This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0781
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Dennis Vincent Gomez, Appellant.
Filed June 22, 2026 Affirmed Bratvold, Judge
Clay County District Court File No. 14-CR-22-2399
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Cecilia Knapp, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges the final judgment of conviction for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial
because the district court abused its discretion in admitting Spreigl evidence of his sexual conduct involving another victim. 1 Appellant contends that (1) the evidence was
propensity evidence and therefore inadmissible; (2) the potential for unfair prejudice to
appellant from the Spreigl evidence outweighed the probative value of the evidence; and
(3) the Spreigl evidence substantially affected the jury’s verdict. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion and therefore affirm.
FACTS
In July 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Dennis Vincent
Gomez with first-degree criminal sexual assault involving his step-granddaughter, O.G.,
from 2020 to 2021, as stated in the amended complaint. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(a) (Supp. 2019) (prohibiting sexual penetration or sexual contact with a victim
under 13 years old if the defendant “is more than 36 months older” than the victim).
Before trial, the state filed a notice of its intent to introduce Spreigl evidence that
Gomez sexually abused his granddaughter, K.G. The notice said the state sought to
introduce Spreigl evidence to prove “motive and intent,” “common scheme or plan,” and
“absence of mistake.” Over Gomez’s opposition and after a hearing, the district court
granted the state’s motion to admit the Spreigl evidence.
The district court held Gomez’s jury trial during five days in November 2024. The
following summarizes the evidence received during trial.
1 “Spreigl evidence is evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, which would otherwise be inadmissible, but which the state can seek to have admitted for the limited purpose of showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or plan.” State v. Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2003); accord Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see also State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Minn. 1965).
2 O.G., who was 15 years old at the time of the trial, testified that Gomez’s assault
occurred in Moorhead at the house of C.G., Gomez’s daughter. C.G. was O.G.’s stepmother
at the time; C.G. separated from O.G.’s father before the trial. On the day that Gomez
assaulted O.G., she was in C.G.’s living room with Gomez. No other adults were in the
house, and O.G.’s four siblings were upstairs. Gomez was on a couch and invited O.G. to
“sit on his lap to play with his phone.” Gomez asked O.G. to remove her clothes. She
refused and “tried to walk away.” Gomez grabbed O.G. by the wrist, “pulled [her] back to
the couch,” and “covered [her] mouth” with his hand to prevent her from screaming.
Gomez removed O.G.’s clothing and put his fingers into O.G.’s vagina.
After the assault, Gomez told O.G. “not to tell anybody” or he would “hurt” O.G.
or her siblings. In response to questioning during trial, O.G. agreed that she “didn’t tell
anybody” about the abuse “for a long time.” The first person that O.G. told about the abuse
was her mother. O.G. testified that mother “kept on asking” O.G. if she had been abused
because mother “found out it happened to [O.G.’s] siblings before.” Mother acknowledged
that C.G. told her that Gomez may have abused one of C.G.’s daughters, K.G. Mother also
testified that, when she first asked O.G. whether Gomez had abused her, O.G.
“[c]ompletely shut down.”
A law enforcement investigator testified that mother told him O.G. “had disclosed
[Gomez] rubbing her thigh with his hand” and “that she was concerned something more
than that had happened.” The investigator arranged a follow-up interview with O.G. at her
school.
3 An audio recording of the interview at O.G.’s school with the investigator and a
social worker was played for the jury. During the interview, O.G. stated that Gomez
touched her on the thigh while they were both seated on a couch and that she “didn’t like
it.” When asked if Gomez touched her anywhere else, O.G. said, “Yeah, sort of yeah,” but
did not want to say more. O.G. did not disclose that Gomez had assaulted her by digital
penetration. O.G. testified that she did not disclose details of the abuse in the school
interview because she “wasn’t ready to talk about it.”
About two months later, O.G. participated in a forensic interview conducted by a
second social worker. O.G. agreed that she told the forensic interviewer “everything that
had happened” to her. The second social worker testified at Gomez’s trial, and a video
recording of the forensic interview was played for the jury.
O.G.’s recorded statement about Gomez’s sexual abuse was generally consistent
with her trial testimony. O.G. also described their positions during Gomez’s assault, stating
that she was sitting up while Gomez lay with his back on top of her, reaching his hand
behind him to cover her mouth. After the assault, Gomez left the house. C.G. returned a
few minutes later, but O.G. said nothing about the assault.
The state’s expert witness—a counselor to child victims of sexual abuse—testified
that it was “very unusual” for a child victim of sexual abuse to say anything about the abuse
immediately after it occurs. The expert testified that “[s]ecrecy and threats keep[] a person
from telling” about abuse. She also testified that “there’s no gain” to a child who lies about
sexual abuse and that she had not encountered a child who fabricated a story of sexual
abuse. The expert agreed that disclosure is “a process” and explained that a child-victim’s
4 memory of abuse “comes back in pieces” and that a victim will disclose an episode of abuse
in “little pieces.”
The Spreigl evidence admitted at trial included K.G.’s testimony; a video recording
of a forensic interview of K.G.; the forensic interviewer’s testimony; and the law
enforcement investigator’s testimony. 2 Before K.G. testified, the district court read the
pattern jury instruction limiting the use of Spreigl evidence. The district court repeated the
instruction before the parties’ closing arguments.
K.G. is C.G.’s daughter and O.G.’s stepsister. K.G. testified to many acts of sexual
abuse by Gomez, including two instances of digital penetration, one while on a couch in
the living room of C.G.’s house as well as one in her brother’s bedroom. K.G. agreed that
Gomez told her “not to tell anybody.” In K.G.’s forensic interview, K.G. also disclosed
multiple acts of sexual abuse by Gomez, including fellatio and vaginal penetration. K.G.
was four or five years old at the time of Gomez’s abuse and seven years old at the time of
trial.
During closing arguments, the prosecuting attorney stated that Gomez was not
charged with assaulting K.G. The prosecuting attorney highlighted similarities between
O.G.’s and K.G.’s testimony about Gomez’s sexual abuse but did not discuss the specific
acts of abuse described in K.G.’s testimony.
In closing, Gomez’s attorney challenged O.G.’s credibility, arguing that O.G.’s
“story changed” between her forensic interview and trial testimony. He emphasized
2 This was the same law enforcement investigator who testified about the investigation of the sexual abuse of O.G.
5 inconsistencies in O.G.’s description of where she and Gomez were seated when the assault
occurred and in O.G.’s description of the assault itself. Gomez’s attorney stated, “It just is
not possible that [Gomez] would have been able to contort his body” during the assault in
the manner O.G. described. Gomez’s attorney argued that “[O.G.’s] stories have issues”
and that “[K.G.’s] stories have far more or far more serious issues.”
The jury found Gomez guilty. The district court imposed a sentence of 160 months
in prison.
Gomez appeals.
DECISION
Gomez argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of
his abuse of K.G. Gomez contends that, because the evidence “was not markedly similar
to O.G.’s allegation, it was only relevant as inadmissible propensity evidence.” Gomez also
argues that unfair prejudice from the Spreigl evidence outweighed its probative value.
Gomez maintains that he is entitled to a new trial because the challenged evidence “had a
significant effect on the jury’s verdict.”
Appellate courts review the admission of Spreigl evidence for abuse of discretion.
State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). An appellant challenging the
admission of Spreigl evidence “bears the burden of showing an error occurred and any
resulting prejudice.” State v. Buchan, 993 N.W.2d 614, 626 (Minn. 2023) (quotation
omitted). If an appellate court determines that the district court erroneously admitted
Spreigl evidence, the appellate court must then determine “whether there is a reasonable
6 possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State
v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted).
“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). “It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. When
Spreigl evidence is offered for another purpose, Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2)
provides that it is admissible if certain requirements are met. The supreme court has
established a five-step test that incorporates rule 404(b)’s requirements:
(1) the State must provide notice of its intent to use the evidence; (2) the State must clearly indicate what the evidence is being offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the other act; (4) the Spreigl evidence must be relevant and material; and (5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by the potential prejudice.
Buchan, 993 N.W.2d at 626 (quotation omitted). On appeal, Gomez challenges only the
district court’s conclusion that the state met the requirements under the fourth and fifth
steps.
Step Four: The Spreigl evidence was relevant and material.
Under step four, “the Spreigl evidence must be relevant and material” to the state’s
case. Id. (quotation omitted). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401.
7 To demonstrate a common plan under rule 404(b), Spreigl evidence must “have a
marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d
676, 688 (Minn. 2006) (considering the appellant’s common plan or scheme to commit
criminal sexual conduct). “[T]he closer the relationship between the other acts and the
charged offense, in terms of time, place, or modus operandi, the greater the relevance and
probative value of the other-acts evidence and the lesser the likelihood that the evidence
will be used for an improper purpose.” 3 Id. We consider the relationship between the
Spreigl evidence and the crime charged against Gomez, starting with modus operandi.
Modus Operandi
As discussed, to be admissible under the common-plan exception, Spreigl evidence
must “have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” Ness,
707 N.W.2d at 688 (quotation omitted). In its pretrial memorandum, the district court
concluded that “the evidence of the sexual acts involving [K.G.] being offered to prove
common scheme or plan is relevant and material to the State’s case.” 4 The district court
3 Gomez argues that, to be admissible as common-plan evidence, Spreigl evidence must exhibit “a signature that allows the jury to infer that the same person committed two separate crimes by virtue of the unique manner in which the crimes were committed,” quoting Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 267 (Stras, J., concurring). We are not persuaded. First, a concurring opinion is not precedent. See State v. Thompson, 929 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn. App. 2019) (stating that language in a concurring opinion “is not the opinion of the court and, thus, not precedential”), aff’d, 937 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 2020). Second, Gomez relies on Griffin’s “discussion of the evolution of the law on other-bad-acts evidence” that refers to “identity evidence,” not common-plan evidence. 887 N.W.2d at 266-67 (Stras, J., concurring). Thus, the suggestion that other-crimes evidence must be committed in a “unique manner” is not helpful for our analysis. 4 The state’s Spreigl notice also identified motive, intent, and absence of mistake as other purposes. But the district court noted that “both parties neglect[ed] to address motive and
8 determined that the similarity between the sexual conduct described by K.G. and O.G. was
“substantial.” The district court reasoned that both girls “were left in the care of Gomez”;
that Gomez “exerted a power” over both girls “by being in the position of caretaker”; “each
victim was digitally penetrated” by Gomez; and Gomez directed both girls “to not disclose
these acts to anyone.”
Gomez concedes that “K.G.’s allegation that [Gomez] digitally penetrated K.G.
while they were on the couch in the living room was markedly similar to O.G.’s allegation
of digital penetration in the living room.” But Gomez challenges the admissibility of
evidence of the other sexual conduct involving K.G., arguing that “allegations of anal, oral,
and vaginal penetration in different locations failed to exhibit a unique mode of operation.”
Gomez emphasizes that “there was nothing distinct that connected [K.G.’s]
allegations . . . to the allegation of digital penetration in this case” and that “the district
court did not make any findings that these acts were markedly similar.”
Gomez relies on State v. Clark, in which the supreme court summarized the
similarities between the Spreigl evidence “as described to the jury” and the charged
offense: “(1) both acts involved the use of a gun to threaten the victims; (2) both acts
occurred in the victims’ bedrooms; and (3) both acts involved vaginal penetration or
attempted vaginal penetration.” 738 N.W.2d 316, 346 (Minn. 2007). The supreme court
determined that “the two incidents as described to the jury do not arguably share a ‘marked
similarity.’” Id. at 347. The supreme court stated that admission of the Spreigl evidence
intent or absence of mistake” in their arguments. Accordingly, the district court declined “to do a motive and intent or absence of mistake analysis.”
9 was a “close call” and concluded that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
it. Id.; see Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 685 (“If the admission of evidence of other crimes or
misconduct is a close call, it should be excluded.”).
We reject Gomez’s analogy to Clark because it does not address the circumstances
that both O.G. and K.G. were minors under Gomez’s care in a family context. Gomez’s
argument also seems to imply that a court should focus on the body parts involved in sexual
abuse. This is not persuasive because common-plan evidence involves more than one
characteristic. Here, the district court identified digital penetration as one shared
characteristic between the Spreigl evidence and the charged offense. But the district court
relied on a “set of factors,” as summarized above, that were present in Gomez’s multiple
instances of abuse of K.G. and were also markedly similar to factors present in the charged
offense. Thus, we reject Gomez’s argument that “the district court did not make any
findings that these acts were markedly similar.”
The supreme court’s analysis in State v. Wermerskirchen guides our analysis of
modus operandi for Spreigl evidence of child sexual abuse within a family. 497 N.W.2d
235 (Minn. 1993). The jury convicted Wermerskirchen of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct based on evidence that he had “touched” his nine-year-old daughter “in the vaginal
area.” Id. at 236-39. On appeal, Wermerskirchen challenged the admission of Spreigl
evidence involving the victim’s half-sister and two of Wermerskirchen’s nieces. Id. at 237-
39. The Spreigl evidence included Wermerskirchen touching “breasts and buttocks”;
sexual name-calling; sexualized massages; sexualized comments accompanied by “sexual
grunting sounds”; and walking in on one of the girls bathing and refusing to leave the
10 bathroom. Id. at 237-38. The supreme court concluded that the Spreigl evidence was
relevant to “to disprove” Wermerskirchen’s fabrication defense. Id. at 242. The supreme
court observed that the evidence was “highly relevant in that it showed an ongoing pattern
of opportunistic fondling of young girls within the family context.” Id.
The Spreigl evidence involving Gomez’s abuse of K.G. described acts that are more
similar to the charged offense than were the Spreigl incidents in Wermerskirchen. See id.
at 236-38; see also State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 391 (Minn. 1998) (determining that
attempted digital penetration and attempted penile penetration of a child were “nearly
identical advances”). Gomez’s role as caretaker of both K.G. and O.G., during which he
committed sexual abuse and prevented disclosure of the abuse by threats, is analogous to
the “opportunistic” nature of the abuse described in Wermerskirchen. 497 N.W.2d at 242.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was
a marked similarity in modus operandi between the multiple Spreigl incidents that K.G.
described and the charged offense.
Place and Time
The district court also concluded that K.G.’s allegations were “markedly similar in
time and place” because “at least some of the acts occurred at the same place, the home of
C.G.,” and the acts were separated by, at most, five years.
Gomez does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the Spreigl incidents
and the charged offense were close in time. Gomez contends that K.G.’s abuse occurred
“in other locations” than the abuse of O.G., distinguishing between Gomez’s house and
K.G.’s house and various rooms within each house. The state responds that the locations
11 of abuse were the same because the sexual acts occurred “in the home where [Gomez] was
babysitting the particular victim.”
The district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the location of the Spreigl
evidence. In Clark, the supreme court determined that Spreigl evidence of two acts, one in
Minneapolis and one in St. Paul, were “relatively close in terms of place.” 738 N.W.2d at
346. By analogy, different rooms within the same house would also be close in terms of
place.
As for K.G.’s testimony that Gomez abused her “in his house,” it is unclear from
the record where Gomez lived when he abused K.G. But appellate courts will uphold the
admission of Spreigl evidence “notwithstanding a lack of closeness in time or place if the
relevance of the evidence was otherwise clear.” Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 390 (quotation
omitted). Because of the similarity in modus operandi, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Spreigl evidence of Gomez’s abuse of K.G. in his house without an
express finding of closeness in place to the charged offense.
Because the Spreigl incidents involving K.G. were markedly similar to the charged
offense involving O.G., the district court acted within its discretion in determining that the
fourth step favored admission of the evidence.
Step Five: The probative value of the Spreigl evidence was not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
Step five requires a district court to consider whether the probative value of the
Spreigl evidence is outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Buchan, 993 N.W.2d at 626.
The district court must “balance the relevance of the other offenses, the risk of the evidence
12 being used as propensity evidence, and the State’s need to strengthen weak or inadequate
proof in the case.” State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009). Although Spreigl
evidence of other criminal conduct prejudices a defendant, the issue is whether the Spreigl
evidence unfairly prejudices a defendant and, if so, whether the potential for unfair
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Id. at 319-20. “[U]nfair prejudice
is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair
prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair
advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
In its pretrial order, the district court recognized that the Spreigl evidence created
the risk of “significant prejudice” to Gomez because of the emotional impact that child
sexual abuse may have on jurors and “the risk of the incident involving [K.G.] being used
as propensity evidence.” Even so, the district court determined that the probative value of
the Spreigl evidence outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice for two reasons. First, the
district court reasoned that the state’s case was “almost entirely dependent” on O.G.’s
testimony. Because there were “no other witnesses that could testify to the events and no
physical evidence” because of delayed disclosure, O.G.’s credibility would be “a central
issue before the fact finder” such that Spreigl evidence involving K.G. would have
“significant probative value.” Second, the district court determined that a limiting
instruction would reduce the likelihood that jurors would use the Spreigl evidence as
propensity evidence.
Gomez contends that admitting the Spreigl evidence to bolster O.G.’s credibility
was “merely a different way of saying that the evidence was admissible as propensity
13 evidence.” Gomez emphasizes that juror misuse of Spreigl evidence as propensity evidence
is the “overarching concern” and maintains that the “lack of similarity” between K.G.’s
and O.G.’s allegations increased the likelihood that the Spreigl evidence was used
improperly as propensity evidence.
We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded
that the “state’s need” for the Spreigl evidence was strong because of the lack of physical
evidence or other witnesses to O.G.’s abuse. See Fardan, 773 N.W.2d at 319 (including
“the State’s need to strengthen weak or inadequate proof” as a factor in determining
whether the probative value of Spreigl evidence outweighs its potential for unfair
prejudice). The state’s need for the Spreigl evidence increased during trial because Gomez
argued that O.G. fabricated her testimony. Gomez’s attorney suggested during opening
statements that O.G. was coached by her mother or C.G. to accuse Gomez, that someone
other than Gomez abused O.G., and that O.G. “made up the allegations against [Gomez] to
help and protect her little sister [K.G.]” During cross-examination, Gomez’s attorney
pressed O.G. on perceived inconsistencies between her statements to law enforcement and
the forensic interviewer and her trial testimony and, as summarized above, focused on those
inconsistencies during closing arguments.
The supreme court has repeatedly affirmed a district court’s discretion to admit
Spreigl evidence to bolster victim credibility in criminal-sexual-conduct cases. See
Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 391 (affirming the admission of Spreigl evidence to “refute
defendant’s contention that the victim’s testimony was a fabrication”); see also
Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 241-42 (summarizing cases where Spreigl evidence was
14 “highly relevant” to “whether the conduct on which the charge was based actually occurred
or was, as the defendants contended, a fabrication or a mistake in perception by the
victim”); cf. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 688 (stating that bolstering a victim’s credibility is a
“legitimate reason” to admit Spreigl evidence, but concluding that this probative value is
diminished when the state’s case is “particularly strong” on the issue of witness credibility).
Thus, the district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence involving K.G. was consistent with
the well-established purpose of bolstering victim credibility.
Gomez’s second argument—that the dissimilarity between O.G.’s and K.G.’s
testimony about Gomez’s abuse increased the risk that the Spreigl evidence would be used
for an improper purpose—relies on his argument that there was no marked similarity in the
sexual abuse of O.G. and K.G. Here, the marked similarity between the Spreigl evidence
and the charged offense in time, place, and modus operandi reduced the likelihood that the
jury would consider the Spreigl evidence for an improper purpose. See Ness, 707 N.W.2d
at 688 (stating that similar time, place, and modus operandi between other acts and the
charged offense increase relevance and probative value and decrease the likelihood of
improper use of the other-acts evidence).
Finally, the risk of unfair prejudice from the Spreigl evidence was reduced by the
district court’s limiting instruction. See, e.g., State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 839-40
(Minn. 2016) (recognizing that a district court’s limiting instruction can reduce the
probability that jurors will use Spreigl evidence for an improper purpose). Before K.G.
testified, the district court gave the pattern jury instruction on the limited purpose of Spreigl
evidence and repeated the instruction before closing arguments. See 10 Minnesota
15 Practice, CRIMJIG 2.03 (2023); see also State v. Broulik, 606 N.W.2d 64, 68-71 (Minn.
2000) (approving the pattern jury instruction on the limited purpose of Spreigl evidence). 5
As the district court did, we recognize the prejudicial nature of the Spreigl evidence against
Gomez. Still, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining
that the risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
In sum, because the Spreigl evidence of Gomez’s abuse of K.G. was relevant and
material, and because its probative value was not outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence and we
need not consider whether it significantly affected the verdict. 6
Affirmed.
5 The district court asked the parties if they had any issues with the limiting instruction both before K.G.’s testimony and before closing arguments. Gomez’s attorney replied, “No,” both times. On appeal, Gomez argues for the first time that the district court’s limiting instruction on the Spreigl evidence was ineffective because it “did not inform jurors that the other-crime evidence was offered solely to show a common scheme or plan.” Because Gomez did not argue plain error on appeal or challenge the language of the limiting instruction in district court, we need not consider this argument. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (stating that appellate courts “generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court”). 6 We acknowledge Gomez’s argument within the prejudicial-error issue about the scope of evidence received involving Gomez’s abuse of K.G. Gomez argues that the district court admitted excessive Spreigl evidence that “permeated the State’s entire case” and involved allegations of multiple acts of sexual abuse. As discussed above, we need not reach the prejudicial-error issue. But we are mindful that the supreme court has stated that “the district court should take great care in limiting . . . Spreigl testimony so as to minimize the potential for unfair prejudice.” State v. Washington, 693 N.W.2d 195, 204 (Minn. 2005). A defendant’s “failure to object to Spreigl testimony constitutes waiver of the right to appeal unless (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights.” Id. Here, Gomez’s attorney did not object to the scope of Spreigl evidence during trial. And as discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Spreigl evidence; therefore, no plain error occurred.