessed Bonnell fatally shoot LaValley twice in the face, she and accomplice Anthony Howson switched shoes so she could walk more easily in the snow. In addition, a police officer testified that the distinctive circular tread in the shoe print found at the scene matched the sole of a pair of Osiris shoes found in Howson’s house. Howson testified at trial that on the night of the murder he lent the Osiris shoes to French so she could walk with Bonnell in the snow.
5 The officers discovered LaValley’s EBT card on Howson during a search. Officers
returned to French’s house and discovered that Bonnell and his girlfriend, Bailey French,
were inside. The officers asked Bonnell and French to step outside.
After Bonnell stepped outside, two officers directed him to sit in the passenger seat
of their squad car, where they conducted an on-scene interview. At the start of the
interview, the officers told Bonnell that they did not know if he was connected to the crime,
but they did know he had “probably” been “speaking with . . . an individual,” Howson,
whom they suspected was involved. As part of the interview, Bonnell confirmed that he
and French were dating. He also asserted that he was heavily intoxicated on the night of
the murder and did not remember anything that happened. The officers repeatedly told
Bonnell that he was free to leave the car if he wanted to, and he eventually did so. 2
While officers interviewed Bonnell, two other officers interviewed French. French
went into detail about the killing, identified Bonnell as “Pineapple,” and indicated that she
and Bonnell texted and sent messages through social media on the night of the murder. In
a separate interview with law enforcement officers, Howson also admitted to taking part in
the murder and to using Facebook Messenger to communicate with Bonnell and French
that night.
After his on-scene interview, Bonnell, who lived with his mother, went home.
Thirty minutes later, officers arrived at his mother’s house, arrested him, and read him his
2 Immediately after Bonnell stepped out of the car, the agents seized Bonnell’s cell phone without a warrant. Bonnell does not contest the seizure of his cell phone on appeal. Moreover, the police never tried to search the contents of Bonnell’s cell phone.
6 Miranda rights for the first time. Bonnell requested an attorney, and the officers did not
question him further. Bonnell’s mother, however, allowed the officers to enter and search
the house. On top of the fridge, the officers located a brown paper bag that had the words
“.22 Ruger pistol” written on it. There was no gun inside the bag, but there was .22-caliber
ammunition. The officers also located spent .22-caliber ammunition in Bonnell’s bedroom
in the basement of the house.
The officers later sought and received a warrant to search French’s home, where
they found a Ruger .22-caliber pistol under the mattress in one of the bedrooms. BCA
analysts subsequently tested the pistol for fingerprints and DNA, and compared the spent
casing found at the scene to a casing test-fired from the pistol found in Bonnell’s home.
The BCA fingerprint analyst testified that she found a fingerprint above the trigger of the
gun that matched French, but did not find fingerprints matching Bonnell. The BCA DNA
analyst testified, however, that she found a mixture of DNA profiles on the gun. On the
magazine, she found a mixture of four or more people’s DNA, and the major male profile
matched Bonnell’s profile. On the trigger, she found a mixture of three or more people’s
DNA, and the major male profile also matched Bonnell’s. She was not provided with
French’s or Howson’s DNA profiles and was unable to confirm whether their DNA
matched the DNA on the gun. The BCA firearms analyst testified at trial that the spent
cartridge found in Bonnell’s basement bedroom came from the pistol.
In February 2019, a law enforcement officer applied for a single warrant authorizing
the officer to search 12 separate Facebook accounts, five of which are relevant here. The
first relevant account was owned by French, and the second and third relevant accounts
7 were owned by Howson. The fourth and fifth relevant accounts were purportedly owned
by Bonnell (including an account named “Pineapple Man”). For each Facebook account,
the warrant application sought “[a]ll contact information,” “[a]ll Photos or videos,” “[a]ll
Neoprints, including profile contact information,” “[a]ll activity logs,” “[a]ll other records
of communications made or received by the users or between users,” and “[a]ll IP logs.”
The warrant did not provide time or date ranges for the records. The probable cause
statement in the warrant application described the discovery of LaValley’s body and that
LaValley’s personal effects were found in Howson’s possession. It also stated the
following:
During the investigation, several cellular devices were secured from Howson, French and Bonnell. With statements provided to Investigators it was discovered Howson, French and Bonnell spoke amongst each other and others via phone calls, text messaging, Facebook and other social media accounts before, during and after the murder of LaValley.
Two weeks later, a grand jury indicted Bonnell for first-degree premeditated murder,
see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1), and first-degree intentional murder while committing a
felony (aggravated robbery), see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3).
In March 2019, Facebook complied with the warrant and provided copies of all 12
Facebook accounts. During his review of Howson’s Facebook accounts, the officer found
a self-portrait photograph (aka “a selfie”) of Howson, French, Bonnell, and LaValley that
was taken the day before the murder. During the review of French’s Facebook account,
the officer discovered digital copies of messages that Bonnell sent from his Pineapple Man
Facebook account to French, which were received and stored in French’s Facebook
8 account. 3 As relevant here, French received the following messages from the Pineapple
Man Facebook account:
January 2 and January 4, 2019 • A message asking French whether anything happened between French and a man named K.
• A message that said, “I know if I loose another person I’ma go on a rampage.”
• A screenshot of an image (sent through Facebook) from Pineapple Man to an unknown man with a picture of Bonnell holding a gun with a caption that said, “Better stop texting my chick before you get dropped b****.”
• A message that said, “Diff between me and other n*****s il actually do what I say I’m gonna do.”
• A message that said, “I’m having the worst day . . . I just really wanna shoot someone.”
• A message that said, “I don’t even wanna be alive . . . I’m a terrible person.”
January 5, 2019 (the day before the murder)
• A message that said, “[LaValley] has a punchable face.” 4
• A message that said, “Ight I’m down I still wanna pop him.” 5
3 Bonnell does not contend that he had an ownership interest in French’s Facebook account or any of the devices on which her account was stored. 4 This message was a response to several messages sent from French’s Facebook account to the Pineapple Man Facebook account. French initially sent messages that read, “I have someone your gonna wanna take care of . . . Who goes by the name [LaValley’s nickname],” and then sent a message that included a screenshot of an image (sent through Facebook) of French and LaValley together. 5 This message was a response to messages sent from French’s Facebook account to the Pineapple Man Facebook account, which read, “Trust me . . . we can . . . take his s***
9 • A message that said, “Why not take him out now I can do it it’s not hard.” 6
• A message that said, “He [LaValley] knows to much I gotta take him out . . . I need to take a video of me shooting [LaValley] to send to my crew there killers they love this s*** . . . I’m shooting him anyway your not gonna tell me I’m not. You tell me no il shoot him right here.”
• A message that said, “No I’m shooting someone tonight he knows too much . . . I need you to find a spot we can go to dump.” 7
• A message that said, “Damn ight well I’m capping him tonight.” 8
January 6, 2019 (the day of the murder)
• A message that said, “I didn’t do it for payment I did it cause I love you.”
During the officer’s review, the officer discovered digital copies of the electronic
messages listed above stored in both French’s and Bonnell’s Facebook accounts. 9
In June 2019, Bonnell’s attorney informed the district court that the defense had no
omnibus issues and that Bonnell wished to enter not guilty pleas to all the charges. Based
on defense counsel’s statements, the district court made a record of “the entry of not guilty
n send him out without a beating or with one depending on how he reacts and what he says.” 6 This message was a response to messages sent from French’s Facebook account to the Pineapple Man Facebook account, which read, “Not yet tonight we scare him our next move is annihilation and we gotta plan that out.” 7 This message was a response to messages sent from French’s Facebook account to the Pineapple Man Facebook account, which read, “It’s not a good time yet besides i have a plan that will make him wish you did shoot him.” 8 “Capping” can be used as a colloquial term for “shooting.” 9 Because the officer obtained records containing copies of French’s and Bonnell’s Facebook accounts at the same time, the information obtained during the review of Bonnell’s Facebook accounts could not have been used to justify the request for the warrant to search French’s Facebook account.
10 plea[s] and the waiver of any omnibus issues.” Three months later, in September 2019,
Bonnell entered a guilty plea to first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony
(aggravated robbery). Bonnell subsequently filed a postconviction petition, alleging that
the factual basis for his guilty plea was inaccurate. The district court denied the
postconviction petition. In December 2022, we reversed the district court’s order and
remanded for trial on the charges pending when Bonnell pleaded guilty. See Bonnell v.
State, 984 N.W.2d 224, 231 (Minn. 2022) (holding that “the evidence in the plea colloquy
record is inadequate to show that Bonnell ‘cause[d] the death’ of LaValley ‘while
committing . . . aggravated robbery’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 609.185(a)(3))). Concurrently, Howson and French pleaded guilty and were convicted
of second-degree intentional murder in connection with LaValley’s death under an aiding
and abetting theory of criminal liability. See Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (second-
degree intentional murder); Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (aiding and abetting liability).
In May 2023, Bonnell filed a motion to reopen the omnibus hearing. His motion
listed nine different issues that he sought to litigate at the hearing, including suppression
of “any information obtained as a result of the February 12, 2019, Search Warrant for
Facebook data as the warrant lacks specificity.”
The district court granted Bonnell’s motion and held a contested omnibus hearing
in September 2023. When the district court asked defense counsel to identify the issues
that would be litigated at the hearing, defense counsel made a general reference to the
issues raised in the May 2023 motion to reopen the omnibus hearing. The State called
several witnesses. In addition, the parties stipulated to the admission of several documents,
11 including the search warrant application, the search warrant, and the officer’s “receipt,
inventory and return” form, in which the officer averred that he obtained, pursuant to the
search warrant, records containing copies of all five of the relevant Facebook accounts in
March 2019. After all the evidence was presented, the parties agreed to submit their
arguments in writing.
In October 2023, Bonnell filed his written argument. 10 As part of Bonnell’s
argument, defense counsel wrote, “At issue is the validity of the search warrant for
Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook records and whether probable cause was established to support the
warrant.” (Emphasis added.) In describing the State’s burden, defense counsel wrote, “The
State must therefore prove the following: (1) [the officer’s] affidavit established probable
cause to seize all of the data on Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook accounts, and (2) the authorization
for the extraction of the data was sufficiently particular to limit the area subject to search
and the items subject to seizure.” (Emphasis added.)
On the issue of particularity, defense counsel argued, “[T]he warrant allowed
officers to search Mr. Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts without providing any time frame.
It also allowed officers to conduct a wholesale review of everything and anything on
10 As part of his written argument, Bonnell erroneously asked the district court to “suppress” the “search warrant.” The legal principle underlying Fourth Amendment suppression motions is “a ‘prudential’ doctrine that requires the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.” State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566, 572 (Minn. 2024) (emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011)). Search warrants that lack particularity are not “suppressed,” instead they are deemed “invalid.” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 672–73 (Minn. 1990) (concluding that the search warrant was “invalid” because it lacked particularity); see also State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 711–13 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that the language of the warrant was sufficiently particular and therefore rejecting appellant’s claim that the search warrant was “invalid”).
12 Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook accounts.” (Emphases added.) In summarizing his particularity
argument, defense counsel wrote, “The failure to place or observe any limits on the search
or seizure of data from Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook accounts independently requires
suppression of all evidence obtained during the search.” (Emphasis added.) Bonnell’s
written argument never acknowledged, much less addressed, the issue of whether the
searches of his accomplice’s Facebook accounts triggered Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment
protections. Instead, defense counsel simply included a single sentence in the concluding
paragraph of his written argument, which read, “The wholesale review of the twelve
Facebook accounts—and specifically Mr. Bonnell’s two (2) Facebook accounts—violated
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution.”
In November 2023, the State filed its written argument. The State argued that
despite Bonnell’s assertion to the contrary, the language of the warrant established probable
cause and was sufficiently particular to justify the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook
accounts. The State also observed that Bonnell lacked standing to challenge the searches
of the Facebook accounts owned by French and Howson because he made “no showing of
a reasonable expectation of privacy in another person’s social media account.”
In March 2024, the district court denied Bonnell’s suppression motion. On the issue
of probable cause, it stated, “Considering the totality of the circumstances as it relates to
the Bonnell Facebook accounts, the Application for Search Warrant establishes a sufficient
nexus between the property to be searched—Bonnell’s Facebook account—and the crime
that was under investigation at the time—an apparent homicide.” On the issue of
13 particularity, the court wrote, “Considering the totality of the circumstances, giving
deference to the issuing judge, and considering the stage of the investigation, a more
precise description of the information to be obtained from Bonnell’s Facebook data would
not be available in this instance.” The court did not discuss the searches of the accomplice’s
Facebook accounts, which is not surprising because Bonnell’s written argument can
reasonably be read as narrowing the focus of his argument to the searches of Bonnell’s two
Facebook accounts. Bonnell did not file a motion for reconsideration challenging the scope
of the district court’s analysis.
In April 2024, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence of
Bonnell’s prior bad acts—as described in Facebook messages from Bonnell stored in
French’s Facebook account—under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). Bonnell argued the evidence of his prior bad acts
was inadmissible. On April 26, 2024, the district court granted the State’s motion,
concluding that the evidence was admissible under both exceptions.
After the district court granted the State’s motion in limine, the case proceeded to
trial. At the jury trial, French testified that she personally witnessed Bonnell fatally shoot
LaValley twice in the face. During her testimony, the State introduced messages between
French’s and Bonnell’s Facebook accounts as trial exhibits. 11 Each exhibit included a chart
with the date, time, and contents of electronic messages Bonnell sent to French that were
received and stored in her Facebook account, along with copies of the relevant messages
11 Complete copies of the Facebook records obtained from the accounts owned by Bonnell, French, and Howson were also admitted as trial exhibits.
14 from French’s Facebook account. 12 Howson also testified about the facts surrounding the
murder. During his testimony, the State introduced the photograph of Howson, French,
Bonnell, and LaValley that was taken the day before the murder, along with copies of the
relevant messages from Howson’s Facebook account. Officers also testified about their
investigation, and the State introduced an exhibit of a call Bonnell made from jail in which
Bonnell says he needs to delete the Pineapple Man Facebook account. In total, three trial
exhibits were admitted that consisted of Facebook records obtained exclusively from
Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. Finally, BCA firearms and DNA analysts testified about
the results of their testing.
In its closing argument, the State focused on the messages sent from Bonnell’s
Pineapple Man Facebook account to French’s Facebook account, arguing that Bonnell was
planning to kill LaValley that night, that he had a motive to kill LaValley for flirting with
his girlfriend, and that Bonnell, French, and Howson made a concrete plan for the murder
through Facebook messages. In contrast, defense counsel argued that the Facebook
messages showed that French was “an absolutely wickedly manipulative person who
craves attention and wants to feel like she can control the people in her life,” and that the
plan was “to scare Mr. LaValley—perhaps beat him up and leave him somewhere without
his car.” Defense counsel also argued that the testimony of French and Howson was not
12 The exhibits also contained copies of the relevant pages from the records obtained from Bonnell’s Facebook account. Although the electronic messages were identical, they appeared on different pages of the records obtained from the accounts owned by French and Bonnell.
15 credible, that Bonnell never walked down the Mesabi Trail, and that Howson was the actual
shooter.
On the charge of first-degree premeditated murder, the jury was instructed on both
principal and aiding and abetting theories of criminal liability. The jury found Bonnell
guilty as charged. The district court convicted Bonnell of first-degree premeditated murder
and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release. 13
This direct appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
We begin our analysis by addressing an issue of first impression, specifically
whether a sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and
independent account or device. Next, we determine whether the searches of French’s and
other individuals’ Facebook accounts triggered Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state
constitutional protections after the messages Bonnell sent were received and stored in the
recipient’s account or device. Then, we consider whether the searches of Bonnell’s two
Facebook accounts violated his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections
based on his assertion that the searches of his accounts were conducted pursuant to a
warrant that was not sufficiently particular, and if so, whether the district court’s admission
13 On the charge of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, the jury was also instructed on both principal and aiding and abetting theories of criminal liability. Although the jury found Bonnell guilty of this charge and the district court entered a conviction, the district court later vacated the conviction in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (precluding adjudications of conviction for lesser included offenses), in light of State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 765–67 (Minn. 1999).
16 at trial of the digital messages and data collected during the searches was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
We also consider whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting, under
the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1),
constitutionally obtained Facebook messages that described Bonnell’s prior bad acts, and
if so, whether the erroneous admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Finally, we consider whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict,
the corroborative evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of
French’s direct eyewitness testimony that she saw Bonnell shoot LaValley, and if the State
presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’s conviction.
I.
Bonnell contends that the sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the digital copy of the received
message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. This
is an issue of first impression for our court.
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are “personal right[s]” that may be
invoked when an individual “personally has an expectation of privacy in the place
searched” and that “expectation is reasonable.” In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565,
571 (Minn. 2003) (emphasis added). In State v. Perkins, we explained that the Fourth
Amendment’s “protections are not triggered unless an individual has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded space.” 588 N.W.2d 491, 492 (Minn. 1999)
17 (emphases added). Put differently, “a defendant who cannot demonstrate a legitimate
expectation of privacy relating to the area searched . . . may not contest the legality of the
search or seizure.” State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1999) (emphasis added).
Although we have never considered the issue presented, other state and federal
courts have addressed the issue. For example, in State v. Patino, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court concluded that the sender of a text message does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the digital copy of a text message contained on the recipient’s device because
after the message is received by the recipient, the sender can no longer control what the
recipient does with the message. 93 A.3d 40, 56–57 (R.I. 2014). Similarly, in Guest v.
Leis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that an email sender loses a legitimate expectation of
privacy in an email that has already reached its recipient because at that moment, “the
e-mailer would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose ‘expectation of privacy ordinarily
terminates upon delivery’ of the letter.” 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United
States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995)).
The reasoning in Patino and Guest is consistent with the rule that the federal circuit
courts of appeal have uniformly applied to physical letters. For example, in United States
v. Dunning, the First Circuit concluded that “if a letter is sent to another, the sender’s
expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery.” 312 F.3d 528, 531 (1st Cir.
2002) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.
1999); King, 55 F.3d at 1196; United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir. 1994);
Ray v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 658 F.2d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1981).
18 We agree that when an electronic message or physical letter is received by the
recipient, the sender no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the message or
letter because the sender cannot control what the recipient does with the message or letter.
Consequently, we conclude that the sender of an electronic message does not retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored
in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. 14
In urging us to adopt a different rule of law, Bonnell cites to obiter dicta in Carpenter
v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 319 (2018). Carpenter “present[ed] the question whether
the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical
cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements,”
id. at 300, and held that “[t]he Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records here was a
search under th[e] [Fourth] Amendment,” id. at 320. In that case, Justice Kennedy
remarked in dissent that the third-party doctrine “may not apply when the Government
obtains the modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ ” when
held by a third party. Id. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Carpenter majority
14 In support of his view, Bonnell cites several federal and state cases that involved a search of the defendant’s Facebook account, device, or computer. See, e.g., United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 333 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 571 (2024) (holding that the defendants had standing to challenge the searches of Facebook accounts that belonged to them, while observing that defense counsel conceded that appellants lacked standing to challenge the searches of Facebook accounts “belonging to two co-conspirators who [were] not parties in this appeal”); People v. Joly, 970 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 2021) (involving a search of the defendant’s tablet computer which contained an email that the defendant had sent to his attorney); State v. Jereczek, 961 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021) (involving a search of the defendant’s family computer). Bonnell’s reliance on these cases is misplaced because they do not involve searches of separate and independent accounts or devices belonging to the recipient of the electronic message.
19 acknowledged that Justice Kennedy’s position would be a “sensible exception” to the third-
party doctrine. Id. at 319. Bonnell’s reliance on Carpenter is misplaced for two reasons.
First, we are not bound by a dissent nor by the obiter dicta in the majority. Sheehy
Lee v. Kalis, 19 N.W.3d. 186, 193 n.9 (Minn. 2025) (explaining that “obiter dicta” is
generally “considered to be expressions in a court’s opinion which go beyond the facts
before the court and therefore are the individual views of the author of the opinion and not
binding in subsequent cases”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); City of
Duluth v. Wendling, 237 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1975) (explaining that we were not bound
by dicta in Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)). Neither the exception proposed by
Justice Kennedy in dissent, nor its passing reference by the majority, is binding here. 15
Second, the type of third party contemplated by Kennedy in proposing his exception
was an intermediary handling messages in transit such as a mail carrier or an internet
company that provides email accounts, not the end recipient of a message as is the case
here. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (letters held by mail carrier) and United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (personal emails held by the defendant’s internet
service provider)). In sum, the non-binding dissent and obiter dicta in Carpenter does not
15 The majority in Carpenter was clear that its “decision today is a narrow one” and that it did “not express a view on matters not before us.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 316. And the issue before the Supreme Court in Carpenter involved “a detailed log of a person’s movements over several years,” id. at 319, not the modern-day equivalent of a person’s “papers” or “effects.” Thus, the majority opinion’s statement regarding Justice Kennedy’s proposed exception is obiter dicta because it went beyond the facts before the Court and was not necessary or essential to the Court’s analysis.
20 support Bonnell’s claim that the sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the
recipient’s separate and independent account or device.
Because the rule adopted in Patino and Guest is sound and the caselaw cited by
Bonnell does not call that rule of law into question or support a different rule of law, we
hold that the sender of an electronic message does not retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s separate
and independent account or device.
II.
Next, we apply the newly articulated rule of law to the facts of Bonnell’s case.
Bonnell sent electronic Facebook messages to French and Howson that were received and
stored in French’s and Howson’s Facebook accounts. Bonnell does not claim that he had
any ownership interest in French’s and Howson’s Facebook accounts, or that he has any
other claim to privilege in his communications with French or Howson. Moreover, under
the newly articulated rule of law, Bonnell did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the digital copy of the received messages that were stored in French’s and Howson’s
separate and independent accounts or devices. Consequently, the searches of French’s and
Howson’s separate and independent Facebook accounts did not trigger Bonnell’s Fourth
Amendment or state constitutional protections.
III.
Next, we consider Bonnell’s argument that the searches of his two Facebook
accounts violated his Fourth Amendment protections because the warrant authorizing the
21 searches of his two accounts lacked particularity and was therefore invalid. The State
argues that the warrant was valid because it was sufficiently particular, and therefore the
searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts did not violate his Fourth Amendment
protections.
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution require that a search warrant describe the
evidence to be seized with particularity. This particularity requirement “prohibits law
enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” State v. Bradford,
618 N.W.2d 782, 795 (Minn. 2000). “If a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant that is
not particular—in other words, does not adequately describe the places or things to be
searched with specificity—the search is unconstitutional.” State v. Zielinski, 10 N.W.3d 1,
21 n.9 (Minn. 2024). Determining whether a warrant is sufficiently particular requires a
“case-by-case examination.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 601 (Minn. 2024).
In conducting this analysis, we consider “the circumstances of the case . . . , as well as the
nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible
under the circumstances.” State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. 2003).
When reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, “we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.”
State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2020). “Under the de novo standard, we do
not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review.”
Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).
22 Bonnell contends that the warrant authorizing the searches of his two Facebook
accounts was invalid because it lacked particularity as to both subject-matter and time
limitations. We address his particularity arguments in turn.
When a search warrant seeks to search an electronic account or device, the subject
matter is defined by the scope and type of data that the investigators would like to access.
See Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 600 (noting that the subject matter of the search warrant
at issue was the defendant’s entire Facebook account). Here, the warrant authorizing the
searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts sought “[a]ll contact information,” “[a]ll
Photos or videos,” “[a]ll Neoprints, including profile contact information,” “[a]ll activity
logs,” “[a]ll other records of communications made or received by the users or between
users,” and “[a]ll IP logs.” Critically, the warrant was not subject to any temporal
limitations. In other words, the warrant authorized access to the entirety of both of
Bonnell’s Facebook accounts.
In Sardina-Padilla, we “addressed whether a warrant authorizing a search of all
content on a social media account for a limited time period meets minimal constitutional
requirements for particularity.” Id. at 599. In that case, officers applied for a warrant to
search “[a]ll content” of two Facebook accounts associated with Sardina-Padilla for an
approximately three-month period. Id. at 591. Although we concluded that the warrant in
Sardina-Padilla was valid based on its temporal limitation, we said “that the portion of the
warrant authorizing law enforcement to search ‘[a]ll content’ associated with Sardina-
Padilla’s Facebook accounts—standing on its own [without a temporal limitation]—would
be ‘clearly impermissible.’ ” Id. at 599. We also stated that “[a] warrant permitting a broad
23 search can be sufficiently particular if greater specificity is not possible because officers
do not know all the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime.” Id. (emphasis added).
“A warrant which describes things in broad or generic terms may be valid ‘when the
description is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under
investigation permit.’ ” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn. 1990) (quoting
United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 614 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Here, it cannot be said that a search of all information and messages from Bonnell’s
two Facebook accounts is “as specific” as it could be. In Hannuksela, the extent of the
police’s knowledge of the crime was “that [the subject of the warrant] was the victim of
foul play and that appellant was involved.” Id. We therefore upheld a somewhat vague
warrant because it specifically described searching personal property that might contain
items belonging to the victim. Id. In contrast, the warrant authorizing the searches of
Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts was not tailored to, for example, messages shared
between Bonnell and the co-conspirators in the crime, which would be likely to show
evidence of a crime. See State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1999) (stating that
“probable cause to search exists [if] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The Eleventh Circuit—in a case that we affirmatively cited in Sardina-Padilla,
7 N.W.3d at 601—considered whether a warrant authorizing access to all of the defendant’s
Facebook data was sufficiently particular. United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 974
24 (11th Cir. 2017). 16 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the warrant was invalid, noting
that if the police had wanted to make the warrant sufficiently particular, “[w]ith respect to
private instant messages, for example, the warrants could have limited the request to
messages sent to or from persons suspected at that time of being prostitutes or customers.”
Id. A similar subject-matter limitation applies here.
In the Fourth Circuit—in a case discussed by both parties—the court upheld a search
warrant seeking “all private communications” from Facebook accounts that belonged to
the appellants. United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
145 S. Ct. 571 (2024). But that case is materially distinguishable because the warrants at
issue were two-step warrants: “while the warrants authorized the government to search all
of the information disclosed by Facebook, they only permitted the subsequent seizure of
the fruits, evidence, or instrumentalities of violations of enumerated federal statutes.” Id.
(emphasis added). Here, by contrast, the warrant authorizing the search of Bonnell’s two
Facebook accounts was a one-step warrant that allowed the officer to both search and seize
16 As here, the search warrant in Blake
required Facebook to “disclose” to the government virtually every type of data that could be located in a Facebook account, including every private instant message Moore had ever sent or received, every IP address she had ever logged in from, every photograph she had ever uploaded or been “tagged” in, every private or public group she had ever been a member of, every search on the website she had ever conducted, and every purchase she had ever made through “Facebook Marketplace,” as well as her entire contact list.
868 F.3d at 966–67 (footnotes omitted).
25 all data in Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. 17 The warrant application did not tailor its
search to data or messages that would be likely to show Bonnell’s participation in
LaValley’s murder or another violation of Minnesota law.
We have stated, however, “that a temporal limitation may make a warrant
sufficiently particular, even if the authorized search is otherwise broad as to subject matter.”
Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 600. Bonnell points out that the warrant authorizing the
searches of his two Facebook accounts lacked any temporal limitations, while the State
asserts that the undefined timeframe was necessary to establish that Bonnell owned the
Pineapple Man account. In Sardina-Padilla, we cautiously upheld the warrant but noted
that the “warrant’s broad scope raises a close question.” Id. at 602. Our decision to uphold
the warrant in that case hinged in large part on the temporal qualifier, which limited the
search to data generated within a three-month period. Id. We also affirmatively cited a
case from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, which upheld a
warrant that was tailored to “ ‘a specified, fairly narrow period of time close’ to the alleged
criminal activity.” Id. at 600 (quoting United States v. Charles, No. 16-065 (JNE/FLN),
2016 WL 5939333, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 12, 2016), aff’d 895 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2018)).
Here, there is no temporal limitation. The warrant authorizing the searches of
Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts allowed the collection of information from the moment
the accounts were created until the warrants were issued, a span of many years. But at the
time they sought the warrant, officers had already interviewed French and Howson and
17 Indeed, the entirety of Bonnell’s Facebook account data—more than 8,000 pages— was entered into evidence as a court exhibit at trial.
26 thus had some sense of the events leading up to LaValley’s murder. The warrant application
stated that the officer knew from French’s initial interview that the incident precipitating
the murder had occurred when LaValley tried to physically touch French at the apartment
on January 5, 2019. Because officers must be “as specific as the circumstances and the
nature of the activity under investigation permit,” Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d at 674, they
should have tailored the application to the weeks leading up to the murder—to ascertain
whether there was any evidence of intent or planning—to the date when Bonnell and his
co-conspirators were arrested and thus no longer had access to their accounts. 18
The warrant authorizing the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts goes far
beyond the three-month temporal limitation in Sardina-Padilla and lacks any subject
matter or time limitations to meet the particularity requirement. 7 N.W.3d at 602 (“[A]
search warrant permitting police to seize ‘[a]ll content’ associated with a social media
account for a period of almost three months comes ‘perilously close to violating the
requirement of particularity.’ ”).
18 To the extent that the State argues that law enforcement should be able to seek a broader search warrant for the purposes of establishing foundation and authenticity of the ownership of a social media account, we disagree. In State v. Zanter, the police sought three search warrants for the defendant’s home, each time seeking to do additional forensic testing in the house that they had not performed during the preceding searches. 535 N.W.2d 624, 628–29 (Minn. 1995). In finding that the third and final search warrant lacked probable cause, we wrote, “the police failed to provide the issuing judge with sufficient new information that could have led the judge to conclude that a fair probability existed that other enumerated items not discovered during the two previous, exhaustive searches of the Zanter home would now be discovered during a third search.” Id. at 634 (emphasis added). Therefore, if the police receive data from a properly tailored search warrant and discover that it is insufficient to establish the authenticity of the account, police must seek another warrant to broaden the scope.
27 Therefore, we conclude that the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts
violated his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections because the searches
were conducted pursuant to a warrant that lacked particularity and therefore was invalid.
Because the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts violated his constitutional
protections against unlawful searches, the district court erred when it denied Bonnell’s
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the two searches, and when it later
admitted at trial exhibits containing the pages from Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. 19
19 Bonnell also argues that the Facebook searches were unconstitutional because the evidence was derived from Bonnell’s provision of his phone number during the interview with the special agents in the squad car. Officers asked for Bonnell’s phone number within the first four minutes of the interview, and Bonnell provided it without reluctance. During the interview, officers also learned that Bonnell had recently turned eighteen, and that he did not have a high school diploma or a GED. After Bonnell stated numerous times that he lived with his mother and wanted to call her, one of the officers told Bonnell that he did not need to talk to his mother because he was an adult. Bonnell argues that the interview was unduly coercive, and the results of the interview should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (explaining derivative evidence is entitled to suppression as “fruit of the poisonous tree” if “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”). Because we conclude that the search of Bonnell’s Facebook accounts violated Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections based on a lack of particularity, we do not consider Bonnell’s alternative argument. Similarly, Bonnell argues for the first time on appeal that the admission into evidence of the portion of his squad car interview where he provided the agents with his phone number was error and was entitled to suppression. Because the evidence was unobjected-to, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). Under plain error review, the appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the appellant’s substantial rights. Id. An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that it had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Id. at 741. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude there is sufficient admissible evidence tying Bonnell to LaValley’s death, and the recording entered into evidence of Bonnell providing his phone number to law
28 IV.
We turn now to the issue of whether the district court committed harmful error when
it failed to suppress the evidence obtained during the unconstitutional searches of Bonnell’s
two Facebook accounts and when it later admitted at trial exhibits containing messages
from those accounts. “When an error implicates a constitutional right, we will award a
new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Davis,
820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012). “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if
the jury’s verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the error.” Id. (citation omitted). In
considering whether erroneously admitted evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
we have said, “[i]mproperly admitted evidence is harmless . . . when the evidence is
cumulative.” State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2013). Other relevant
factors include “the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether it was highly
persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively
countered by the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although overwhelming evidence of guilt is also an important consideration, a court cannot
focus on the evidence of guilt alone. Id.
Here, the Facebook messages that were obtained as a result of the seizure of
Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts and included in the challenged trial exhibits are
enforcement is unlikely to have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury. Thus, even if the district court committed plain error in admitting this evidence, the error did not affect Bonnell’s substantial rights, and he is not entitled to any relief based on this alleged error. See State v. Patterson, 587 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn. 1998) (explaining that a court will not reverse a conviction based on unobjected-to error unless the appellant shows all three prongs of the plain error test are met).
29 undoubtedly cumulative. Each of those exhibits also included duplicative records obtained
from French’s Facebook account containing identical information to that obtained from
Bonnell’s Facebook accounts. Consequently, the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable
to the erroneous admission of Bonnell’s Facebook messages as part of these exhibits, and
therefore the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This does not end our analysis, however, because the district court admitted three
additional trial exhibits that consisted entirely of Facebook records obtained only in the
unconstitutional seizure of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. We conclude that the jury’s
verdict was surely unattributable to the admission of these records, for the following
reasons.
The manner in which these three exhibits were presented suggests that the jury
would not have unduly focused on the evidence. One of the exhibits was used to establish
the dates, times, and duration of calls to the Pineapple Man account during the State’s case.
Because the exhibit was referenced infrequently and not in the State’s opening statement
or closing argument, it was unlikely to be a focus for the jury. The State partially relied on
the other two exhibits to establish Bonnell as the owner of the Pineapple Man Facebook
account in its opening statement, direct examinations, and closing argument. Referring to
one of the exhibits at closing, which included pictures of Bonnell, the State explained that
the photos “are of Mr. Bonnell and Mr. Bonnell only” and thus establish him as the owner
of the Pineapple Man account. The State also cited to the other exhibit at closing, which
included verified phone number data, to explain that “the phone number tied to Pineapple
Man’s Facebook account . . . [was] [i]n that same recorded statement” that he gave to
30 officers in the squad car. While referenced in closing argument, the State presented
multiple additional pieces of evidence linking Bonnell to the Pineapple Man account and
thus these two exhibits were unlikely to pull the jury’s focus.
Furthermore, the information in these three exhibits was cumulative to the vast
amount of evidence tying Bonnell to the crime. There were numerous incriminating
Facebook messages derived from French’s account that we have determined were
admissible at trial, including multiple messages from Bonnell to French saying that he
wanted to shoot LaValley, messages describing a plan for where to take LaValley’s body,
and messages after the murder indicating that Bonnell committed the crime because of his
love for French. Moreover, DNA matching Bonnell’s profile was found on the magazine
and trigger of the murder weapon, and police found bullets in Bonnell’s bedroom that were
fired by the same gun as the murder weapon. Suppressing the messages and data derived
from Bonnell’s account would not obviate the incriminatory nature of the other admissible
evidence. Moreover, any persuasive value in these three exhibits was likewise undermined
by the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
We also observe that defense counsel generally countered during opening statements
and closing arguments that information from the Facebook accounts should be considered
less persuasive than the physical evidence.
Ultimately, of the three exhibits that came exclusively from Bonnell’s two Facebook
accounts, the two exhibits referenced in opening and closing provided information
duplicative from other admissible trial evidence, and the third exhibit was not a focus of
the State’s case. On this record, we conclude that the jury’s verdict was surely
31 unattributable to the erroneous admission of these three additional exhibits, and therefore
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
V.
Next we consider Bonnell’s argument that the district court committed reversible
error when it admitted into evidence, under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions
to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), constitutionally obtained Facebook messages
contained in French’s account that described Bonnell’s prior bad acts. The State argues
that the district court did not err because the challenged messages satisfied both the
immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Rule 404(b). 21
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) generally prohibits the admission of
“[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act . . . to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith.” As relevant here, there are two exceptions to this
general prohibition. First, evidence of a prior bad act is admissible as immediate-episode
evidence “where two or more [crimes, wrongs, or acts] are linked together in point of time
or circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other.” State v.
Wofford, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 1962). Evidence of a prior bad act satisfies the
immediate episode exception if “there is a close causal and temporal connection between
20 Because we find that the error was harmless, we do not address the State’s arguments that the messages would have been inevitably discovered in the recipients’ accounts or that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply. 21 In one of the challenged messages, Bonnell identifies himself as “Deshon Bonnell.” This message does not constitute an “act,” much less a prior bad act, because it is simply a message of identification. It therefore does not fall within the purview of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) and need not satisfy the immediate episode or Spreigl exceptions.
32 the prior bad act and the charged crime.” State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 425
(Minn. 2009). Second, under the Spreigl exception, evidence of past crimes may be
admissible when relevant to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common
scheme or plan. State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871, 877 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Spreigl,
139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)).
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). “A defendant appealing the admission of
evidence has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.”
Riddley, 776 N.W.2d at 424.
Bonnell argues the district court erred in admitting the following messages sent from
the Pineapple Man Facebook account and received and stored in French’s Facebook
account between January 2 and January 4, 2019, a few days before LaValley’s murder:
• A message asking French whether anything happened between French and a man named K.
• A message saying “I know if I loose another person I’ma go on a rampage.”
• A screenshot of an image (sent through Facebook) from Pineapple Man to an unknown man with a picture of Bonnell holding a gun with a caption that said, “Better stop texting my chick before you get dropped b****.”
• A message that said, “I’m having the worst day . . . I just really wanna shoot someone.”
• A message that said, “I don’t even wanna be alive . . . I’m a terrible person.”
Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion when it
admitted the challenged statements under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to
33 Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), we conclude that Bonnell failed to satisfy his
burden to show that the erroneous admission of the challenged statements was prejudicial.
To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State
v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009) (“To warrant a new
trial, the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence must create a reasonable possibility that
the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We have previously identified a list of nonexclusive
factors that may be considered in determining whether the defendant has satisfied his
burden of demonstrating prejudice, including “(1) the manner in which the party presented
the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who
offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively
countered the evidence.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54. In addition, “[s]trong evidence of
guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. (quoting State
v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020)). These factors may not be relevant or
persuasive in every case because determining whether the defendant satisfied his burden is
a “fact-specific” analysis. Id. at 55.
Here, the challenged messages were read into the record by a police officer. The
challenged messages were not highly persuasive because their persuasive value was
undermined by the large amount of other admissible evidence that established Bonnell’s
ownership of the Pineapple Man account, his participation in the crime, his relationship to
34 the crime, and his desire to hurt LaValley. The prosecutor referenced the challenged
messages twice in his closing argument. Defense counsel countered the challenged
messages in his closing argument by telling the jury, “We saw several [messages] in which
there was a discussion about shooting these guys and of course, it never happened. This
was an eighteen-year-old kid at the time, Mr. Bonnell. He has a new girlfriend. He’s trying
to impress and to appear to be a big tough guy and she loved it.” (Emphases added.) Based
on the specific facts of this case, we conclude that Bonnell failed to show that there is a
reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict, especially when the challenged messages were outweighed by the strong evidence
of guilt from other admissible evidence establishing Bonnell as the owner of the Pineapple
Man account, demonstrating Bonnell’s participation in and relationship to the crime, and
his motivation to hurt LaValley.
In sum, even assuming that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
the challenged messages under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 404(b), we conclude that Bonnell failed to show there is a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.
VI.
Finally, we consider Bonnell’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction because the State presented only accomplice testimony and
circumstantial evidence. 22 This presents two intertwined issues. First, we must consider
22 There is no dispute that French is an accomplice whose testimony requires corroboration under Minn. Stat. § 634.04.
35 whether the corroborative evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict,
was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of French’s eyewitness testimony
that Bonnell fatally shot LaValley such that it can be considered as part of our examination
of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. See State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 225 (Minn.
1995). Second, we must consider whether the State presented sufficient evidence to
support Bonnell’s conviction.
We first consider whether the presented evidence was weighty enough to
corroborate French’s testimony. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 634.04,
[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
Minn. Stat. § 634.04. A witness is an accomplice if the witness “could have been indicted
and convicted for the crime with which the defendant is charged.” State v. Pendelton,
759 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In such circumstances, corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony is required to sustain a
conviction. “The rationale for this rule is that the credibility of an accomplice is inherently
untrustworthy.” State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 877 (Minn. 2008). Evidence to
corroborate accomplice testimony is sufficient “when it is weighty enough to restore
confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s testimony.” State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d 266,
282 (Minn. 2023) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But accomplice
testimony “does not need to be corroborated on every point or element of the crime.” Id.
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The corroboration is complete when
36 a defendant is linked to the alleged crime with evidence that “affirm[s] the truth of the
accomplice’s testimony and point[s] to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial
degree.” Id. at 281 (citation omitted). The corroborating evidence may consist of physical
evidence associated with the crime, the testimony of eyewitnesses and experts at trial, and
suspicious and unexplained conduct of an accused before or after the crime. State v.
Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn. 2000); State v. Mathiasen, 127 N.W.2d 534, 539
(Minn. 1964). Moreover, the corroborating evidence may be direct or circumstantial. State
v. Thoresen, 921 N.W.2d 547, 551–52 (Minn. 2019); State v. Rasmussen, 63 N.W.2d 1, 3
(Minn. 1954) (explaining that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate the
testimony of an accomplice).
The sufficiency requirement for corroborating evidence is less stringent than the
sufficiency requirement for sustaining a conviction. State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241,
253–54 (Minn. 2008) (“The precise quantum of corroborative evidence needed necessarily
depends on the circumstances of each case, but corroborative evidence does not need to be
sufficient to . . . sustain a conviction.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Consequently, the circumstantial evidence analysis that we apply in determining
whether the circumstances proved are sufficient to support a conviction does not govern
our review of whether the corroborating evidence is weighty enough to restore confidence
in the truth of the accomplice’s testimony. Instead, we simply view circumstantial evidence
corroborating an accomplice’s testimony in the light most favorable to the verdict. Ford,
539 N.W.2d at 225; State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 93 (stating that we “view corroborative
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict”).
37 French testified that Bonnell shot LaValley. Here, the following physical evidence
and expert testimony corroborates French’s testimony and establishes Bonnell’s
involvement in the crime: LaValley was shot twice in the face with a .22 Ruger pistol;
DNA matching Bonnell’s profile was found on the pistol used in the crime; and a bullet
casing found at the scene matched both the pistol and other bullet casings found in
Bonnell’s bedroom. In addition, the following evidence from before the murder is
incriminating: Bonnell converses with French on Facebook about where to take LaValley
to dispose of him; and Bonnell messages French repeatedly about how he is going to shoot
LaValley and film the killing. After the murder, the following activity is suspicious:
Bonnell messages French, “I didn’t do it for payment I did it cause I love you”; and Bonnell
says on a jail call that he needs to delete his Pineapple Man Facebook account. Viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, the above-described evidence is weighty enough to
restore confidence in the truth of French’s eyewitness testimony that Bonnell brought his
pistol to the scene and fatally shot LaValley.
Having concluded the evidence corroborates French’s eyewitness testimony, we
turn to whether the State presented sufficient direct evidence, including French’s testimony,
to support Bonnell’s conviction. Direct evidence is “[e]vidence that is based on personal
knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.”
See State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted). When a
disputed element is proven by direct evidence, we apply the traditional standard of review.
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). “Under the traditional standard, we limit
our review to a ‘painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
38 viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to
reach the verdict which they did.’ ” Id. at 40 (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430
(Minn. 1989)).
Here, French testified, based on her personal knowledge and observations, that
Bonnell brought his pistol to the scene and fatally shot LaValley twice in the face on Mesabi
Trail. Moreover, the statements Bonnell made in the messages that he sent French provide
direct evidence that he intentionally fired the shots with premeditation. Viewed in a light
most favorable to the conviction, this direct evidence was sufficient to permit the jurors to
find Bonnell guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. Consequently, we conclude that
the State presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’s conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State of Minnesota v. Deshon Israel Bonnell, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-minnesota-v-deshon-israel-bonnell-minn-2026.