This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0234
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
DeAngelo Cortez Ransom, Appellant.
Filed January 5, 2026 Affirmed Florey, Judge *
Clay County District Court File No. 14-CR-23-2888
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Caitlin Rose Hurlock, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this sentencing appeal following a guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance
sale, appellant DeAngelo Cortez Ransom argues that the district court improperly based its
sentencing decision on allegations involving dismissed charges or uncharged acts. Because
Ransom fails to demonstrate error in the district court’s sentencing decision, we affirm.
FACTS
In summer 2023, law enforcement received a tip from a confidential informant that
Ransom was selling pills likely containing fentanyl. Following a controlled purchase, law
enforcement obtained and executed a search warrant of Ransom’s residence. Law
enforcement recovered at least 200 pills containing fentanyl and, according to the
allegations in the complaint, two firearms.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ransom with one count of first-degree
controlled-substance sale in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(5) (Supp. 2023),
and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.165,
subd. 1b(a) (2022).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ransom pleaded guilty to the drug offense. In
exchange, the state (1) dismissed the two firearm counts, (2) agreed to dismiss a separate
file, (3) agreed not to charge Ransom for the controlled purchase that led to the search
warrant, and (4) agreed that Ransom would be free to move for a downward sentencing
departure and that it would cap its sentencing request at a middle-of-the-box sentence under
2 the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Ransom additionally agreed to pay restitution in the
dismissed file. The district court accepted Ransom’s plea.
Prior to sentencing, Ransom moved for a downward dispositional departure or, in
the alternative, a downward durational departure. The state opposed the departure requests.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties made arguments regarding sentencing. The district
court denied Ransom’s motion, dismissed the firearm counts and the other file, and
imposed an executed sentence of 64 months in prison, a duration at the lower end of the
presumptive sentencing range of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 4.C (2023).
In denying Ransom’s motion, the district court made several statements referencing
dismissed charges or uncharged conduct. Notably, the district court stated, “[y]ou had two
guns, which nobody’s ever mentioned,” “[w]e’re also not talking about . . . this other file,”
and “we’re also not talking about the fact that you’re not being charged for the actual
undercover buy that was done on you that led to the search warrant.” The district court
added, “[s]o, I’m taking all that into consideration.” It concluded by stating that, “[b]ut
given what I said about these other cases, . . . the guns that are being dismissed, the other
buy that’s not being charged out, I cannot, in good faith, grant the departure motion and
give you a small amount of jail time, okay?”
Ransom appeals.
3 DECISION
Ransom argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his departure
motion and imposing an executed sentence by basing its sentencing decision on dismissed
charges or uncharged conduct.
Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a downward departure motion
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Beganovic, 974 N.W.2d 278, 286 (Minn. App. 2022),
aff’d, 991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023). A district court abuses its discretion by misapplying
the law. State v. Hoskins, 943 N.W.2d 203, 211 (Minn. App. 2020). Appellate courts
“generally will not interfere with a sentencing court’s decision to impose a term within the
presumptive sentence range.” State v. Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 2015); see
also State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (explaining that “it would be a rare
case which would warrant reversal of [a] refusal to depart”).
In arguing that the district court erred by considering uncharged conduct or
dismissed charges in its sentencing decision, Ransom relies on State v. Womack, 319
N.W.2d 17, 18 (Minn. 1982). In Womack, the defendant was charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm and assault with a dangerous weapon. 319 N.W.2d at 18. The
defendant pleaded guilty to the possession charge in exchange for dismissal of the assault
charge. Id. In imposing an upward durational departure, the district court referenced the
dismissed assault charge, stating that “he fired the firearm which he had in his possession
and he fired it in a manner in which I don’t believe he was demonstrating self-defense.”
Id. at 18-19. The supreme court held that it was error for the district court “to rely on the
overall course of conduct as justification for aggravating [the] defendant’s sentence for the
4 possession charge” and accordingly determined that the aggravated sentence was improper.
Id. at 19.
Ransom relies on several other cases in arguing that the district court erred by
considering dismissed charges or uncharged conduct in imposing the presumptive
sentence: State v. Lubitz, 472 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. 1991) (explaining that the
defendant, by pleading guilty in exchange for dismissal of a sexual conduct charge,
“removed the fact issue of whether he penetrated complainant when she was unconscious,
something defendant consistently denied,” and “[s]entencing him as if the penetration was
as alleged by complainant deprived him of the benefit of his plea bargain”);
State v. Larkins, 479 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Minn. 1991) (“A sentencing court may not use
elements of a dropped charge as aggravating factors unless the defendant admitted to that
conduct.”); State v. Arnold, 514 N.W.2d 801, 801-02 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that it was
error to consider conduct underlying a dismissed charge in imposing an upward durational
departure); and State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Minn. 2022) (“[T]he grounds for
departure must reflect whether the offense is any more or less serious than the typical
offense of conviction, mindful that any uncharged or dismissed offenses are not to be
considered . . . .”).
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0234
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
DeAngelo Cortez Ransom, Appellant.
Filed January 5, 2026 Affirmed Florey, Judge *
Clay County District Court File No. 14-CR-23-2888
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Caitlin Rose Hurlock, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this sentencing appeal following a guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance
sale, appellant DeAngelo Cortez Ransom argues that the district court improperly based its
sentencing decision on allegations involving dismissed charges or uncharged acts. Because
Ransom fails to demonstrate error in the district court’s sentencing decision, we affirm.
FACTS
In summer 2023, law enforcement received a tip from a confidential informant that
Ransom was selling pills likely containing fentanyl. Following a controlled purchase, law
enforcement obtained and executed a search warrant of Ransom’s residence. Law
enforcement recovered at least 200 pills containing fentanyl and, according to the
allegations in the complaint, two firearms.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ransom with one count of first-degree
controlled-substance sale in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(5) (Supp. 2023),
and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.165,
subd. 1b(a) (2022).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ransom pleaded guilty to the drug offense. In
exchange, the state (1) dismissed the two firearm counts, (2) agreed to dismiss a separate
file, (3) agreed not to charge Ransom for the controlled purchase that led to the search
warrant, and (4) agreed that Ransom would be free to move for a downward sentencing
departure and that it would cap its sentencing request at a middle-of-the-box sentence under
2 the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Ransom additionally agreed to pay restitution in the
dismissed file. The district court accepted Ransom’s plea.
Prior to sentencing, Ransom moved for a downward dispositional departure or, in
the alternative, a downward durational departure. The state opposed the departure requests.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties made arguments regarding sentencing. The district
court denied Ransom’s motion, dismissed the firearm counts and the other file, and
imposed an executed sentence of 64 months in prison, a duration at the lower end of the
presumptive sentencing range of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 4.C (2023).
In denying Ransom’s motion, the district court made several statements referencing
dismissed charges or uncharged conduct. Notably, the district court stated, “[y]ou had two
guns, which nobody’s ever mentioned,” “[w]e’re also not talking about . . . this other file,”
and “we’re also not talking about the fact that you’re not being charged for the actual
undercover buy that was done on you that led to the search warrant.” The district court
added, “[s]o, I’m taking all that into consideration.” It concluded by stating that, “[b]ut
given what I said about these other cases, . . . the guns that are being dismissed, the other
buy that’s not being charged out, I cannot, in good faith, grant the departure motion and
give you a small amount of jail time, okay?”
Ransom appeals.
3 DECISION
Ransom argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his departure
motion and imposing an executed sentence by basing its sentencing decision on dismissed
charges or uncharged conduct.
Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a downward departure motion
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Beganovic, 974 N.W.2d 278, 286 (Minn. App. 2022),
aff’d, 991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023). A district court abuses its discretion by misapplying
the law. State v. Hoskins, 943 N.W.2d 203, 211 (Minn. App. 2020). Appellate courts
“generally will not interfere with a sentencing court’s decision to impose a term within the
presumptive sentence range.” State v. Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 2015); see
also State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (explaining that “it would be a rare
case which would warrant reversal of [a] refusal to depart”).
In arguing that the district court erred by considering uncharged conduct or
dismissed charges in its sentencing decision, Ransom relies on State v. Womack, 319
N.W.2d 17, 18 (Minn. 1982). In Womack, the defendant was charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm and assault with a dangerous weapon. 319 N.W.2d at 18. The
defendant pleaded guilty to the possession charge in exchange for dismissal of the assault
charge. Id. In imposing an upward durational departure, the district court referenced the
dismissed assault charge, stating that “he fired the firearm which he had in his possession
and he fired it in a manner in which I don’t believe he was demonstrating self-defense.”
Id. at 18-19. The supreme court held that it was error for the district court “to rely on the
overall course of conduct as justification for aggravating [the] defendant’s sentence for the
4 possession charge” and accordingly determined that the aggravated sentence was improper.
Id. at 19.
Ransom relies on several other cases in arguing that the district court erred by
considering dismissed charges or uncharged conduct in imposing the presumptive
sentence: State v. Lubitz, 472 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. 1991) (explaining that the
defendant, by pleading guilty in exchange for dismissal of a sexual conduct charge,
“removed the fact issue of whether he penetrated complainant when she was unconscious,
something defendant consistently denied,” and “[s]entencing him as if the penetration was
as alleged by complainant deprived him of the benefit of his plea bargain”);
State v. Larkins, 479 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Minn. 1991) (“A sentencing court may not use
elements of a dropped charge as aggravating factors unless the defendant admitted to that
conduct.”); State v. Arnold, 514 N.W.2d 801, 801-02 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that it was
error to consider conduct underlying a dismissed charge in imposing an upward durational
departure); and State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Minn. 2022) (“[T]he grounds for
departure must reflect whether the offense is any more or less serious than the typical
offense of conviction, mindful that any uncharged or dismissed offenses are not to be
considered . . . .”).
These cases are distinguishable because they involve impositions of upward
departures or a sentence based on the severity level of a dismissed charge rather than, as is
the situation here, sentences within the presumptive guidelines range. See Lubitz, 472
N.W.2d at 132; Larkins, 479 N.W.2d at 75; Arnold, 514 N.W.2d at 801; Misquadace, 644
N.W.2d at 67. And we have previously declined to extend Womack and its progeny to
5 impositions of guidelines sentences. In State v. Middleton, we explained that Womack did
not apply “because the district court did not impose an upward durational departure.” No.
A21-1291, 2022 WL 3349044, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Oct.
26, 2022). We added that, therefore, “the applicable caselaw is the well-developed caselaw
. . . that an appellate court generally will not interfere with a sentencing court’s decision to
impose a term within the presumptive sentence range.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
adopted the same reasoning in State v. Heard, No. A23-0898, 2024 WL 4199022, at *3
(Minn. App. Sept. 26, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2024).
Although nonprecedential, we are persuaded by the reasoning in Middleton and
Heard. 1 Like in Middleton and Heard, the district court imposed a guidelines sentence in
sentencing Ransom to 64 months in prison. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.C (2023). We
additionally note that State v. Brusven, upon which Ransom additionally relies, also
involved the denial of a downward departure motion. 327 N.W.2d 591, 592 (Minn. 1982).
Although it was error to rely on conduct underlying dismissed charges in imposing an
upward durational departure, the supreme court merely ordered that the district court
impose the maximum guidelines sentence without remanding with instructions to
reconsider Brusven’s departure motion. Id. at 592-94.
Ransom, as the party seeking reversal, bears the burden of establishing error in the
district court’s sentencing decision. State v. Bellazan, 18 N.W.3d 385, 402 (Minn. App.
2025), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 2025). Because Ransom failed to establish error in the
1 These decisions are cited for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
6 district court’s consideration of uncharged conduct in imposing a guidelines sentence, we
affirm.
Affirmed.