This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1162
State of Minnesota, Appellant,
vs.
Deon Sinkfield, Jr., Respondent.
Filed December 28, 2015 Affirmed Willis, Judge
Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CR-15-364
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Tori K. Stewart, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for appellant)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Willis,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WILLIS, Judge
Appellant state seeks reversal of a pretrial order suppressing respondent’s
confession on the ground that the Miranda warning given omitted any notice that an
attorney could be appointed for Sinkfield at no cost to him if he could not afford one and
if he so desired. The state argues that the suppression order will have a critical impact on
the likelihood of a successful prosecution, that the Miranda warning was sufficient, and
that Sinkfield knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and confessed voluntarily. Because we conclude that the Miranda warning was
insufficient, we affirm.
FACTS
Burnsville Police arrested respondent Deon Sinkfield, Jr. on February 4, 2015,
because he was a suspect in an aggravated-robbery investigation. Sinkfield was
interviewed by two police officers while in custody at the police station. At the beginning
of the interview, one of the officers read to Sinkfield from a card, stating, “you have the
right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have one present with you before any questioning
if you wish.” The officer admitted that she mistakenly skipped one of the warnings printed
on the card; the parties do not dispute that this was an accidental omission. After more
than an hour of interrogation, Sinkfield confessed piecemeal to elements of the charged
offense. On February 6, 2015, Sinkfield was charged with aggravated first-degree robbery
and prohibited possession of a firearm.
2 Sinkfield moved to suppress his confession on the ground that the Miranda warning
given to him was insufficient because he was not given specific notice that an attorney
would be appointed for him if he could not afford one and if he so desired. The district
court granted the motion and ordered that the confession be suppressed. The state appealed
the ruling and moved to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal. Sinkfield
opposed the stay, demanding a speedy trial. The district court granted the stay, and this
appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The pretrial order suppressing Sinkfield’s confession has a critical impact on the likelihood of successful prosecution.
The state can prevail on appeal from a district court’s pretrial ruling only if the ruling
is clearly and unequivocally erroneous, and has a critical impact on the state’s case. State
v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1998); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04,
subd. 2(2)(b). “Critical impact has been shown when ‘the lack of the suppressed evidence
significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’” State v. Zanter, 535
N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (citing State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn.
1987)). The court must consider the state’s evidence as a whole to assess the impact of a
suppression order. Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 416 (citing Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 630-31).
Minnesota courts have repeatedly held that suppression of a confession by a defendant
satisfies the critical-impact requirement. See, e.g., id.; State v. Ronnebaum, 449 N.W.2d
722, 724 (Minn. 1990); State v. Anderson, 396 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Minn. 1986); State v.
Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. App. 2003).
3 The parties dispute which facts should be considered in conducting the critical-
impact analysis. But we need not decide which facts in addition to the confession we
should consider, given the established principle that suppression of a defendant’s
confession “normally” satisfies the requirement—and there is no relevant distinguishing
factor here. See Ronnebaum, 449 N.W.2d at 724.
II. The district court did not err in determining that the Miranda warning was insufficient.
On a pretrial appeal challenging the suppression of evidence, if critical impact is
established, this court then conducts an independent review of the district court’s ruling.
State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d
90, 98 (Minn. 1999)). We review legal determinations de novo and accept factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing State v. Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn.
1998)). The facts relevant to the Miranda issue here are not in dispute.
The district court ordered suppression of Sinkfield’s confession on the ground that
the Miranda warning was constitutionally flawed because it omitted any notice that an
attorney could be appointed for Sinkfield prior to questioning at no cost to him if he could
not afford one and if he so desired. The state argues that the totality of the circumstances,
including Sinkfield’s past contact with the criminal-justice system, allows the inference
that he understood his right to a public defender. But Miranda itself specifically rejected
this argument.
The United States Supreme Court unequivocally held in Miranda v. Arizona that a
suspect in a criminal case is entitled to effective notice of certain constitutional rights. 384
4 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624 (1966). An effective Miranda warning must notify the
suspect
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630 (emphasis added). The Miranda court further held that
speculation as to whether an individual was otherwise aware of these rights could not be
permitted to relieve the state of its burden to provide the warning and specifically
prohibited such speculation based on “prior contact with authorities” because “whatever
the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is
indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free
to exercise the privilege at that point in time.” Id. at 468-69, 86 S. Ct. at 1625.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1162
State of Minnesota, Appellant,
vs.
Deon Sinkfield, Jr., Respondent.
Filed December 28, 2015 Affirmed Willis, Judge
Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CR-15-364
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Tori K. Stewart, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for appellant)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Willis,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WILLIS, Judge
Appellant state seeks reversal of a pretrial order suppressing respondent’s
confession on the ground that the Miranda warning given omitted any notice that an
attorney could be appointed for Sinkfield at no cost to him if he could not afford one and
if he so desired. The state argues that the suppression order will have a critical impact on
the likelihood of a successful prosecution, that the Miranda warning was sufficient, and
that Sinkfield knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and confessed voluntarily. Because we conclude that the Miranda warning was
insufficient, we affirm.
FACTS
Burnsville Police arrested respondent Deon Sinkfield, Jr. on February 4, 2015,
because he was a suspect in an aggravated-robbery investigation. Sinkfield was
interviewed by two police officers while in custody at the police station. At the beginning
of the interview, one of the officers read to Sinkfield from a card, stating, “you have the
right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have one present with you before any questioning
if you wish.” The officer admitted that she mistakenly skipped one of the warnings printed
on the card; the parties do not dispute that this was an accidental omission. After more
than an hour of interrogation, Sinkfield confessed piecemeal to elements of the charged
offense. On February 6, 2015, Sinkfield was charged with aggravated first-degree robbery
and prohibited possession of a firearm.
2 Sinkfield moved to suppress his confession on the ground that the Miranda warning
given to him was insufficient because he was not given specific notice that an attorney
would be appointed for him if he could not afford one and if he so desired. The district
court granted the motion and ordered that the confession be suppressed. The state appealed
the ruling and moved to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal. Sinkfield
opposed the stay, demanding a speedy trial. The district court granted the stay, and this
appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The pretrial order suppressing Sinkfield’s confession has a critical impact on the likelihood of successful prosecution.
The state can prevail on appeal from a district court’s pretrial ruling only if the ruling
is clearly and unequivocally erroneous, and has a critical impact on the state’s case. State
v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1998); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04,
subd. 2(2)(b). “Critical impact has been shown when ‘the lack of the suppressed evidence
significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’” State v. Zanter, 535
N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (citing State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn.
1987)). The court must consider the state’s evidence as a whole to assess the impact of a
suppression order. Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 416 (citing Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 630-31).
Minnesota courts have repeatedly held that suppression of a confession by a defendant
satisfies the critical-impact requirement. See, e.g., id.; State v. Ronnebaum, 449 N.W.2d
722, 724 (Minn. 1990); State v. Anderson, 396 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Minn. 1986); State v.
Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. App. 2003).
3 The parties dispute which facts should be considered in conducting the critical-
impact analysis. But we need not decide which facts in addition to the confession we
should consider, given the established principle that suppression of a defendant’s
confession “normally” satisfies the requirement—and there is no relevant distinguishing
factor here. See Ronnebaum, 449 N.W.2d at 724.
II. The district court did not err in determining that the Miranda warning was insufficient.
On a pretrial appeal challenging the suppression of evidence, if critical impact is
established, this court then conducts an independent review of the district court’s ruling.
State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d
90, 98 (Minn. 1999)). We review legal determinations de novo and accept factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing State v. Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn.
1998)). The facts relevant to the Miranda issue here are not in dispute.
The district court ordered suppression of Sinkfield’s confession on the ground that
the Miranda warning was constitutionally flawed because it omitted any notice that an
attorney could be appointed for Sinkfield prior to questioning at no cost to him if he could
not afford one and if he so desired. The state argues that the totality of the circumstances,
including Sinkfield’s past contact with the criminal-justice system, allows the inference
that he understood his right to a public defender. But Miranda itself specifically rejected
this argument.
The United States Supreme Court unequivocally held in Miranda v. Arizona that a
suspect in a criminal case is entitled to effective notice of certain constitutional rights. 384
4 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624 (1966). An effective Miranda warning must notify the
suspect
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630 (emphasis added). The Miranda court further held that
speculation as to whether an individual was otherwise aware of these rights could not be
permitted to relieve the state of its burden to provide the warning and specifically
prohibited such speculation based on “prior contact with authorities” because “whatever
the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is
indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free
to exercise the privilege at that point in time.” Id. at 468-69, 86 S. Ct. at 1625.
Miranda explicitly provides that, in a custodial interrogation, mere notice of the
right to counsel will not suffice. Id. at 473, 86 S. Ct. at 1627. The suspect additionally
must be notified that a lawyer will be appointed for him if he cannot afford one, and if he
so desires, because “[w]ithout this additional warning the admonition of the right to consult
with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer
if he has one or has the funds to obtain one.” Id.
III. Because the Miranda warning was inadequate, waiver and voluntariness are irrelevant.
If a suspect has been properly warned under Miranda, the rights to counsel and to
remain silent can be waived if done “knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at
5 1628; see also Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 417; State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn.
1997); State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 106 (Minn. 1978) (“Waiver is defined as an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (quotation
omitted). But waiver can be established only if the Miranda warning was adequate.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S. Ct. at 1626. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Dickerson
v. United States, “The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be
by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his ‘rights,’ may
nonetheless be excluded. . . .” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444, 120 S. Ct.
2326, 2336 (2000).
Affirmed.