This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1854
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Demarcius Maurice Payton, Appellant.
Filed November 18, 2024 Affirmed Larson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-21-7047
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Maria DeWolf, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Demarcius Maurice Payton challenges his conviction for third-degree test
refusal on the basis that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from a traffic stop. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2020). On appeal, Payton argues the district court clearly erred when it found his vehicle crossed a
white-dashed centerline without signaling, giving a police officer reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop his vehicle because he violated a traffic law. Because the district court’s
findings are not clearly erroneous, we conclude the district court correctly denied the
motion to suppress and affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were elicited at a hearing on Payton’s motion to suppress. On
December 13, 2021, at 6:15 p.m., a St. Paul police officer responded to a report that a black
sport utility vehicle was blocking the entrance to a store. The report indicated that an
individual was seated in the driver’s seat and asleep or unconscious. When the officer
arrived, he noticed an unoccupied vehicle with a similar description in a parking space in
the store’s parking lot. The officer “cleared the call,” but remained at the scene to observe
the vehicle. The vehicle eventually left the parking lot, and the officer followed the vehicle
with his dash camera recording. The vehicle traveled south on Hamline Avenue, which
has two southbound lanes of traffic separated by a white-dashed centerline. While
following the vehicle, the officer observed the driver swerve 6-12 inches over the white-
dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet before recentering the vehicle in the
appropriate lane. Based on his observation, the officer conducted a traffic stop.
During the traffic stop, the officer identified Payton as the driver, noticed signs of
impairment, directed Payton to perform field sobriety tests, and arrested Payton for driving
under the influence of a controlled substance. The officer secured a search warrant for a
2 blood or urine test. After the officer read Payton the search warrant and informed Payton
that refusing to submit to testing was a crime, Payton refused to submit to testing.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Payton with three counts: (1) third-degree
driving while impaired (refusal to test), pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2);
(2) fourth-degree driving while impaired (operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
a controlled substance), pursuant to Minn. Stat. 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (2020); and (3) driving
after revocation, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2020). Payton moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing the officer lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion to perform the traffic stop and the expansion of the stop was
unreasonable. The district court denied the motion to suppress.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4, preserving Payton’s right to appeal the district court’s decision to deny the motion
to suppress. The district court adjudicated Payton guilty of third-degree driving while
impaired (refusal to test), dismissed the remaining counts, and imposed a probationary
sentence.
Payton appeals.
DECISION
Payton challenges the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from the traffic stop. Specifically, Payton contends the district court
clearly erred when it found the officer credibly testified that Payton crossed the white-
dashed centerline without signaling. See Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1) (2020).
3 When reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a pre-trial suppression motion,
we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal determinations
de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We “will not conclude
that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); State v. Thompson, 988 N.W.2d
149, 158 (Minn. App. 2023) (applying Kenney), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2023). When
applying the clear-error standard, we fully perform our duty when we have “fairly
considered all the evidence and . . . determined that the evidence reasonably supports the
decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee individuals the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. A police officer may, however, initiate a limited investigatory stop without a warrant
if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if, “in justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.” Id. at 21. These facts are judged by an objective standard. Id. Even a minor
traffic-law violation can establish a particularized, objective basis for an investigatory stop.
State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
Here, the officer testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he observed Payton
swerve 6-12 inches over the white-dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet
4 before recentering the vehicle in the appropriate lane. The officer indicated his belief that
this conduct violated Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1), which states, “When any roadway
has been divided into two [lanes] . . . a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” The officer testified that he
“clear[ly]” observed the violation and indicated exactly when the violation occurred in the
dash-camera video. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible, and we defer
to the district court’s credibility determinations. 1 See State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555-
56 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989). Based on this evidence, the
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1854
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Demarcius Maurice Payton, Appellant.
Filed November 18, 2024 Affirmed Larson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-21-7047
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Maria DeWolf, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Demarcius Maurice Payton challenges his conviction for third-degree test
refusal on the basis that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from a traffic stop. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2020). On appeal, Payton argues the district court clearly erred when it found his vehicle crossed a
white-dashed centerline without signaling, giving a police officer reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop his vehicle because he violated a traffic law. Because the district court’s
findings are not clearly erroneous, we conclude the district court correctly denied the
motion to suppress and affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were elicited at a hearing on Payton’s motion to suppress. On
December 13, 2021, at 6:15 p.m., a St. Paul police officer responded to a report that a black
sport utility vehicle was blocking the entrance to a store. The report indicated that an
individual was seated in the driver’s seat and asleep or unconscious. When the officer
arrived, he noticed an unoccupied vehicle with a similar description in a parking space in
the store’s parking lot. The officer “cleared the call,” but remained at the scene to observe
the vehicle. The vehicle eventually left the parking lot, and the officer followed the vehicle
with his dash camera recording. The vehicle traveled south on Hamline Avenue, which
has two southbound lanes of traffic separated by a white-dashed centerline. While
following the vehicle, the officer observed the driver swerve 6-12 inches over the white-
dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet before recentering the vehicle in the
appropriate lane. Based on his observation, the officer conducted a traffic stop.
During the traffic stop, the officer identified Payton as the driver, noticed signs of
impairment, directed Payton to perform field sobriety tests, and arrested Payton for driving
under the influence of a controlled substance. The officer secured a search warrant for a
2 blood or urine test. After the officer read Payton the search warrant and informed Payton
that refusing to submit to testing was a crime, Payton refused to submit to testing.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Payton with three counts: (1) third-degree
driving while impaired (refusal to test), pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2);
(2) fourth-degree driving while impaired (operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
a controlled substance), pursuant to Minn. Stat. 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (2020); and (3) driving
after revocation, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2020). Payton moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing the officer lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion to perform the traffic stop and the expansion of the stop was
unreasonable. The district court denied the motion to suppress.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4, preserving Payton’s right to appeal the district court’s decision to deny the motion
to suppress. The district court adjudicated Payton guilty of third-degree driving while
impaired (refusal to test), dismissed the remaining counts, and imposed a probationary
sentence.
Payton appeals.
DECISION
Payton challenges the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from the traffic stop. Specifically, Payton contends the district court
clearly erred when it found the officer credibly testified that Payton crossed the white-
dashed centerline without signaling. See Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1) (2020).
3 When reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a pre-trial suppression motion,
we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal determinations
de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We “will not conclude
that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); State v. Thompson, 988 N.W.2d
149, 158 (Minn. App. 2023) (applying Kenney), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2023). When
applying the clear-error standard, we fully perform our duty when we have “fairly
considered all the evidence and . . . determined that the evidence reasonably supports the
decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee individuals the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. A police officer may, however, initiate a limited investigatory stop without a warrant
if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if, “in justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.” Id. at 21. These facts are judged by an objective standard. Id. Even a minor
traffic-law violation can establish a particularized, objective basis for an investigatory stop.
State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
Here, the officer testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he observed Payton
swerve 6-12 inches over the white-dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet
4 before recentering the vehicle in the appropriate lane. The officer indicated his belief that
this conduct violated Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1), which states, “When any roadway
has been divided into two [lanes] . . . a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” The officer testified that he
“clear[ly]” observed the violation and indicated exactly when the violation occurred in the
dash-camera video. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible, and we defer
to the district court’s credibility determinations. 1 See State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555-
56 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989). Based on this evidence, the
district court found that Payton’s vehicle “swerve[d] and cross[ed] the dashed white line
separating the two lanes without signaling.” We conclude that the evidence amply supports
the district court’s finding that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without
signaling.
Payton disagrees, arguing the district court clearly erred when it found he crossed
the white-dashed centerline. Payton relies on his assertion that the dash-camera video does
not support the officer’s testimony. But contrary to Payton’s argument, though dark and
poor quality, the dash-camera video does not contradict the officer’s testimony. While the
1 Payton challenges the district court’s credibility determination because he presented evidence that the officer had previously been demoted and had two prior reprimands for improper procedures. But Payton presented this evidence to the district court and, despite that evidence, the district court found the officer credible. “Because the weight and believability of witness testimony is an issue for the district court, we defer to [the district] court’s credibility determinations.” State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003).
5 white-dashed centerline does not appear in the dash-camera video, the dash-camera video
plainly captures Payton’s vehicle veering slightly to the right at the time the officer testified
that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline. Although not dispositive, the dash-camera
video bolsters the officer’s testimony that a traffic violation occurred.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not clearly err when it found
Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without signaling and, thereby, violated Minn.
Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1). As such, the district court correctly determined the officer had
the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting the traffic stop and,
therefore, the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. See
George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to deny
Payton’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.